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SUMMARY 
This project seeks to determine the technologies that are used for monitoring and 
tracking the internet activities of persons by both public and private sector actors. 
It asks if the use of such technologies interferes with internet users‘ right to 
privacy. It also asks, in the event that privacy is indeed interfered with, what 
should be the legal response to the use of such technologies in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Singapore? On the basis of their functionality and mode of 
interference with privacy, the thesis generally divides surveillance technologies 
into interception and tracking technologies. This categorization is in line with the 
two broad methods by which the technologies interfere with privacy: interference 
with information while in transit, and the recording of usage data or online habits 
respectively. Furthermore, as regards the standards for determining the content of 
the right to privacy and measuring the responses in the relevant jurisdictions, the 
thesis endorses the provisions of international human rights treaties on privacy as 
the relevant standards of protection. It thus relies on Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as interpreted by the Human 
Rights Committee, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. It also leans on 
the EC Data Protection Directive in evaluating responses to private sector 
tracking technologies.  
 
In accomplishing its objectives, the thesis identifies and examines the major 
technologies used for surveillance on the internet in the public and private sectors. 
  x 
 
It finds that these technologies do indeed interfere with internet users‘ right to 
privacy as that term is understood in the jurisprudence of the ICCPR and the 
ECHR. On the basis of this jurisprudence also, the thesis also outlines what the 
responses to these technologies should be. Specifically, it finds that the laws of 
the US generally meet the standards of the treaties on the interception of content 
but not on the interception of addressing information. The laws of the UK are 
slightly less satisfactory in both respects and Singapore needs to enact 
comprehensive legislation to regulate communications surveillance. On tracking 
technologies, the thesis finds that the UK‘s implementation of the EC Data 
Protection Directive, for the most part, satisfies treaty expectations on the right to 
privacy in this area but the US and Singapore need to enact comprehensive 
legislation. 
 
On the basis of these findings, the thesis is also able to generally recommend that 
countries similarly situated as Singapore, which does not have adequate laws and 
needs to enact some for public and private sector surveillance should, for relevant 
standards, look to the ECHR on regulating interceptions and the EC Data 
Protection Directive on regulating the tracking and profiling of persons in the 
private sector. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The Internet is a global network of networks connecting millions of computers. It 
is made up of hardware and software components. The hardware component 
consists of high-speed cables and routers while the software component consists 
of several standard communication interfaces known as protocols. Of the many 
protocols, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol deserve a 
mention. These two protocols are so jointly used that programmers now refer to 
them as the ‗TCP/IP suit‘. The TCP/IP is a two-layered programme. The higher 
layer, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), is responsible for assembling 
transmission data, e.g. a message or a file, into smaller pieces known as packets. 
The packets are then transmitted through the network and are received at the other 
end also by the TCP. The Internet Protocol (IP), the lower layer of the two, 
handles the addressing of each packet, ensuring that it gets to its destination.   
Each computer connected to the internet is equipped with the TCP/IP suit. Several 
other protocols are usually packaged together in the TCP/IP suit. Some of these 
are known as the application layer protocols and it is with these that the average 
internet user interacts. Application layer protocols include the World Wide Web‘s 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), used for publishing and receiving 
information on the World Wide Web; the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), 
used for the relaying of mails over the internet; and the Voice over Internet 
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Protocol (VoIP), used for the relaying of voice data over the internet. The TCP/IP 
uses the client/server mode of communication whereby a computer user- the 
client, requests for a service from say a website- the server, which in turn provides 
the requested service.  
 
With these different parts working together efficiently, the internet has been 
acknowledged to be a borderless world of near-seamless dissemination and 
reception of information, ideas, cultures, goods, services and much more.  It has 
also, by facilitating communication so efficiently, changed many aspects of 
human conduct. Unfortunately the internet is not without some major worries. 
One of these worries is that of the privacy of users. The client/server mode of 
communication of the major application layer protocols means that some of what 
goes on the internet share some similarities with the traditional post-
telecommunication in the sending and receiving of data. For example, in the 
World Wide Web, when the internet user clicks on a hyperlink or enters a 
particular URL in his browser for any information, the user‘s computer actually 
makes an HTTP request for that piece of information from a server to which the 
URL refers. If the webpage or other information requested is found, the web 
server actually sends it to the user‘s computer with a note that it was found and if 
the information is not available, a different note is sent back indicating that the 
information was not found. In many non-technical ways this two-way 
communication resembles the sending and receiving of letters, telephone calls, 
telexes and faxes. This equally means that, just like in the traditional post-
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telecommunication, the data or information sent through the internet could be 
intercepted on transit. 
 
Unlike most traditional post-telecommunication however, the request for 
information and the sending of same is finally done at the computer level which 
means that the user‘s computer holds much personal information and it may be 
queried for same without the user‘s knowledge. Some of the information could 
also be the type that the user may not ordinarily agree to send. This also implies 
that the user may be unaware of the availability of such information or its 
transmission to outsiders. Furthermore, with the increase in computing ability 
comes an increase in the way in which information could be obtained and used on 
the internet. The increase in the digitisation of hitherto analogue media also 
means that more materials, including those considered private, can now be 
accessed through the internet.  Since the well-publicised cases and investigations 
from 2000 involving some major US companies on the privacy implications of the 
use of cookies and similar technologies, the capture and dissemination of personal 
data of users and other monitoring practices of web-based companies has been 
receiving some attention.  
 
Cookies have perhaps received more than their fair share of the said attention. 
They are small text files which web servers can install in an internet user‘s 
computer. The main function of the cookie is to uniquely identify the particular 
web browser so that it remains recognisable to the cookie-setting website and 
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sometimes to other websites to which the original website is related. Through the 
use of cookies, websites are said to be able to keep track of what the user does on 
a particular website or across a number of sites. In some cases, personal 
information provided by a user in interacting with a website can be linked to other 
information collected through the use of cookies such that he is personally 
identified as he surfs the web. Some people have therefore objected to the use of 
cookies not only because their browsers are identified but also because they could 
be personally identified through the use of the technology and this is said to 
violate their right to privacy. Other technologies include Search Engines, which 
are able to keep a record of search terms that have been used by a particular 
internet user, and packet sniffers which can intercept internet communications, 
including emails, while they are on transit.   
 
1.2 Objective 
This project seeks to determine the technologies that are used for monitoring and 
tracking the internet activities of persons by both public and private sector actors. 
It asks if the use of such technologies interferes with internet users‘ right to 
privacy. It also asks, in the event that privacy is indeed interfered with, what 
should be the legal response to the use of such technologies in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Singapore? The preliminary assumption of the project is 
that some of the technologies, in at least some circumstances, will interfere with 
users‘ right to privacy to an extent that calls for protection. It is also the position 
of the project that privacy protection in this regard requires reference to 
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international human rights provisions on privacy as the relevant standard of 
protection. The following provisions are therefore in focus: Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As representative of a generally 
accepted standard of privacy protection in the area of informational privacy, and 
an example of the implementation of the ECHR, the EC Data Protection Directive 
will also be in focus. These provisions will be used as a normative basis for 
evaluating responses to the internet surveillance technologies and practices in the 
designated jurisdiction. In a nutshell, the questions the project will attempt to 
answer in order to do justice to the foregoing objective may be outlined as 
follows: 
 
1  What are the existing internet surveillance technologies and how do 
different organisations deploy them? 
 
2 To what ends do the organisations deploy these technologies? 
 
3 Do existing internet surveillance technologies infringe internet users‘ right 
to privacy?  
 
4 What are the privacy standards, under the ECHR, ICCPR, and Data 
Protection instruments, for determining acceptable use of internet surveillance 
technologies? 
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5 What are the current legal responses to these technologies in the US, UK, 
and Singapore?  
 
6 How well do these responses measure against the privacy standards of the 
ECHR, ICCPR, and Data Protection instruments? 
 
 
1.3 Scope and Justification of the Study 
To answer the above questions, the thesis will first enquire into the concepts of 
rights and privacy in order to clarify the concepts as they apply to the project and 
to streamline the discourse. Thereafter, it will enquire into the right to privacy as 
distilled from the treaties in focus and data protection rights as distilled from 
existing instruments, especially the EC Data Protection Directive. These enquiries 
will constitute the theoretical and normative basis for the evaluation to follow in 
the subsequent parts. To complete the foundation for subsequent evaluation, the 
thesis will also examine existing internet surveillance technologies, differentiating 
between the technologies favoured by the private and public sectors. The 
architecture, functionality, and objective of the different technologies will be 
examined to determine how and to what extent they interfere with privacy as well 
as the technical considerations to be reflected in laws. The final part of the thesis 
will evaluate the laws of the US, UK and Singapore in the light of the 
technologies and on the basis of the standards identified in the treaties and data 
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protection instruments. It will also highlight the reasons the thesis considers it 
necessary that internet users in these jurisdictions be protected against the privacy 
impacts of the technologies and why law should be the primary mode of 
regulation as against other cyber regulatory modalities.     
 
The considerations that influenced the choice of the foregoing scope for the 
project include some conceptual, empirical, and analytical lacunae the author 
perceived in existing commentaries. Additionally, the potential harm internet 
users are likely to encounter as a result of the use of surveillance technologies is 
part of the impetus for the study. As regards conceptual gaps, the author‘s survey 
of many standard textbooks on Cyberlaw, Information Technology Law, and 
Internet Law revealed some absence of depth in the analysis of the right to 
privacy. This lack of depth may perhaps be explained in part by the fact that some 
of the authors did not seem overly familiar with international human rights law, 
which is one area where the right to privacy is most distinctly provided for. No 
doubt there are several good works on the right to privacy but the application of 
the concept to information technology lacked depth in many texts. For example, 
many of the authors treat data protection as synonymous with the right to privacy. 
Doubtlessly, data protection is a very important aspect of privacy protection. It 
however is a distinct subset. Data protection will be invaluable in addressing 
internet surveillance and privacy but would not suffice in addressing all the 
issues. This is because, for one thing, surveillance technologies do not have to 
process personally identifying information to interfere with user privacy. For 
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another, data protection laws have wide exceptions that would operate to remove 
some serious governmental surveillance from their purview. Furthermore, even an 
understanding of ‗rights‘ is not adequately represented in available commentaries. 
For example, there are commentaries that advocate industry self-regulation for the 
protection of privacy, what is not clear is whether such a regulatory modality 
could be said to actually confer rights as in the right to privacy. 
 
On a preliminary survey of literature dealing with the subject of the project, the 
author also noted a light treatment of the technologies. While law discourses are 
not expected to be overly technical, the author perceived a gap when available 
commentaries discussed the underlying technologies in such general terms that it 
is often difficult to distinguish between assumptions and empirical facts. The 
situation is not helped by the overgeneralization perceived in the treatment of the 
issue in the media. It seemed important to study the technologies in order to 
contribute to informed discussion of the legal implication of their use seeing that 
opinions on the subject is polarised. On one side, privacy activists advocate for 
greater protection but seem to pay insufficient attention to the legitimate interests 
of the commercial entities and state agencies that deploy the technologies. With 
the sensational terms employed in the debate, it is also usually difficult to 
determine the extent of the interference with privacy. On the other hand, most 
commercial entities seem to pay only lip service to privacy protection. Regarding 
the use of the technologies for law enforcement, it seemed fitting to enquire into 
the impact of the technologies on the scope of investigatory powers. 
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In sum, available commentaries indicate that there is indeed a problem of privacy 
caused by internet surveillance technologies however, there doesn‘t seem to be 
many comprehensive works tackling the issue, especially from an international 
perspective. In addition to the foregoing, other gaps the thesis hopes to fill include 
the identification of privacy standards in international human rights law for 
evaluating the protection of privacy in the public and private sectors. This would 
be different from analyses that refer to domestic standards such as the 
constitution.  The advantage of this perspective is its normative prescription; it 
takes the debate beyond an outlook that would limit privacy protection to 
availability of domestic provisions. Furthermore, the thesis hopes to contribute 
towards the updating of existing scholarship in other respects. For example, there 
are existing materials on traditional state surveillance but there is a need to 
establish what privacy safeguards, such as warrants specifications, a state should 
apply when extending surveillance to the internet. The hypothesis here is that 
safeguards that were used for the traditional wiretap may not always suffice for 
internet surveillance because of the nature of the internet. 
 
Beyond the foregoing gaps in scholarship, another reason the author considered 
the study important relates to the role privacy apparently plays in society. Some of 
the works surveyed by the author indicate that privacy plays important roles in the 
society and some of these roles will be examined in the thesis. However suffice it 
to say that as human interactions migrate to the internet, it seems necessary to 
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work towards the preservation of any important role privacy plays in the online 
environment. Additionally, the author also believes that the study will contribute 
to the general understanding of how to shield users from the potential harms that 
the misuse of online personal information could engender.  
 
1.4 Methodology and Arrangement of the Work 
The thesis, excluding the introduction and conclusion, is divided into three parts. 
Part I is made up of three chapters and discusses rights, privacy, and the right to 
privacy respectively. This part is mostly doctrinal and forms the conceptual and 
normative foundation of the thesis. Part II, made up of two chapters, discusses 
surveillance technologies. It differentiates between interception technologies and 
tracking technologies. Under the former, technologies that are more likely to be 
used for public sector surveillance are discussed while the latter discusses 
technologies that are more likely to be deployed by private sector commercial 
entities. In part II, empirical methodology is used in analysing some of the 
technologies. The method consists of the deployment of some of the technologies 
and using a protocol analyser to observe the information communicated. 
Reference to the works of experts in the field is also used to determine the 
functionality of other technologies. Part III is made up of three chapters. It 
evaluates the legal responses to interception and tracking technologies in the US, 
UK and Singapore on the basis of the standards identified in Part I and the 
capabilities of the technologies examined in Part II. Part III is overwhelmingly 
normative but it also employs doctrinal and comparative methods of scholarship. 
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In all, most of the thesis involved library research but a good part of Part II 
involved empirical research.    
 
1.5 Principal Terms 
The principal terms that will feature in the thesis include rights, privacy, the right 
to privacy, data protection, and surveillance. Since all of these, except 
‗surveillance‘ will be discussed in detail in the first part of the thesis, only 
surveillance will be defined here. 
 
1.5.1 Surveillance 
The Cambridge Dictionaries Online defines the word surveillance as ―the careful 
watching of a person or place, especially by the police or army, because of a 
crime that has happened or is expected.‖1 The Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary on its part specifies the etymology of the term as follows: ―Etymology: 
French, from surveiller to watch over, from sur- + veiller to watch…‖ It then 
defines surveillance as ―close watch kept over someone or something (as by a 
detective)‖2 These definitions are more or less consistent with the general 
understanding of the word. ‗Surveillance‘ thus still evokes a vista of police 
officers or private investigators watching someone‘s movements in a car parked 
across the street through binoculars or listening to his bugged conversations with 
                                                          
1
 Cambridge Dictionaries Online 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=80288&dict=CALD 
2
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary http://www.webster.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?sourceid=Mozilla-search&va=surveillance 
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headphones. Although the term still retains this connotation of law enforcement 
investigations and state security, regarding the Internet however, the connotation 
of law enforcement will not always hold true. The term is now increasingly 
applied to surveillance conducted by non-state actors such as companies and other 
online undertakings. 
 
‗Surveillance‘ in the context of this study, as indicated above, is divided into 
interceptions and tracking. The application of the term to technologies that 
facilitate the former would generally evoke less controversy because surveillance 
is an acceptable description of traditional interceptions and there are apparent 
conceptual and practical parallels between traditional and internet forms of 
interceptions. In both instances, information on the existence and contents of 
communications are made available to parties other than the intended recipients. 
Furthermore, as will be seen below, laws that regulated traditional interception 
surveillance have now also been applied to internet interceptions at both domestic 
and international levels.
3
 Accordingly ‗surveillance‘ is applied to the use of 
internet interception technologies in this study with little anticipation of any 
confusion. 
Regarding the application of ‗surveillance‘ to the use of tracking technologies- 
technologies that gather internet usage data of individuals – however, this would, 
at first brush, seem to be a stretch. Notwithstanding, reference to the use of 
                                                          
3
 In the UK, for example, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 regulates telephonic 
and internet interceptions alike. At the ECHR level, the ECtHR held in Copland v. UK ((2007) 45 
E.H.R.R. 37, para 44) that the regulation of the interception of telephonic communications in its 
jurisprudence equally applies to internet communications 
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tracking/information collection technologies such as cookies and web bugs as 
surveillance has crept into legal commentary. A number of authors now use the 
term to refer to both state surveillance and the use of tracking technologies by 
non-state online undertakings.
4
 This is often done without much justification or 
explanation. A few authors have however considered the propriety of using the 
term to refer to cyber data collection. Jerry Kang for example supplies a possible 
justification.
5
 He noted that ―[i]nformation collection presupposes observation of 
the individual‖ and that extensive, undesired observation may be called 
surveillance.
6
  Kang then sought to distinguish between surveillance and casual 
observation, such as takes place in public spaces, in plain view and with unaided 
senses i.e. without the use of technology, and surveillance. In this regard, he 
opined that ―information collection in cyberspace is more like surveillance than 
like casual observation... data collection in cyberspace produces data that are 
detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and permanent.‖7 The 
justification that may be read into Kang‘s exposition is that, first, cyberspace data 
collection is akin to surveillance because both entail the observation of 
individuals. Second, cyberspace data collection is more like surveillance than 
casual observation because of the extensiveness of the observation. 
 
                                                          
4
 See E.g. W. Barnes ‗Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to 
Online Surveillance‘ 39 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 1545; R. Hahn & A. Layne-Farrar ‗The Benefits and 
Costs of Online Privacy Legislation‘ 54 Admin. L. Rev. 85; C. Bennett ‗Cookies, web bugs, 
webcams and cue cats: Patterns of surveillance on the world wide web‘ (2001)3 Ethics and 
Information Technology 197 
5
 J. Kang, ‗Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions‘50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193. 
6
 Ibid, at 1260. 
7
 Ibid, at 1260—1261. 
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Gary T. Marx had a different take on the application of the term ‗surveillance‘ to 
online tracking and other new technologies for collecting personal information. 
He proposes the obviation of the term ‗observation‘ in the definition of ‗new 
surveillance‘.8 He notes that the failure of dictionary definitions to capture current 
understandings of surveillance is an indicator of rapid change. He then used the 
example of the Concise Oxford Dictionary which defines surveillance as ―close 
observation, especially of a suspected person‖ to make his point. He criticised the 
definition on three grounds. 1) ―new surveillance technologies are not "especially" 
applied to "a suspected person".‖; surveillance is nowadays applied to contexts 
(e.g. places, spaces, time periods, networks, systems, and categories of persons). 
2) the dictionary definition implies a distinction between the person carrying out 
the surveillance and the object whereas nowadays self surveillance is not 
uncommon. 3) The term ‗close observation‘ fails to capture contemporary 
practices whereby surveillance need not be close in terms of proximity or detail 
since remote and superficial surveillance are also not altogether uncommon today. 
He further criticised the visual means of information gathering connoted by 
‗observation‘.9 A better definition of the new surveillance in Marx‘s view is 
―...the use of technical means to extract or create personal data.‖ 10 By new 
surveillance, Marx refers to new means of surveillance assisted by technology, 
                                                          
8
 G. Marx, ‗What‘s New about the ―New Surveillance‖? Classifying for Continuity‘, Surveillance 
and Society 1(1): 9-29. Available online at http://www.surveillance-and-
society.org/ojs/index.php/journal/article/view/50/50 , accessed on 19 February 2010. 
9
 Ibid, 10—11. 
10
 Ibid, 12. 
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including email and telephone monitoring, self test for alcohol level, computer 




The foregoing stipulations no doubt raise some questions. For example, how does 
Marx expect the adoption of separate definitions for new surveillance and 
traditional surveillance to work in practice? However, since the exploring of these 
questions is unlikely to advance our purposes here, it suffices to note that while 
some academics have applied the term ‗surveillance‘ to the use of online 
technologies for the collection of personal information as a matter of course, 
others have given thoughtful consideration to such an application. Perhaps a less 
controversial way of making the connection between surveillance and the use of 
tracking technologies is by employing the term data surveillance or 
‗dataveillance‘. According to Roger Clarke, he coined the term ‗dataveillance‘ in 
1986, as a contraction of 'data surveillance'.
12
 He defines the term as ―...the 
systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the 
actions or communications of one or more persons.‖13 He also cites data matching 
- a process in which personal data records relating to many people are compared 
in order to identify cases of interest - as one of the techniques of dataveillance. 
The term has since gone somewhat mainstream, having been employed by many 
                                                          
11 Ibid, 12—13. See also p. 9 where Marx explored the ―New Surveillance‖; new technologies for 
collecting personal information. He included ―computer monitoring including email and web 
usage and the use of computer techniques such as expert systems, matching and profiling, data 
mining, mapping, network analysis and 
Simulation.‖ 
12
 R. Clarke, ‗Roger Clarke‘s Dataveillance and Information Privacy Home Page‘, 
http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/, accessed on 20 February 2010. 
13
 R. Clarke, ‗Information Technology and Dataveillance‘, 
http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CACM88.html , accessed on 20 February 2010. 
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academics including in the context of online tracking.
14
 It has also been included 
in at least one English dictionary, Webster‘s New Millennium Dictionary of 
English, which defines it as ―surveillance of a person's activities through 
electronic data; the use of personal data systems to monitor individuals.‖15   
 
In sum, at some abstract level, traditional and new surveillance or data 
surveillance entail the collection of information about natural persons, usually in a 
surreptitious manner. The use of tracking technologies is therefore also treated as 
surveillance in this study. This is however done with full acknowledgement of the 
differences in the dimensions of traditional surveillance and internet tracking.  
Since the technologies to be examined are varied and sometimes go beyond 
observation, the author would like to describe surveillance technologies, in the 
context of the project, to mean technologies that do any of the following 
surreptitiously: monitor, watch, track, profile, and intercept the communication of 
internet users. The term will also cover some practices that may not be 
surreptitious on their own but which impact privacy when combined with any of 
the surreptitious technologies. 
                                                          
14
 See E.g., K. Strandburg, ‗Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 Boston College Law Review 741, at 761; I. Rubinstein, 
R. Lee, & P. Schwartz, ‗Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and 
Technological Approaches‘ 75 U.Chi L. Rev. 261; D. Steinbock, ‗Data Matching, Data Mining, 
and Due Process‘ 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1. 
15
 Dictionary.Com, ‗Dataveillance‘, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dataveillance , 
accessed 20 February 2010.  
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PART I: RIGHTS, PRIVACY, AND THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY 
 
CHAPTER 2: RIGHTS AND LEGAL THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
The topic of this study presupposes that rights do exist. This presupposition 
perhaps reflects contemporary views on rights since the language of rights is 
pervasively employed in most jurisdictions in the world today. Human rights in 
one form or the other seem to have become a present reality around the world. 
However, not all legal theorists are agreed on even the very existence of rights. A 
more tempered version of rights scepticism, other than the outright denial of the 
existence of rights, is found in the theories that posit that there can only be legal 
rights. By this view, rights, properly so-called, can only be the creation of laws 
and are enforced by sanctions. Outside this scope, any talk of rights in the 
relations among persons can only be metaphorical at best and meaningless at 
worst. At the other end of the debate are those who hold the view that rights are of 
natural or moral origin and that legal rights are merely codifications of pre-
existing natural rights.
1
 While this debate between legal-basis of rights and 
moral/natural basis of rights may sound moot today considering the pervasive 
employment of the language of rights in contemporary discourse, the content of 
                                                          
1
 See generally M. Tebbit ‗Philosophy of Law an Introduction’ (Routledge, London, 2000) pp 96-
97 
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the debate seems to have some bearing on this study. This is because the most 
prominent consequence of accepting the moral basis of rights is an 
acknowledgement of the limiting effect that rights should have on law.  
 
Indeed, to what extent is the state obliged to accept rights as an effective 
constraint on the implementation of public policy? Another facet of this question 
relates to what weight should be assigned to infringement of rights particularly 
those rights that are now considered fundamental. Additionally, how favourably 
or unfavourably should we regard states that have not codified such rights? This 
part of the thesis is not meant to provide answers to these philosophical questions 
nor can it acceptably do so. The aim of this chapter is to throw some light on what 
legal theorists have had to say on the issue and perhaps draw some general 
conclusions that might be of some assistance to the study. In addition, the chapter 
will also discuss a separate but related issue of the nature and substance of rights 
as in what concerns/interests they protect. This would also contribute to our 
understanding of rights.  
2.2 The Nature of Rights 
Today, there are two competing theories on the nature of rights, the ―will‖ or 
―choice‖ theory and the ―interest‖ or ―benefit‖ theory.  The will theory is 
primarily associated with H.L.A. Hart. By this theory, a party has a right when he 
is ―…given by the law exclusive control , more or less extensive, over another 
person‘s duty so that in the area of conduct covered by that duty the individual 
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who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed.‖2 The 
theory identifies the right-bearer by the power, which the right confers upon him 





The interest theory first appeared in Bentham‘s writing; it was adopted by Jhering 
and is today espoused by Neil MacCormick, Joseph Raz and T. Campbell among 
others.
4
 This theory argues that the purpose of rights is to protect certain interests 
and not individual assertions.
5
 It equates the existence of rights with being the 
intended beneficiary of another person‘s duty.6 ―One version of the benefit theory 
says that X has a right whenever he stands to benefit from the performance of a 
duty... Another says that X can have a right (whether in moral theory or within a 
legal system) whenever the protection or advancement of an interest of his is 
recognised…as a reason for imposing obligations, whether they are actually 
imposed or not.‖7  
 
These two theories have their strengths and weaknesses. According to Brian Bix, 
―The relative strength of the will theory is that it seems to point to something 
distinctive about rights in a way that the interest theory does not.‖8 It is perhaps to 
such strength that Alon Harel also alludes when he states, ―The choice theory 
                                                          
2
 H.L.A. Hart, ‗Legal Rights‘, in Essays on Bentham (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), p. 183. 
3
 See, Hart, Ibid, pp. 183 – 184.  
4
See  M. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 6th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1994) p. 389 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 B. Bix, Jurisprudence Theory and Context 4
th
 ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006), p. 129. 
7
 M. Freeman, Supra note15, p. 389 
8
 B. Bix, Supra, note17, p. 130 
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explains why rights are often regarded as fundamental to one‘s personhood, 
individuality and self-determination.‖9 The major weakness of the will theory is 
its inability to account for inalienable rights. ―Ironically, the most fundamental 
protection granted by law, namely the protection of one‘s inalienable right to life 
and liberty, would not be classified as rights while the protection of lesser 
interests – interests which can be alienated – such as property would be 
recognised as such.‖10 Further, entities that are incapable of exercising choice, 
such as comatose patients and children, cannot be assigned with rights under the 
theory. Without doubt, such entities are commonly regarded as right holders in 
reality. In addition, according to Harel, the will theory reverses the commonsense 
priority between the Hohfeldan rights. For example, under the theory, one‘s right 
not to be assaulted consists of three liberties: the liberty to waive or not to waive 
the duty of others not to assault; the liberty to sue or not to sue for compensation; 
and the liberty to waive or not to waive the right to the payment of the 
compensation. Traditionally, the claim right not to be assaulted should be the 
central component of the right not to be assaulted. This ‗claim‘ is to be protected 
by peripheral liberties, powers, and immunities. Conversely, under the will 
theory, the liberties and powers are the key components of the right.
11
 The theory 
would also seem to allow all rights to be waived whereas most people hold the 
view that their duties not to kill or torture may not be waived by the potential 
                                                          
9
 A. Harel, ‗Theories of Rights‘ in M. Golding & W. Edmundson (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, (2005, Blackwell, Singapore), p. 194 
10
 A. Harel, Ibid, citing N. MacCormick, ‗Rights in Legislation‘ in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz 
(eds.), Law Morality  and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1977 ) 
11
A. Harel, Ibid, p. 195.  




 Finally, the will theory seems less applicable to rights  in moral theory 
(discussed below) and is consequently inadequate for a comprehensive theory of 
rights. 
 
The strength of the interest theory lies in the fact that it covers all types of rights 
as well as right-bearers. It can accommodate inalienable rights; it can also ascribe 
rights to non-agents, such as children and comatose patients, as long as these have 
interests that can be protected. Notwithstanding, the interest theory has its own 
difficulties.  The theory does not explain why rights should be tied to benefits in 
the first place. In other words, can a person‘s interest be advanced by a rule 
without that rule conferring rights on him? There are many rules that advance 
interests without conferring rights. ―A parent‘s interests may be advanced by the 
rule limiting the contracts that a minor child of his may make, but no rights are 
conferred on him by the rule.‖13 There are indeed other cases of third party 
beneficiaries; persons whose interests are promoted by the exercise of a duty but 
who cannot be classified as right-holders. For example, if A owes B a sum of 
money and B has promised C that she would get him a present when A pays the 
debt. Although C is a beneficiary of the duty to B and his interests would 
definitely be advanced by that duty, he may not however be considered a right-
holder concerning A‘s debt.  Additionally, ―right holders do not necessarily 
benefit from the fulfillment of duties owed to them; it is only typically…that 
                                                          
12
 M.  Freeman, Supra note 4, p. 388 
13
 M. Freeman, Ibid, p. 389. 
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right-holders benefit from these obligations‖14 An example of the foregoing 
would be when a person misuses his property. In that case, the person does not 




None of these two theories has proven satisfactory in its entirety. Regarding the 
right to privacy with which we are concerned here for example, the will theory 
would make a stronger case for its protection but cannot account for the 
application of the right to children and other incompetent persons. Neither can the 
will theory account for the ability of persons to waive their right to privacy. What 
advantage the interest theory may have over the will theory in that  it is wide 
enough to accommodate the claim of privacy by  even children and incompetent 
persons and the ability of such persons to waive the right, it lacks in its inability to 
account for the weight that people attach to the right. This weight is evident in 
instances where privacy is claimed as a right although no benefit is derived 
thereby or where privacy is protected with no attempt to connect the protection to 
any obvious interests of the right-holder. In many law enforcement scenarios, for 
example, access to personal information is constrained because of the right to 
privacy even where swift access to such information would advance the interest of 
the right holder and confer significant benefit on her.   
 
It would seem therefore that a comprehensive analysis of the nature of rights 
would have to countenance both theories and marry them where possible. Gopal 
                                                          
14
 A. Harel, Supra, note 9,  p. 195 
15
 Ibid 
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Sreenivasan in his ‗Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights‘, has propounded such a 
marriage. The Complex Hybrid model of the theory is as follows: 
 ―Suppose X is duty-bound to <<phi>>. Y has a claim-right against X that X 
<<phi>> just in case: Y's measure (and, if Y has a surrogate Z, Z's measure) of 
control over a duty of X's to <<phi>> matches (by design) the measure of control 
that advances Y's interests on balance.‖16 By this theory,  
 
―…an entity X is a right-holder if and only if the question of 
who has some measure of control over a corresponding duty 
(i.e., who can waive the duty, enforce it, or not or who can 
waive or extinguish the duty to pay compensation in case of 
breach) is determined by the balance of interests. If Y has 
control over a duty, Y is the right-holder if and only if Y was 
given control in order to promote Y‘s balance of interests while 
X is the right-holder if and only if Y‘s control over the duty is 
aimed at promoting X‘s balance of interest. ‖17 
 
Without doubt, this hybrid theory has its own difficulties but it does show that the 
advantages of the will and interest theories can be merged while avoiding their 
shortcomings. It overcomes the problem of inalienable rights facing the will 
theory because it would allow rights to be alienated if the balance of the right-
holders interests requires that the right be alienable. Similarly, it overcomes the 
                                                          
16
 G. Sreenivasan ‗A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights‘, 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 257 at 271 
17
 A. Harel, Supra, note 9, p. 196. 
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problem of non-agents or incompetent persons since control vested in third parties 
can amount to rights as long as the interest protected thereby are those of the 
right-holder. Unlike the interest theory, the hybrid theory also solves the problem 
of third party beneficiaries who are too widely invested with rights according to 
the interest theory. This is because these beneficiaries cannot be regarded as right 
holders since they do not control the duty nor is the duty controlled on their 
behalf. In sum, rights accrue to persons either who have a measure of control over 
related duties or whose interests are advanced by the performance of related 
duties, where the measure of control promotes the interest. Now let us consider 
theories of rights proper. 
 
 
2.3 Rights-Based Moral Theory versus Rights-Scepticism 
One of the most striking of contemporary debates in legal philosophy has been 
between those who advocate a rights-based moral theory and those who advocate 
goal-based theories.
18
 Those who espouse right-based theories basically insist on 
the importance, and sometimes, the pre-eminence of rights. But then what exactly 
are rights and where do they come from. One popular interpretation of rights is 
that they are strong moral claims; a distinctive moral force or power to insist on 
receiving that to which one is entitled.
19
 This, of course is a right-based 
interpretation. Another interpretation is that rights are more than standard moral 
                                                          
18
See  M. Freeman, Supra note 4, p. 380 
19
 M. Tebbit, Supra note 1, p. 99 
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claims. They are granted with a guarantee of protection and enforcement. Force 
here is actual force rather than moral force. This force is the backing of the 





2.3.1 Rights Scepticism 
By this latter view, rights are purely creations of law and owe their existence 
exclusively to the laws that created them. One of the legal theorists that advocated 
this view is Jeremy Bentham. According to Bentham, any talk of moral or natural 
rights is confusing and dangerous political rhetoric.
21
 He regarded all rights, 
including legal rights and duties as ‗fictitious entities‘ or ‗imaginary conjurings‘. 
However, legal rights, in his view, are ‗legal fiction‘ that can be interpreted by his 
method of paraphrases as follows:  
 
―A sentence containing the word ‗right‘ can be rewritten and 
translated as a legal duty. Thus, ‗X has a property right‘ can be 
translated into a sentence of equivalent meaning: ‗Y has a duty 
to refrain from appropriating or trespassing on X‘s property‘. 
But a ‗duty‘ is also a fictitious legal entity. This in turn can be 
translated into the language of coercion: ‗If Y appropriates or 
trespasses on X‘s land, then Y will be liable to a certain 
punishment‘. Every legal term can be traced back in this 




 Ibid, p. 100 
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manner to the pleasure-pain calculus of utilitarian social 
welfare.‖22  
 
To Bentham, the threat of punishment is an empirical reality. He thus draws a 
distinction between ‗translatable‘ fictitious entities: legal rights, which have 
meaning, and non-legal rights, which have no meaning because they are not 
translatable. As they can‘t be rendered in the language of coercion, they are 
therefore literally unintelligible or plain nonsense. In his very words, ―Natural 
rights is simple nonsense; natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, 
nonsense upon stilts.‖23 As adumbrated above, other legal theorists lean towards 
the complete elimination of the concept of rights.
24
 Notwithstanding, the heart of 
all versions of rights-scepticism is the denial that rights are inherent in all human 
beings. By this view, rights are not entitlements per se, and they are not pre-
existing such that declarations of human rights are merely endorsements of rights 
which already exist. Any defence of the concept of moral or natural rights must 
therefore address this very denial.      
 
2.3.2 Response to Rights-Scepticism 
An insufficient, yet forceful reply to the view that seeks to completely eliminate 
all rights whether moral or legal relates to the mere pervasiveness of the notion of 
                                                          
22
 Ibid,  p. 101 
23
 J. Bentham, ‗Anarchical Fallacies‘, in P. Smith, The Nature and Process of Law, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1993), p. 96  
24
 See E.g., K. Olivercrona, Law as Fact (Stevens & Sons, London 1971 [1939]) (Taken from M. 
Tebbit Supra 1, p. 102 ) 
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rights.  The language of rights has infiltrated every strata of contemporary human 
society. Almost every country of the world has some form of recognition of 
human as well as other rights in its laws. All major law schools in the world now 
teach human rights in one form or the other. Rights have also become an 
established reality in most international discourses. However, according to Tebbit, 
―The argument against eliminative rights-scepticism that there are rights, both 
within the law and beyond it, would be implausible if it rested solely on the fact 
that it is widely believed that there are ways in which people should or should not 
be treated, solely by virtue of certain qualities they possess, such as reason or 
consciousness.‖25 Regardless of the implausibility or logical incompleteness of 
arguments advocating for rights that are based on its pervasiveness, one who 
claims that there are no rights must nonetheless confront and overcome this status 
that rights have acquired today.  
 
Furthermore, the insistence that there can only be legal rights – pure creations of 
the law – could be said to be incoherent. If it is conceded that legal rights exist, 
then there must also be pre-legal rights since rights cannot suddenly spring into 
existence only by mere legal exercise. Statutory recognition of rights only 
provides legal backing for something that already exists. A popular reply to this is 
that a right is only an interest among others. ―If rights are suddenly created as 
legal entitlement, and this is on the grounds that there are interests which need to 
be given legal protection, then the legal rights are merely licenses which can be 
                                                          
25
 M. Tebbit, Supra note 1, p. 105 
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revoked at the first sign of difficulty.‖26 In other words, legal rights are not rights 
at all. To posit that rights can be denied or overridden in this manner is, according 
to Waldron, self-defeating. This is because the denial or the overriding themselves 
involves an implicit recognition of the force of human rights.
27
 According to 
Freeman, the most sophisticated of the arguments that the denial or overriding of 
rights is self-defeating is the one presented by Gewirth, summarised as follows: 
 
―First, every agent holds that the purposes for which he acts are 
good on whatever criterion (not necessarily a moral one) enters 
into his purposes. Second, every actual or prospective agent 
logically must therefore hold or accept that freedom and well-
being are necessary goods for him because they are the 
necessary conditions of his acting for any of his purposes; 
hence, he holds that he must have them. Third, he logically 
must therefore hold or accept that he has rights to freedom and 
well-being; for, if he were to deny this, he would have to 
accept that other persons may remove or interfere with his 
freedom and well-being, so that he may not have them; but this 
would contradict his belief that he must have them. Fourth, the 
sufficient reason on the basis of which each agent must claim 
these rights is that he is a prospective purposive agent, so that 
he logically must accept the conclusion that all prospective 
                                                          
26
 Ibid, p. 104 
27
 M. Freeman, Supra note 15, quoting J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Right (1984) p. 19 
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purposive agents, equally and as such, have rights to freedom 
and well-being.‖28   
 
The logic of the above is indeed very forceful and cannot be lightly discarded. A 
government that would deny human rights would naturally seek to justify its 
actions either on the grounds of higher policy ideal or on the basis of its standing 
as the governing agent in the land. These higher policy ideals, such as equality 
and justice, would usually be of the same moral or natural extraction as rights. 
Besides, the mere insistence, by such a government, on its freedom to act is in 
itself a claim of the right to act on behalf of its people. As one cannot approbate 
and reprobate one thing at the same time, such a government must logically 
accept that rights do exist. In practice, this scenario plays out in almost all cases 
of gross human rights violations by governments around the world. Such states 
regularly assert the concept of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference in another state‘s domestic affairs to ward off accusations and or 
investigations of human rights abuses.
29
 The assertion of state sovereignty is an 
assertion of a right that did not originate from law. It will therefore never be 
compatible with the denial of the existence of rights. There are therefore some 
strong arguments in support of the existence of rights outside and prior to legal 
codification. If this is the case, it follows that rights qua rights are capable of 
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 M. Freeman Ibid, p. 386 – 387, quoting Gewirth, Human Rights (1982), p. 20 
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 See H. Steiner, ‗International Protection of Human Rights‘ in M. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 572. 
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restricting the law. This line of reasoning has given rise to a related debate on 
rights and utility as will be explored below. 
 
2.4 Rights versus Utility 
Insistence on utility is the foremost of goal-based theories. Goal-based theories 
promote the interest of the community whereas right-based theories promote 
individual interest. Utilitarianism insists that a legal system should withhold the 
status of legal rights to interests that would obstruct the general welfare of the 
community; it focuses on utility maximisation and would today employ cost-
benefit analysis. ―In Bentham‘s rational legal system, any codified right which 
turned out to obstruct the general good would be revoked.‖30 This stringent form 
of utilitarianism is however not the only view on utility. Hare, for example, insists 
that ―[a] mature theory of social utility can indeed accommodate the protection of 
certain key rights.‖31 J.S. Mill also attempted to modify utilitarian doctrine by 
arguing that it was compatible with justice and moral rights. Unlike Bentham, 
Mill was more aware of the dangers of unchecked majority rule. He sought to 
absorb anti-utilitarian theories of rights and justice by representing them as 
distorted versions of the doctrine of utility. He interpreted theories of individual 
rights as being ultimately rooted in instrumental conceptions of social good. 
Additionally, he argued that  
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―…the cultivation of respect for individual rights and liberty, as 
exemplified by the right to freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, the right to pursue one‘s own lifestyle and so on, has a 
strengthening rather than a weakening effect on the health of 
the society, and the repression of individual difference and 
creativity has a devitalising effect which will ultimately lead to 
its destruction.‖32 
 
In On Liberty, Mill made it clear that his theory of rights does not accommodate 
abstract rights independent of utility. He stated,  
 
―…I forgo any advantage which could be derived to my 
argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent 
of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions; but it must be utility in the larger sense, grounded on 
the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.‖33 
 
A. Harel outlined a similar form of rapprochement between rights and utility, 
which he termed, ‗consequentialism of rights‘. This theory ―depicts the 
minimisation of the infringement of rights as a collective goal, which competes 
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with other goals such as the maximisation of utility.‖34 Under this view, rights 
would always be justifiably infringed when their infringement prevents more 
infringements of the same right.
35
      
 
Whatever may be said in favour of these theories that seek to demonstrate how 
utilitarianism can accommodate rights, the problem remains that although there 
may be utilitarian reasons for respecting legal rights, ―these reasons are not the 
same as the moral force of rights.‖36 ―Rights only become important when they 
are likely to be denied, that is precisely when they are inconvenient and 
unwelcome to the majority…Defending them in these circumstances is one of the 
things Dworkin means by taking rights seriously.‖37 Rights should also transcend 
the three regions of liberty that Mill believed society should not interfere with 
because society has only indirect interest if any therein i.e. domain of 
consciousness, liberty of tastes and lifestyle, and liberty of each individual to 




In right-based theories, moral rights pre-exist laws and should operate as obstacles 
to utility. One utilitarian response to this assertion is that the acceptance of pre-
legal moral rights can only mean that moral rights are absolute. Hence, one facet 
of the utility vs. rights debate is the question of how much weight we should 
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attached to rights. Put differently, when can rights be overridden? Responses to 
these questions range from those that posit that rights are supposed to be absolute 
to those that hold that rights are only very important interests. Most contemporary 
right-based theories are however not committed to absolutism. Dworkin‘s rights 
thesis offers a perspective that seeks to meet this challenge. According to 
Dworkin, ―Rights are best understood as trumps over some background 
justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a 
whole.‖39 He argued against unrestricted utilitarianism as follows:  
 
―My argument therefore comes to this. If utilitarianism is to 
figure as part of an attractive working political theory, then it 
must be qualified so as to restrict the preferences that count by 
excluding political preferences of both the formal and informal 
sort. One very practical way to achieve this restriction is 
provided by the idea of rights as trumps over unrestricted 
utilitarianism.‖40  
 
He then advocated for the right to political independence and the right to moral 
independence. The way he envisaged rights to act as trumps is not so much in the 
form of weighted votes or data of greater value but as arguments that appeal to 
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justice and by so doing, remove certain policies from the ambit of preferences, 




In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworking noted that the word ‗right‘ has different 
force in different contexts. He then differentiated between saying that someone 
has a ‗right in a strong sense‘ and saying that it is the ‗right‘ thing for him to do 
something or that he does no ‗wrong‘ in doing it. By saying that someone has a 
‗right in a strong sense‘ ―we imply that it would be wrong to interfere with his 
doing it, or at least that some special grounds are needed for justifying any 
interference.‖ 42 In Dworkin‘s view, if fundamental rights – i.e. certain moral 
rights that have been made into legal rights by the constitution – are worth 
bragging about, then they must be rights in a strong sense and should be rights 
against the government. ―The claim that citizens have a right to free speech must 
imply that it would be wrong for the Government to stop them from speaking, 
even when the Government believes that what they will say will cause more harm 
than good. The claim cannot mean…only that citizens do no wrong in speaking 
their minds, though the Government reserves the right to prevent them from doing 
so.‖43 While the claim that a government act is calculated to increase general 
utility or over-all benefit may be sufficient justification, even in some cases of 
limitation of liberty, for rights in the strong sense, such as the right to free speech, 
this sort of justification is not enough. Dworkin paints a picture of rights without 
absolutism when he stated: 
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―I must not overstate the point. Someone who claims that 
citizens have a right against the Government need not go so far 
as to say that the state is never justified in overriding that right. 
He might say, for example, that although citizens have a right 
to free speech, the Government may override that right when 
necessary to protect the rights of others, or to prevent a 
catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major public benefit 
(though if he acknowledged this last as a possible justification 
he would be treating the right in question as not among the 
most important or fundamental). What he cannot do is say that 
the Government is justified in overriding a right on the minimal 
grounds that would be sufficient if no right existed. He cannot 
say that the Government is entitled to act on no more than a 
judgement that its act is likely to produce, overall, a benefit to 
the community. That admission would make his claim of a 
right pointless, and would show him to be using some sense of 
‗right‘ other than the strong sense necessary to give his claim 
the political importance it is normally taken to have.‖ 44   
 
Dworkin therefore invokes an image of hierarchy of rights, with fundamental 
rights falling within ‗rights in the strong sense‘ and other rights outside it. It is to 
be borne in mind that in the foregoing analysis, Dworkin takes the acceptance of 
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rights for granted. He states that although Bentham thought that the idea of moral 





2.5 Rights in Contemporary View 
In practice today, neither unrestricted utility nor absolute rights have thrived. The 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789),
46
 which prompted Bentham to 
declare that the notion of natural and imprescriptible rights is nonsense upon 
stilts, has had parts of it accepted as the default global position on rights through 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR has in 
turn inspired other international instruments including the two treaties that are in 
focus in this study, the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. In Article 1, the 
UDHR proclaims that ―All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.‖47 This indeed is an endorsement of pre-legal 
natural rights since humans are born with and not conferred with the said rights.  
 
Notwithstanding, even the UDHR recognises that the rights it proclaims are not 
absolute but may be limited in certain circumstances. It states, ―In the exercise of 
his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
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determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.‖48 Rights 
may therefore be limited by law in order to inter alia secure the just requirements 
of general welfare in a democratic society. This is a form of recognition of utility 
but the role of rights here is different from that envisaged by classical 
utilitarianism. This is because here rights do not owe their existence to law, which 
may abrogate them whenever they cease to serve the general welfare. Rather, 
rights are the rule while general welfare is the exception or limitation. That the 
UDHR is the global statement on the existence and role of rights in general in 
today‘s world can hardly be in doubt. It was adopted in the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and was the product of authors representing many countries 
with very different social, economic and philosophical backgrounds. It is 
noteworthy that the declaration was adopted without any direct opposition. There 
were 48 votes for it
49
 and 8 abstentions.
50
 Most former colonial countries that did 
not directly participate in the adoption of the UDHR have since endorsed these 
rights by including them in their constitutions in varying forms and some have 
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expressly cited the UDHR as the inspiration for the rights.
51
 Instructively, Article 
12 of the UDHR, on the right to privacy, with which we are most concerned in 
this study, was adopted unanimously.
52
 Having established that the existence of 
rights is generally accepted today, the next chapter narrows the discourse down to 
the right to privacy by inquiring into the meaning of privacy.
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This part of the thesis seeks to identify what privacy means to a person that would 
resist the interception of his communication or the tracking of his online activities 
through the collection and aggregation of his usage data. One of the underlying 
reasons for making this determination is to get a sense of whereabouts to place the 
balance between privacy interests of individuals and competing interests such as 
state security and advertising interests of commercial entities. The determination 
will also provide some support for the legal regulation position adopted by the 
thesis and at the same time inform the nature of the regulatory measures to be 
recommended. Since the meaning of privacy would seem to be essential to this 
determination, the chapter will seek to first identify the ordinary meaning of 
privacy. It will do this by outlining the commonest forms of definition of privacy, 
highlight the differences and conflicts, and attempt a general non-contextualised 
definition. Thereafter, the chapter will conduct a contextual analysis of the value 
of privacy to the individual as well as the society. Article 17 ICCPR
1
 prohibits 
any interference with privacy and Article 8 ECHR
2
 prohibits interference with 
private and family life. These treaty provisions are perhaps the most 
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comprehensive on the right to privacy. However, neither these nor any other 
international instruments have endeavoured to define privacy or private life. This 
lack of legal definition is equally evident in the domestic sphere. As a result, the 
onus seems to have fallen on academics to formulate a proper definition of the 
term. The result has been a kaleidoscope of definitions and formulations. The 
differing and sometimes conflicting definitions have prompted some 
commentators to opine that privacy is too amorphous a term to be amenable to 
comprehensive enquiry. According to Robert C. Post, ―Privacy is a value so 
complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged 
with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be 
usefully addressed at all.‖3 Serge Gutwirth in his part feels that ―The concept of 
privacy is something elusive.‖4 This temptation to despair notwithstanding, there 
is no dearth of attempts to define the term not least because of the fundamental 
role the concept is perceived to play in modern societies. Although legal 
commentators generally eschew definitions, the seeming indeterminate meaning 
of privacy makes attempts at definitions nearly inevitable such that most serious 
commentaries on privacy proffer or adopt some form of definition. True to 
Gutwirth‘s stipulation, a review of the available definitions reveal that while most 
are useful, majority are suited only for a discussion of some aspects of the right to 
privacy but not others.  
 
                                                          
3
 R. Post, ‗Three Concepts of Privacy‘, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001) 
4
 S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age (2002, Rowan & Littlefield, New York) p. 11 
  41 
 
Furthermore, it would seem that most of the confusion seen in the attempts to 
determine the meaning of privacy stems from the fact that oftentimes the 
definitions are precising rather than lexical even though they are presented as 
lexical. Lexical definitions are used to report the meaning that a word already has 
in a language.
5
 A precising definition on the other hand serves the purpose of 
reducing the vagueness of a word. A term is vague if there are borderline cases in 
which it is impossible to tell if the word applies or not. When words are taken 
from their ordinary usage and used in a systematic context such as in law, they 
usually need to be clarified by means of a precising definition.
6
 By precising the 
meaning of privacy to fit a particular discourse without indicating that this is what 
is being done, commentators end up cutting into the concept from an advanced 
rather than primary level. The result is the conflicts we see in attempted 
definitions of privacy. As will be seen below; related issues and concepts are thus 
sometimes discussed as unrelated.  
 
 
Commentators have also severally noted a cultural relativism in privacy 
perception in different societies.
7
 Some have also noted social metamorphosis of 
perceptions; shifts in perceptions and claims in a single society over time usually 
                                                          
5
 See, P. Hurley A Concise Introduction to Logic 9
th





 See E.g., J. Michael, Privacy and Human Rights (1994, UNESCO Publishing and Dartmouth, 
Paris), p. 2, ―It is a commonplace that privacy is culture-specific: the matters which a particular 
society regards as ‗private‘ can vary widely; S. Gutwirth, Supra, note 4, p. 20, ―The meaning of 
the term ‗private‘ changed from age to age, differed from one social group to another.‖ 
  42 
 
engendered by economic developments and technological innovation.
8
 It is 
noteworthy however, that although cultures differ in how they seek or claim 
privacy and perhaps in the degree to which they value it, many authors have come 
to agree that all cultures appear to value privacy.
9
 The relativism of perception 
and value of privacy compounds the discourse such that any attempt to identify 
the meaning of privacy must accommodate this reality. We now turn to the 
meaning that some authors have assigned to the term.  
 
3.2 The Recurrent Headings of Privacy Definition 
Nearly every author that discusses privacy attempts or adopts a definition. 
Although these definitions are innumerable, Daniel J. Solove has however quite 
rightly argued that the concept could be dealt with under six headings that capture 
the recurrent ideas in the discourse as follows:   
 
―(1) the right to be let alone--Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis's famous formulation for the right to privacy; (2) 
limited access to the self--the ability to shield oneself from 
unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy--the concealment of 
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certain matters from others; (4) control over personal 
information--the ability to exercise control over information 
about oneself; (5) personhood--the protection of one's 
personality, individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy--
control over, or limited access to, one's intimate relationships 
or aspects of life.‖10  
 
Solove then went on to offer a critique of the different conceptions insisting that a 
prevalent problem with them is that they are either too narrow, by excluding 
matters that are typically viewed as private, or too broad because they fail to 
exclude matters that are not deemed private.
11
 Examples of each form of privacy 
definition are provided below. 
 
3.2.1 The Right to be let alone 
In their seminal article, The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
indicated that the right to privacy is to them synonymous with the right to be let 
alone. In their words, ―Recent inventions and business methods call attention to 
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for 
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone."‖12  
What it is to be let alone was not elaborated on in the article but the authors 
indicated that the protection of this right generally entails the repression of 
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publications that concern ―the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an 
individual…‖13 
 
3.2.2 Control over Personal Information 
This is one of the prominent formulations of the concept of privacy. Although 
there are various definitions of privacy that could fit under this head, one example 
is that proffered by Hyman Gross. He stated,  
 
―Concern for privacy is sometimes concern about which facts 
about us can become known and to whom. This includes 
acquaintance with all those things which make up the person as 
he may become known – identity, appearance, traits of 
personality and character, talents, weaknesses, tastes, desires, 
habits, interests – in short things which tell us who a person is 
and what he‘s like. The other kind of private matter is about 
our lives – what we‘ve done, intend to do, are doing now, how 
we feel, what we have, what we need – and concern about 
privacy here is to restrict acquaintance with these matters.‖14 
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 In addition to the foregoing, ‗personal data‘, as defined by various data protection 
laws, fall under this heading. Examples of personal data include names, telephone 
numbers, addresses and email addresses. 
 
3.2.3 Limited Access to Self 
This heading encompasses the foregoing one since control over personal 
information can understandably be viewed as an offshoot of limited access to self. 
Several definitions of privacy fall under this heading. For example, philosopher, 
Sissela Bok stipulates that privacy is ―the condition of being protected from 
unwanted access by others--either physical access, personal information, or 
attention.‖15 According to Ernest Van Den Haag, ―Privacy is the exclusive access 
of a person (or other legal entity) to a realm of his own. The right to privacy 
entitles one to exclude others from (a) watching, (b) utilizing, (c) invading 
(intruding upon, or in other ways affecting) his private realm.‖16 
 
3.2.4 Intimacy 
Some legal theorists are of the opinion that intimacy is what determines the 
information or matters that may be considered private. For example, Julie C. 
Inness posits that privacy is ―the state of the agent having control over decisions 
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concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the agent‘s love, 
caring, or liking. These decisions cover choices on the agent‘s part about access to 
herself, the dissemination of information about herself, and her actions.‖17 
 
3.2.5 Personality/Personhood 
According to Jeffrey Reiman, privacy ―protects the individual‘s interest in 
becoming, being, and remaining a person.‖18 The connection between privacy and 
personality was however earlier established by Warren and Brandeis when they 
used the terms privacy and personality interchangeably in their paper. They first 
stated, ―The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication 
in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an 
inviolate personality.‖19 They then stipulated further down that ―The principle 
which protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of 
the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to 
formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, 
acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.‖20 In their view therefore, 
privacy and ‗inviolate personality‘ are the same. By this view also, personality 
extends to personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic 
or otherwise. 
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Secrecy involves the concealment of information about oneself. Posner defines 
privacy as an individual's ―right to conceal discreditable facts about himself.‖21 
According to Daniel J. Solove , ―One of the most common understandings of 
privacy is that it constitutes the secrecy of certain matters. Under this view, 
privacy is violated by the public disclosure of previously concealed 
information.‖22 
 
3.3 Evaluating the Comprehensiveness of the Six Forms of 
Privacy Definition  
A consideration of these definitions shows a measure of conflict. This is seen in 
the fact that none of the definitions is comprehensive enough to cover all of the 
six forms. This shortcoming deserves a bit of commentary here. It should however 
be borne in mind that the intention here is not to debunk or discredit the six forms 
of privacy definition but to show their comparative limitations regarding 
comprehensiveness. Indeed, as is seen hereunder, some of the formulations, such 
as limited access to self, and personality/personhood, are very useful as 
definitions for most aspects of privacy. They however fail to cover some narrow 
aspects that are regarded as part of the concept. Equally worthy of note is the fact 
that this part is not designed to be an exhaustive critique of the limitations of the 
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forms of definition. Accordingly, it suffices to demonstrate that each of them fails 
to cover only an aspect of privacy.  
 
Firstly, ‗Right to be let alone‘ is too vague to serve as a comprehensive definition 
of privacy. Although the intent of Warren and Brandeis is quite discernible from a 
reading of their article i.e. to argue for the legal protection of private life, habits, 
acts, and relations, they did not however set out to define privacy and this 
formulation cannot serve well as a definition. One must read the formulation in 
the context of their paper for it to make any sense. Standing alone, the formulation 
is vague. This vagueness can result in privacy being sometimes too broad and, at 
other times, too narrow. For example, ‗to be let alone‘ can be so vague that 
privacy would be violated by a person asking directions from another in the street. 
Without doubt, the prerogative of deciding whether one is spoken to or not in a 
public place does not pertain to any one person and is therefore not private. To 
this extent, ‗to be let alone‘ would be too broad to be a definition of privacy. On 
the other hand, since Warren and Brandeis focused on the invasion of privacy by 
the publication of information relating to private persons, ‗to be let alone‘ could 
be taken to be limited to informational privacy whereupon it would not 
comprehend other definitions of privacy such as intimacy as is seen below. 
 
Regarding ‗Control over personal information‘, this form of definition has the 
shortcoming of narrowing privacy down to information. This would indeed not 
suffice because privacy could be interfered with even where no information is 
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gained. For example if a person were to push a pram containing a 6-month old 
baby through a door left ajar into another‘s living room without himself entering 
the room and gaining any information about the room, the presence of the baby 
alone constitutes an interference with an area that is private though no information 
about the person is gained as the baby cannot obtain or disseminate any 
information concerning the living room.  This sort of claim to spatial privacy is 
also the reason why some consider email spamming an invasion of privacy even 
where the spammer gains no information by his activity.
23
 Similarly, if we follow 
Julie C. Inness‘ stipulation that privacy is the state of having control over 
decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the agent‘s 
love, caring, or liking; i.e. intimacy, control over personal information would not 
always be able to account for privacy. This is because a government that forces 
couples to limit child bearing to two offspring, for example, interferes with 
private matters that draw their meaning from the agent‘s love and caring but gains 
nor seeks to gain any personal information in the process.  
 
‗Limited access to self‘ is perhaps the most comprehensive of the six forms of 
definition outlined above. However, it cannot account for some privacy issues 
such as attacks on reputation. Where these attacks are based on lies – no personal 
information is accessed – the attacker does not gain access to the person that is 
being attacked, not even by attention/surveillance but that which is being attacked 
– reputation – relates to a person and is viewed as pertaining to privacy for 
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example by Article 17 of the ICCPR and in some jurisdictions, such as the USA 
where publication that presents a person in a false light amounts to tortious 
invasion of privacy. An attack on reputation is a personal attack and no one can be 
expected not to take such an attack personally. The owner of the reputation alone 
is allowed to shape it and may, by wrongful behaviour, bring negative attention to 
it through her own fault alone. Since ‗limited access to self‘ does not account for 
such attacks, it does not fully comprehend the intimacy aspects of privacy, which 
accounts for attacks on reputation because reputation can be said to draw its 
meaning and value from the agent‘s liking and caring. It also fails to account for 
all that personality accounts for.  
 
Clearly, ‗intimacy‘ is too narrow to fully account for privacy. Not all things that 
are generally viewed as pertaining to privacy are intimate. People‘s addresses, e-
mail addresses and telephone numbers, for example, are in many instances private 
but they do not derive their value and meaning from peoples‘ love, caring, or 
liking. Accordingly, intimacy cannot fully account for say control over personal 
information which does cover addresses and telephone number. In the same vein, 
although ‗personality/personhood‘ does indeed account for a very large 
percentage of things that fall under privacy, there are matters that are generally 
accepted as relating to privacy but do not pertain to people‘s personal traits 
(appearance, sayings, acts, and relations). Examples include addresses, telephone 
numbers, and email addresses. Failing to account for these, 
personality/personhood does not fully comprehend ‗control over personal 
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information‘. Furthermore, ‗secrecy‘ will also not always account for everything 
that pertains to privacy. There are matters that pertain to a particular person; 
which are private but are nonetheless unconcealed, things which are in plain view 
but not subject to the public‘s control. Examples include names, reputation, 
identity, and addresses. These things, in certain circumstances, relate to people‘s 
privacy but are not secret. Accordingly, secrecy cannot fully account for say 
‗control over personal information‘ because personal information includes things 
such as names and addresses, which though not secret are generally limited to the 
control of their owners subject to exceptions that are allowed by law. 
 
The foregoing indicates that although the six forms of privacy definition may 
have something in common, none is comprehensive in itself as each has been 
shown to have at least one aspect of privacy that it fails to cover. In the same vein, 
none of them can fully serve as a lexical definition seeing that each infringes the 
criteria that a lexical definition should not be too narrow.
24
 One common feature 
in attempts to define privacy is that the definitions are usually proffered in the 
context of specific discourses, usually in a discussion of whether or not what is 
delimited as privacy should be legally protected as a right. In this regard, as long 
as the definition serves the author‘s purpose, it may be accepted as satisfactory for 
that discourse but the conflicts being highlighted here usually stem from 
presenting such definitions as encompassing all of privacy. A good example of 
this sort of contextual definition is Warren and Brandeis‘ right to be let alone‘ 
characterisation of privacy. The authors were arguing for laws that would assist in 
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the repression of publications that concern the private life, habits, acts, and 
relations of an individual. As we know today, privacy usually goes beyond this 
sphere. Other definitions of privacy are best understood when viewed from the 
perspective of the culture, legal jurisdiction or specific sphere of endeavour being 
discussed by the author. For example, most definitions of privacy that highlight 
‗control over personal information‘ are usually proffered in the context of the 
discussion of the information society. Confusion arises however when such 
contextual definitions are utilised as covering all of privacy.
25
 In sum, most 
definitions of privacy are to differing degrees ‗precised‘ for specific discourses, 
jurisdictions or culture. Some of the confusion seen in privacy definitions may 
therefore be reduced or avoided by the authors or those quoting them by 
indicating that the definitions are presented in a specific context and are therefore 
necessarily qualified. This stipulation however presupposes that it is possible to 
define or describe privacy in a more comprehensive manner; a manner that may 
constitute a broad, all encompassing point of departure. The paragraphs below 
explore this possibility.     
 
3.4 Identifying the Ordinary Meaning of Privacy 
Where the aim is to fully report the meaning that ‗privacy‘ already has in ordinary 
usage, one of the more obvious courses would be to find out what the everyday 
                                                          
25
 For example, Christopher Reed had this to say about privacy laws‘ ―A privacy law thus consists 
of two elements: A definition of the circumstances in which third parties have the right to collect, 
use and disseminate personal information about others; and a mechanism for preventing 
collection, use and dissemination outside those limits.‖ C. Reed, Internet Law: Texts and 
Materials, (2000, Butterworths, London), 227. Clearly privacy is not limited to information as the 
excerpt suggests. 
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English dictionary has to say. Incidentally, the dictionaries surveyed on this seem 
to be consistent on the meaning of ‗privacy‘ and do not support the notion that the 
concept of privacy is confusing. Two of those are set out below. The Random 
House Webster‘s Unabridged Dictionary defines privacy as ―1. the state of being 
private, retirement or seclusion; 2. the state of being free from intrusion or 
disturbance in one‘s private affairs; 3. secrecy…‖ It also defines the term ‗private‘ 
as ―1. belonging to some particular person; 2. pertaining to or affecting a 
particular person or a small group of persons; individual; personal; 3. confined to 
or intended only for  the persons immediately concerned; confidential; 4. personal 
and not publicly expressed…; 7. removed from or out of public view or 
knowledge; secret.‖ 26 The Webster‘s New World College Dictionary also defines 
privacy as ―1. the quality or condition of being private; withdrawal from company 
or public view; seclusion; 2. secrecy; 3. one‘s private life or personal affairs…‖ It 
also defines private as ―1. of, belonging to, or concerning a particular person or 
group; not common or general; 2. not open to, or intended for, or controlled by the 
public; 3. for an individual person…‖27 
 
From the above, it is clear that when the term privacy is employed in normal 
parlance, a myriad of states are comprehended under it. These include: seclusion, 
retirement, secrecy, withdrawal from company or public view, and above all, the 
state or quality of being private as well as freedom from intrusion in one‘s private 
or personal affairs. One possible way of presenting these dictionary entries to 
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 Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 2nd ed. (1998, Random House, New York) 
27
 V. Neufeldt & D. Guralnik (eds.) Webster’s New World College Dictionary 3rd ed. (1996, 
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make them amenable to analysis is by adopting the extensional or denotative 
technique of definition, whereby the members of the class that ‗privacy‘ denotes - 
seclusion, retirement, secrecy etc. - are enumerated. One shortcoming of this 
formula is that it succumbs all too easily to one of the obvious disadvantages of 
denotative definitions i.e. they do not always distinguish the definiendum
28
 from 
terms that are similar. This is partially because it is usually very difficult or 
impracticable to fully enumerate all the extensions of any particular term.
29
 
Accordingly, an intentional (connotative) definition is preferable. An intentional 
definition ―is one that assigns a meaning to a word by indicating the qualities or 
attributes that the word connotes.‖30 The intention or connotation of a word or 
term therefore ―consists of the attributes shared by all the objects denoted by the 
term, and shared only by those objects.‖31 Out of all intentional methods of 
definition, the genus and difference technique (definition per genus et 
differentiam) is noted to be the more widely applicable technique of definition 
than any other.
32
 It is achieved by assigning a ―meaning to a term by identifying a 
genus term and one or more difference words that, when combined, convey the 
meaning of the definiendum...‖33 With this technique, the above dictionary entries 
may be distilled to the following definition: privacy may generally be defined as 
the state or quality of being private, that is, state, quality or condition of being 
for, pertaining to, belonging to or concerning a particular person or group; being 
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 The word or group of words being defined. 
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personal as opposed to public or of general concern. The process through which 
this definition is achieved is set out below. 
 
3.4.1 Privacy and Definition per Genus et Differentiam 
The first step in the use of this technique to define privacy is to identify the genus 
or larger class to which privacy belongs. This task is not difficult as the dictionary 
entries above indicate that privacy is a condition, quality or state of being. This 
then is the genus to which privacy as a specie belongs. As there are many other 
species of ‗state/condition/quality‘, such as redundancy and bankruptcy, one must 
then delimit the specie or subclass of privacy. This is done by determining the 
‗difference‘ that marks out the privacy specie i.e. the attribute or attributes that 
distinguish all the ‗states‘ that fall under the privacy specie.  A careful 
consideration of the dictionary entries above points to a recurrent attribute: 
‗private‘. If this be the case, then the genus being state/quality/condition, and the 
difference being private, privacy could then be defined as ―the condition, state or 
quality of being private‖. To avoid circularity – one of the criteria for lexical 
definitions – however, the definition would have to include the meaning of the 
term private. From the dictionary entries also, the things that belong to the private 
sphere are things that pertain, belong to or concern a particular person or group; 
things that are personal as opposed to public or of general concern. The latter 
sense is borne out by the etymology of the term ‗private‘. The term comes from 
the Latin words privatus, belonging to oneself, not to the state; privare, to 
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separate, deprive; and privus, separate, peculiar.
34
  Etymologically therefore, the 
sphere of the private abhors government/state meddling and stands for a willing 
deprivation of the society or company of other persons, and is a sphere where 
affairs that are peculiar to a person or which are separate from those of others are 
handled. The next question then is whether the term ‗private‘ is truly the 
difference. 
 
The Random House Webster‘s Unabridged Dictionary above provides two 
renditions of the meaning of privacy in which the word ‗private‘ is the central 
theme: the state of being private; and the state of being free from intrusion or 
disturbance in one‘s private affairs. It also provides three synonyms for privacy 
all of which connote (non-logic use) ‗private‘ as follows:  retirement, seclusion, 
and secrecy. Seclusion is the act of secluding and to be secluded means to be 
screened or hidden from view.
35
 Clearly, to be thus secluded is to be in a state that 
is private, a state that pertains to a particular person or group. Retirement is the 
act of retiring and to retire means to withdraw especially for privacy.
36
 Again, to 
withdraw from others in this sense amounts to moving to a private place, a place 
open only to a particular person or group. Secrecy is the condition of being hidden 
or concealed and secret means to be kept from knowledge or view: hidden.
37
 
Secret knowledge is usually not different from private knowledge and if a secret 
                                                          
34
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is not related to a particular person or group, it will not be considered to affect 
anyone‘s privacy. For instance, trade secrets are not discussed under the right to 
privacy.  The difference in the privacy specie is therefore ‗private‘ while the 
genus is state/quality/condition. Given the meaning of the term private as outlined 
above, a full definition of privacy could be set forth as follows:  privacy may 
generally be defined as the state or quality of being private, that is, state, quality 
or condition of being for, pertaining to, belonging to or concerning a particular 
person or group; being personal as opposed to public or of general concern. This 
definition could be set forth in many alternative ways. However, the bottom line 
is that whatever pertains to a person or group of persons, which is not the concern 
of others, to the extent that it does not concern others, is private and any 
interference with same is an interference with privacy.  
 
Whether or not this formulation is accepted as useful by other commentators, it 
serves two purposes here. Firstly it is this thesis‘s depiction of what a non-
contextualised definition of privacy, which may serve as a sufficient point of 
departure for the privacy discourse, should look like. Secondly, as a definition, it 
underscores the broadness of the concept in question.  When initiating the privacy 
discourse or when presenting the concept in a general manner, a denotative 
formulation of privacy that enumerates its attributes is one way to go. The other 
way would be the type attempted above; a connotative/intentional formulation per 
genus et differentiam. Such a general and broad definition would be necessarily 
broad, so broad that it is arguable that it is not very suitable for direct legal 
  58 
 
application. In the light of this possible objection, let us consider some criticisms 
of the definitional approach.  
3.5 Some Criticisms of the Definitional Approach 
3.5.1 Definition by Genus and Difference vs. ‘Family 
Resemblances’ 
In Conceptualizing Privacy, Daniel J. Solove noted that the majority of theorists 
conceptualize privacy by defining it per genus et differentiam. That is, by looking 
for a common set of necessary and sufficient elements that single out privacy as 
unique from other conceptions. This approach, he stated, evaluates conceptions of 
privacy by determining whether it is coherent--that is, whether it is logical and 
consistent. He then noted that this is certainly not the only way to evaluate 
conceptions of privacy.
38
 Thereafter Solove advanced his ‗approach‘, an approach 
to understanding privacy rather than definition or formula for privacy. This 
approach conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in the 
abstract.
39
 The said approach is based in part on Solove‘s contention that the quest 
for a common denominator or essence in the notion of privacy can sometimes 
lead to confusion. This contention, in turn, he supported by reference to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s ‗family resemblances‘40   
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In Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein, in examining the essence of 
‗language‘ stated,  
 
―Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing 
in common which makes us use the same word for all,-but that 
they are related to one another in many different ways. And it 
is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we 
call them all "language".‖41  
 
Comparing language to games and illustrating with same, he noted that a 
consideration of many, many groups of games show how similarities crop up and 
disappear. ―And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and cries-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of details.‖42 He then observed, ―I can think of no better 
expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the 
various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and cries-cross in the same way.‖43 In 
other words, Wittgenstein was of the view that looking for a distinguishing 
attribute in all things that are called ‗games‘ or ‗language‘, as we do in the 
technique of definition by genus and difference, cannot identify the essence of 
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 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Translated by G. Anscombe) (1972, Basil 
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game and language. The identification of the meaning of privacy through reliance 
on ‗family resemblances‘ is essentially a denotative definition of privacy; an 
enumeration of the attributes of privacy and the disadvantages of denotative 
definitions noted above also apply here. In this approach, there is a lot of margin 
for imprecision. The approach would also entail the mapping of the topography of 
the term in question, identifying the similarities and noting when and how they 
appear and disappear. However, with the difficulties involved in formulating a 
universally acceptable definition of privacy, perhaps there is cause to explore this 
approach.   
 
Solove‘s argument is that ―Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances frees us 
from engaging in the debate over necessary and sufficient conditions for privacy, 
from searching for rigid conceptual boundaries and common denominators.‖44 He 
preferred a pragmatic approach that entails ―...a recognition of context and 
contingency, a rejection of a priori knowledge, and a focus on concrete 
practices.‖45 There would seem to be some force to Solove‘s approach. As noted 
above, the attempted general definition can only serve as a point of departure. It is 
an attempt at answering the philosophical question, what is privacy? The general 
definition will however be too broad to assist in making some contextual 
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determinations that will advance the purposes of the project. For instance, it does 
not tell us why or when personal information, private as it may be, is deserving of 
protection as a right or why an individual‘s interest in the integrity of her 
communication should constrain the state‘s discretion in enforcing laws or 
upholding national security. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will 
attempt a more contextual analysis of what privacy means to an individual that 
would refuse the interception of his communication or the collection and use of 
his personal information by online undertakings.  
3.6 Privacy and Online Interception and Data Collection 
In Jerry Kang‘s view, ‗privacy‘ conveys numerous ideas that can be grouped in 
three clusters. The first cluster is spatial; concerns an individual‘s physical space. 
The second is decisional; concerned with an individual‘s ability to make certain 
decisions without interference, while the third is informational.
46
 If these 
‗clusters‘ characterisation is accepted, then privacy in the context of the thesis is 
informational privacy. However the informational delimitation may not be 
adopted too strictly. This is because these clusters have a tendency to mingle as 
also acknowledged by Kang.
47
 For example the interception of internet 
communication may well primarily implicate informational privacy but if the 
interception is implemented by means of hardware or software installed in the 
target‘s computer, there will be a spatial dimension to the privacy issues raised. In 
the same vein, the collection of internet usage data through cookies may implicate 
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informational privacy but as cookies are actually installed in an individual‘s hard 
drive, spatial privacy is also implicated. Notwithstanding for the purposes of ease 
of analysis, this section will treat the privacy questions raised by internet 
surveillance technologies as affecting only informational privacy. 
 
Following the general definition adopted above, informational privacy would 
concern information about a person or group of persons and their activities, which 
is not of public or general concern. By a definition adopted by Kang, information 
privacy is ―an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal 
information--information identifiable to the individual--is acquired, disclosed, and 
used.‖48 Essentially, this area of privacy relates to an individual‘s personal 
information. Since human beings live in societies where it is imperative that 
personal or private information be shared, the more important determination is 
when would an individual be said to have a right to informational privacy? This is 
because talking about privacy without laying claim to the duty of others presents 
little problems. According to James Michael, 
 
―In considering the connotation of ‗privacy‘, it is of some 
importance to recall whether one is discussing a state or 
condition, a desire, a claim, or a right. The state or condition is 
familiar enough:  everyone knows what it is to be withdrawn 
from society of others, to find seclusion, avoid publicity, be 
solitary, or retire from the world‘s activities. Desiring to 
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achieve such a state or condition presents no problem by itself 
but to claim to be entitled to achieve it at will is quite another 
matter; and to be given a right to it, even against adverse 
claimants, is yet another.‖49 
 
Accordingly the next step in this chapter would be to identify the content of 
informational privacy as a rights claim.  
 
3.6.1 Information Privacy and Theories of Rights 
Generally, a right to informational privacy, properly so called, would entail an 
individual‘s claim to the duty of others, including governments, not to interfere 
with (acquire, disclose, use or disseminate) his personal/private information. To 
determine how and when this sort of right should be conferred, it seems necessary 
to delimit as precisely as possible what it is that is conferred by a right to 
informational privacy. One way to do this is to refer to the will and interest 
theories of the nature of rights discussed in chapter 2 above.  
 
3.6.1.1 Informational Privacy and the Will Theory 
Applying the will theory, to say that a person has a right to informational privacy 
is to say that such a person has been conferred with control over the duty of other 
persons and entities so that in matters of information relating to him, he is a small-
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scale sovereign to whom the duty of non-interference is owed.
50
 The right holder 
has the choice to extinguish the duty, enforce it or leave it un-enforced.  
 
Approaching informational privacy from the perspective of this theory would 
emphasise choice and consent before personal information is processed even by 
governments. While this approach to the right to informational privacy is quite 
likely to resonate with most privacy advocates, one would be hard-pressed to find 
a jurisdiction where the right to informational privacy is conferred with the 
measure of control envisaged by the theory. The more attenuated measure of 
control that one is more likely to find would be in laws that require a very high 
threshold of conditions precedent to interference with the personal information of 
individuals. Such high thresholds are in fact more likely to be attached to some 
but not all information relating to a person. For example, in the EU, a person‘s 
explicit consent or other grounds of exigency is needed before sensitive 
information, such as that which relates to the person‘s health or sexual orientation, 
can be processed by another.
51
 Some other kinds of personal information do not 
require such a high threshold of conditions precedent in the EU.  
 
One possible shortcoming of this theory is that while it emphasises the 
fundamental nature of rights, it may not make it easier to balance the privacy 
interests of individuals against competing interests such as state security or 
commercial imperatives. One who advocates the measure of control anticipated 
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by this theory will more often than not lean on abstract ideals such as human 
dignity or inviolate personality for support.
52
 Without prejudice to the other 
benefits of this theory in this regard, pitting human dignity against say a state‘s 
interest in personal information for crime investigation does not exactly make the 
balancing of interests easy.  
 
When then should an individual be said to have a right to informational privacy 
under the will theory of the nature of rights? A possible answer would be when 
such a person is entitled to control the acquisition, disclosure, use or 
dissemination of his information as a petit sovereign. When exactly an individual 
is entitled to such a control is a further philosophical question. From the 
perspective of the moral theory of rights, a possible argument would be that such 
an entitlement is inherent to the human.
53
 A legal rights approach would however 
look to see where applicable laws grant such an entitlement.
54
 In practice, as 
noted above, only an attenuated form of the will theory measure of control as 
regards informational privacy is likely to be found. For the requirement of a high 
threshold of condition precedent to the processing of certain information such as 
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the acquiring of the content of communications and processing sensitive personal 
data, it may not be so difficult to forge a consensus in some jurisdictions. 
However more may be required to balance competing interests relating to some 
other kinds of personal information. Perhaps the benefit theory, also discussed in 
Chapter 2 above, would be more helpful.    
 
3.6.1.2 Informational Privacy and the Benefit Theory 
The benefit or interest theory of rights sees certain benefits and not individual 
assertions as the purpose of rights.
55
 ―One version of the benefit theory says that 
X has a right whenever he stands to benefit from the performance of a duty... 
Another says that X can have a right (whether in moral theory or within a legal 
system) whenever the protection or advancement of an interest of his is 
recognised…as a reason for imposing obligations.‖56 Accordingly, an individual 
would have a right to informational privacy where he stands to benefit from a 
duty on others not to interfere (acquire, disclose, use or disseminate) with 
information relating to him. His interest in the non-interference with his personal 
information would form the basis for the imposition of this duty under the theory.  
 
Unlike the will theory, the benefit theory does not quite provide strong support for 
regarding rights as fundamental.
57
 Notwithstanding, its emphasis on the benefits 
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that accrue to the right holder admittedly makes for ease of evaluation on more 
concrete terms. For informational privacy, this would involve looking to the 
benefits that protecting an individual‘s information from interference bestows on 
the individual. In specific contexts, where these benefits outweigh competing 
interests, then the individual would be said to have a claim to the duty of the 
beneficiaries of those competing interests not to interfere with her information 
and vice versa. 
 
In grappling with how informational privacy should be protected, many 
commentators have considered the benefits of privacy in this sphere. Kang for 
example, discussed the value of privacy; the purpose it serves. He highlighted and 
discussed three values: avoiding embarrassment, constructing intimacy, and 
averting misuse.
58
 One way that information can be misused In Kang‘s view is 
that information of poor quality can derail an otherwise fair process that 
distributes social benefits and burdens.
59
 Another way is that certain information 
can make persons vulnerable to unlawful acts and ungenerous practices.
60
 Daniel 
Solove on the other hand, argues that the problem raised by the fear of databases 
of people‘s profiles generated from their electronic activities cannot be well 
understood by reference to the Big Brother (and small brother) metaphor.
61
 Under 
the big brother paradigm, privacy is invaded by uncovering one's hidden world, 
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by surveillance, and by the disclosure of concealed information giving rise to such 
harms as inhibition, self-censorship, embarrassment, and damage to one's 
reputation.
62
 He argued that ―that the problem is best captured by Franz Kafka's 
depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial
63
 --a more thoughtless process of 
bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization, a world where 
people feel powerless and vulnerable, without any meaningful form of 
participation in the collection and use of their information.‖64 In proposing this 
alternate metaphor, Solove argues that most of the information collected about 
people concerns relatively innocuous details and the surveillance (big brother) 
model does not explain why the recording of such non-taboo information poses a 
problem.
65
 He maintains that, the primary problem with databases, viewed from 
the Kafka metaphor perspective, stems from the way the bureaucratic process 
treats individuals and their information.
66
 The harm depicted by this argument is 
reminiscent of a provision in European data protection law that seeks to protect 





In approaching informational privacy from the benefit theory perspective, the 
benefits of shielding persons from such harms as these depicted by Kang and 
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Solove become important. Where, for example, the benefits of avoiding 
embarrassment, modulation of intimacy, averting of information misuse, and 
shielding of persons from bureaucratic indifference regarding their information 
are recognised as a reason for imposing obligations on others, such a person 
would be said to have a right to informational privacy by a version of the benefit 
theory.  
 
One opposition that the analysis of informational privacy from this perspective is 
likely to incur would seem to be related to the utilitarian tenor of the benefit 
theory. The theory will not countenance privacy rights if the information to be 
protected is of no significant utility as regards the benefits it bestows on the right 
holder. No doubt this benefit theory perspective makes for easier analysis when 
seeking to balance information privacy interests against other competing interests 
such as the advertising interests of commercial entities. With the focus on 
benefits, legislators, for example can craft laws to cure specific mischief; to limit 
say commercial interests to the extent that they deprive individuals certain 
benefits regarding their information. However contemporary human rights 
discourse is hardly ever couched in terms that specify the benefits of specific 
rights. International human rights discourse, for example is imbued with appeals 
to inalienability and inherence of rights,
68
 which are more supportive of the will 
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theory of rights. 
 
The foregoing paragraphs have sought to identify when an individual may be said 
to have a right to informational privacy by reliance on the will and benefit 
theories of the nature of rights. They have also noted the advantages and 
limitations of both approaches. It is likely however that approaches adopted in 
practice will be a mixture of both approaches. One feature of both approaches is 
that they analyse privacy in terms of its importance to individuals. One approach 
will emphasise an individual‘s entitlement to control the use of his information 
and the other the benefits of information privacy to the individual. For certain 
privacy questions, these approaches may be sustainable but not for all. Questions 
raised by the interception of private communications, for example may be 
resolved by reference to individual interests but the debate raging on the privacy 
issues raised by the tracking of people‘s electronic activities go to show that the 
importance of informational privacy to the individual alone may not always 
suffice as basis for protection. According to Priscilla Regan, ―... defining privacy 
primarily in terms of its importance to the individual and in terms of an individual 
right has served as a weak basis for public policy...‖69She also noted that ―privacy 
importance does not stop with the individual and...a recognition of the social 
importance of privacy will clear a path for more serious policy discourse about 
                                                                                                                                                              
Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Preamble: ―The States Parties to the present Covenant,… 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…‖ 
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privacy and for the formulation of more effective public policy to protect 
privacy.‖70 This is an appeal to the social utility of privacy. Although 
utilitarianism is opposed to the moral theory of rights that seems to be the default 
in international human rights discourse, as regards informational privacy, the 
consideration of the utility of protection would seem to be necessary in forging 
consensus for privacy protection. Accordingly, this chapter will conclude with 
some utilitarian considerations for the protection of privacy.     
 
3.7 Utilitarian Considerations for Legal Protection of the 
Right to Privacy 
 
As noted in Chapter 2 above, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
stipulates that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
71
 
This is an endorsement of moral theory of rights. The ICCPR and ECHR both 
refer to the UDHR as their inspiration and also embrace the moral theory of 
rights. The question then is whether the moral basis of the right to privacy, for 
example, is enough justification for its legal protection even in the face of 
competing interests. Strictly speaking, in moral theory, rights do not need further 
justification for their protection. However, since most human rights are not 
absolute, in practice, utilitarian considerations play a role in balancing privacy 
with other competing interests in the society. Since the thesis intends to advocate 




 Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
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legal regulation of the use of interception and tracking technologies, it seems 
fitting to point out at this juncture that there are also utilitarian considerations that 
justify legal protection of privacy and these are the focus of the following 
paragraphs. 
  
3.7.1 Chilling Effect of Surveillance on Freedom of Expression and 
Association 
It does not take an anthropologist to understand that persons who are aware that 
they are under surveillance would be inhibited in the exercise of other human 
rights notably, freedom of expression and freedom of association. This fact is now 
well noted in the doctrine of ‗chilling effect‘ enunciated by the US Supreme 
Court. The court first referred to ‗chilling effect‘ in the 1952 case of Wieman v. 
Updegraff.
72
 In that case, Justice Frankfurter, describing the effect of an 
Oklahoma state law requiring teachers to take an oath that they are not, and have 
not been, members of a ‗subversive‘ or ‗Communist-front‘ organization five years 
prior to the oath taking, noted that requiring such an oath, on pain of a teacher's 
loss of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a teacher for 
exercising a right of association, free speech and free inquiry. In his words, ―It has 
an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers 
ought especially to cultivate and practice.‖73 (Emphasis added) 
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Since this case, the doctrine of chilling effect has developed mostly regarding 
First Amendment free speech cases, largely in the context of vague or overbroad 
statutes or regulations that proscribe constitutional conduct.
74
 However, in Laird 
v. Tatum,
75
 the Supreme Court first addressed the chilling effect in the context of 
domestic intelligence gathering. The plaintiffs in that case did not contest any 
specific action but alleged that they were chilled in the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights by the existence of the intelligence gathering and distribution 
system. The court took a restrictive view of the doctrine holding that for the 
complaint to be justiciable, the plaintiffs had to show that they had suffered an 
objective harm or were in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a 
result of the Army's surveillance activities.
76
 Notwithstanding, in White v. 
Davis,
77
 the California Supreme Court held as follows: ―In view of this significant 
potential chilling effect, the challenged surveillance activities can only be 
sustained if defendant can demonstrate a ‗compelling‘ state interest which 
justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be 
served by alternative means less intrusive on fundamental rights.‖78 The Court 
also found that the defendants had failed to show a compelling state interest for 
their surveillance of classroom activity at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, and plaintiff had established a prima facie violation of First Amendment 
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The overall normative lesson from the application of the chilling effect doctrine to 
surveillance cases is that the limits placed on police surveillance as prescribed by 
say the constitutional ‗search and seizure‘ provisions in the U.S. must be 
considered alongside the effect the exercise of such powers has on the exercise of 
other rights of the citizens. Hence, the guarantees of say freedom of speech as 




 Amendments of the Constitution should be 
factored in considering the extent to which the authorities may exercise 
investigatory powers. It is deemed that society loses when self-expression is 
stifled or inhibited. The First Amendment is ―based on the assumption, perhaps 
unprovable, that the uninhibited exchange of information, the active search for 
truth, and the open criticism of government are positive virtues.‖80 In applying the 
chilling effect doctrine to police surveillance of university class rooms in White v. 
Davis, the California Supreme Court also opined as follows: 
 
―The crucible of new thought is the university classroom; the 
campus is the sacred ground of free discussion. Once we 
expose the teacher or the student to possible future prosecution 
for the ideas he may express, we forfeit the security that 
nourishes change and advancement. The censorship of 
totalitarian regimes that so often condemns developments in 




 F. Schauer, ‗Fear, Risk and The First Amendment: Unraveling the ―Chilling Effect‖‘, 58 B.U. L. 
Rev. 685, 693 (1978); See generally, G. Horn, Supra, note 74, 735—778. 
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art, science and politics is but a step removed from the 
inchoate surveillance of free discussion in the university; such 
intrusion stifles creativity and to a large degree shackles 
democracy.‖81 (Emphasis added) 
 
The ubiquity of surveillance technologies raises the same chilling effect concerns. 
Perhaps the chill is not enough for the complete proscription of the surveillance 
technologies but it raises enough questions to justify legal regulation of online 
surveillance in general. For anyone who comprehends the immense capabilities of 
public and private sector surveillance technologies and the ability of the former to 
requisition data gathered by the latter, the need for regulation is obvious. When 
the foregoing surveillance abilities are added to the general tracking abilities of 
banks, credit card companies, electronic toll services, and phone companies 
among others, the corollary is that it takes little for one‘s world to be transformed 
into a giant fish bowl. 
 
3.7.2 The Function of Privacy in Preserving Individuality, 
Creativity and Mental Wellbeing 
In the face of these threats to privacy and in recommending strong legal 
regulation, Alan Westin‘s discussion of the functions of individual privacy comes 
to mind. He noted that privacy performs some useful functions for individuals in 
the area of personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and 
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protected communication. It is not convenient to fully discuss all four headings of 
the function of privacy here but Westin‘s discourse on personal autonomy will 
help make the point. He noted that democratic societies hold a fundamental belief 
that the individual is unique in his basic dignity and worth and there is a need to 
maintain social processes that safeguard this sacred individuality. Psychologists 
and sociologists have linked the development and maintenance of this 
individuality to the human need for autonomy; the desire to avoid domination and 
manipulation by others.  
 
This need for autonomy may be represented by an inner circle surrounded by a 
series of larger concentric circles. The inner circle is the core of autonomy and 
shelters the individuals ―ultimate secrets‖; those fears, hopes, and prayers that the 
individual would rather not share with anybody except under stress and in a bid 
for emotional release. The outer circles represent, intimate secrets that may be 
shared with close relations, confessors etc. This is followed by secrets that may be 
shared with friends, the circles continue until the outer circle of casual 
conversation is reached. The threat to individual autonomy lies in the penetration 
of the inner zone and the unveiling of the ultimate secrets. This is akin to the 
penetration of the individual‘s protective shell; his psychological armour, which 
would leave him naked to ridicule and shame. The individual is thus unmasked in 
a world where everyone else still wears his mask. The hot light of selective 
exposure sears the individual and Westin points to the numerous instances of 
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suicides and nervous breakdowns resulting from such exposure.
82
 These instances 
hold true today as they did when Westin first wrote.    
 
The 1972 Report of the Committee on Privacy (Younger Committee, UK 
Parliament), reached a conclusion similar to that of Westin‘s above. It noted: 
 
―[…] it is surely beyond dispute that a free and democratic 
society can exist only if its citizens are able to count on a 
substantial area of privacy in their family and personal affairs 
and in the various group activities which make up their 
working and leisure hours. Unlimited interferences in these 
spheres by public authorities is one principal reason given for 
rejecting the totalitarian state; but interferences by private 
interests must also be kept within bounds, especially as modern 
organisation and technology increases the power to ride 
roughshod over individual rights and interests.‖83 
 
 
The Committee heard testimonies from the British Psycho-Analytical Society and 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists and noted that there is a natural need for 
Privacy and when this is not met, the result would be an increase in the incidence 
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of tension-induced mental illness or at least a decrease in the imaginativeness and 




Some may argue that the need for privacy in real space differs from privacy 
online since being online may be viewed as not being imperative. Today however, 
the matter of communicating or interacting online is no longer a choice for many. 
From university students to private and public sector employees, most persons are 
now required to maintain at least partial online presence. Very few therefore have 
the choice whether or not to migrate to the internet. Additionally, many have 
found the internet a singularly suitable medium of social interaction. This fact is 
borne out by the immense popularity of social networking websites like 
Facebook, Bebo, and Hi5. The non-immunity of people‘s online communication 
from surveillance has slowed neither the increasing popularity nor the desirability 
of online interactions for many. This phenomenon is perhaps explained by 
Westin‘s finding that much as individuals need privacy, they equally need 
disclosure and companionship every bit as importantly as they need privacy. 
Ancient and modern philosophers agree that man is a social animal whose need 
for affiliation marks his conduct in every society.
85
 Many have found the 
fulfillment of this social need in parts of the internet and the importance of the 
internet in this regard is only likely to increase.  
 
                                                          
84
 Ibid, para 108—111. 
85
 A. Westin, Supra, note 82, p. 39. 
  79 
 
Another of the functions of privacy noted by Westin is limited and protected 
communication and one of the two aspects of this function is the fulfillment of 
individuals‘ need to secure counsel from persons with whom they do not have to 
live daily. Little wonder then that communications with lawyers, doctors, 
ministers, and psychiatrists are protected in most jurisdictions. Additionally, 
―[F]or this reason, certain places where the real world is seemingly held in 
suspension ―outside‖—such as trains, boats, and bars—lend themselves to free 
conversation.‖86 Many aspects of the internet fulfill similar functions and lend 
themselves also to free conversations. Indeed most governments encourage this 
sort of online diversion. Without legal regulation, it is not difficult to project that 
the adverse effect of sustained interference with privacy as noted by Westin and 
the Younger Committee will begin to manifest in those persons that are either 
attached to or have to conduct online interaction and communication. The other 
positive functions of privacy will also be undermined to the loss of society. 
 
3.7.3 Consumer Confidence in the Private Sector 
A related utilitarian argument in support of legal regulation for the protection of 
privacy is that of consumer confidence. Academic commentaries are replete with 
references to the relationship between privacy protection, especially through 
legislation and increase in consumer confidence, which is in turn deemed 
indispensable to progress in e-commerce.
87
 In a 2002 Letter to Senator John 
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McCain concerning the Senate Commerce Committee‘s hearing on the proposed 
Online Privacy Protection Act, Mozelle W. Thomson, then a Commissioner with 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) opined that online privacy legislation is 
needed. He noted that consumer confidence is one of the most important features 
of American economic strength and that emerging markets and young industries 
are particularly vulnerable to consumer uncertainty. Little surprise then that 
industries involved in e-commerce development had begun to direct greater 
attention and more resources to strategies that address consumer confidence. In 
his view, data privacy is one of the things needed to allow e-commerce to reach 




A recent survey conducted on behalf of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
in Australia regarding community attitudes towards privacy buttresses the 
foregoing point. When 1503 respondents were asked how trustworthy or 
untrustworthy they would say 9 different types of organisations, including 
businesses selling over the internet, are with regards to how they protect or use 
personal information, the result as represented in Figure 7.1 shows that 63 % 
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Figure 3-1 Chart of Community Attitudes towards Privacy (Australia)
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A different part of the survey shows that 50% of these respondents were more 
concerned about providing information over the internet than they were two years 
ago and 31% were as concerned as they were two years ago, while only 11% were 
less concerned.
91
 25% of these respondents have actually provided false 





Another survey of 2,513 U.S. adults surveyed online between March 11 and 18, 
2008,
93
 confirms that majority of Americans are uncomfortable with websites 
customizing content with information about a person‘s online activity. This 
survey however indicates that an assurance of stronger privacy protection could 
reduce the discomfort with this practice. 59% were uncomfortable with the 
practice of websites like Google, Yahoo, and MSN using information about their 
online activity to tailor advertisements or content to their hobbies and interests. 
The survey did clarify to the respondents that these websites provide free search 
engines and email accounts because of the income they receive from advertisers 
trying to reach users on their websites. Interestingly, the percentage of 
respondents uncomfortable with this practice would drop to 45% if a website 
adopted and followed certain privacy and security policies.
94
 The fact that 45% of 
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the respondents would still be uncomfortable with the practice even with the 
privacy policies is probably explained by the fact that most Americans prefer 
statutory regulation of online privacy to self-regulatory privacy policies.
95
 These 
surveys suggest that mistrust of the way web-based companies handle personal 
information negatively impacts e-commerce and that reliable legal regulation 
would bolster consumer confidence.  
 
3.7.4 Informational Harm to Internet Users 
In addition to the foregoing reasons, privacy should also be legally protected in 
order to shield internet users from some real harm. Some forms of online harm are 
only possible or exacerbated by acquisition and retention of personal data. These 
include identity theft, credit card fraud, cyber stalking, and real time assault, 
violence, etc based on acquisition of unprotected online data. A phenomenon that 
could be added to this list is the nuisance of unsolicited emails engendered by the 
disclosure of email addresses by entities that acquired them. Without doubt, 
regulating surveillance technologies is likely to diminish the freedom of 
information for all especially the online entities that need some of the information 
for their businesses. However such regulation will also reduce the risk of anyone 
coming to the sort of harm listed above. Accordingly, there is a need for balance 
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in any such regulation. Access to personal information ought to be limited to 
processes that ensure security of data and which exhibits safeguards against 
abuse. 
 
A related reason for legal protection of privacy is that in many instances, 
information obtained online, especially through surveillance technologies would 
be incomplete or inaccurate for any other purpose other than that for which the 
user disclosed it. The use of such information in any other context is likely to lead 
to injustice. The habit of employers and other agencies of visiting social 
networking sites to glean information about future and current employees makes 
this issue topical. The protection of internet users in this regard entails regulation 
that ensures that individuals are protected from organisations making decisions 
about them based on information obtained through automatic processing 
especially where such information has been divested of its contextual integrity. 
     
In sum, the chilling effect of surveillance on the exercise of other fundamental 
rights, including the attendant stifling of creativity; the function of privacy in 
preserving individuality, creativity and mental wellbeing; consumer confidence in 
e-commerce; and informational harm to internet users are all significant utilitarian 
reasons that complement moral theory of rights reasons for protecting privacy.  
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3.8 Conclusion on the Meaning of Privacy 
In conclusion, one who desires a non-contextualised definition of privacy may 
adopt a denotative definition that enumerates the attributes of privacy. He may 
also define privacy connotatively as  the state or quality of being private, that is, 
state, quality or condition of being for, pertaining to, belonging to or concerning 
a particular person or group; being personal as opposed to public or of general 
concern. The thesis however accepts the position that privacy as a term is so 
broad that an abstract general definition as the above can only serve as start off 
point to buttress the broadness of the term. Detailed discourse should be in the 
context of specific social practices. Accordingly, the foregoing paragraphs have 
also inquired into informational privacy and explored the will and benefit theories 
of rights as they relate to informational privacy. Both theories have limitations but 
are of use in theorising on when a person may be said to have a right to 
informational privacy and contribute to the quest to balance privacy interests 
against competing interests. Since the advantages of privacy to the individual, on 
its own, may not sustain the clamour for the legal regulation of privacy, the 
chapter also explored some utilitarian considerations for protecting privacy. In 
sum, the chapter has hopefully cast some light on the content and value of privacy 
to the individual and the society in the context of the thesis. 
 










CHAPTER 4: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
4.1 Introduction 
Given the definition of privacy adopted in Chapter 3 above, the right to privacy, 
properly so called, would involve the affirmative claim of a person against all 
others to non-interference with his circumstances, affairs, or activities which are 
private; that is, which pertain to him alone or to a small group to which he 
belongs. Clearly, the correlative of this claim is the prohibitive duty of all others 
not to interfere with the said privacy. To be significant, this right ought to be 
effective not only against individuals that would interfere with privacy but also 
against governments. Indeed, the essence of the discussion of the moral theory of 
rights above is to underscore the fundamental nature of rights, demonstrating that 
they pre-exist laws and should accordingly limit it in some circumstances even if 
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utility is not promoted. It is to be recalled however that, as demonstrated by 
Article 1 (read together with Article 29 (2)) of the  UDHR
96
, utility, should play a 
role but as the exception rather than the rule. Any attempt to translate the natural 
right to privacy into legal rights must therefore strike a balance between the 
overriding nature of rights and the competing social interests of public order and 
general welfare among others. The thesis adopts the position that this sort of 
balance has, to a very large extent, been achieved in article 17 ICCPR and Article 
8 ECHR as would be seen hereunder. The treaties prohibit interference with 
privacy. In the context of informational privacy, interference will include 
acquisition, disclosure, use, or dissemination of information relating to a person 
and his activities. This prohibition notwithstanding, the treaties rely on the 
concepts of necessity and proportionality to provide for situations when 
interference will be permissible especially in the light of other competing interests 
such as national security and law enforcement. With the availability of exceptions 
to the general prohibition of interference, the treaties do indeed make room for 
utilitarian considerations in privacy protection such that there is room for 
balancing competing interests in the implementation of the treaties. It is in the 
light of these features that the study will rely on the treaty provisions in evaluating 
the impact of internet surveillance technologies on the privacy of internet users as 
well as the legal responses to the technologies. Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine the right to privacy as provided under these treaties. Although the 
treaties had set the standards for the protection of informational privacy, the 
advent of computers and increase in computing capabilities gave rise to new 
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privacy challenges in the area of automatic or semi-automatic handling of 
personally identifying information of natural persons. This area, now referred to 
as the processing of personal data, required the amplification of the treaty 
standards to protect personal information and at the same time allow the free flow 
of data In the context of the thesis, data protection laws would seem to be more 
appropriate for regulating privacy issues raised by tracking technologies. 
Accordingly, this chapter will  also examine data protection or privacy protection 
specific to the information society. 
One other point that needs to be underscored at this outset is that if one desires to 
discuss privacy as a right, one cannot also at the same time speak of protecting 
such a right through the voluntary compliance of persons with rules aimed at 
protecting privacy. Voluntary self-regulation cannot bestow a claim right on the 
beneficiaries of such regulation. In this regard, the three instruments in focus 
below, the ICCPR, ECHR, and the EC Data Protection Directive, would seem to 
constitute an adequate standard for evaluation of privacy as a claim right. This is 
because all three instruments require interference with privacy or the processing 
of personal data to be in accordance with laws that grant individuals a claim to the 
duty of non-interference with privacy against others.    
 
 4.2 The Right to Privacy under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  
Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that ―No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
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unlawful attacks upon his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.‖ The prohibition of 
interference with privacy, as is evident above, is qualified by the terms ‗arbitrary‘ 
and ‗unlawful‘. Generally, the term ‗arbitrary‘ signifies everything that is not in 
accordance with well-established legal principles as well as actions taken at the 
will of a person who cannot be called upon to show just cause.
97
  However, as will 
be explained below, in the jurisprudence of the HRC it implies proportionality. 
The term ‗unlawful‘ on the other hand simply implies that, to be permissible, 
interference with privacy, apart from not being arbitrary, must also be in 
accordance with the law. The ICCPR is legally binding on states parties and is 
monitored by the Human Rights Committee (HRC/the Committee). The HRC‘s 
case law and General Comments have clarified Article 17 and this jurisprudence 
also provides some insight into the Committee‘s approach to analysing 
interference with privacy as seen below.     
 
4.2.1 Analysis of Right to Privacy Violation under the ICCPR 
In determining if the right to privacy has been violated, the HRC, in its case law, 
firstly asks if there has been an interference with the privacy of the individual. It 
is at this juncture that the meaning of privacy (including family, home, and 
correspondence) plays a role. As has been demonstrated above, the HRC has 
habitually applied the ordinary meaning of privacy. In any case, the HRC‘s 
jurisprudence, including General Comment no. 16 indicates that the determination 
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of whether or not internet surveillance technologies interfere with privacy may 
not be an uphill task. This is because the HRC has already stipulated that the 
following amount to interference with privacy: Surveillance, telephonic and 
telegraphic interceptions, wiretapping and recording of conversations, home and 
body searches, gathering and holding of personal information.
98
 In the HRC‘s 
words,  
 
―Compliance with article 17 requires that the integrity and 
confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed de jure 
and de facto. Correspondence should be delivered to the 
addressee without interception and without being opened or 
otherwise read. Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, 
interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of 
communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations 
should be prohibited.‖99  
 
It further states that ―The gathering and holding of personal information on 
computers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private 
individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law‖100 Internet surveillance 
technologies are therefore likely to interfere with privacy. It is however to be 
noted that mere interference with privacy will not amount to a violation of Article 
17; only an unlawful and arbitrary interference will amount to a violation. 
                                                          
98
 CCPR General Comment No. 16, paras. 8, 10, and 11. 
99
 Ibid, para 8. 
100
 Ibid, para 10. 
  91 
 
Accordingly, after determining that there has been an interference with privacy, 
the HRC usually follows up with a determination of the lawfulness and 
arbitrariness of the interference.  
 
On lawfulness, in General Comment No. 16, the Committee stated that ―The term 
"unlawful" means that no interference can take place except in cases envisaged by 
the law. Interference authorized by States can only take place on the basis of law, 
which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant.‖101   This means that the availability of authorisation for interference 
with privacy in domestic law is not sufficient. Such a law must also prove 
satisfactory when evaluated by the terms of the Covenant. Furthermore, in 
Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v The Netherlands the committee recalled ―that the 
relevant legislation authorizing interference with one's communications must 
specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such interference may be 
permitted and that the decision to allow such interference can only be taken by the 
authority designated by law, on a case-by-case basis.‖102 
 
Regarding arbitrariness, in General Comment No. 16, the Committee stated that 
―The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness [in Article 17] is intended to 
guarantee that even interference provided for by domestic law should be in 
accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should 
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be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.‖103 Lawfulness 
therefore speaks to the availability of domestic laws while the check for 
arbitrariness has to do with the evaluation of the quality of the domestic laws by 
the terms of the Covenant. The requirement of reasonableness on the other hand, 
according to the HRC in Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v The Netherlands 
―...implies that any interference with privacy must be proportionate to the end 
sought, and must be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.‖104  
 
 
4.2.2 State Obligation under the ICCPR  
The obligations imposed by Article 17 ICCPR on states parties is principally to 
adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the prohibition of 
interference and attacks as well as to protection against such attacks on privacy. 
The prohibition of interference embodies a negative obligation on the states while 
protection from interference embodies a positive obligation; it requires states to 
take steps to protect privacy and accordingly covers not only interferences by 
agents of the state but also those of non-state agents i.e. nongovernmental natural 
or legal persons.
105
  Article 2 (2) of the ICCPR provides that  
 
―Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
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to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.‖ 
 
The effect of this provision is that the parties to the Covenant would have satisfied 
their obligation under it if laws and measure exist by which the rights guaranteed 
therein are protected. In some states, it takes a myriad of legislations to give full 
effect to the undertakings in the covenant while other states pass legislation or 
have constitutional provisions that make the covenant part of municipal law. 
Generally however, the provisions of the Covenant serve as relevant standards 
against which existing and new legislations would be judged to see if they are 
sufficiently protective of the guaranteed rights. This project would similarly 
employ the covenant by using it as a normative basis for appraising laws and 
practices relating to internet surveillance in the jurisdictions to be examined. 
 
4.3 The Right to Privacy under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)  
The ECHR
106
 provision on the right to privacy is found in Article 8 and is framed 
in terms of a right to ―respect for private and family life‖:  
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―1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and correspondence. 2. There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.‖         
 
This provision is drafted in such a way that paragraph 1 prohibits all interferences 
while paragraph 2 allows very strict limitation to the right in paragraph 1.  
 
4.3.1 Analysis of Right to Privacy Violation under the ECHR 
The European Court of Human Right (ECtHR), the tribunal that oversees the 
implementation of the Convention, has in practice always looked to see if an 
interference is prohibited under paragraph 1 and if it is, then it inquires to see if 
the interference is excluded in the limitation under paragraph 2.  
 
4.3.1.1 Interference with Private Life 
In determining whether there has been an interference with ‗private life‘, the 
meaning of the term comes into play. However, as has been indicated above, the 
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ECtHR habitually applies the ordinary meaning of private life in most of the cases 
without even attempting to define the term and when it does define it, adopts a 
broad and inclusive definition. For interference with private life (including family 
life, home and correspondence) by internet surveillance technologies, the 
ECtHR‘s jurisprudence indicates that of the technologies would interfere with 
private life. Violation however will depend on whether or not the exemptions in 
Article 8 (2) apply. In Malone v. United Kingdom,
107
 the court found that 
interception of (telephone) communication interfered with private life and 
correspondence.
108
 Additionally, the court found that the release of personal 
communication traffic data/information to the police without the subscriber‘s 
consent interferes with the right to private life.
109
 The data in question was 
obtained from the metering of the subscriber‘s telephone line. The metering 
device registers the numbers dialled on a particular telephone and the time and 
duration of each call. In Amann v. Switzerland as well as Leander v. Sweden, the 
court found that the storing of personal data relating to a person‘s private life 
would interfere with Article 8.
110
 Furthermore, in Copland v. United Kingdom, the 
court found ―that the collection and storage of personal information relating to the 
applicant's telephone, as well as to her email and internet usage, without her 
knowledge, amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private 
life and correspondence.‖111 It is therefore safe to conclude that internet 
surveillance technologies would usually interfere with the right to private and 
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family life (including correspondence and home). Whether the use of these 
technologies would result in the violation of the said right depends on if the 
interference is carried out in accordance with law and if it is necessary in a 
democratic society. These indeed are the next points that the ECtHR habitually 
considers in analyzing violations of Article 8. 
 
4.3.1.2 In Accordance with Law 
In Malone v. United Kingdom, the Court referred to its jurisprudence on the 
meaning of 'in accordance with the law' and held that the term includes written 
and unwritten law and the interference in question must have some basis in 
domestic law. The latter requires that firstly, the law must be adequately 
accessible and secondly, it must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable 
the citizen to regulate his conduct; the citizen must be able to reasonably foresee 
the consequences that a given action may entail.
112
 In the court‘s view, 
foreseeability in the special context of police interception of communications  
 
―[c]annot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee 
when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications 
so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, the 
law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an 
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the 
conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort 
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to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the 
right to respect for private life and correspondence.‖113 
 
On the extent of the required clarity, the court held that the law must indicate the 
scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the 
manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to guard against arbitrariness. 
Additionally, the rule of law precludes the couching of such a law in terms of 
unfettered discretion.
 114
 In sum, the court reiterated that ―the phrase 'in 
accordance with the law' does not merely refer back to domestic law but also 
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of 
law.‖115 Furthermore, 
 
 ―In its case law on secret measures of surveillance, the Court 
has developed the following minimum safeguards that should 
be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the 
nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception 
order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have 
their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone 
tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and 
storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances 
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On the facts of the Malone case, the court noted that detailed procedures 
concerning interception of communications on behalf of the police in England and 
Wales existed. The public had also been made aware of the arrangements and 
principles. Nonetheless, it was uncertain what elements of the powers to intercept 
are incorporated in legal rules and what elements remain within the discretion of 
the executive. The Court therefore held that the law of England and Wales does 
not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the 
relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. Accordingly, the court felt 
that the minimum degree of legal protection to which citizens are entitled under 
the rule of law in a democratic society is lacking. The interference with private 
life and correspondence was therefore not in accordance with law.
117
 Similarly, in 
Copland v. United Kingdom, the court relied on the above reasoning and held that 
as there was no domestic law regulating monitoring at the relevant time, the 
interference was not, "in accordance with the law".
118
 Again, In Amann v. 
Switzerland, the court held that the laws in question cannot be considered 
sufficiently clear and detailed to guarantee adequate protection against 
interference by the authorities with the applicant's right to respect for his private 
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life. Accordingly, the creation of the card (processing personal data) on the 
applicant was not therefore "in accordance with the law".
119
 In almost all the cases 
that the ECtHR finds that the interference is not in accordance with law, it also 
deems it unnecessary to consider whether the interference was necessary in a 
democratic society for a recognised purpose. It has however had cause to consider 
necessity in other cases. 
 
4.3.1.3 Necessary in a Democratic Society 
In Klass v. Germany, the Court held that the requirement of ‗in accordance with 
law‘ was met since the ' interference' results from Acts passed by Parliament and 
any individual measure of surveillance has to comply with the strict conditions 
and procedures laid down in the legislation itself.
120
 The Court also found that the 
aim of the law in question is indeed to safeguard national security and/or to 
prevent disorder or crime thus fulfilling two of the five purposes for which 
interference may be deemed necessary in a democratic society under paragraph 2 
of Article 8. It however noted that it has to be ascertained whether the means 
provided under the impugned legislation for the achievement of the above-
mentioned aim remain in all respects within the bounds of what is necessary in a 
democratic society.
121
 To this end, the Court noted that it must be satisfied that, 
whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate and effective 
guarantees against abuse. This would entail the assessment of all the 
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circumstances of the case including the nature, scope and duration of the possible 
measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities 
competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of 




The Court then held that the interference in the case was justifiable under Article 
8 (2) since it was necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national 
security and for the prevention of disorder or crime. This is because substantial 
safeguards were revealed upon a close examination of the impugned legislation. 
In the first place, some 'factual indications' had to be present before surveillance 
could be undertaken. The Surveillance also required the approval of the Supreme 
Land Authority or a designated federal minister on the application of the head of 
one of four security agencies. The measures themselves lapsed after three months 
but could be renewed, whereupon the subject of the surveillance had to be notified 
after its termination if it could be done without jeopardising the purpose of the 
surveillance. Furthermore, a statutory commission supervised the lapsing and 
notification aspects of the system while the surveillance itself was supervised by 
an official qualified for judicial office. Additionally, the Minister had to make 
regular reports on the law's use to an all-party parliamentary committee and the 
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In Funke v France,
124
 the Court considered it unnecessary to determine the 
question of ‗in accordance with law‘125 in determining whether the searches and 
seizures carried out in Mr. Funke's house violated Article 8. It also held that the 
measures pursued the legitimate aim of ‗the interest of the economic well being of 
France‘. However, concerning whether the searches and seizures were ‗necessary 
in a democratic society‘, it held that house searches and seizures may be 
considered necessary in order to obtain physical evidence of exchange-control 
offences and, where appropriate, to prosecute those responsible. Nevertheless, the 
relevant legislation and practice must afford adequate and effective safeguards 
against abuse. The Court however found that such safeguards were lacking in that 
case because, 
 
―the customs authorities had very wide powers; in particular, 
they had exclusive competence to assess the expediency, 
number, length and scale of inspections. Above all, in the 
absence of any requirement of a judicial warrant the 
restrictions and conditions provided for in law, which were 
emphasised by the government, appear too lax and full of 
loopholes for the interferences in the applicant's right to have 
been strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.‖126  
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In sum, it can safely be said that the fulfillment of the requirement of necessity in 
a democratic society for one of the five legitimate aims hinges on the actual 
existence of the aims and the availability of safeguards in the nature of adequate 
and effective guarantees against abuse. Additionally, the interferences must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. We therefore see that any 
interference that fails either the ‗in accordance with law‘ test or ‗necessary in a 
democratic society‘ test would amount to a violation of the right to privacy as 
protected by Article 8. It remains however to establish that these standards apply 
to non-state entities such as companies and natural persons. 
 
 
4.3.2 State Obligation under the ECHR: Application of the ECHR to 
Non-State Agents 
Article 1 of the ECHR provides that ―The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
this Convention.‖ This forms the general obligation under the convention and it is 
couched in the language of a positive obligation. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on Article 8 confirms that the Convention does indeed require the States Parties to 
adopt legislative and other measures to secure the rights provided for under the 
Convention. However, the language of Article 8 suggests that the negative 
obligation of non-interference under paragraph 2 is imposed solely on state actors: 
―There shall be no interference by public authorities‖. Nonetheless, it is now well-
settled in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that Article 8 equally embodies a 
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positive obligation on states parties that extends to interferences brought about by 
private persons. In MC v Bulgaria
127
, The Court reiterated that the obligation of 
the States Parties under Art.1 – to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention – taken together with Art.3, 
requires states to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their 
jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment. This includes ill-treatment 
administered by private individuals.
128
 The court further confirmed that this 
positive obligation extends to Article 8 of the Convention on the right to privacy. 
It stated, ―Positive obligations on the State are inherent, in the right to effective 
respect for private life under Art.8; these obligations may involve the adoption of 
measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves.‖129 Accordingly, the surveillance technologies employed by private 
entities on the internet do indeed come within the scope of the Convention in the 
jurisdiction of member states.  
 
In the relationship of individuals inter se, the court‘s opinion in Von Hannover v. 
Germany
130
 would seem to operate to protect the personally identifying 
information of internet users that are harvested by certain internet surveillance 
technologies. This protection, no doubt, extends to seemingly public forums such 
as the internet. In that case, the court, holding that there has been a violation of art 
8, stated inter alia that the concept of "private life" extends to aspects relating to 
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personal identity, such as a person's name or picture, and includes a person's 
physical and psychological integrity. It went ahead to opine that there is a zone of 
interaction with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope 
of "private life". According to the court, in certain circumstances, a person has a 
legitimate expectation of protection and respect for his or her private life.
131
 This 
applies to seemingly non-private environments, such as offices, where the 
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist nonetheless.
132
 In other words, 
certain interactions in public spaces could attract privacy protection. Having 
established the analytical methodologies under the ECHR and ICCPR, the next 
step is to summarise the findings and briefly highlight the relevance of the 
treaties. 
 
4.4 Relevance of the Treaties to Internet Surveillance Privacy 
Under the ECHR and the ICCPR therefore, technologies that intercept 
communications, process personal data, monitor persons or otherwise place them 
under any kind of surveillance would interfere with the right to privacy.  
Undoubtedly, there are technologies that do these things on the internet and the 
question is when are such interferences permissible? By the treaties and their 
jurisprudence as seen above, we can also generally summarise that, for the 
protection of the right to privacy, such interferences can only be permissible if 
they are provided for by domestic laws that are precise enough to guard against 
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arbitrariness. Such laws and related practices must also embody adequate and 
effective safeguards against abuse. In particular, the privacy interference brought 
about by the technologies must be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by 
their existence. In the foregoing, we clearly see the relevance of the treaties to wit; 
they set the minimum standards for the protection of the right to privacy even on 
the internet. The setting of standards is one of the primary roles of international 
human rights treaties and the ICCPR and the ECHR have been particularly 
successful to this end. Accordingly, even states that are not parties do refer to the 
standards in framing laws and protecting privacy. For example, in Singapore, the 
ICCPR has featured repeatedly in parliamentary debates.
133
 This indicates that 
even though Singapore is not yet a party to the instrument, government officials 
do sometimes refer to it and this would no doubt result in limited but non-
negligible protection. There is plenty of academic commentary on this effect of 
human rights treaties. For example, according to Douglass Cassel, ―...international 
human rights law has shown itself to be a useful tool for rights protection. Most 
important are its indirect effects. International articulation of rights norms has 
reshaped domestic dialogues in law, politics, academia, public consciousness, 
civil society, and the press.‖134 Even Oona Hathaway, who discussed empirical 
evidence that ratification of human rights treaties does not always translate into 
compliance acknowledged that ―the first expressive function of treaties [arising 
from treaties‘ legal nature] may change discourse about and expectations 
regarding country practices and thereby change practices of countries regardless 
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of whether they ratify the treaties.‖135  Hathaway also noted that ―Treaties, like 
domestic laws, work by expressing the position of the community of nations as to 
what conduct is and is not acceptable; they tell the international community what 
are the norms and code of conduct of civilized nations.‖136 It is probably this sort 
of international expression of position and general acceptance of same that the 
Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) referred to as 
‗international best practices‘.  In the wake of a May 1999 port scanning incident 
by SingNet, the IDA issued internet privacy guidelines and acknowledged that 
such computer scanning without permission is wrong and that the guidelines were 
based on international best practices in the areas of consumer privacy and 
protection.
137
 If there are any ‗international best practices‘ in the area of consumer 
privacy, there is little doubt that  the standard-setting influence of treaties like the 
ICCPR and the ECHR played a role in their formation. Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks have also theorised on one of the mechanism by which international human 
rights law might change state behaviour. They termed this process acculturisation: 
―the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of 
the surrounding culture. This mechanism induces behavioral changes through 
pressures to assimilate--some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the 
self.‖138 In Goodman and Jinks‘ view, the reference point of this acculturisation 
mechanism is that ―identification with a reference group generates varying 
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degrees of cognitive and social pressures-- real or imagined--to conform.‖139 The 
fact that states generally seem to care about their human rights records whether or 
not they have ratified relevant treaties would seem to lend some credence to this 
theory. In sum, the two treaties in focus here fairly represent the position of the 
community of nations on the right to privacy. 
 
In addition to the standard-setting relevance of the treaties, many states have 
direct international obligation to implement these treaties. The ICCPR is very 
widely ratified and currently has 152 state parties out of which 104 have ratified 
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. This means that ordinary citizens in the 
104 states, who have exhausted domestic remedies, can directly apply to the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) to hear their cases for the protection of their 
rights. The ECHR on the other hand has the force of law in all 47 member-states 
of the Council of Europe and ordinary citizens who have exhausted domestic 
remedies can also send their cases to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). It is in the exercise of their jurisdiction to hear cases from individuals 
that the HRC and ECtHR have now developed the very useful methodologies or 
analytical approaches depicted above for determining when the right to privacy is 
interfered with or violated. The reliability of the said analytical approaches and 
the technology-neutral provisions of the treaties are perhaps the most compelling 
reasons for the use of the treaties in this thesis as a normative framework for 
evaluating the legal responses to interference with privacy by internet surveillance 
technologies.  
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In sum, the question in the project would be whether, after a careful examination 
of the technical practices and available laws in a jurisdiction, the protection 
accorded the right to privacy captures the spirit and intendment of the treaties? In 
other words, would the state be said to have fulfilled its obligations under the 
particular treaty if it were a party to it? If the answer is yes, then that state could 
be said to have met the international standard for the protection of the right to 
privacy. The crossroad between the right to privacy and information technology 
and the attendant ease of handling personal information has now necessitated the 
development of specialised laws for the protection of personal data. This chapter 
would therefore conclude by considering this aspect of privacy. 
 
4.5 Protection of Personal Data 
The protection of personal data is only an aspect of the protection of the right to 
privacy and is not designed to answer all privacy questions in the information 
society. It generally involves the regulation of the automatic or semi-automatic 
handling of personally identifying information of natural persons. Approaching 
certain interferences with privacy from the perspective of data protection would 
diminish the importance that is attached to this right. For instance, If A intercepts 
webcam images emanating from B‘s online activity, the image in question being 
of B and his family members in their home, which is not intended for receipt by 
A. Viewing this interference purely as the processing of personal data would 
capture only a facet of the issues and lighten the gravity. The appropriate view 
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would be that A has intercepted private communication and thereby interfered 
with the right to privacy, including interference with correspondence and home 
(since the images are of home activities), and has also processed personal data. 
The act of intercepting communications is in itself a grave interference with 
privacy whether or not any information is gained. There is no doubt that capturing 
the gravity of the interference would have some bearing on available remedies 
such as damages in a civil action. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for example, provides for 
protection of personal data in Article 8 as an autonomous right that is separate 
from the right to privacy in Article 7.
140
 Additionally, the ECtHR does not seem 
to consider data protection laws as sufficiently protective of privacy in cases of 
monitoring. In Copland v. UK, for example, it held, ―as there was no domestic 
law regulating monitoring at the relevant time, the interference in this case was 
not, "in accordance with the law" as required by Art.8(2) of the Convention.‖141 
(emphasis added) This was in spite of the availability of the Data Protection Act 
of 1984 in the UK, which provided for wide-ranging data protection. Conversely, 
in Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, where the issues were on access to information 
and data storage in a secret police registry, the court considered the interference to 
be in accordance with law on the basis of the Swedish 1998 Police Data Act.
142
 
Data protection and the right to privacy are therefore not interchangeable terms 
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even though the latter encompasses the former. The background to data protection 
would assist in elucidating this fact as seen below. 
 
4.5.1 Background 
Advancements in computing technologies in the 1970s generated two related fears 
that interplayed to give birth to data protection laws. On the one hand were the 
fears that computing capabilities would undermine human rights, particularly the 
right to privacy. On the other hand were the fears that restrictions of data 
movement on human rights grounds would fetter trade, including international 
trade. A number of states began to take steps to address these fears by developing 
standards for the use and dissemination of personal data. At the international 
level, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
143
 
adopted the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data in 1980.
144
 The Council of Europe also adopted the Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (COE Convention) in 1981.
145
 These two instruments form the foundation of 
much of the existing personal data protection laws and the twin concerns that 
animated their adoption—individual privacy and free flow of data—remain at the 
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heart of data protection laws. The OECD Guidelines recommend inter alia that 
member states take into account certain principles concerning privacy in their 
domestic legislation. Member states are also to avoid creating barriers to free flow 
of data in the name of privacy.
146
 The Annex to the Guidelines defined ‗data 
controller‘,147 ‗personal data‘,148 and ‗transborder flows of personal data‘.149 It 
also outlined the scope of the Guidelines
150
 and specified eight basic principles of 
national application
151
 and four basic principles of international application, 
which espouse free flow of data and legitimate restriction where the receiving 




In its part, the COE Convention recognised in its preamble ―that it is necessary to 
reconcile the fundamental values of the respect for privacy and the free flow of 
information between peoples‖153 This fact is also reflected in its provisions. Like 
the OECD Guidelines, the scope of the Convention encompasses processing of 
personal data in the public and private sector. Under Article 3, which specifies its 
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scope, the Convention allows certain derogations. In addition to defining ‗personal 
data‘ and ‗controller of data file‘ in terms identical to the OECD Guidelines, Article 
2 of the Convention also defined ‗automated data file‘154 and ‗automatic 
processing‘.155 The central part of the Convention is its Chapter II156 in which are 
laid down basic ‗common core‘ principles for data protection. These principles, in 
addition to comprehending nearly all the principles in the OECD Guidelines and 
being binding on state parties, are more elaborate in certain respects.
157
 Chapter II 
satisfies the first of the twin aims of the Convention while Chapter III, containing 
the transborder flow provisions reflects the second.
158
 In sum, once countries 
guarantee the protection represented by the common core principles, there should 
thereafter be no restrictions to the processing of personal data. 
 
                                                          
154
 ―automated data file‖ means any set of data undergoing automatic processing, Article 2 (b), COE 
Convention Ibid. 
155
 ―automatic processing‖ includes the following operations if carried out in whole or in part by 
automated means: storage of data, carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on those 
data, their alteration, erasure, retrieval or dissemination, Article 2 (c), COE Convention Ibid. 
156
 See Explanatory Report, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data ETS No. 108, para. 20, available online at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/108.htm  
157
 For example, Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Convention, which form the equivalent of the Individual 
Participation Principles in the Guidelines, contain slightly more elaborate and protective provisions 
than the Guideline. Article 10 of the Convention also requires sanctions and remedies for violation of 
domestic laws giving effect to the principles. This is comparatively a much stronger provision than 
the accountability principle provisions of the Guideline. Additionally, Article 6 of the Convention 
introduced the concept of ‗special category of personal data‘, which is data revealing racial origin, 
political opinions or religious or other beliefs. It also includes personal data concerning health or 
sexual life as well as criminal conviction. These may not be processed automatically unless 
domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. 
158
 This chapter ―…aims at reconciling the simultaneous and sometimes competing requirements 
of free flow of information and data protection, the main rule being that transborder data flows 
between Contracting States should not be subject to any special controls.‖ Ibid, para. 21 
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The OECD Guidelines have served their purpose as non-binding guidelines. They 





 The Guidelines also formed the basis for the Model Code for 
the Protection of Personal Information
161
 adopted by the Canadian Standards 
Association.
162
 The Model Code has now been incorporated into Canadian law as 
Schedule 1of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA), 2000. The Guidelines however constitute soft law at best and lack any 
enforcement or monitoring mechanism and as such would not be the most 
comprehensive of the relevant standards that may be used for evaluating the right to 
privacy as it relates to data protection. The COE Convention is binding on most of 
the member states of the Council having been ratified by all but six of the 47 
member states. It provided the impetus for the enactment of a number of legislation 
in member states such as the 1984 Data Protection Act in the UK and continues to 
be a binding treaty in the jurisdictions of state parties. Nevertheless, the Convention 
has somewhat been eclipsed by the EC Data Protection Directive (the Directive)
163
 
especially regarding the private sector.  
 
                                                          
159
 The Preamble to the Privacy Act 1988 cites Australia‘s obligation under Article 17 of the 
ICCPR and the Council Recommendation on the OECD Guidelines as the impetus for its 
enactment. 
160
 The Preamble to the 1993 Privacy Act states that the Act is to promote and protect individual 




 See L. Bygrave, Data Protection Law, (2002, Kluwer, London), p. 33. 
163
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
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The Directive is more elaborate in its provisions and is generally regarded amongst 
academics as the most comprehensive data protection instrument to date.
164
 It has 
proved to exert political and legal influence outside the European Union. This 
influence can be attributed to its safe third country provisions.
165
  These provisions, 
being binding on the preponderance of the world‘s leading economies,166 has forced 
many other states to update their data protection laws in order to be eligible for data 
flow between them and the countries of the European Union. Canada, for example, 
enacted the PIPEDA partly out of concerns on how the third safe country 
provisions
167
 would affect international commerce.
168
 The US-EU ‗Safe Harbor‘ 
Framework was also developed in order to bridge the different privacy 
approaches of the two jurisdictions and provide a streamlined means for U.S. 




                                                          
164
 See E.g., L. Bygrave, Supra note 67, p. 30: ―The EC Directive is the most comprehensive and 
complex of the instruments [The Directive, the OECD Guidelines, and the COE Convention]‖; K. 
Connolly Law of Internet Security and Privacy (2004 Ed, 2004, Aspen, New York) pp. 160 – 161: 
―...the EU Directive shows signs that it can and may become the de facto worldwide standard for 
privacy protection.‖ 
165
 Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive permit the transfer of personal data to a third country only if 
the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection. There are however a few 
narrow exceptions to this rule. 
166
 All the countries of the European Union and the other members of the European Economic 
Area: Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein (The Directive was incorporated into the 1992 
Agreement on the European Economic Area on 25 June 1999). 
167
 Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive. 
168
 See E.g., House of Commons Committees - INDY (36-1) - Edited Evidence - Number 091 
(Official Version), para 0935: Individual presentation by Mr. Colin J. Bennett:  ―…You'll be 
aware that this directive attempts to prevent the flow of personal data on European citizens to 
jurisdictions that do not have an adequate level of protection. You will know that the concerns 
about how this provision will impact international commerce have been one of the driving forces 
behind Bill C54 [PIPED Bill].‖, available online at 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1039256&Language=E&Mod
e=1&Parl=36&Ses=1 ,accessed on 2 June 2009. 
169
 Export.Gov, ‗U.S.-European Union Safe Harbor‘, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/index.asp , accessed on 2 June 2009. 
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Notwithstanding, the OECD Guidelines and the COE Convention constitute part 
of the relevant standards for data protection. For data protection rights analysis 
analogous to those of Article 17, ICCPR and Article 8, ECHR, both instruments 
would go a long way in facilitating a positive outcome on the ‗in accordance with 
law‘ test. The necessity/non-arbitrariness/proportionality test is resolved in part by 
the data protection principles. The two instruments however achieve this in very 
general terms such that the line between privacy rights and free flow of data is 
vague. The EC Data Protection Directive however provides a good example of 
how this line might be made more pronounced. Chapter II of the Directive 
contains general rules on the lawfulness of the processing of personal data. 
Specifically, Articles 7 and 8 specify the conditions for legitimate processing of 
personal data and special category of personal data respectively. As will be seen 
below, these conditions give a clearer indication to data controllers of what 
constitutes their duties and when they may process personal data lawfully. Data 
subjects also have a clearer indication of what their rights are. The provisions of 
Chapter II, particularly Article 7 and 8 are central to both the ‗in accordance with 
law‘ and necessity/proportionality tests. In sum, in a graduated scale, the 
Directive undoubtedly contains the most elaborate provisions on both the right to 
privacy and free flow of data arms of data protection standards, followed by the 
COE Convention, while the OECD Guidelines understandably forms the least 
comprehensive of the relevant standards. Paragraph 11 of the recitals to the 
Directive indicates that the principles of protection of the right to privacy 
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contained therein give substance to and amplify those contained in the COE 
Convention.  
 
As will be seen below, the Directive is also elaborate on the specific analytical 
headings that may be used for evaluating adequacy of data protection laws in this 
thesis. For an evaluation of data protection laws on the basis of safeguard features 
that could be gleaned from the right to privacy discussion above, the analytical 
headings of Lawfulness and Necessity/Non-arbitrariness/Proportionality are 
relevant. The latter inter alia implies the following: adequate and effective 
safeguards against abuse; redress/remedy provisions, which also deter abuse; and 
supervisory authorities to monitor implementation. For the free flow of data 
analysis, it is important that data protection laws afford sufficient flexibility in its 
application without sacrificing privacy. This calls for delicate balancing and the 
Directive largely achieves this balance hence its choice in the thesis as the 
primary standard for evaluating data protection laws. The following paragraphs 
would therefore provide more details on the Directive. For non-EU countries, the 
use of the Directive as a standard for evaluation would of course be only a 
normative or comparative exercise.        
 
4.5.2 The EC Data Protection Directive 
Like the OECD Guidelines and the COE Convention above, the Directive does 
not aim to prevent the processing of personal data, rather it aims to facilitate it but 
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equally protect the right to privacy in the process by providing safeguards.
170
 The 
Directive aims to protect the right to privacy as enunciated under Article 8 of the 
ECHR. This fact is not in question as Article 1 of the Directive, when read 
together with paragraph 10 of the Directive‘s recital, establishes this unambiguous 
connection.  
 
4.5.2.1 The Scope of the Directive 
The most basic question in protecting personal data is whether the process is 
subject to data protection rules and the first step towards answering this is to ask 
if the activity falls within the scope of the Directive. The Directive applies to the 
―the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the 
processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part 
of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.‖171 For our 
purposes, it is safe to conclude that the processing of personal data on a computer 
would always amount to processing by, at least, partly automatic means. In any 
case, the ECJ has held that 
 
 ―the act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons 
and identifying them by name or by other means, for instance 
by giving their telephone number or information regarding 
their working conditions and hobbies, constitutes the 
                                                          
170
 See Directive 95/45/EC, Article 1 (1) & (2) 
171
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 3 (1). 
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processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 
95/46.‖172  
 
It is however to be noted that the Directive does not apply to processing of 
personal data in certain areas including, ―operations concerning public security, 
defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the 
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law‖.173 The application of the Directive is also 
precluded in the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity.
 174
 Most internet surveillance technologies 
deployed by commercial entities as well as those by natural persons in non-
domestic circumstances would however fall within the scope of the Directive. The 
next step would be to determine whether the data in question is ‗personal data‘ 
and if the activity in question amounts to ‗processing‘ same. To this end a 
consideration of the meaning of the terms is necessary. 
 
4.5.2.2 Personal Data and processing of Personal Data 
Under the Directive, 
 
                                                          
172
 Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, 6 November 2003, [2003] ECR 1-12971, para 27.  
173
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 3 
174
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 3 (2) 
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―(a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity; 
(b) 'processing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;‖175 
 
 
From the foregoing, once the information is about an identified or identifiable 
natural person, it is personal data and whenever it is put to any type of use, it 
amounts to processing. These definitions reflect the intention of the European 
lawmakers for a very wide notion of personal data. According to the Article 29 
Working Party,
176
 this broad notion of personal data was maintained throughout 
                                                          
175
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2 (a) and (b). 
176
 The working party is an independent European advisory body on data protection set up 
pursuant to Article 29 of the Directive. See, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/index_en.htm , accessed on 27 
November 2009. 
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the legislative process of the Directive.
177
 The ECJ has now repeatedly endorsed 
this broad concept of personal data. In Lindqvist, it implied that the following are 
personal data: names, telephone numbers, information regarding working 
conditions and hobbies. Reference to these on an internet page also amounts to 
processing personal data.
178
 Additionally, the Advocate General‘s opinion in 
Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU , 
indicates that IP addresses may be considered personal data for the purposes of 
the Directive.
179
 He noted that the indication of which users were assigned IP 
addresses at particular times constitutes personal data.
180
 Further, he opined that 
dynamic IP addresses are traffic data under Directive 2002/58, which should be 
subject to confidentiality of communications under Article 5 (1) of that directive, 
and the storage and communication of such personal traffic data on internet use 
should be prohibited in principle.
181
 In the Grand Chamber judgement in that case, 
the ECJ also confirmed that the names and addresses of persons behind IP 
addresses are personal data.
182
 The communication of this information to 
copyright holders constitutes processing of personal data in the view of the 
court.
183
 The ECJ has yet to go as far as  the Article 29 Working Party on this 
point. The Working Party is of the firm opinion that IP addresses are personal 
                                                          
177
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 136: Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal 
data, adopted on 20 June 2007, p. 4.  
178
 Lindqvist , Case C-101/01, Supra note 77, para 27. 
179
 Productores de Musica de Espa&ntilde;a (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espa&ntilde;a SAU  
Case C-275/06, [2008] ECR 00. (Opinion of the Advocate General), Celex No. 606C0275 
180
 Ibid, para 61. 
181
 Ibid, paras. 63—66; under Article 2(b) of Directive 2002/58, traffic data are data which are 
processed for the purpose of conveyance of communication on an electronic communications 
network. 
182
 Productores de Musica de Espa&ntilde;a (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espa&ntilde;a SAU 
Case C-275/06, [2008] ECR 00. (Judgement: Grand Chamber), Celex No. 606J0275, para 45. 
183
 Ibid. 




 It is noteworthy that the wording of paragraph 27 of the judgement in 
Lindqvist indicates that identifying a person does not necessarily have to be via 
their names, it suffices to identify them ―by other means, for instance by giving 
their telephone number or information regarding their working conditions and 
hobbies.‖185 In this regard, the Article 29 Working Party implied that web traffic 
surveillance tools that make it easy to identify the behaviour of a machine, and 
through it the behaviour of the user; that piece together an individual‘s personality 
in order to attribute some decisions to her, may be processing personal data.
186
 In 
sum, it is indeed not difficult for the data processed by internet surveillance 
technologies to qualify as personal data. The corollary of this is that data 
protection rules are triggered by the use of the technologies and the logical first 
step for data controllers is to ensure that their processing of such data is lawful. 
 
4.5.2.3 In Accordance with Law 
The Directive allows member states to determine more precisely, the conditions 
under which the processing of personal data would be lawful within their 
                                                          
184
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 136: Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal 
data, adopted on 20 June 2007, p. 16—17; WP 37: Privacy on the Internet – An integrated EU 
Approach to On-line Data Protection – adopted on 21.11.2000. 
185
 Lindqvist , Case C-101/01, Supra note 77, para 27. 
186
 Article 29 Working Party, WP136, Supra, note 89, p. 14. According to the Working Party, in 
such cases, the determination of whether personal data is processed would depend on a number of 
factors. These include: cost of identification, the intended purpose (if the data is pooled for the 
purpose of identifying people then it is personal data e.g. IP addresses in the hands of copyright 
holders), structure of processing, advantages expected by the controller, the interests of the data 
subject at stake, organisational dysfunctions (e.g. breach of confidence), and technical failures. 
This test should keep pace with the state of technology (page 15). What is impossible today, may 
become commonplace tomorrow. Sound and image data could also constitute personal data by 
Article 33 and paragraph 14 of the recital to the Directive. 




 However, such determination must be done within the limits of 
Chapter II of the Directive, which provides for general rules on the lawfulness of 
the processing. Chapter II is made up of nine sections and covers several rules and 
principles.
188
 Of these rules, the ‗criteria for legitimate processing‘189 address the 
‗in accordance with law‘ question most directly. They equally provide the first 
step towards safeguarding processing from abuse. The following paragraph will 
therefore provide a little more detail on the relevant provisions. 
     
4.5.2.3.1 Criteria for Legitimate Processing of Personal Data 
The criteria for making data processing legitimate are found under Article 7 of the 
Directive.
190
 The most important of these criteria and the general rule is that, to be 
legitimate, the processing of personal data must be with the unambiguous consent 
of the data subject.
191
 However, processing could also be legitimised if the 
processing is for any of the following: performance of a contract involving the 
                                                          
187
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 5. 
188
 Principles relating to data quality (Art.6); criteria for making data processing legitimate (Art. 
7); special categories of processing (Art. 8—9); information to be given to the data subject (Art. 
10—11); the data subject‘s right of access to data (Art 12); exemptions and restrictions of the 
application of the directive (Art. 13); the data subjects right to object to processing (Art. 14—15); 
confidentiality and security of processing (Art. 16—17); and obligation to notify the supervisory 
authority (Art. 18—21). 
189
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 7. 
190
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 7: ―Member States shall provide that personal data may be 
processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) processing is 
necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take 
steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing is 
necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or (d) 
processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or (e) processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or (f) 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by 
the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1 (1).‖ 
191
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 7(a). 
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data subject; compliance with the data subject‘s legal obligation; protection of the 
data subjects vital interests; tasks of public interest by official authority.
192
  It is 
unlikely that most undertakings that would process personal data can legitimise 
their day to day activities under these provisions. Accordingly, the data 
controllers would have to either obtain the consent of the data subjects or seek to 
legitimise processing under Article 7 (f), which provides that it would be lawful to 
process personal data if  
 
―processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or 
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection 
under Article 1 (1).‖193  
 
‗Legitimate interest‘ is not defined in the Directive. 194 However, the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ seems to suggest that all legal claims (rights) would 
amount to legitimate interest, including intellectual property rights. It also 
suggests that the term is not limited to where a clear-cut claim exists but may 
include lawful pursuits, aims and objectives. For example, in Alicja Sosnowska v 
                                                          
192
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 7 (b)—(e). 
193
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 7 (f) 
194
 But see, The Black‘s Law Dictionary, which  defines ‗interest‘ inter alia as ―A legal share in 
something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property <right, title, and 
interest>.‖ It also defines legal interest as ―An interest recognized by law, such as legal title.‖ 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), ‗interest‘. 
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Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wroclawiu Osrodek Zamiejscowy w Walbrzychu, the 
Advocate General used the following terms interchangeably with ‗legitimate 
interest‘: ‗a genuine aim‘, and ‗objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth 
Directive‘.195 Accordingly, lawfully pursued commercial interests – commercial 
and business activities – may constitute legitimate interests for the purposes of 
Article 7 (f). 
 
Such interests are to be balanced against the interests of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject, which according to Article 7 (f) could be overriding. 
Accordingly, an analysis similar to that of the ECtHR outlined above on Article 8 
ECHR would be necessary to determine when persons with legitimate interests 
can process personal data without their interests being overridden by the interest 
of the right to privacy.
196
 A key to determining this could lie in how scrupulously 
a data controller observes the other safeguards in the Directive. In addition to the 
foregoing criteria, there are special categories of personal data that require even a 
higher threshold for legitimacy than that of Article 7. These are data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and data concerning health and sex life. The processing of 




                                                          
195
Alicja Sosnowska v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wroclawiu Osrodek Zamiejscowy w 
Walbrzychu, Case C-25/07, [2008] ECR 0, para 19. 
196
 Regarding the legitimate interests of commercial and business entities, the right to privacy 
would not be overriding only for processing that is in accordance with the law. Such processing 
must also be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the economic well being of the 
country, for the prevention of crime or for the protection of the rights of others. 
197
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 8. 
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Permissibility of processing under the Directive is not limited to the foregoing 
legitimacy criteria, other safeguard provisions have to be observed as is seen 
below.   
 
4.5.2.4 Adequate and Effective Safeguards 
The provisions of the Directive on the data quality principles;
198
 the information 
to be given to the data subject;
199
 the data subject‘s right of access to data;200 the 
data subject‘s right to object to processing;201 and the confidentiality and security 
of processing
202
 are some of the safeguard provisions of Chapter II. They are 
roughly the more elaborate equivalents of the Basic Principles of National 
Application of the OECD Guidelines and part of the Basic Principles for Data 
Protection of the COE Convention.
203
    
 
4.5.2.4.1 Data Quality Principles 
The observance of the data quality principles (the principles)
 204
 is paramount to 
the continued lawfulness of processing; it ensures that the processing is or 
                                                          
198
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 6. 
199
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 10—11. 
200
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 12. 
201
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 14—15. 
202
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 16—17. 
203
 COE Convention, Articles 5, 7, and 8. 
204
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 6: ―1. Member States shall provide that personal data must be: (a) 
processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that 
Member States provide appropriate safeguards; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed; (d) accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
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remains proportionate. The principles must be complied with whenever data 
undergoes processing independently of compliance with the criteria for legitimate 
processing. It may therefore be said that the criteria for legitimate processing
205
 
provide the first layer of protection against abuse while the principles
206
 provide a 
second layer. Proportionality is the overriding objective of the principles and as 
such, they will continue to feature in most discussions of data protection. Article 6 
(1) (b) For example, requires the purpose of processing to be specified and forbids 
further processing for purposes that are incompatible with the original. This 
fetters the discretion of data controllers under the law regarding the use to which 
they may put people‘s personal data. One practical application of this principle is 
that web-based companies that collect user information for say site usage analysis 
would not be able to sell such data to another party without the consent of the user 
in question because trading personal data is an incompatible purpose to site usage 
analysis. The principles would also give a cause of action to an aggrieved data 
subject when they are violated.   
 
4.5.2.4.2 Information to Data Subjects 
The Directive requires that the following information be given to the data subject 
at the very least: (a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
                                                                                                                                                              
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which 
they are further processed, are erased or rectified; (e) kept in a form which permits identification 
of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected 
or for which they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for 
personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use. 2. It shall be for 
the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with.‖ 
205
 Under Article 7, Directive 95/46/EC. 
206
 Under Article 6, Directive 95/46/EC. 
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(b) the purposes of the processing; (c) any further information.
207
 If data is 
obtained from the data subject, the further information to be given may include: 
the recipients or categories of recipients of the data; whether replies to the 
questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of 
failure to reply; the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the 
data concerning him.
208
 Where the data have not been obtained from the data 
subject, the further information may include the categories of data concerned; the 
recipients or categories of recipients; and the existence of the right of access to 




4.5.2.4.3 Data Subjects Rights of Access and Objection, and 
Confidentiality Duties of Controllers 
Furthermore, member states are to guarantee the right of the data subject to obtain 
certain information from the controller without constraint, at reasonable intervals, 
and without excessive delay or expense. This includes confirmation of whether or 
not his/her personal data is being processed and the categories of data concerned; 
the recipients or categories of recipients; and the existence of the right of access to 
and the right to rectify the data concerning him. The relevant data must be 
revealed in an intelligible form with their sources if available. The data subject is 
also to be guaranteed the right to have the data rectified, erased, or blocked to the 
extent that the processing has not complied with the Directive. Wherever possible, 
                                                          
207
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 10 and 11. 
208
 Directive 95/46/EC , Article 10. 
209
 Directive 95/46/EC , Article 11. 
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third parties to whom data had been communicated must be notified of 




For processing such as those legitimized under Article 7 (e)—processing 
necessary for the performance of a public interest task, and (f)—processing 
necessary to the pursuit of the legitimate interests of the controller, the Directive 
gives the data subject a right to object on compelling legitimate grounds relating 
to his particular situation. He/she is also to have the right to object to processing 
of personal data for direct marketing.
211
 The Directive also requires states to grant 
the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal 
effect on or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated 
processing of data.
212
 It also imposes the duty of confidentiality and security of 




Beyond these safeguards, other safeguards in the directive include judicial 
remedies and the provision for a supervisory authority. These as noted above, are 
some of the specific points that would be referenced in the evaluation of data 
protection laws in the thesis. They would therefore be discussed briefly below. 
  
4.5.2.4.4 Judicial Remedies 
                                                          
210
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 12. 
211
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 14. 
212
 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 15. 
213
 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 16 and 17. 
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Article 22 requires member states to provide for a right of judicial remedy for 
every person whose rights guaranteed him under any legislation enacted pursuant 
to the Directive has been breached. Such remedies shall be without prejudice to 
any administrative remedy ordered by say a supervisory authority set up pursuant 
to the Directive. States are also to ensure that any person who has suffered 
damage due to unlawful processing receives compensation from the data 
controller except where the controller proves that he is not responsible for the 
events that engendered the damage.
214
 The significance of these provisions is that 
not only do they ensure compensation for the aggrieved data subject, they also 
operate as disincentive to unlawful or excessive processing of data. When these 
provisions are read together with the data subjects‘ right of access to information, 
there is little doubt that unlawful or excessive processing of data would, at the 
instance of data subjects, have real adverse consequences in member states that 
have properly implemented the Directive.  
 
4.5.2.4.5 Supervisory Authorities 
Under Article 28, member states are to provide that one or more public authorities 
are responsible for monitoring the application of the provisions adopted pursuant 
to the Directive within its territory. The supervisory authorities are to be allowed 
complete independence in the discharge of their duties. The said authorities are to 
be endowed with investigative powers, such as power of access to data forming 
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 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 23. Article 24 requires suitable measures that ensure the full 
implementation of the Directive and the specification of sanctions to be imposed for infringement 
of the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. 
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the subject matter of processing. They are also to be endowed with effective 
powers of intervention such as ordering the blocking, erasure or destruction of 
data; and power to engage in legal proceedings regarding the violation of national 
legislation pursuant to the Directive. Supervisory authorities can hear claims 
lodged by any person concerning his rights and freedoms regarding personal data 
and their decisions are to be appealable through the courts. They are also to draw 
up reports at regular intervals concerning their activities.   
 
The monitoring activities of a supervisory authority necessarily include receiving 
and monitoring the notifications by data controllers obligated by Article 18. 
Under that provision, the data controller or his representative must notify the 
supervisory authority before carrying out processing operation(s). Member states 
may however provide for the simplification of or exemption from notification in 
some narrowly specified circumstances.
215
 The monitoring activities of a 
supervisory authority also include the conducting of the prior checks required by 
Article 20 of the Directive. Prior checks involve the determining of processing 
                                                          
215
 Directive 95/46/EC,  Article 18 (2): ―Member States may provide for the simplification of or 
exemption from notification only in the following cases and under the following conditions: 
- where, for categories of processing operations which are unlikely, taking account of the data to 
be processed, to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data subjects, they specify the 
purposes of the processing, the data or categories of data undergoing processing, the category or 
categories of data subject, the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data are to be 
disclosed and the length of time the data are to be stored, and/or 
- where the controller, in compliance with the national law which governs him, appoints a personal 
data protection official, responsible in particular: 
- for ensuring in an independent manner the internal application of the national provisions taken 
pursuant to this Directive 
- for keeping the register of processing operations carried out by the controller, containing the 
items of information referred to in Article 21 (2), 
thereby ensuring that the rights and freedoms of the data subjects are unlikely to be adversely 
affected by the processing operations.‖ 
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operations likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects and checking that the operations are examined prior to the start of 
processing. This is to be done upon notification. The authorities are also to 
maintain a register of processing operations notified under Article 18. Any person 





The Directive therefore exhibits an array of safeguards including rights accruable 
to data subjects including rights to information, to object to processing, to 
compensation, and to information. It also imposes duties on data controllers 
including the data quality principles, and the duty to secure data and observe 
confidentiality. Moreover, it imposes implementation and monitoring duties on 
member states as is evident in the judicial remedy and supervisory authority 
provisions. It however remains to be shown that the Directive equally remains 
flexible regarding free flow of data and it is to this consideration that the 
following paragraph turns. 
  
4.5.2.5 Free Flow of Data/Flexibility of the Application of the 
Directive 
Article 1 of the Directive outlines the objectives thereof. Paragraph (1) upholds 
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms especially the right to privacy 
while paragraph (2) stipulates that ―Member States shall neither restrict nor 
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 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 21. 
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prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons 
connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1‖. Since the Directive 
contains no specific rules on how data must be processed other than rules to 
protect the rights of individuals, the only restrictions that may be placed on the 
free flow of data are those arising out of the interests of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, particularly the right to privacy of natural persons. The general thrust of 
the Directive regarding the free flow of data is to remove related obstacles by 
approximating the laws of member states. Paragraph 7 of the recitals to the 
Directive notes that differences in levels of protection of individual rights 
regarding the processing of personal data afforded in member states may prevent 
the transmission of such data between territories. These differences are due to a 
wide variety of laws regulations and administrative provisions. Accordingly, 
although the emphasis of the Directive is the protection of privacy, the overall aim 
would seem to be free flow of data. This is because when member states have 
equivalent laws as a result of the approximation of national laws afforded by the 
Directive, they will no longer be able to inhibit the free movement of personal 




The next question however is whether the provisions of the Directive also afford 
flexibility in its application. In this regard, it is noteworthy that although the 
Directive is quite elaborate on the standard of privacy to be maintained, the actual 
administrative burden on data controllers may not always be onerous in the light 
of the seriousness of the privacy interests that necessitate the steps. A data 
                                                          
217
 See Paragraphs 7—9, Recitals to Directive 95/46/EC, Supra note 68. 
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controller would no doubt need to design her system to comply with the laws 
enacted pursuant to the Directive. A well-designed system should adequately take 
care of the information to be given to the data subject. For websites, one would 
expect that appropriate banners, and privacy notices in web pages where data is 
collected would suffice in most cases. Beyond this, the controller is required to 
take administrative steps only when requests are made by data subjects in exercise 
of their right of access and in complying with the notification obligations of the 
Directive. Of these two, the notification process would be the more burdensome 
but even on this, member states may provide for exemptions and simplification. 
An example of the type of simplification envisaged by the Directive is for the 
laws of member states to exempt data controllers from the notification obligation 
if they appoint personal data officials with certain specified responsibilities that 
ensure the rights and freedoms of data subjects are unlikely to be adversely 
affected by the processing operation.
218
 Since the Directive leaves member states 
with a margin for manoeuvre,
219
 it remains to be seen how member states choose 
to implement the simplification/exemption from notification provision. This will 
bear on the overall flexibility of national laws. The UK provisions in this regard 
will be examined latter in the thesis. The Directive also allows for some 
derogations and exemptions that may add to the flexibility of the implementation 
of national laws.
220
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 See Article 18 (2), Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
219
 See E.g., Paragraph 9 of the Recitals, Directive 95/46/EC, Supra note 68. 
 
220
 See E.g., Directive 95/46/EC , Article 9-exemptions for freedom of expression; Article 13- 
allows restrictions to the scope of the obligations under Art 6 (1), 10, 11, 12, and 21 in order to 
safeguard inter alia an important economic or financial interests including monetary, budgetary 
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In sum, laws based on the Directive would be one of those to be considered by the 
ECtHR in its analysis under Article 8 (2) ECHR for personal data interferences. 
The question then is whether the Directive is sufficiently protective in such cases 
to pass the ‗in accordance with the law‘ and ‗necessary in a democratic society‘ 
tests. The answer to this ought to be in the affirmative if the state in question has 
properly implemented the Directive.  
 
4.6 Conclusion to Chapter 4 
This discussion of data protection concludes this chapter and this part of the 
thesis. This first part of the thesis sets the standard for further investigation and 
evaluation in the parts to follow. The discussion of rights underscores the 
fundamental nature of rights while the discussion of the meaning of privacy 
throws some light on the interest being protected and the discussion of the right to 
privacy outlines the standard of protection set at the international level by the 
treaties and their enforcement mechanisms. The ICCPR and the ECHR provisions 
may be directly used in evaluating the laws of the jurisdictions under review. 
However as regards, surveillance technologies that merely process personal data 
in the private sector, the EC Data Protection Directive would be used as the 
primary standard for evaluation. These evaluations would be carried out in Part III 
of the thesis. The next part, part II, will examine available technologies on the 
                                                                                                                                                              
and taxation matters; the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others; and 
Article 18 (4)-exemption or simplification of notification for in the case of processing operations 
under Article 8 (2) (d)-processing of special category of data carried out by an association or 
foundation with appropriate guarantees in the course of its legitimate activities. 
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basis of the foregoing standards to ascertain if they do indeed interfere with 
privacy.  
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PART II: INTERNET SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
 




The objective of this part is to present contemporary internet surveillance 
technologies and highlight how they interfere with the privacy of internet users. It 
is to be recalled that mere interference with privacy does not always amount to a 
violation of the right to privacy. The right is violated, at least in the jurisprudence 
of the treaty bodies analysed above, when the interference is, inter alia, arbitrary 
or unlawful. Accordingly, to determine if the use of a particular technology 
violates the right to privacy, it will always be necessary to inquire into the laws 
and policies in force in the jurisdiction in question. This task will be executed in 
Part III below. This part will be limited to a determination of whether the 
technologies do indeed interfere with privacy. To facilitate the analysis in the 
subsequent part, this part will also highlight the reasons for the deployment of the 
technologies and the advantages that the technologies bestow on both the entities 
that deploy them and to society. The advantages of the technologies will assist in, 
for example, balancing the legitimate interests of the entities that deploy the 
technologies against the privacy interests of the internet users when considering 
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the legitimacy of processing personal data. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that this part does not aim to be exhaustive as in presenting all known internet 
surveillance technologies. It suffices if the technologies presented are reasonably 
representative of many others that share similarities in functionality or method of 
interfering with privacy. This is because the analysis on the application of the law 
and other regulatory modalities to the technologies would most likely hold true 
for others that share similarities in functionality. It is to be further noted that the 
thesis does not deal with every aspect of privacy on the internet but is limited to 
privacy questions raised by surveillance technologies. For example, the 
publication of a person‘s personal information on the internet by another without 
authorization may violate the right to privacy but is outside the remit of the thesis 
since the violation is not engendered by a surveillance technology.     
 
In the context of this thesis, surveillance technologies are technologies that do any 
of the following surreptitiously: monitor, watch, track, profile, or intercept the 
communication of internet users. These technologies may however be divided 
into two broad categories: Interception technologies and tracking technologies. 
This categorization is in line with the two broad methods by which surveillance 
technologies interfere with privacy: interference with information while in transit, 
and the recording of usage data or online habits respectively. Interception 
generally involves the gaining of access to communication while in transit and 
making some or all of its contents available to person(s) other than the intended 
recipient(s) or sender(s). Interception could also relate to the addressing 
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information of the communication, which includes, the type of communication, 
the name of the sender and recipient, and the source and destination of the 
communication. The real space analogue of internet interception, in the context of 
this study, will be the telephone wiretap. Tracking on the other hand refers to the 
collection of the personal information of internet users especially as it relates to 
how they use internet services. The real space analogue of tracking would be the 
following of a person and observing what they do in particular contexts. 
According to Daniel Solove, ―Currently, there are two basic ways personal 
information is collected in cyberspace: (1) by directly collecting information from 
users (registration and transactional data); and (2) by surreptitiously tracking the 
way people navigate through the Internet (clickstream data).‖1 Here however, we 
are concerned with tracking. By tracking of clickstream, Solove refers to the 
recording, by websites of  the following information regarding an internet user: 
―the Internet service provider, the type of computer and software used, the 
website linked from, the amount of time spent perusing each page, and exactly 
what parts of the website were explored and for how long.‖2 The term ‗tracking‘ 
is now very much in use by academics. In the quoted work, Solove discussed only 
cookies as have other academics.
3
 In the news media, the term ‗tracking‘ or 
‗tracking technologies‘ has been applied to web bugs4 and generally to 
                                                          
1
 D. Solove, ‗Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy‘, 53 




 See also, J. Kang, ‗Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions‘50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 at 
1229. ―To summarize, a client's browsing behavior at a particular site can be tracked with 
detail.  Through, for instance, the use of cookies, this tracking can continue over multiple visits, 
over an indefinite period of time, with all browsing information compiled into a database.‖  
4
 See E.g., J. Schawrtz, ‗Technology; ‗web bugs‘ are tracking the use of internet‘, New York 
Times, 14 August 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/business/technology-web-bugs-are-
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technologies with similar abilities.
5
 . Generally, the degree of interference with 
privacy would be greater in the interception of communication than in tracking of 
users and their behaviour. For example, a technology that is able to communicate 
a person‘s email address and name to an internet undertaking may be said to 
interfere with privacy but not quite to the same degree as another technology that 
is able to intercept the contents of an email and transmit it to an unintended 
recipient. Accordingly, different laws would sometimes apply to surveillance by 
interception and surveillance by online tracking. Data protection laws would seem 
to be more suitable for regulating tracking than for regulating interceptions. This 
part of the thesis is consequently divided between interception and tracking 
technologies since the two categories would sometimes raise different kinds of 
privacy issues.   
 
5.1.1 Interception 
The interception of a communication involves the modification, interference or 
the monitoring of the system in which the communication is being transmitted so 
as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available, while 
                                                                                                                                                              
tracking-use-of-internet.html?pagewanted=1 , accessed on 8 March 2010. ―Many people who have 
personal Web pages are unknowingly tracking people [using web bugs] who visit and sending the 
information to third parties, according to a new report.‖ 
5
 R. Cellan-Jones, ‗Web Creator Rejects Net Tracking‘ BBC News, 17 March 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7299875.stm accessed on 8 March 2010: ―The creator of the web [Sir 
Tim Berners-Lee] has said consumers need to be protected against systems which can track their 
activity on the internet.‖; S. Hsu and C. Kang, ‗US Web-Tracking Plan Stir Privacy Fears‘ 
Washington Post, 11 August 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/10/AR2009081002743.html , accessed 8 March 2010 : ―The Obama 
administration is proposing to scale back a long-standing ban on tracking how people use 
government Internet sites with "cookies" and other technologies…‖ 
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being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of the 
communication.
6
 It is not always necessary that a special technology be deployed 
for interception purposes. However, the systematic interception of any set of 
internet communication would usually entail the deployment of a special 
technology in the nature of software or hardware. It is with such technologies that 
this chapter is concerned. In principle, all internet communications can be 
intercepted remotely, including emails, web browsing, file transfers, chatting, 
instant messaging, short message services (on the internet), voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
calls, and so forth. In practice however, comprehensive interception of these 
internet communications would entail the placing of the interception technology 
at a strategic position in the network. Under normal circumstances, only state 
security/law enforcement agencies, and internet service providers/network 
administrators should have such access to the network. Since law enforcement 
agencies and network administrators usually have different reasons for 
intercepting communications and are therefore likely to deploy different kinds of 
technologies, this chapter will discuss law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
interception technologies under separate headings although there is nothing in 
principle that precludes either of these entities or even an ordinary individual, 
who gains relevant access, from deploying any of the technologies to be discussed 
below. 
 
                                                          
6
 See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, Chapter 23, Section 2 (2). 
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5.2 Law Enforcement/State Security Interception 
Technologies   
New technologies have given rise to new law enforcement challenges and have 
provided criminals with new opportunities. Accordingly, the boundaries of 
traditional wiretap surveillance have been redefined in the face of the continuous 
migration of human communication to the internet. The greatest difficulty that 
was envisaged at the inception of this project regarding the analysis of internet 
surveillance technologies that fall under this heading is that of availability of 
information. This is because the investigation of serious crime and the 
preservation of national security are usually conducted under the shroud of state 
secrecy. This leaves commentators with scant information on the techniques 
employed. Fortunately, however, some reliable data are available on the 
architecture, functionality, and capabilities of some of the technologies. 
Carnivore, an interception technology used by the United State‘s Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and other interception technologies will be discussed. 
 
Carnivore has now been decommissioned since January 2005. Notwithstanding, 
documentation on it are the most detailed on any interception technology 
unearthed by this project. It points to the capabilities of technologies that may still 
be in use. Furthermore, the way it was deployed by the FBI also forms a good 
basis for suggestions on how such technologies should be regulated in the interest 
of privacy. Carnivore would therefore be discussed in some detail and would be 
followed by a discussion of the other available law enforcement interception 
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technologies. It is indeed reasonable to expect that law enforcement agencies in 
the jurisdictions to be examined would be using some of these technologies or 
others that are very similar in functionality and capability. First however, a 
general outline of the components of law enforcement interception technologies.  
 
5.2.1 Components of Law Enforcement Interception and Basic 
Terms 
To ensure systematic procedures for carrying out interception, while also 
lowering the costs of interception solutions, industry groups such as the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) as well as government agencies worldwide have attempted to 
standardize the technical processes behind interceptions by law enforcement 
agencies (LEA). Accordingly, some general frameworks have emerged. There are 
generally three stages in the architecture of law enforcement interceptions: 
collection, where target-related ―call‖ data and content are extracted from the 
network; mediation, where the data is formatted to conform to specific standards; 
and delivery, where the data is delivered to the law enforcement agency (LEA). A 
generic framework by Paul Hoffmann and Kornel Terplan, which is derived from 
an IETF Internet-Draft of October 2003, fairly represents the components of 
contemporary law enforcement interception architecture as follows: 
  
_ Administration function: This function provides the provisioning interface for 
the intercept. This is where the communication to be intercepted is specified 
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(target identification), usually within the dictates of a warrant. It could be carried 
out directly by the law enforcement agency or by the ISP. This function is also 
responsible for the scheduling of interception set-up and tear-down. 
_ Intercept access point (IAP): This is a device within the network that is used for 
intercepting lawfully authorized information. It may be an existing device with 
intercept capability (e.g., a switch or router), or it may be a special device (e.g., a 
probe) provided for that purpose. 
  
_ Mediation device (MD): These devices receive the data from the IAP, package it 
in the correct format, correlate it with interception warrants, and deliver it to the 
LEA. In cases in which multiple law enforcement agencies are intercepting the 




The data to be intercepted could be either Intercept Related Information (IRI), 
also known as Call Data (CD) or content of communication, also known as call 
content (CC). The IRI is the information or data associated with 
telecommunication services involving the target identity.
8
 It includes the 
destination and source of a transmission such as IP address and ‗to‘ and ‗from‘ 
fields in an email, as well as time of the communication etc. the CC is the 
information exchanged between two or more users of a telecommunication 
                                                          
7
 P. Hoffmann & K Terplan, Intelligence Support Systems, (2006, Auerbach, Florida), p. 13—14. 
8
 See, ETSI ‗Lawful Interception (LI); Handover interface for the lawful interception of 
telecommunications traffic‘ ETSI ES 201 671 V3.1.1 (2007-05), p. 14. 




 e.g. the body of an email. Communication between LEA 
and Telecommunication Service Providers are through Handover Interfaces (HI): 
physical and logical interface across which the interception measures are 
requested from service provider and the results of interception are delivered from 




5.2.2 The Carnivore 
The FBI developed Carnivore to facilitate the interception of electronic 
communications. It was designed as a software-based Internet Protocol (IP) 
packet sniffer that can select and record a defined subset of the traffic on the 
network to which it is attached. The FBI believed that Carnivore enables them to 
precisely limit the information they gather more than they could through 
commercially-available tools or by requesting interceptions by ISPs. Because of 
the absence of detailed information about Carnivore, privacy advocates and other 
members of the public raised questions about Carnivore and its use by the FBI. 
There accordingly arose concerns within the US Federal Government whether 
Carnivore is a necessary and appropriate tool for permissible electronic 
surveillance. In response to these concerns, the US Department of Justice solicited 
an independent review of Carnivore by the academia and private industry. IIT 
Research Institute (IITRI) and Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent 
College of Law were selected from several organizations that submitted proposal 




 Ibid,  
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and were under contract to the Department of Justice to carry out the review. The 




5.2.2.1  Carnivore System Architecture and Capabilities 
―The Carnivore system architecture comprises: (1) a one-way tap into an Ethernet 
data steam; (2) a general purpose computer to filter and collect data; (3) one or 
more additional general-purpose computers to control the collection and examine 
the data; (4) a telephone link to connect the additional computer(s) to the 
collection computer; and (5) Carnivore software.‖12 Carnivore software is a 
component that, with two other components, Packeteer and CoolMiner, make up a 
software suite called Dragonware written by the FBI. Carnivore selects and 
records IP packets from an Ethernet data stream. It does not assemble packets into 
higher level protocols. Indeed, no IP protocol stack is installed. The packets are 
treated strictly as data; they are subjected to a series of tests looking for specific 
patterns. Success or failure of the tests determines which packets are selected and 
recorded. Packeteer and CoolMiner are subsequently deployed to reconstruct the 
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 IIT Research Institute, ‗Independent Review of the Carnivore System Final Report‘ 8 December 
2000, available online at http://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf , accessed on 29 March 
2008. 
12
 Ibid, p. 3-10 
13
 Ibid. 







The Carnivore system was typically loaded on a generic Pentium-class PC, with a 
generic 10/100 Mbps Ethernet adapter. This adapter is set to promiscuous mode 
and accordingly acquires all the packets that pass through the segment of the 
network to which the read-only tap is connected. Upon acquisition, the packets 
are tested by the Carnivore software against pre-set filter settings. All the packets 
that match the filter settings are then saved to a removable jazz disk, located 
behind a key-lockable panel on the Carnivore box. The filter settings are done 
through Carnivore‘s graphic user interface. Carnivore‘s user interface are divided 
into basic (figure 3) and advanced (figure 4). The basic interface enables an 
operator to start and stop collection, view collection statistics, and segment the 
output file while the advanced interface allows an operator to define the filter 
parameters that control what Carnivore collects. 




Figure 5-1 Carnivore, Basic Screen
14
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 Ibid, p. 3-14. 
15
 Ibid, p. 3-15 
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As is noticeable from Figure 5-2, Carnivore‘s advanced menu enables a precise 
description of the parameters of the data to be collected. Packets can be filtered 
based on IP address, protocol, text strings, port, and e-mail address.
16
 IP address 
filtering is possible for both fixed and dynamic IP addresses. Carnivore supports 
the collection of dynamically –allocated IP addresses made via RADIUS or 
DHCP. For DHCP, the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the target 
machine must be input while for RADIUS, the username must be input.
17
 
Additionally, Carnivore could be set to capture only IRI or the full content/CC of 
any internet communication. The collection computer is installed without a 
keyboard and monitor, and is normally physically inaccessible to case agents 
while in use. However, the Carnivore collection computer is equipped with a 56-
Kbps modem allowing it to communicate with control computers via a standard 
but dedicated analogue telephone link. pcAnywhere, a standard commercial 
product from Symantec Inc. supports this remote access. The telephone link is 
also protected as follows: First, a unique (i.e., not reused), unlisted telephone 
number is assigned; second, the link is equipped with a hardware key such that 
only computers with an identical key can connect; third, the pcAnywhere software 
supporting the link requires a user name and password; and finally, pcAnywhere 
encrypts information on the link. 
 
The control computers have Packeteer and CoolMiner installed and are located at 
law enforcement sites. While the control computer is connected to the collecting 
                                                          
16
 Ibid, p. 3-13. 
17
 Ibid, p. 3-15 
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computer by a modem as described above, the operator of the control computer 
can set and change filter settings, start and stop collection, and retrieve the 
collected information.  With Packeteer and CoolMiner, the operator can 
reconstruct target activity from collected IP packets. Packeteer reconstructs the 
TCP sessions, which are in ―.vor‖ files; it reconstructs them into a series of files 
that can be viewed with CoolMiner. The CoolMiner program is used by the case 
agent to further select which data to view. For example, CoolMiner can be set to 
show only HTTP packets. This is not to limit collection, but to make it easier to 
view, analyze, and minimize the collected data. The operator might, for example, 
choose to first look at the HTTP traffic and thereafter look at the SMTP traffic. 




5.2.2.2 Relevant IITRI Concluding Observations 
The IITRI reached a number of general conclusions and the ones that are most 
relevant to this study are as follows: 
 
a) Carnivore restricts collected information in a precise manner that cannot be 
duplicated by other means. Publicly available sniffer software, such as EtherPeek, 
are not capable of limiting collection as precisely as most court orders require. 
This results in over-collection and greater reliance on human intervention to 
minimize the information collected. Moreover, many ISPs are unwilling or unable 
to collect only the information specified in a court order and it is not desirable that 
                                                          
18
 Ibid p. 3-17 – 3-18. 
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b) ―Carnivore is used under the same basic legal and organizational controls as 
are employed for telephone wiretaps and telephone pen-trap devices. Multiple 
organizational approvals are required for Carnivore deployment before a court 
order is issued; significant post-collection organizational and judicial controls 
exist as well.‖20 
 
 
c) ―Carnivore can collect everything that passes by on the Ethernet segment to 
which it is connected…It is up to the agent who sets up Carnivore to select the 
proper set of filters so only the data that is allowed by the court order is actually 
collected.‖21 It is noteworthy however that there are no automated checks for 
valid configuration within the Carnivore system, reliance is placed on the 
significant FBI procedural checks.
22
 In effect, although Carnivore was designed 
to, and can, perform fine-tuned searches, it is also capable of broad sweeps. 
 
d) In pen mode/IRI interception of certain e-mail protocols, Carnivore version 
1.3.4 captures the contents of the TO and FROM fields. It however replaces each 
character in the other fields with an X. Using one-to-one replacement permits 
                                                          
19




 Ibid p. 4-3. 
22
 Ibid. 
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users to determine the length (but not the content) of all of the fields defined by 
the e-mail protocol e.g. subject field and body field of the message. The 
determination of the length of these other fields would be more than what is 




e) ―Carnivore version 1.3.4 mixes pen-trap and full-content capability in one 
device. Unless correctly configured, the device can over-collect under a pen-trap 
order.‖24 
 
f) In full collection mode, Carnivore can record whatever transactions occur 
through TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols including HTTP, FTP, SMTP, POP3, 
Exchange Mail, IMAP, CCmail, VoIP, and streaming media. E-commerce 
payments-related communications, however, typically use Secure Sockets Layer, 




g) Carnivore does not come close to having enough power ―to spy on almost 
everyone with an e-mail account.‖26 To work effectively, Carnivore must reject 
the majority of packets it monitors. It also has storage space as its main limitation 
in this regard. 
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h) ―There is no auditing in Carnivore. The Carnivore version 1.3.4 collection 
computer is always logged in as the ―Administrator‖ rather than using individual 
user IDs. This Administrator log-in means that every user of the system has full 
control over all the resources of the system. Even if auditing were enabled, there 
is nothing to prevent someone from editing or deleting those audit logs.‖27 
 
i)  
―Carnivore version 1.3.4 has significant deficiencies in 
protection for the integrity of the information it collects. 
Information gathered by Carnivore may be lost or corrupted by 
physical attack, software bugs, or power failure. Also, the 
relationship among Carnivore filter settings, collected data, and 
other investigative activities may be difficult to establish. 
These deficiencies make Carnivore less effective as an 
investigative tool. Lack of physical control of the Carnivore 
collection computer engenders some risk of compromise by 
untrustworthy ISP personnel.‖28 
 
5.2.3 Xcipio for Internet Access Intercept 
SS8 Networks‘ Xcipio is designed for real-time communication intercept, its 
portfolio of supported technologies has grown to include VoIP, wireless data, 
WiFi, Wi-Max, broadband, satellite, IP Multimedia Systems (IMS) and 
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 According to SS8 Networks, ―With the 
experience of hundreds of deployments worldwide, from the largest nation-wide 
carriers to the smallest regional carriers, Xcipio has evolved into a robust Lawful 
Intercept (LI) platform serving the needs of carriers, governments and law 
enforcement agencies globally.‖30 From the foregoing, it is indeed likely that 
Xcipio is in use in some of the jurisdictions under consideration. Additionally, 
Xcipio also meets the following technical standards: TIA J-STD-025, ETSI ES- 
201-671, TIIT in the Netherlands, and PacketCable. Xcipio comprises six 
applications designed to meet the needs of different networks.
31
 For the internet, 
the relevant application is the Internet access delivery function (IADF).
32
 All of 
Xcipio‘s applications however operate on a common service layer with four 
modules.
 33
 The details of the IADF and its underlying modules are outlined 
below.  
 
5.2.3.1 Xcipio Internet Access Delivery Function (IADF):  Functioning 
and Key Features  
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 SS8 Networks ‗Xcipio Lawful Intercept Platform‘ 2007, http://www.ss8.com/xcipio.php, 




 Including circuit switch, call data delivery, internet, softswitch, wireless data, and recording 
equipment. 
32
 The other applications are: Circuit switch delivery function (CSDF); Call data delivery function 
(CDDF); Softswitch delivery function (SSDF); Wireless data delivery function (WDDF); and 
Collection function (CF). 
33
 P. Hoffmann & K Terplan, Supra note 7, p. 179—181. 
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5.2.3.1.1 The Functioning of the System 
 
 




―The Xcipio IADF runs on standard Sun Microsystems servers 
and Xcipio CP-2300-ISP content processing module. Once 
lawful intercept is authorized by a court order, the CP-2300-
ISP module is provisioned with target identifying information 
by the Xcipio provisioning engine. This information is then 
used to identify data packets belonging to the target subscriber. 
The identified data is then extracted from the IP network data 
stream—all in real-time.  
 
                                                          
34
 SS8 Networks ‗Xcipio for Intercept Internet Access‘ 2007, http://www.ss8.com/internet.php, 
accessed on 3 April 2008. 
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In addition to passive monitoring capabilities, the Xcipio IADF 
supports dynamic IP addressing, enabling data packets to be 
extracted in real-time from network switches and aggregation 
routers.‖35 
 
Xcipio also contains a range of security features that ensures a secure platform 
and secure access for law enforcement users. Physical access is restricted to either 
network connectivity via the Ethernet card or a direct RS232 port. It also includes 
authentication, and security features that safeguard data and content and rule-
based user privileges can be tailored to restrict system access to only necessary 
and appropriate users. 
  
5.2.3.1.2 Key features of the CP-2300-ISP 
Hoffmann and Terplan, in their discussion of Xcipio IADF, noted the following 
key features of the CP-2300-ISP, and other features that recommend the system: 
a) Complies with current and emerging standards for IP interception (J-STD-025, 
TIIT, ETSI, etc.) and meets the interception requirements of various governments 
(such as CALEA in the United States) 
b) Connects to the network in a non-intrusive mode 
c) Collects IP traffic and filters out the exact information requested by a 
provisioning system 
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d) Filters traffic based on IP address, MAC address, e-mail address (Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol [SMTP] and Post Office Protocol 3 [POP3], using to, from, and 
cc fields), RADIUS log-in name, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), 
and universal resource locator (URL)/universal resource identifier [URI] (to and 
from). Additional filters are planned for future releases. 
e) Supports provisioning and device management Application Programming 
Interface (API) 
f)  Formats and delivers filtered data to LEAs based on international standards 
g) Supports both 10Base-T/100Base-TX with two 1000Base-SX port 
configuration 
h) It includes optimal granularity to preserve privacy. 
i) Its flexible architecture allows for configurations based on country-specific 
regulations. 
j) It captures only the traffic to or from the entity listed on the warrant; the privacy 
of all non-warrant-defined IP traffic is preserved. 
k) It operates at high speeds without service disruption. 
l) The high operation speed (measured in Gbps) ensures interception of all IP 
traffic for a specific warrant-defined suspect. 
m) Its non-intrusive network connectivity avoids disruption or degradation of 
customer services. 
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n) Traffic is intercepted in the core of the network, minimizing the number of 





5.2.4 Aqsacom Lawful Interception Management Solution (ALIS) 
This technology from Aqsacom is designed to be a real-time mediation platform 
to satisfy a variety of lawful interception requests. Aqsacom has advertised it as 
an interception technology that is non-intrusive, totally transparent and 
independent of the underlying connectivity technology. The system has a 
client/server layered architecture and comprises two functional entities: ALIS-M 
and ALIS-D. ALIS-M is the management platform. It manages the interception 
sessions, instructs the network elements to start / end interception and constantly 
monitors the status of the network elements to alert the network operator of a fault 
condition. It is the target provisioning and central system management element of 
ALIS. ALIS-D is the collection platform. It receives the interception content and 
data from the network elements, formats this information, and sends the results to 




Aqsacom is a member of ETSI. Accordingly, ALIS is compliant with ETSI 
recommendations on technical standards. It is additionally compliant with 
CALEA and supports several other national lawful interception requirements 
                                                          
36
 P. Hoffmann & K Terplan, Supra note 7, p. 201 
37
 Aqsacom, ‗Lawful Interception‘ 
http://www.aqsacomna.com/us/index.cfm?vSectionCode=PROD1, accessed on 4 April 2008. 
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including those of Australia, Belgium, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Germany.  
 








Figure 5-4 provides an overview of the ALIS architecture. As is apparent, it 
supports interceptions on Public Land Mobile Networks (PLMN); Public 
Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN); IP; VoIP; and Next Generation Networks 
                                                          
38
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(NGN). We are however concerned with only its internet interception capabilities. 
Accordingly, its key features will be discussed as they relate to IP interceptions. 
 
Provisioning: ALIS-m is responsible for provisioning, workflow synchronization, 
and confidentiality and security of access to the data. It supports multi-
administration whereby one person‘s communication could be intercepted on 
behalf of several law enforcement agencies. Its GUI provides the user with 
optimal flexibility to start, stop, query, and modify interception operations in a 
secure manner. It supports several interception criteria including IP address, MAC 
address, user id, and geographical criteria. Additionally, ALIS-m supports 




Mediation: ALIS-d supports the mediation aspects of the System. Mediation 
operations are performed upon the IRI and CC to match the format 
constraints/handover interfaces imposed by the different regulatory bodies and 





Delivery: ALIS-d supports the delivery requirements of the lawful interception 
operations. The interception content is forwarded to the concerned law 
enforcement agency or monitoring centre using secure data links. Delivery of the 
IRI may also be carried out using the Short Message Services (SMS) or FAX. 
                                                          
39
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40
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Under special circumstances, the interception content could be transferred to 
external media such as DAT tape or CD ROM. Additionally, ―Delivery 
mechanisms based on open standards such as ROSE or FTP are used to 
communicate with the other components of the lawful interception chain. The 
security of the connections between the different elements is guaranteed by the 
use of trusted paths with support for open standards like IPSEC and SSL.‖41 
 
 
Authentication, Access Methods and Security: ―Stringent system access control 
rules apply. Access can take place locally (e.g. through a LAN), remotely via a 
WAN or through remote access using a secure dial up connection with a user-
identity exchange and a call-back procedure. The user authentication is performed 
over trusted paths and can take multiple forms, from entry of a User ID and 
Complex Password combination to authentication based a biometrics.‖42 
 
The foregoing are the general structural features of ALIS. It is however to be 
noted that its modular architecture supports a series of configurations and 
deployment alternatives. ALIS may be deployed as an All-in-One Box solution, 
which is a portable solution in which all the functional components – 
provisioning, mediation, and delivery – are located within one transportable 
system. It could also be deployed with a configuration whereby administrative 
and legal responsibilities are separated from the technical responsibilities. This is 





  161 
 
known as the Centralized Management and Distributed Delivery (CMDD). 
Additionally, it could be deployed with a configuration that allows different 
operators to carry out data mediation, while a single legal entity, usually a 
designated government agency, carries out the centralized functions of 





5.2.4.2 The Functioning of ALIS: Illustrations for IP Interceptions 
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Figure 5-5 IP Interception
44
 
―ALIS-m operates in conjunction with the service provider‘s network access 
switching and servers (e.g., RADIUS) to determine the target‘s originating IP 
address (static or dynamic). Once this address is known, ALIS-d routes a secure 
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5.2.5 Comparison Table of the Key Features of the Interception 
Technologies Relevant to the Study 
 CARNIVORE XCIPIO ALIS 
Filters Packets can be filtered 
based on IP address, 
protocol, text strings, 
port, and e-mail address 
Packets can be filtered 
based on IP address, 
MAC address, e-mail 
address, URL/URI, and 
by using the to, from, 
and cc fields 
Supports several 
interception criteria 
including IP address, 
MAC address, user id, 
and geographical 
location 
IRI & CC 
Interception 
In the same 
Platform 




Remote Access: possible 
through a 56-Kbps 
modem and a dedicated 
analogue telephone link.  
Security: Unique 
unlisted telephone 
number for each link; 
link is protected by 
Access is restricted to 
either network 
connectivity via the 





Remote Access: via a 
WAN or a secure dial 
up connection with a 
user-identity exchange 
and a call-back 
procedure. 
Further Security: 
Ranges from User ID 
  164 
 
hardware keys; user 
name and password 
authentication; link is 
encrypted by 
pcAnywhere 
security features that 
safeguard data and 
content, and rule-based 
user privileges 
 








No, but the system is not 
completely secure from 
ISP snooping 
Designed to be deployed 
by ISPs and other 
carriers 
Hybrid Deployment: 
may be deployed by 
either ISP with data 
delivery to LEA or by 
LEA at ISP and direct 






No, collection computer 
is always logged in as 
―administrator‖ 
Has authentication and 
rule-based user privileges 
features but there is no 
emphasis on audit trails 
supports user 
authentication by user 
ID, complex passwords 
and biometrics but there 
is no emphasis on audit 
trails 
 
Table 5-1 Comparison Table of Interception Technologies 
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5.2.6 The Privacy Question  
The fact that the use of these technologies interferes with privacy is quite beyond 
question. Governments and related industry groups acknowledge this fact. Indeed, 
a large portion of the analysis in Chapter 4 establishes that the interception of 
personal communications would always interfere with privacy. According to the 
Human Rights Committee, ―interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other 
forms of communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations should be 
prohibited.‖46  These technologies do indeed intercept ‗other forms of 
communication‘, namely internet communications. They represent a new form of 
wire-tapping. In Copland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights clarified that the regulation of the interception of telephonic 
communications in its jurisprudence equally applies to internet communications.
47
 
It is however also beyond question that governments generally pursue legitimate 
aims when they intercept communications for law enforcement and national 
security purposes and these aims are equally recognized in the ICCPR and ECHR 
jurisprudence. Terrorists, organised crime groups, other criminals, and espionage 
agents all avail themselves of the enhanced communication opportunities brought 
about by the internet. Governments have therefore had to deploy these 
technologies to fight crime and preserve national security and territorial integrity. 
Traditionally, the law has sought to balance the competing interests of privacy 
and law enforcement by prescribing safeguards in the nature of interception 
warrants and other procedural checks. 
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The question therefore is whether the laws that may have been sufficient for 
regulating interceptions in the traditional telecommunication scenarios are 
sufficient for doing the same for internet interceptions. Two views may be 
adopted here. The first will treat the internet as similar to traditional post-
telecommunication while the second holds that internet interceptions raise more 
issues than traditional post-telecom. 
 
5.2.6.1 Internet Communications as Akin to Traditional Post-
Telecommunication 
This view might suffice as a point of departure to the effect that if the interception 
of traditional post-telecommunication interferes with privacy, the interception of 
internet communications would also interfere with privacy. The ECtHR in 
Copland v United Kingdom reached this point of departure when it pointed out 
that since according to its case law, telephone calls made from business premises 
are covered by notions of ―private life‖ and ―correspondence‖, it follows logically 
that emails sent from work and internet usage should be similarly protected under 
Article 8.
48
 This view is perhaps supported by a non-technical consideration of 
some application layer protocols of the internet such as the HTTP as the author 
has done elsewhere as follows: 
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―Communication over the internet is conducted through a set of 
rules or protocols, the most common of which is the Hyper 
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). When an internet user clicks 
on a link or types an address into his web browser, the browser 
sends a request for the webpage, be it a document, an image, a 
movie or music file. This request goes through the ISP‘s 
Domain Name System (DNS). The function of the DNS is to 
translate a domain name such as http://www.uu.se into its 
actual IP address: 130.238.7.10.  The IP address is a unique 
number that devices use in order to identify and communicate 
with each other on a network using the internet protocol 
standard. The request for a web page would thus read: 
 
 ―GET/studentdirectory/benvincents.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: http://www.uu.se‖  
 
This would be a simple request to the Uppsala University web 
server to send the benvincents webpage from the student 
directory at the Uppsala University website. If this page is 
found successfully, then the web server will use the user‘s IP 
address to send the requested page with a message that would 
read as follows: 
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 ―HTTP/1.1 OK 200 
Date: (date of page) 
Server: (web server type) 
Content/type: text.html…and the file‖ 
 
The code 200 at the beginning of the message indicates that the 
page was found and if this were not the case, an error code 
such as 404 would be sent back.
 49
  
The foregoing is a basic illustration of how part of the internet 
works and, as is immediately apparent, such communications 
could be quite similar to traditional forms of postal and 
telecommunication at a non-technical level. The IP address, 
without which the internet cannot function, could be likened to 
a telephone number or a postal address. However, the 
illustration above is on only one application layer protocol, the 
HTTP, through which we conduct some of the most common 
online activities such as surfing the World Wide Web. There 
are several other application layer protocols that carry other 
forms of data.‖50      
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 See generally Answerbag  ‗When I Request a Web Page, What Really Happens in the 
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 O. Vincents, ‗Interception of Internet Communications and the Right to Privacy: An Evaluation 
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Protocol (SMTP) and the Post Office Protocol (POP), for email transmissions; the Voice Over 
Internet Protocol (VOIP), used for internet telephony; and many other protocols for instant 
messaging such as the AOL Instant Messenger Protocol (AIM) 
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Beyond the said point of departure, the foregoing view becomes unsustainable 
hence the need for the second view below. 
  
5.2.6.2 Internet communications as more than traditional post-
telecommunication 
In the same article excerpted above, the author also maintained as follows: 
 
―Internet usage is transforming more into a way of life than a 
way of communicating and, in this regard, it goes beyond the 
traditional post and telecommunication. The availability of a 
myriad of application layer protocols for transmitting data over 
the internet supports the view that users do much more on the 
internet than is possible in the traditional post and 
telecommunication media. Indeed the similarity between the 
internet and the traditional post and telecommunication 
diminishes with the realisation that internet communication, as 
illustrated above with the HTTP, often takes place only 
between two computers such as a server and a browser at the 
instance of one person and not between two natural persons. 
This sort of human to computer interaction is what obtains in 
most information retrieval/updating usage of the internet as 
well as in many of the web browsing activities undertaken by 
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users. These can hardly be described as two-way 
communication since only one natural person is usually 
directly involved. 
 
The interception of such online activities may amount to an 
unprecedented intrusion on a person's seclusion not dissimilar 
to interference with a person's very thoughts. This is because 
the user may not in any way intend that his information be 
accessible to any other person except himself. Two kinds of 
internet services immediately come to mind as illustrative. One 
is the maintaining of diaries on the internet such as the services 
provided by InternetDiary.net, while the other is the storage of 
personal documents on the internet such as the services 
provided by briefcase.yahoo.com. Without doubt, the 
traditional interception warrant did not extend to such materials 
as briefcases and diaries because hitherto such were not 
available via communication. The search of diaries and 
briefcases ordinarily required search warrants. Such search 
warrants usually require that the premises to be searched and 
the objects to be seized be specified with a degree of 
precision.‖51 
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In line with the foregoing, it is submitted that the laws that were sufficient for the 
protection of privacy in the traditional wiretap may not always be adequate for 
internet wiretaps. In the light of the discussion in Chapter 4, the most pressing 
question to be determined concerning laws that authorise interceptions and 
privacy is that of proportionality. To allow only interceptions that are strictly 
necessary in a democratic society, the invasiveness of the interceptions ought to 
be limited as much as possible. As is evident from the technologies discussed 
above, very many different kinds of communications can be intercepted on the 
internet. Equally evident is the fact that filters are available and very narrow 
filters are possible such that warrants can now narrowly specify the data to be 
intercepted. Proportionality would therefore require that this availability of filters 
be reflected in the law to prevent the authorisation of more invasive interceptions 
where a narrow one is possible. In the same vein, the law should require separate 
interception of Intercept Related Information i.e. addressing information (IRI) and 
Call Content i.e. the content of communication (CC) whenever this is possible and 
when only IRI is required.  
 
Additionally, with a packet-switched network like the internet, CC and IRI travel 
in the same network such that interception is usually of the entire communication 
even where the interception of content is not authorised. The intercepted data is 
usually subsequently minimised to exclude content but the risks of unauthorised 
processing of content in such circumstances are much higher than in the 
traditional post and telecommunication, where IRI and CC are normally 
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separated. The corollary of the treaty standards in focus in this study is adequate 
and effective safeguards/guarantees against abuse even where the interference 
with privacy is lawful and pursues a legitimate aim. One way to meet these 
standards in the face of the inherent risk of over-interception is by legislative 
imposition of stricter conditions precedent to the issuance of a warrant for internet 
interceptions.  
 
Other safeguards that are considered necessary from the discussion of the 
technologies above include the requirement of effective auditing of interceptions 
for the apportionment of liability in the event of interceptions that exceed 
authority; the requirement of strong security measures for the preserving of 
interception data from unauthorised access; and disincentives to fishing 
expeditions, unlawful, or excessive interception. The foregoing are some of the 
criteria against which the laws in Singapore, US, and UK would be evaluated in 
Part III below.  
 
5.3 Private Sector Interception Technologies 
5.3.1 Packet Sniffers 
On the internet, there are perhaps a few technologies that assist in the interception 
of data but by far the one that has been pervasively employed in the private sector 
is the packet sniffer, also known as a network protocol analyzer. A packet sniffer 
is a device that intercepts internet communication at the packet level. When a 
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computer sends data using the internet, the data is broken down to smaller pieces 
known as datagrams or packets. Each packet contains a header, which consists of 
the Internet protocol (IP) addressing information for determining where the packet 
is coming from and where it is going as well as the type of content which it 
embodies. The packet is also made up of content, which is the original file being 
transmitted or part thereof. The sending computer creates the packets and assigns 
the headers while the receiving computer reassembles the original file after 
receiving all the packets, it thereafter discards the packet headers. Located at a 
particular physical point in a network, the packet sniffer checks or sniffs every 





Once the sniffer identifies a packet based on the preset parameters, it makes a 
copy of all or part of the packet depending on its setting, while allowing the 
packet to move on to its original destination. This means that the interception 
subjects never have an idea that they are under surveillance. With the packet 
sniffer, interception could be made of all communication from a particular 
computer or set of computers, including voice data, emails, Web surfing, 
purchases and any other online activity. Packet sniffers were developed as 
diagnostic and security tools employed by network administrators; as a result, 
there are quite a few models that are publicly available; some are free of charge. 
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Private individuals are therefore able to easily obtain and deploy packet sniffers in 
their computers. However, a sniffer run on a personal computer can only analyse 
internet traffic that goes through a limited part of an entire network. In order to 
have a wider reach, sniffing devices need to be deployed at a strategic location, 
usually at the internet service providers‘ facilities. All the law enforcement 
interception technologies discussed above are specialized forms of packet sniffers. 
However, there are some differences between those and the publicly available 
sniffer devices as would be seen below. 
 
5.3.1.1 Publicly Available Sniffer Devices: EtherPeek 
There are several widely available sniffer products. Wireshark, available for free; 
Ethereel, available for free; and Omnipeek, with a free demo version, are all 
examples of packet sniffers. In analyzing the Carnivore system, IITRI also 
downloaded, deployed, and analyzed a publicly available sniffer software, 
Etherpeek (now OmniPeek). IITRI found that EtherPeek permits the user to 
capture any packet visible to the network interface card on which it is installed i.e. 
any packet traversing a network segment on a local area network in which the 
software is installed. EtherPeek‘s capture utility can be configured to capture only 
those packets using a particular protocol, such as IP, TCP/IP, or IP/HTTP. It can 
also target particular IP or Ethernet addresses. After packets have been captured, 
EtherPeek software can be caused to group packets comprising a particular 
session. Packet contents may then be examined in a graphical display that 
highlights particular elements of transactional information and displays plain text 
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contents in readable ASCII format. IITRI had no difficulty in configuring 
EtherPeek to capture packets comprising a short web browsing session and to 
capture packets comprising email retrieved through web mail from a Microsoft 
exchange server. The full content of the e-mail thus retrieved and the full content 
of the URLs and selected web pages were clearly visible in the plain text ASCII 
window of the software.
53
 IITRI also concluded that publicly available sniffer 
software have less precise filters than Carnivore. 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Wireshark 
The author was able to confirm most of the foregoing findings by downloading 
and deploying Ethereal and Wireshark; some features of Wireshark are therefore 
outlined below. Wireshark permits the user to capture any packet visible to the 
network interface card on which it is installed. In addition to the Broadcom 
network interface card displayed in the capture options (Figure 5-6), packets 
visible to the other installed network cards in the system may be chosen and 
captured including the dialup and wireless interfaces. As is evident from Figure 5-
8, there are some display and name resolution options available to the user. The 
user may also designate one or multiple files into which the captured packets may 
be saved directly and may also configure capturing to stop after a particular 
amount of time has elapsed or a number or size of packets have been captured. 
More importantly, the user may set the capture filters as seen in figure 5-9 below.  
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Figure 5-6 Wireshark Capture Options 
 
The user may use any of the default filter options, some of which are visible in 
figure 5-7 or type in his filter string. It is to be noted that Wireshark is set by 
default to capture packets in promiscuous mode with no filters set. With these 
settings, Wireshark may capture any packets that pass through the network 
segment in which it is deployed as long as the packets conform to any of the 836 
protocols and packet types that Wireshark supports. It is to be noted however that 
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Wireshark may also be configured so that some higher level protocols are not 
displayed by disabling those protocols.  
 
Figure 5-7 Wireshark Capture Filter 
 
After Wireshark is started, the captured packets are displayed as in figure 5-8 
below whereupon the user may use the available features to find the desired 
packets. There are also features within the program for grouping packets 
comprising a particular session. For example, by right-clicking any of the packets 
(like the highlighted packet in Figure 5-8), the user, by choosing the option 
‗follow TCP stream‘, can cause the software to reassemble all the packets 
comprising a particular session as seen in figure 5-9. Figure 5-9 shows the 
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reconstruction of all the packets comprising the author‘s browsing of nus.edu.sg 
captured by Wireshark. The source code of the webpage is clearly visible in 
ASCII. 
 
Figure 5-8 Wireshark Display GUI 
  179 
 
 
Figure 5-9 Reconstructed Packets  
 
Without doubt, anybody with sufficient technical knowledge can download and 
deploy any of these packet sniffers. The only limitation would be that of access to 
the segment of the network through which the target‘s internet traffic passes and 
knowledge of say the IP address to intercept. Network administrators and internet 
service/access providers are well placed to overcome these limitations. They can 
therefore effectively intercept the internet communication of any person in their 
network at very little cost.  
 
  180 
 
5.3.2 The Privacy Question 
It is beyond question that the use of packet sniffers to intercept internet users‘ 
communications interferes with those users‘ privacy. As noted above, the 
interception of personal communications would always interfere with privacy. 
The references to the ICCPR and ECHR jurisprudence above also applies here 
with the very important exception that non-state officials have very little or no 
justification for intercepting communications to which they are not a party if they 
are not acting on behalf of law enforcement agencies. It is difficult to imagine that 
there is a jurisdiction where it is lawful for individuals to intercept each other‘s 
communications. The deployment of these technologies in the private sector for 
surveillance purposes is therefore likely to fail the ‗in accordance with law‘ test 
under both the ICCPR and the ECHR if it is not regulated by law in the relevant 
jurisdiction. Where the law does not expressly prohibit the use of these 
technologies without authorisation, the obvious argument would be that it should. 
Additionally, even if the use of these technologies is deemed lawful, to be 
justified, it has to also be shown that the use is 
reasonable/proportionate/necessary. These are some of the issues that will be 
addressed regarding Singapore, the UK, and the US in Part III below. 
  
For a balanced analysis, it must be borne in mind that there are very cogent 
reasons for the existence of packet sniffers. Network professionals around the 
world use them for troubleshooting, analysis, software and protocol development, 
and education. Education would include the use of packet sniffers for research. 
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For example, a number of the technologies discussed in Chapter 6 below were 
detected by the use of packet sniffers and the outline of Wireshark above would 
not have been possible if the author were unable to deploy it. Additionally, using 
the information captured by packet sniffers, network administrators can identify 
abnormal/erroneous packets, use the data to pinpoint bottlenecks, help maintain 
efficient network data transmission, and even detect intrusion attempts. These 
functions are invaluable to the administration of networks and are the envisaged 
reasons for the existence of packet sniffers. Unfortunately, the potential for abuse 
is high as is evident in the story of a software programmer who deployed Ethereal 
to unearth evidence of his partner's infidelity.
54
 For some strange reason, Ethereal 
touts this story on its website.
55
 It would therefore seem that the use of these 
technologies ought to be regulated in a way that limits its use to legitimate 
purposes. One possible solution is the enactment of laws that prescribe stiff 
penalties that would act as deterrents as well as the requirement of reporting from 
network administrators and other forms of audits.  These issues would be 
addressed in Part III, first however, a discussion of tracking technologies.
                                                          
54
 The Register, ‗Packet-sniffing Techie Uncovers Spousal Infidelity‘, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/03/30/ethereal_relationship_break-up/  By John Leyden, 30 
March 2006, accessed on 11 April 2008. 
55
 http://www.ethereal.com/news/item_20060330_01.html.  
  182 
 
CHAPTER 6: TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Many stakeholders in the information society are interested in user data and 
online habits. These include commercial, educational, and scientific entities. 
However, the sector that has proactively deployed privacy-significant 
technologies to track users online is the commercial sector. The major push for 
the deployment of these technologies is Customer Relations Management (CRM). 
CRM ―is a process that manages the interactions between a company and its 
customers.‖1 In today‘s internet global village, a customer‘s continuing business 
is no longer a given. The features of trading in the physical world that once 
guaranteed customer loyalty are almost outdated now and have disappeared 
altogether in cyberspace. There are now more customers, more products, more 
competitors and less time to react to customers‘ needs and shifts. Accordingly, it 
has become important to understand the customers better and identify their needs 
even before they show signs of dissatisfaction.
2
 These customers are also now 
difficult to understand such that the more a business knows about its existing and 
potential customers, the more effective and competitive it will be. This need 
accounts for the increasing importance of CRM and the consequent appetite for 
user data. CRM personnel and marketers must firstly identify market segments 
                                                          
1
 A. Berson, S. Smith, and K. Thearling, Building Data Mining Applications for CRM, (2000, 
McGraw-Hill, New York) p. 10. 
2
 See generally, A. Berson, S. Smith, and K., Ibid, pp. 4—10.  
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with existing and prospective customers. They must thereafter build and execute 
campaigns that would bring them in. Identifying this segment requires significant 
data about prospective customers. To this end, almost all technologies that are 
capable of collecting user data have been utilized regardless of their primary 
purpose and new technologies are continuously deployed. The debate about 
tracking technologies must therefore countenance the importance of customer 
information. At the same time, this importance underscores the threat to internet 
users‘ privacy since, from the perspective of CRM, the more user information the 
company is able to collect, the better.  
 
The most prominent of these tracking technologies are discussed below with 
highlights on the reason for their deployment; the nature of information the 
companies expect to obtain; and how they affect privacy. Cookies, flash cookies, 
web bugs, web search engines, search robots, spyware, and other technologies 
that perform undisclosed capture and transmission of personal data are discussed. 
Of all the technologies, cookies have received the most attention in the media and 
among internet users. There are good reasons for this. For one thing, cookies are 
the primary identifiers among the technologies and as is evident below, other 
technologies take advantage of this identification. Some of these other 
technologies affect user privacy primarily because the user or browser is 
identified. The fact that cookies affect user privacy seems to be quite settled 
because almost all websites that employ cookies notify this fact in their privacy 
policies. Special attention is therefore paid to cookies below and the discussion of 
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cookies also provides an opportunity to discuss the attendant data warehousing 
and data mining, including log file analysis and reporting. Although data 
warehousing and mining are discussed under the ‗cookies‘ heading, the same 
processes are applicable to log files obtained through other tracking technologies.    
 
6.2 Cookies 
Cookies are small text files that are placed on web-users‘ computers by websites 
in order to "remember" them the next time they return to the site and or to 
personalize web content. Contrary to popular notions, cookies are not programs 
but are a special form of identifiers that cannot perform any tasks on their own. 
They neither scan a person‘s computer nor gather any information from the host 
computer. Cookies however allow a Website to store information on a user's 
machine and later retrieve it.  
 
When a web browser needs to communicate with a server in HTTP transactions, it 
composes a request. This could be a GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, DELETE, 
TRACE, or OPTION request. When an internet user decides to visit a website by 
either typing in the URL or by following a link, the browser will compose a GET 
request and if no cookie had been previously set by the domain, the header of the 
GET request will contain no cookie information but the request will contain an 
instruction from the server to the browser to set a cookie as in the following 
example of a visit to www.mediacorptv.sg: 
 




   
The response from the server, separated from the request by a blank line, provides 
some basic information: It was a HTTP 1.1 request and the URL was successfully 
retrieved hence the 200 OK code. In addition to these and other information such 
as the date of the request, the content type and length, the server instructs the 
browser to set a cookie named ASPSESSIONIDSAAQACTB, which has a value 
of CHEOHEFDEAKAOEGOGKDFPANM, and the path ‗/‘. All these make up 
the header of the response while the requested page follows, after a blank line. 
From the time this cookie is set, any other request for a page from the 
mediacorptv domain would always contain the name and the value of the cookie 
in the header as in the following example: 
 




Every other website that had previously set a cookie for this particular browser 
would similarly have the name(s) and value(s) of its cookie(s) returned in all 
subsequent requests. Cookies are stored on the cookie folder of the browser. In 
the Mozilla Firefox browser, users can easily view the cookies folder by clicking 
on ‗tools‘, and selecting ‗options‘, and then selecting ‗privacy‘, and clicking on 
‗show cookies‘. Following this procedure, the cookie set by medicorptv.sg in the 
above illustration may easily be viewed as seen in figure 6-1.  
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Figure 6-1 Cookie Folder showing the details of a cookie set by mediacorptv.sg 
 
From Figure 6-1, we see that Firefox cookies, like standard cookies, consist of six 
parts: name, value (content), domain (host), path, expiry, and secure properties. 
The name is a sequence of characters that uniquely identify the cookie. The value 
or content of the cookie is the variable that websites use to store information; it 
contains whatever the setter of the cookie desires. The domain field of the cookie 
indicates the domain name from which the cookie was set. Normally, only the 
domain that created the cookie can read the cookie. The path value of the cookie 
restricts cookie usage within a site; only pages in the path specified by this value 
in a cookie can read or update the cookie. When the path is simply set to ‗/‘, i.e. 
no path is specified, then all the pages within a domain can read and update the 
cookie. The expiry value of the cookie determines when the cookie is to expire. 
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The cookie depicted by figure 6-1 is a session cookie and is deleted at the end of 
the session. Many other cookies are more persistent, they are set to expire in 
months, years or tens of years. The ‗send for‘ value in figure 6-1 is the secure 
option in a cookie. It allows the cookie setter to determine whether the cookie 
could be sent for any type of connection or for only secure/encrypted connections. 
After a cookie has been set, only the name=value/content pair is returned to the 
setting server with every request. To update the cookie, all the server need do is 
set a new cookie with the same domain, path and name. This will overwrite the 




Cookie contents stored in the browser are normally limited to 4 kb. This limits the 
amount of information that can be stored in the cookie itself. Hence, many servers 
only assign the unique ID to the cookie and store the bulk of the desired 
information on the server. Whether the information is stored in the cookie or not, 
the information is always communicated to the server and this is logged. Because 
every request to the server also communicates the cookie name=value pair, the 
server is able to log every page requested by the browser which the cookie 
identifies, this includes all images displayed to that browser. In short, the user‘s 
path or clickstream
4
 is logged. It is to be noted that although the internet user is 
not always directly identified by the information logged by the server through 
                                                          
3
 See generally, S. St. Laurent Cookies, (1998, McGraw-Hill, New York). 
4
 Clickstream ―…means data reflecting a sequence of actions taken by a User while connected to a 
digital network. Clickstream may include a record of the steps taken by a User to visit a Web page, 
execute an online search, or fill out a Web-based form‖. Agreement between Attorneys General of 
The States of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Vermont, And Washington and Doubleclick Inc., para 15 
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cookies, the user is always indirectly identifiable. This is because part of the 
information that the server logs, whenever it is programmed to do so,  is the IP 
address of the browser making the request as well as the date and time of the 
request.  
 
6.2.1 The Privacy Question 
The foregoing has established that websites are able to install cookies on internet 
user‘s hard drives to uniquely identify their browsers. With cookies, websites are 
also able to log all the actions taken by the user whenever she visits the website. 
In addition to these, many websites also require users to submit personally 
identifying information at some stage of their interaction with the website, others 
require regular authentication whereby the users‘ identities are verified. Such 
personal information may be added to a database or databases. With usage 
analysis tools that are increasingly available to servers, website administrators are 
able to aggregate users‘ personal information and other information contained in 
cookie log files. This way, it is possible to analyze, interpret, and appropriate user 
information without having to manually comb through many files.  
 
These features of the use of cookies raise some privacy questions. In the first 
place, some people actually find it objectionable that their computers should be 
tagged or identified the way cookies do. This objection is linked to the fact that 
the tagging is only possible with the installation of the cookie on the user‘s hard 
drive, most times without his knowledge or consent because browsers are set to 
  190 
 
accept cookies by default. This in itself  could be viewed as an interference with 
privacy because the user‘s browser and hard drive are private to the extent that 
they belong to him alone. To tag the former by installing text in the latter without 
prior consent could be said to interfere with the state or condition of being private. 
To the website administrator who is aware of the usefulness of cookies and their 
passive nature, this stipulation might sound outlandish. However, the right to 
privacy, by its very nature, accommodates individual idiosyncrasies to the extent 
that the individual chooses the things that pertain to him that he wants protected 
as private. Accordingly, those who consider their browsers and hard drives private 
would expect the protection of the law. 
 
Secondly, the logging and tracking of all the actions taken by a web user within a 
website is a type of surveillance and an interference with privacy. This is more so 
in cases where the personally identifying information of the user is combined with 
the log of his web activities to produce a more detailed profile. AT&T, for 
example, openly admits that it collects Web usage information as well as 
personally identifying information and that, in some cases, it combines web usage 
information with users‘ personal information.5 Even where personally identifying 
information such as names and addresses are not combined with cookie logs, 
there is still the potential of interference with privacy because cookie logs would 
                                                          
5
 ―[AT&T]…may combine Web usage information related to your access to our Web sites with 
personal identifying information. We use the combined information to provide our customers and 
Web visitors with a better online experience by providing customized features and services and to 
market and provide advertising about goods and services that may be of particular interest. Once 
combined, the resulting data is protected as personal identifying information as described in this 
policy‖, AT&T ‗Privacy Policy‘ http://www.att.com/gen/privacy-policy?pid=7666#103 16 June 
2006, accessed on 18 April 2008. 
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usually include IP addresses, date, and time the activities took place. With such 
information, the internet user is always identifiable whether the IP address is 
dynamic or not. 
 
To determine whether these interferences also amount to a violation of the right to 
privacy in the ICCPR and ECHR jurisprudence, recourse should again be had to 
the ‗in accordance with law‘ and arbitrariness/proportionality tests of the treaties. 
Where there are no laws, such as data protection laws, to regulate the use of 
cookies, there is then a violation of the right to privacy under the treaties. Part III 
of the thesis would address this question more fully. However, the following 
paragraphs would highlight practices associated with the use of cookies that could 
affect the determination of proportionality. The usefulness of cookies, and the 
advantages that their deployment engender must be counterbalanced against 
privacy interests to determine proportionality. 
 
6.2.1.1 Reasons for the Deployment of cookies  
Every connection by a browser to a server is, by the default design of the Web, a 
separate event unconnected to any previous events. The Webpage is neutral 
regarding the computer that accesses it, how that computer reached it, what 
country the computer is in and how long ago it was loaded unto that computer. 
This feature of the World Wide Web is generally referred to as statelessness. 
When the user clicks on a link or enters the URL directly, the browser sends a 
request for the file to the particular browser to which the URL refers. The server 
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on receiving the request examines it, determines the file the user wants, if it is 
available it sends it and disconnects. On receiving the webpage, the browser 
parses the HTML and if there are embedded objects, it re-contacts the server and 
the cycle is repeated until all the embedded objects are retrieved. In HTTP 1.1, the 
server, on sending a page, remains open and awaits further instruction until all the 
information for the page is downloaded successfully. Notwithstanding, the 
statelessness of the Web remains an issue even with HTTP 1.1 because the server 
still disconnects after all successful downloads and retains no information about 
previous visits. Consequently, Web developers have devised several ways to 
make client computers and server computers keep track of what they have been 
doing i.e. maintain state. Cookies are one key way to maintain state.
6
  Although 
there are other ways of maintaining state, e.g. by embedding session ID in the 
URL that is sent back to the client
7
, cookies seem to have some advantages that 
have ensured their continued existence in the tool chests of Web developers.  
 
Furthermore, cookies are used to uniquely identify the user‘s browser. With this 
identification, websites are able to associate server-side variables with a particular 
client. With the cookie-enabled identification also, websites are able to implement 
online shopping carts. For shopping carts, the items selected by the user may 
either be stored on the server or in the cookie itself, which resides in the users‘ 
hard drive. Additionally, cookies enable Websites to personalise or customize 
                                                          
6
 See S. St Laurent, Supra, note 3,  p. 1—16. 
7
 See E.g., G. Ollmann, ‗Web Based Session Management‘, Technical Info, 
http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/WebBasedSessionManagement.html accessed on 18 March 
2010. 
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their pages in line with users‘ preferences or location. Without cookies, a server 
would require users to identify themselves each time they access customizable 
pages. In short, cookies enable most of the features that bring about the 
seamlessness that internet users have come to expect on the World Wide Web. In 
addition to all these, cookies enable the logging and tracking of the activities of 
all visitors to a website as discussed above. It is around this latter use that the 
privacy questions associated with cookies have centred. 
 
6.2.1.1.1 The Use of Information Obtained through Cookies and other 
Tracking Technologies 
To determine how well the use of cookies for tracking purposes measures against 
the privacy interests of internet users, it remains necessary to inquire further into 
the type of uses websites make of information obtained through cookie logs. To 
determine where to draw the line in the ranges of uses made of cookie 
information, let us consider one of the technologies that enable a full range use of 
cookie information, the Microsoft Commerce Server 2007. 
 
The Commerce Server combines several tools including Business Management 
Applications, Commerce Server Systems, Line-of-Business Applications, Data 
Warehousing, Analytics, and Reporting tools in one platform.
8
 For our purposes, 
the data warehousing, analytics and reporting features are the most pertinent. The 
                                                          
8
 See Microsoft Corporation, ‗Commerce Server Architecture‘, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa546006.aspx, 2008, accessed on 30 April 2008. 
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Data Warehouse imports and stores data from several different sources and 
manages them for performing data mining and analysis reporting. It collects day-
to-day operational data about users who visit a site including user profile data, 
transaction data, and click-history data. It also collects product data and 
advertising data. The Data Warehouse gathers this data from Web server logs, 
Microsoft Commerce Server databases, and other data sources that the 





Microsoft Corporation provides us with an idea of the nature of analysis and 
reporting that website administrators produce with the information contained in a 





 Ad Reach and Frequency by Date: Review the behaviour of users 
relative to campaign items. 
 Ad Reach and Frequency per Advertiser: Review the behaviour of 
users relative to campaign items over time.  
 Campaign Item and Event Summary: Review the effectiveness of 
campaigns.  
 
                                                          
9
 Microsoft Corporation, ‗Data Warehouse‘, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa545535.aspx, 2008, accessed on 30 April 2008. 
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Product Sales Reports 
 
 Buyer Browse to Purchase: Review user visits and purchasing 
patterns. 
 Customer Sales: Review customer details, total sales, and total 
orders.  
 Order Events: Review order submittal events, such as a user 
clicking the Checkout button to indicate that the order is complete.  
 Shopping Basket Events: Review user behaviour about shopping 
basket activity.  
 
Query String Reports 
 
 Single-value and Multi-value Query Strings: Determine what 




 Distinct Users by Time: Determine whether a few users are 
visiting the site many times or if many users are visiting the site 
one time.  
 New Registered Users: Identify new registered users. 
 Registered User Properties: Review information provided by 
registered users.  
 Registered Users by Date Registered: Review the registration 
behaviour of users.  
 User Days to Register: Track the average number of days it takes 
anonymous users to register on the site. 
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 User Registration Rate: Determine how successfully anonymous 
users have been made to register on the site.  
 User Trends: Review the number of registered and anonymous 




 Entry Pages: Determine the 1,000 pages on the site that users are 
most likely to visit first.  
 Exit Pages: Determine from which pages users are most likely to 
leave the site.  
 General Activity Statistics: Quickly review the activity on the site. 
This report shows the average requests per visit, the average visit 
duration, and the number of requests and visits, over time. 
 User Visit Trends: Determine how successful the site is in 
attracting repeat users. This report shows the types of users (new 
and repeat) who visit the site by date. 
 
Web usage reports 
 
 Activity by Browser: Review activity by the types of browsers 
users use to access the site.  
 Directories: Determine which of the 1,000 URI directory levels are 
the most visited.  
 Entry Path Analysis: Determine the entry paths most frequently 
used to reach the site.  
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 Top Referring Domains by Requests: Review the sites from which 
users access the site.  
 Top Requested Pages: Review a list of the 1,000 most active 
pages, including query strings, by number of requests.  
 Usage Summary by Day of Week.  
 Usage Summary by Hour of Day.  
 Usage Trends: Review a summary of daily page requests, distinct 
users, and visits. 
 





The above represents the nature of reports that are produced from web server log 
files where cookies and user registration are in use. Other tracking technologies 
can produce logs upon which the foregoing analysis may be performed, usually in 
combination with cookies. There are several other web server log analysis tools 
some of which do not rely on cookies or user registration. However, without 
cookies and or user registration/authentication, web server logs are generally quite 
ambiguous and the reports produced from them may not be nearly as reliable as 
those produced from cookie log files.
11
  
                                                          
10
 See Microsoft Corporation, ‗Analysis Reporting‘, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa545688.aspx, 2008, accessed on 30 April 2008. 
11
 This is because of the increasing utilization of proxy servers and firewalls by ISPs and 
commercial corporate gateways respectively. Consequently, the server log files will contain 
records of the same proxy server or firewall IP addresses instead of various distinct client IP 
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This sort of data warehousing and mining as facilitated by cookies underscores 
the serious interference with the privacy that is possible in website administration. 
It however also shows the usefulness of such data processing. The websites do 
indeed have a legitimate interest in the various forms of reports produced with the 
user data. Web-based businesses invest much capital in the operation of websites 
and these reports are invaluable in the measuring of returns on investment, the 
effectiveness of advertising campaigns, web designs, the general thrust of the 
business, and other forms of customer relations management. The continued 
profitability of web-based undertakings is important to the economic wellbeing of 
any country. Internet users‘ also benefit from this sort of data processing when 
adverts are better targeted. Nevertheless, the state must continuously balance 
these interests against user privacy interests. This could be achieved by 
circumscribing grounds on which the use of these technologies could be deemed 
lawful and prescribing safeguards against abuse. In this regard, there are practices 
associated with cookies that seem to evince disproportionate processing. These 
include the use of GUIDs, third party advertising, and the sale or improper 
disclosure of user information. Generally, these practices involve increased depth 
of profiling or excessive processing and apply in particular to large internet 
undertakings that collect information from millions or billions of users. These are 
considered briefly below.  
                                                                                                                                                              
addresses such that several different users will be represented in the log files as one user. IBM‘s 
SpeedTracer, for example, can be used to produce some of the above reports without the use of 
cookies. However, the method used is not as straightforward and the reports produced will 
generally not be as detailed as when cookies are used. 
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6.2.1.2 Cookie Practices that may affect proportionality 
6.2.1.2.1 Third Party Advertising   
The emergence of internet banner advertising contributed to an increase in the use 
of cookies. In the use of cookies for the delivery of targeted banner advertising, 
the practices of one company, DoubleClick Inc. has attracted more attention than 
others. DoubleClick is a third party advertisement service provider, it derives its 
revenue from its ability to record, analyse and target online advertisement based 
on user data. As a third party service, DoubleClick does not create the 
advertisements but delivers them once they are provided and manages them when 
they are in place. DoubleClick ignited controversy in early 2000 when it 
announced that it would use personally identified profiles to bolster the appeal of 
online banner ads. This announcement led to litigations and inquiries.
12
 One of 
these inquiries resulted in an agreement between DoubleClick Inc and the 
Attorneys General of several states in the US.
13 
The findings in that agreement 
provide some insight on how online advertisement companies use cookies. 
 
                                                          
12
 See generally Office of the New York State Attorney General (Press Release) ‗Major Online 
Advertiser Agrees To Privacy Standards for Online Tracking‘ 26 August 2002 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02.html accessed on 18 February 2007 
13
 In the Matter of DoubleClick Inc., Agreement between Attorneys General of The States of 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Vermont, And Washington and Doubleclick Inc. 26 August 2002, available online at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02_attach.pdf  
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According to the findings, when a User first visits a Webpage that has online 
advertisements delivered by DoubleClick, an Ad Serving Cookie is sent to the 
Browser. As the cookie is delivered to that User‘s Browser, it is recorded (in 
binary format) in DoubleClick‘s DART Web ad serving log files.  These cookies 
uniquely identify particular browsers so that DoubleClick can correlate Non-
Personally Identifiable Information user data it collects from users during its 
delivery of banner ads. DoubleClick claims that it does not use personally 
identifiable information in connection with the delivery of online advertisements 
but collects and analyses only non-personally identifiable information. 
Instructively, DoubleClick represents that in most cases, it uses user data to 
provide services on behalf of the advertiser or first-party Web site in connection 
with a user‘s interaction with that party. It however admits that in other 
circumstances, a first-party site may transmit non-personally identifiable user 
clickstream data to DoubleClick under controlled conditions governed by contract 
between DoubleClick and the first-party Website. These are cases in which the 
first-party Website requests services DoubleClick offers that include its 
compilation and analysis of non-personally identifiable information user data, 
including clickstream data, that DoubleClick has collected from uniquely-
identified users interacting with various first-party Websites over time for 
purposes of Multi-Site/Multi-Session ad serving. This indeed represents 
DoubleClick‘s method of using clickstream data and serves here only to indicate 
that such methods are technically possible. 
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Multi-Site/Multi-Session ad serving is separately defined in the agreement as 
―…Online Ad Delivery to a specific Browser based on certain characteristics of a 
User(s)‘ online activity across multiple unrelated First-party Web sites and over 
time.‖14 The import of this is that DoubleClick has the ability to aggregate user 
data collected from one user across multiple unrelated Websites to build up a 
profile on that user‘s preferences and online characteristics in order to direct 
certain advertisements to the same user from multiple Websites. Doubleclick, in 
this agreement, went to great lengths to insist that it does not collect and analyse 
personally identifiable information in its delivery of advertisement. It is however 
to be recalled that the inquiry that precipitated this agreement was in response to 
DoubleClick‘s announcement that it would use personally identified profiles to 
bolster the appeal of online banner advertisements.  
 
Without doubt, this type of use of cookies borders on excessive processing of user 
information. It is to be borne in mind that cookies operate surreptitiously; the 
average internet user does not know what they are and what they do. Perhaps 
nowadays a few more people have heard of them but most do not know how they 
operate. The use of cookies by third parties or advertising companies like 
DoubleClick takes this surreptitiousness a step further. This is because the user 
does not know about this processing neither does she intend to interact with the 
third party. Web beacons – to be discussed below – are used to point out the user 
to ad serving companies. Much premium may not be placed on DoubleClick‘s 
insistence that it does not use personally identifying information. This is because 
                                                          
14
 Ibid, para 25 
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the definition in that Agreement is narrower than what obtains in say the EC Data 
Protection Directive. The Agreement defines Personally Identifiable Information 
as ―data that identifies or locates a particular person‖15 whereas Article 2 of the 
Directive defines ‗personal data‘ as information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person. Accordingly, under the Directive, information that has 
the potential of identifying a person is personal data. In this regard, as discussed 
above, the ECJ has held that IP addresses are personal data. It is unlikely that 
DoubleClick countenanced this in their claim of not using Personally Identifiable 
Information.  
 
The thesis does not however go as far as saying that ad serving companies should 
be barred from setting cookies neither should companies be barred from 
delivering user data to ad serving companies to serve ads on their behalf. 
Notwithstanding, the potential for abuse and the vulnerability of users is great. 
Accordingly, Part III of the thesis will evaluate the laws in the different 
jurisdictions to see what safeguards are available in the face of this threat. It is 
expected that a higher threshold of privacy protection will be required for third 
party cookie setting and the disclosure of user data to third parties for any reason. 
Multi-site/multi-session ad serving is invasive regarding privacy and the laws 
should reflect this fact. 
   
6.2.1.2.2 The Use of GUID 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, para. 34 
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Microsoft Personalisation System is a system that consists of add-on server 
components for Microsoft‘s Internet Information Services (IIS).16 It enables 
organizations to implement customized customer interactions easily. It however 
also includes a feature that enables the identification of users across multiple 
domains. This is achieved by assigning each user a globally unique ID (GUID), 
which is also stored in the cookie file of the browser. Companies that consist of 
multiple internet domains or many sub-domains within a single domain can 
automatically share GUIDs so that each user has the same ID on all participating 
sites.
17
 With the information gathered through GUID cookies stored in a 
centralized database, user information would be available to sites with which the 
user has not interacted. This raises the question of proportionality of processing of 
users‘ information.  
 
6.2.1.2.3 The Sale and other Forms of Disclosure of User Data 
There are several news reports about the collection and sale of personal data.
18
 
With the increase in the use of internet, this becomes a lot easier. Any undertaking 
that makes it part of its business to profile users and sell their data to others would 
indeed exceed the proportionality that permissible interference with privacy 
should maintain. States should always proscribe such practice in their laws 
                                                          
16
 Formerly Internet Information Servers (IIS). 
17
 Microsoft Inc. ‗What is Personalization?‘ 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/archive/mcis/personwp.mspx?mfr=true, 2008, accessed on 7 
May 2008. 
18
 See E.g., J. Krim, , ‗Broker to Limit Sale of Personal Information‘, The Washington Post 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45443-2005Mar17.html 18 March 2005, 
accessed on 6 May 2008; J. Sahadi, ‗Personal Data Trade: Who Buys and Sells Your Information‘ 
CNNMoney.Com, http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/09/pf/info_profit/,  9 May 2005,  accessed on 6 
May 2008. 
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because, in most of such circumstances, the interest of fundamental right to 
privacy of users would override the interest of the undertaking in selling user data. 
Besides, such processing of data would usually be for a purpose other than that 
for which the undertaking collected the data. This would violate one of the now-
accepted data quality principles. In practice however, the determination of when a 
Web company has sold user data is not always so clear-cut. Companies disclose 
users‘ personal data to make profit in most cases. This however may not take the 
form of direct sale of the information for profit. It could entail the disclosure of 
the information for several purposes, some of which may yield profits. For 
example, facebook.com, according to its Privacy Policy, may, provide user 
information to third parties for various services including hosting at co-location 
facilities for servers, sending email updates, removing repetitive information from 
user lists, processing payments, offering online job application processes, and 
providing search results and links (including sponsored links).
19
 It is hard to say 
that facebook.com has sold user data but they certainly increase their profits by, at 
least, providing user data for sponsored links search results.  
 
As noted above, some of the reasons for the deployment of cookies including data 
warehousing and mining also apply to other tracking technologies. In the same 
vein, excessive processing, particularly disclosure of data is not exclusive to 
cookies but applies equally to data obtained through the other tracking 
applications below.  
                                                          
19
 Facebook‘s Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php , 6 December 2007, accessed 
on 7 May 2008. 
  205 
 
 
6.3 Local Shared Objects (Flash Cookies) 
Flash cookies are a feature of Adobe‘s Macromedia Flash MX. They are used to 
store data in much the same way as HTTP cookies. Flash cookies can only be read 
by a video file originating from the same domain as the one that created it; this 
includes advertisements that play automatically on some websites. It is the only 
way that Macromedia Flash players can write data to the user‘s computer. Flash 
cookies are created by using the getLocal method to insert code in the first frame 
of a flash movie. An example of such a code is as follows: 
 
 
This code will create a shared object with the name flashcookie and a specified 
path, movie/mymovie.swf. The path may be set to ―/‖ whereby all videos from the 
same domain can read the flash cookie.
20
 Information, such as username, age, and 
number of visits, is stored in the Shared Object by assigning attributes to its data 




In this way, several pieces of information may be stored or added to the flash 
cookie, including usage data and any personal data that the user may have entered 
                                                          
20
 Adobe TechNote 16194 ‗What is a Local Shared Object‘, 
http://kb.adobe.com/selfservice/viewContent.do?externalId=tn_16194&sliceId=1 19 November 
2004. Accessed on 17 May 2008 
21
 Ibid 
  206 
 
in the flash-enabled application. The flash cookie is itself stored in a .SOL file in 
a special directory in the user‘s computer. In this manner also, the flash video can 
create a unique ID, which is retrieved every time the user returns to that domain 
or plays a file originating from the domain. Unlike HTTP cookies however, flash 
cookies may be used to store much more information. They are set to store 100kb 
of data by default. Flash cookies are also not as visible as HTTP cookies. This is 
because one has to navigate to Macromedia Website for the Adobe Flash Player 
Setting Manager
22
 to delete these cookies and or set other privacy preferences. 
This is quite unlike normal cookies, which users can delete or reject through 
browser privacy settings. The few users who know where to look may also delete 
flash cookies by going to the special directory in which they are stored. In 
Windows XP, this will be: C:\Documents and Settings\[username]\Application 
Data\Macromedia\Flash Player. Firefox Web browser now has an extension for 
managing flash cookies but very few people are aware of flash cookies since they 
have attracted less attention than HTTP cookies. Furthermore, unlike HTTP 
cookies, flash cookies do not have expiry dates by default; they may therefore 
persist until deleted by the internet user.  
 
6.3.1 The Privacy Question 
By identifying users‘ computers, storing data on user‘s hard drives without 
permission, and recording user habits, flash cookies raise the same privacy 
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questions as do HTTP cookies. The challenge of regulating technologies while 
maintaining their benefits equally applies here. Indeed, a good number of flash 
cookies found in the author‘s hard drive do not seem to identify the computer. 
Instead, they contain preferences and other data that would be necessary for the 
running of the application for which the data was stored. An example is a flash 




Many other flash cookies in the author‘s hard drive do however contain unique 
identification of the computer and even GUIDs. An example is one of the flash 




Just like with HTTP cookies, where companies use flash cookies for such 
legitimate purposes as the analysis and reporting discussed above, they may be 
viewed as permissible. However, where they are used for excessive processing 
such as making user data available to third parties, the privacy interests of the 
internet user should be seen as overriding. The latter scenario would seem to play 
out with flash cookies set by ad serving companies across multiple Websites. The 
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use of tracking technologies by third party ad serving companies, as observed 
above, should be subjected to a higher threshold of privacy protection. 
 
6.4 Web Bugs 
A web bug, also known as clear GIF, pixel tag, or web beacon, is typically a 
transparent graphic image (usually 1 pixel x 1 pixel) placed on a Web page or in 
an email message. It is one of several scripts that are embedded in some HTML 
pages. Its primary function is to instruct the user‘s browser to request an image, 
usually from a third party site as can be seen from the following illustration: 
A view of the source page of http://nus.edu.sg/ reveals that one of the scripts that 




This is a simple script that instructs the browser to request an image measuring 1 
pixel x 1 pixel from ad.sg.doubleclick.net. In accordance with the above script, 
the browser made the following GET request as is captured by Wireshark 
Protocol Analyzer deployed by the author: 
 




As is evident from the above, ad.sg.doubleclick.net returns an image. This image 
is invisible to the user because of its size (1x1 pixels); it serves no visual purpose. 
Additionally, as in all HTTP requests, the browser communicated the user‘s IP 
address along with the time and date of the request to the DoubleClick server. The 
request header also communicates the referrer URL to Doubleclick and returns 
the name=value pair of cookies previously set by that domain. The server has 
therefore fully identified the browser. If no previously set cookies were found, the 
response to the request would have included an instruction to set a cookie. 
 
6.4.1 The Privacy Question 
From the perspective of the webmaster of http://nus.edu.sg, this is indeed a very 
simple, easy, efficient and inexpensive method of communicating full user and 
usage statistics of the NUS homepage to Doubleclick for serving advertisements 
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on behalf of NUS on other websites. From the point of view of user privacy 
however, this is a type of surveillance. Simply put, regarding the above 
illustration, DoubleClick now adds to its log files that the user identified by the 
cookie (the author) visited the NUS homepage at a particular time and date, from 
a particular IP address. When this information is aggregated with other logs of the 
user‘s visit to the same site and other sites on which DoubleClick has a web 
beacon, a non-trivial dossier of the user‘s web activities is developed. Web bugs 
represent a serious interference with privacy; they are the facilitating technology 
for multi-site/multi-session tracking and ad serving discussed above. They 
communicate users‘ web behaviour to third party sites with whom the user has no 
intention of interacting and the user is not apprised that his usage data is being 
communicated, logged and profiled for ad serving purposes. As noted above, this 
is one of the examples of processing of personal data that can easily become 
disproportionate. In line with the ‗in accordance with law‘ and necessity or non-
arbitrariness standards identified earlier, there would be need to examine data 
protection and other safeguards in privacy protecting laws in the relevant 
jurisdictions to see if this interference is also a violation of the right to privacy. 
Ad serving companies do indeed have a legitimate interest in processing usage 
data for ad serving. However, given the surreptitious nature of web beacons, it is 
doubtful that this legitimate interest is not overridden by the fundamental right to 
privacy of the users when the technology is deployed without notice. ‗nus.edu.sg‘ 
for example does not mention the use of web bugs and direct communication of 
web usage data to third parties in its privacy policy. There is a vague mention of 
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the site containing links to sites outside the ‗nus.edu.sg‘ domain. This standard of 
protection is unlikely to be sufficient when compared to the international 
standards outlined above. 
 
6.5 Web Search Engines 
Search engines are information retrieval systems; they help find information in a 
computer system. With the increase in the volume of information on the World 
Wide Web, web search engines have become indispensable. There are two types 
of web search engines, crawler-based search engines and human-powered 
directories. Human-powered search directories, such as open directory, depend on 
humans for listings. However, the major web search engines including Google, 
Yahoo Search, and MSN Search are crawler-based and they share the following 
components in their architecture: the crawler, the indexer, the search index, the 
query engine, and the search interface.
23
 The Crawler, also known as spider, 
wanderer, and search robot, ―is a software program that traverses web pages, 
downloads them for indexing, and follows (or harvests) the hyperlinks that are 
referenced on the downloaded pages.‖24 The indexer creates the search index from 
web pages received from the crawler. The search index is a data repository 
containing all the information needed by the search engine to match and retrieve 
web pages. The query engine is the algorithmic centre of the search engine; it 
processes the user‘s query by retrieving the information matching the user‘s 
                                                          
23
 M. Levene, An Introduction to Search Engines and Web Navigation, (2006, Pearson Education, 
London), p. 66 
24
 Ibid, p. 67 
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keywords from the search index and ranking the results. The search interface 
displays the results of the search on the user‘s screen; it is the web search engine‘s 
website. It allows the user to submit queries, browse the results list, and click on 




6.5.1 The Privacy Question 
For our purposes, the search interface or the search engine‘s website is the 
pertinent component. Like other websites, it makes extensive use of cookies, 
which enables the logging of the clickstream of users. Such logs will usually 
contain all the terms ever searched through that particular search engine and these 
terms can be quite revealing concerning a person‘s thinking, disposition, aims, 
aspirations and preferences. Sensitive personal information, such as health 
condition and sexual orientation could be surmised from recurring search terms. It 
is in the logging and retention of search logs of users identified by cookies and 
other technologies that search engines interfere with internet users‘ privacy. The 
retention of search terms over an extended period is tantamount to surveillance of 
the user‘s interests; it includes a tracking of many websites visited by the user by 
following search results. Google, the current leading web search engine 
acknowledges that its servers automatically record page requests made when users 
visit Google web sites. These are kept as ―server logs‖ as in the following 
example of a typical log entry supplied by Google: 
 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, pp. 67—69. 




The different parts of the above log entry as separated by hyphens may be broken 
down as follows: 
 
- 123.45.67.89 is the Internet Protocol address assigned to the user by the user's 
ISP; this could be static or dynamic; 
- 25/Mar/2003 10:15:32 is the date and time of the query; 
- http://www.google.com/search?q=cars is the requested URL, including the 
search query; 
- Firefox 1.0.7; Windows NT 5.1 is the browser and operating system being used; 
and 
- 740674ce2123a969 is the unique cookie ID assigned to this particular computer 




The search term in the query is clearly visible in the third part of the log entry i.e. 
cars. In this way, all the terms searched by the user will be logged and retained by 
Google for 9 months (formerly 18 to 24 months) after which the IP addresses in 
the search logs would be made anonymous.
27
 Before this time, the user data is 
                                                          
26
 Google Privacy Centre, ‗Google Privacy FAQ‘, 
http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.html#serverlogs , 2008, accessed on 10 May 2008. 
27
 P. Fleicher, The Official Google Blog, ‗Another Step to Protect User Privacy‘ 8 September 
2008, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/another-step-to-protect-user-privacy.html accessed 
on 9 March 2010;  See also P. Fleicher and N. Wong, The Official Google Blog, ‗Taking steps to 
further improve our privacy practices‘, 14 March 2007, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/03/taking-steps-to-further-improve-our.html , accessed on 12 
May 2008. 
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generally not anonymous for several reasons. Firstly, people are wont to make 
vanity searches i.e. searching their own names and particulars. This means that 
the IP address anonymization can only be partial. Secondly, the user is always 
identifiable since IP addresses, date and time of each query is recorded in the log 
files.   Furthermore, Google is able to link the information it gathers through the 
use of cookies to the personal information it gathers through other Google 
services such as the AutoFill function in Google toolbar. According to the toolbar 
information, ―To take advantage of AutoFill, you need to enter your information 
once on the AutoFill options page. You can enter as much or as little information 
as you want.‖ The fact that Google sometimes combines such information with 
information gathered with the aid of cookies is evident in its privacy policy.
28
 
Yahoo and MSN privacy policies reveal that most of the foregoing equally applies 
to their services.
29
 MSN and Yahoo have also followed Google‘s step in 
announcing a time limit for the retention of user search data; 90 days (formerly 13 
months) for Yahoo
30
 and 18 months for MSN.
31
 
                                                          
28
See Google Privacy Centre ‗Google Privacy Policy‘ http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html  
accessed on 12 May 2008: “When you sign up for a Google Account or other Google service or 
promotion that requires registration, we ask you for personal information (such as your name, 
email address and an account password). For certain services, such as our advertising programs, 
we also request credit card or other payment account information which we maintain in encrypted 
form on secure servers. We may combine the information you submit under your account with 
information from other Google services or third parties in order to provide you with a better 
experience and to improve the quality of our services. For certain services, we may give you the 
opportunity to opt out of combining such information.‖ (Emphasis added). 
29
 See Yahoo Privacy Policy, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/details.html , accessed on 12 
May 2008; Microsoft Online Privacy Notice Highlights, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/default.aspx , accessed on 12 May 2008.   
30
 Yahoo Inc. Press Release, ‗Yahoo! Sets New Industry Privacy Standard with Data Retention 
Policy‘ 17 December 2008, 
http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=354703 , accessed on 10 
March 2010. 
31
 Microsoft, ‗Bing Privacy Supplement‘, September 2009, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/bing.mspx , accessed on 10 March 2010; Computerworld, ‗Yahoo Joins Google, Microsoft in 
Changing Privacy Policy‘ 25 July 2007, 
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6.5.1.1 Reasons for the Retention of Data by Search Engines 
In addition to the analysis and reporting uses to which websites put tracking 
information as discussed above, Google has unveiled three other reasons for its 
retaining non-anonymous user search logs for 9  months. First, Google retains the 
data to enable it improve the quality of its search service. According to P. 
Fleicher, Google‘s Global Privacy Counsel, ―Analyzing logs data is an important 
tool to help our engineers refine search quality and build helpful new services.‖32 
Second, the logs are retained to maintain security and prevent fraud and abuse. 
According to this view, ―[I]t is standard among Internet companies to retain 
server logs with IP addresses as one of an array of tools to protect the system from 
security attacks.‖33 Google computers can analyze logging patterns to identify, 
investigate and defend against malicious access and exploitation attempts. By the 
third reason, Google retains the non-anonymous search logs to comply and 
anticipate compliance with data retention requirements for law enforcement 
purposes.
34
 Yahoo has echoed these reasons.
35
 For search features such as Google 




                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=902792
4&source=rss_news50 , accessed on 12 May 2008. 
32
 P. Fleischer, The Official Google Blog, ‗Why does Google remember information about 
searchers?‘ 5 May 2007, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/05/why-does-google-remember-






 Computerworld, Supra note 31. 
36
 Urs Hölzle, ‗Update to Google Suggest‘ The Official Google Blog, 8 September 2008, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/update-to-google-suggest.html , acessed on 9 March 
2010. 
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The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Working Party), in its April, 2008 
opinion on data protection issues related to search engines, confirmed these 
reasons in addition to two other reasons given by search engines for retaining user 
logs namely, accounting, and personalized advertising. Various search engines 
supplied these reasons to the Working Party in response to a questionnaire. The 
Working Party then noted that search queries do not need to be attributable to 
identified individuals to be used to improve search services. Similarly, it doubted 
that the personal data of users are really essential for accounting purposes. 
Regarding personalised advertising, the Working Party noted that it is difficult to 
find legitimate grounds for the practice save with the express consent of the user 
who has been adequately apprised of the purpose of the processing. For law 
enforcement requests, the Working Party opined that compliance with such 





Notwithstanding, the working party found that the search engines may have a 
legitimate interest in storing user data in order to maintain security, and detect and 
prevent fraud. Such data must however be subject to strict purpose limitation. 
Further, the amount of data processed and stored as well as the amount of time the 
search engines retain such data will depend on whether the data are indeed 
                                                          
37
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‗Opinion on Data Protection Issues Related to Search 
Engines‘, WP 148, Adopted 4 April 2008. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp148_en.pdf accessed on 14 
May 2008. 
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necessary for these purposes.
38
 In part III, the thesis will evaluate the availability 
of these privacy protecting limitation or safeguards in the relevant jurisdictions. 
One issue that impinges on the proportionality of processing of personal data by 
search engines is the issue of the privacy-threatening acquisitions by major web 
search engines. Google acquired DoubleClick on the 11
th
 of March 2008.
39
 With 
the surveillance capabilities associated with DoubleClick and Google 
respectively, Google-DoubleClick is now arguably the single largest personal data 
controller on the internet. The next question then is what privacy safeguards are in 
place under US law? This question also applies to other major web companies 
that provide search engine services.
40
 Undoubtedly, the protection of privacy in 
the face of these acquisitions should not be left to the goodwill of these 
companies. 
 




 Google Press Center, ‗Google Closes Acquisition of Doubleclick‘, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080311_doubleclick.html , 11 March 2008, 
accessed on 30 May 2008. 
40
 In 13 August 2007, Microsoft acquired aQuantive, a digital marketing undertaking, See 
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http://bluelithium.com/press/2007090411.html , accessed on 30 May 2008; and in 24 July 2007, 
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24 July 2007, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=200
70724005473&newsLang=en , accessed on 30 May 2008. 
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6.6 Search Robots  
Search robots, the same technology as the ‗crawler‘ component of search engines 
may be deployed for purposes other than that to which search engines put them. 
They may be used to ―…recursively query other computers over the Internet in 
order to obtain a significant amount of information…‖41  
 
6.6.1 The Privacy Question 
Privacy questions arise when search robots are used in certain ways, the most 
notorious of which is the use to which spammers put them. The unauthorized use 
of search robots for the harvesting of email addresses from internet service 
providers came up for consideration in the US case of Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, 
Inc.
42
 The court held  inter alia that Register.com's evidence that Verio's search 
robots have presented and will continue to present an unwelcome interference 
with, and a risk of interruption to, its computer system and servers is sufficient to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its trespass to chattels 
claim.
43
 The stark difference between how spammers use search robots and how 
search engines use them is seen in the fact that a search for email addresses in say 
                                                          
41
 Ebay, Inc. V. Bidder's Edge, Inc. 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 at p.1061 
 
42
 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
43
 Ibid, p. 251, the court held Additionally that Register.com has established both irreparable harm 
and a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Verio's use of the search robot to obtain 
data from an Internet domain name, registrar's customer lists, to be later used for unauthorized 
mass marketing purposes, violated § 1030(a)(5)(C) of the Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, at p. 
252. 
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Google will yield no results. A similar search on yahoo will only yield blacklisted 
email addresses.   
 
There are many other uses of search robots, some of which also amount to 
surveillance. For example, Bay TSP, a company that provides tracking services 
for digital content owners in order to protect intellectual property rights, uses 
search robots to identify individuals that are sharing their client‘s works online. 
Bay TSP collects identifying information, including the individuals IP address, 
ISP, date and time of infringement and information on the file being shared. After 
the issuance of takedown notices, Bay TSP continues to monitor the identified 
individuals to gauge compliance.
44
 It would seem that the deployment of search 
robots may be either legitimate or illegitimate depending on the purpose. The use 
by search engines and copyright owners would usually be legitimate while other 
uses such as those of spammers would usually not be. For the former, data 
protection laws should apply to protect privacy, whereby the legitimate interest of 
the Web undertakings is balanced against the privacy interests of the users. For 
the latter, computer misuse laws ought to apply as a bar or disincentive.  
 
6.7 Spyware  
Spyware is an ever-evolving concept that has proven difficult to define precisely. 
The Anti-Spyware Coalition, a group dedicated to building a consensus in the 
                                                          
44
 Bay TSP, ‗Tracking and Removing IP‘ http://www.baytsp.com/legal_law/index.html , accessed 
on 19 May 2008. 
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debate surrounding spyware and other potentially unwanted technologies, has 
however formulated some useful definitions.
45
 According to the coalition, 
Spyware and other potentially unwanted technologies are  
 
―Technologies deployed without appropriate user consent 
and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over: 
Material changes that affect their user experience, privacy, or 
system security; Use of their system resources, including what 
programs are installed on their computers; and/or Collection, 
use, and distribution of their personal or other sensitive 
information.‖46  
 
Many categories of unwanted technologies are comprehended under this 
definition, including spyware (in the narrow sense) or spybots, adware, backdoors 
and botnets, tricklers, hijackers, unauthorized diallers, and unauthorized tracking 
cookies. Spyware/spybots (including snoopware, unauthorized keyloggers, and 
unauthorized screen scraper) are the active tracking software of the lot. They are 
used to gather information about users and their behaviour.
47
 It is with this latter 
category that this paragraph is concerned.  
                                                          
45
 The coalition consists of anti-spyware software companies, academics and consumer groups. It 
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Several stand-alone spyware applications are commercially available; they are 
designed for deliberate installation for surveillance purposes. Examples include 
WebWatcher from Awareness Technologies and SpyAgent from Spytech 
Software and Design, Inc. Perhaps the features of these stand-alone spyware will 
help throw some light on the capabilities of others that are bundled with other 
software. Webwatcher may be purchased over the internet and installed in any 
computer. It is invisible; it does not appear in any of the following: registry, 
process list, system tray, task manager, desktop, or in add/remove programs. It 
can record all of the following: emails sent and received, instant messages, 
website visited, and every keystroke typed. The recorded data are then sent to the 
WebWatcher user‘s online account. The user can log into this account from 
anywhere, view the recorded data, and even block access to some websites and 




The bundled spyware may possess some or all of these features particularly as 
regards the kind of information they are able to record and transmit. The most 
common strategy adopted by distributors of spyware is to bundle (piggyback) the 
spyware with other software, mostly freeware. Distributors may also exploit 
security vulnerabilities to install spyware. In other instances, the distributors use 
trickery to make one install their applications; the spyware may come as fake 
system alert windows or false cancel buttons in a pop-up window.  
                                                          
48
 Awareness Technologies ‗WebWatcher Overview‘, 
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6.7.1 The Privacy Question 
Prima facie, the unauthorized installation of spyware in any computer system 
would be unlawful in tort or criminal law. Privacy may therefore be protected by 
reference to say the tort of trespass to chattel or computer misuse legislation. 
However, regulatory challenges would seem to exist for piggy-backed spyware 
that may have been identified in the End User License Agreement (EULA) of the 
freeware. For these, the question of informed consent naturally arises. 
Experiments performed at Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden circa 2004 
unveiled that the then free (standard) versions of BearShare, iMesh, KaZaa, 
LimeWire, and Morpheus, contained several spyware. These applications are peer 
to peer file sharing applications. Of the identified spyware, twelve were spybots. 
However, most of the spybots communicated data to their respective servers in 
encrypted formats so that it was not possible to determine the nature of data they 
communicated. Notwithstanding, the experiment isolated two spybots: SaveNow, 
bundled with BearShare, and ShopAtHomeSelect, bundled with iMesh, which 
transmitted data to their online servers in clear text. The transmitted data included 
websites visited, zip codes, country, programs and operating system versions.
49
 It 
has not been possible to obtain the EULA of the tested versions of these P2p 
applications to see if they indicated the presence of bundled spyware. This is 
because those versions have now been replaced by newer ones. The websites of 
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 M. Boldt, Privacy-Invasive Software Exploring Effects and Countermeasures (2007, Blekinge 
Institute of Technology, Karlskrona), pp 67—70. 
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most P2p software distributors now declare that their products are completely free 
of spyware and adware.
 50
 With such declarations, the distributors ought to be held 
accountable if in fact their products are found to contain spyware. In sum, the 
deployment of spyware ought to be based on either legal authorisation or express 
consent. Part III of the thesis will examine the extent to which the use of spyware 
is regulated in the relevant jurisdictions.  
 
6.8 Other Technologies that Perform Undisclosed Capturing 
and Transmission of Information 
This heading describes features of software that secretly capture and transmit data 
to Web-based companies as part of their everyday functions. A myriad of 
technologies are comprehended under this description. Most are applications that 
perform useful functions but are designed to capture or transmit data for the 
software distributor. While some of the data transmission features may be useful 
for bug fixes and updates, a number of US cases reveal sufficient disquiet about 
how some technologies capture and transmit personal information to warrant their 
inclusion in this project. Litigations arose over RealNetworks' 
RealJukebox/RealPlayer software
51
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6.8.1 RealNetworks’ Real Player  
The RealJukebox/RealPlayer lawsuits of 1999/2000 typify the privacy concerns 
expressed over these technologies. In In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy 
Litigation, the plaintiffs sued RealNetworks under Federal and Common Law 
alleging trespass to property and privacy. They claimed that RealNetworks' 
software products secretly allowed RealNetworks to access and intercept users' 
electronic communications and stored information without their knowledge or 
consent.
53
 The court however granted RealNetworks‘ motion to enforce the 
arbitration clause in the EULA. This suit came on the heels of revelations by 
Richard M. Smith that RealNetworks assigned GUID numbers to its media 
playing software that could have been used to track its users without their 
consent.
54
 This revelation prompted RealNetworks to change its privacy policy,
55
 
part of which currently reveals that RealNetworks still assigns GUIDs to its 




The RealNetworks privacy policy is not detailed enough regarding the nature of 
information sent to RealNetwork servers for our purposes.  To verify the nature of 
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ooter&src=realplayer_com&pcode=rn&opage=realplayer_com ,8 February 2008, accessed on 23 
May 2008:  ―Some of the personal information collected by RealNetworks is necessary to provide 
you with the RealNetworks product or service you choose and to optimize the delivery of audio 
and video data to your computer. RealNetworks software may include the opportunity to disable 
certain software features to increase your level of privacy. However, certain technical information 
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the information captured and transmitted by RealNetwork‘s RealPlayer, the 
author deployed Wireshark Protocol Analyzer, set it to capture traffic on port 80, 
and started Real Player, which was already installed. He thereafter played several 
music and video files. From the captured packets, it was clear that for every 
playback of any file, Real Player made a GET request for artist information and in 
so doing communicated album/clip, artist and other information to RealNetwork 




From the above GET request, RealNetworks received information that the author 
listened to an album titled ‗Jane Eyre‘ by the artist, Charlotte Bronte. It is to be 
recalled that all HTTP GET requests communicate browser type, date and time of 
the request as well as IP address. Accordingly, the log files at Real Networks have 
accurate information about the time and location of the playback. As 
RealNetworks receives data on all files played, a lot of personal information is 
tracked and retained. To put this in perspective, the author checked his real player 
history folder. In Windows XP, this is located at C:\Documents and 
Settings\[username]\Application Data\Real\RealPlayer\History. The folder 
contained 1200 music and video files. Even a cursory consideration of the files 
unveils a non-trivial amount of the author‘s academic, literary, music, video, 
religious and other interests and taste. Given the enormous amount of information 
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that may be processed in a media player, it is not difficult to understand the 
unease that many users have expressed concerning the communication and 
retention of this sort of data. Such data may also include sensitive data e.g. a 
user‘s health or sexual orientation. In addition to GUID identification used by 
RealNetworks, all the GET requests that communicated playback information also 
returned or set new cookies, including GUID cookies. Users may disable this 
feature of Real Player by deselecting ‗Enable HTML Clip Info‘ at 
tools\preferences\internet\privacy on the Real Player GUI. Nevertheless, this 
feature is selected by default and there are indeed very few people that are aware 
that their playback information is being sent to RealNetworks servers let alone 
know where and how to disable the feature. 
 
6.8.2 The Amazon.com’s Alexa Tool Bar and zBubbles Software  
Z Bubbles was a browser plug-in software run by Alexa Internet, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Amazon.com. ZBubbles provided shopping information about a 
page one is viewing, by clicking on the Z sign, which the plug-in displays, one 
could see information about products listed on that particular page. The Alexa 
toolbar on the other hand provides guidance to Web surfers as they surf the Web. 
When they click on a site, the toolbar will provide vital statistics concerning the 
site, such as its registered owner and contact information, its average traffic and 
customer satisfaction ratings, as well as links to a number of sites that provide 
similar products.  
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In 1999, Richard M. Smith unveiled a tracking problem in the zBubble plugin 
similar to the one raised by RealNetworks‘ RealPlayer. By deploying a packet 
sniffer, Smith, then an independent security consultant, discovered that zBubbles 
transmitted full URL of the Web page someone is visiting including the query 
string. On certain Web pages, query strings can contain personal data such as 
names, addresses, phone numbers, Email addresses, as well as search terms.
 57
 
Smith provided examples of the transmission of data by the plugin to Alexa and 
Amezon.com‘s servers as captured by his packet sniffer.  In one example, the 
plugin transmitted Smith‘s full address, which he entered in a third party website, 







Alexa internet has now discontinued the use of zBubbles. However, the Alexa 
toolbar raised a similar privacy concern, which came to a head in a 2000 privacy 
litigations, Supnick et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc. and Alexa Internet, Inc
59
. 
Amazon.com and Alexa Internet settled this suit with the plaintiffs in April 2001. 
                                                          
57
 R. Smith ‗Privacy Problem with the Alexa and zBubbles Browser Plug ins‘ 





 No. C00-0221-P, Settlement Agreement of 16 April 2001, available online at 
http://pages.alexa.com/settlement/settle.html , accessed on 28 May 2008. 
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By the terms of the settlement, Alexa Internet agreed to modify its DAD log file 
by deleting the last quartile of all IP addresses contained in the DAD log files and 
all data in any Uniform Resource Locators ("URLs") appearing after any "?," "#," 
or "@" character, including any converted or translated forms of those characters. 
The affected data are those collected prior to November 2, 2000 from users of 
several versions of the Alexa Web Browsing Software. Alexa also agreed to 
provide a link to its privacy policy.
60
 The current privacy policy of Alexa.com 
indicates that Alexa's toolbar service still collects and stores information about the 
Web pages viewed by users and the data entered in online forms and search fields 




6.8.3 The Privacy Question 
There is little doubt that the capturing and transmission of users‘ personal 
information to web-based companies as seen in the two applications considered 
above is surveillance that interferes with the right to privacy. Even where the 
transmitted data consists of web visits and query strings as in the case of Alex 
Toolbar, they raise privacy issues that are more serious than those raised by 
cookies and search engines. This is because the transmitted data concern the 
user‘s interactions with third party websites, to which Alexa Internet or 
Amazon.com should not be privy without the unequivocal consent of the user. 
 
                                                          
60
 Ibid, para 4.1—4.2. 
61
 See Alexa Internet Privacy Policy http://www.alexa.com/site/help/privacy?p=Download 17 
March 2003 accessed on 28 May 2008 
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In the light of the right to privacy standard of lawfulness and non-
arbitrariness/proportionality discussed above, regard must be had to the reasons 
why these features are present in the impugned technologies. The reasons should 
be considered before it can be determined whether their usefulness is 
proportionate to the interference they engender.   From the information available 
in Alexa‘s Privacy Policy, it uses the information gathered from the tool bar for 
the kind of analysis and reporting discussed above. It also employs cookies in 
much the same way that other websites do as discussed above and uses IP 
addresses to diagnose problems with their servers and administer their website. 
Moreover, it uses the ‗usage paths‘ to build the ‗Related Links‘ functionality.62 It 
would seem that the latter is what necessitates most of the capturing and 
transmission of user/usage data. Related Links are lists of websites that are related 
to the website that a user is viewing. According to the Privacy Policy, ―Whenever 
you visit a Web page, the Alexa Toolbar Service retrieves information from the 
Alexa servers to suggest other related Web pages that might be of interest to 
you.‖63 To retrieve this information, it is imperative that information about the 
current page being viewed is communicated to Alexa‘s servers. This is quite like 
the ‗HTML clip info‘ feature of Real Player that necessitates its sending data to 
RealNetwoks servers. These impugned features are therefore ostensibly designed 
to provide users with some useful services albeit with serious interference with 
privacy. The part of the story that has been left untold is that such detailed data as 
communicated by these technologies are also very profitable for advertising 
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purposes, which may well be the driving force behind the provision of the 
services in the first place.  
 
The next question then is whether the privacy interference engendered by the 
technologies is proportionate to the usefulness of the collected data without 
consent. The answer would be no. As observed earlier, the processing of personal 
data here is more serious than say with cookies or search engines. Ostensibly, the 
surveillance feature of these technologies is meant to serve the user and not the 
web-based companies so the plea of legitimate interest of the company is not 
particularly strong. Accordingly, RealNetworks, Alexa Internet, and similar 
undertakings ought to obtain consent more so because the interests of the user 
served by the surveillance features are not vital. Analysis in Part III of the thesis 
would insist that the laws in US, UK and Singapore ought to reflect that the 
processing of such personal data without the informed consent of users‘ is not 
sufficiently protective of privacy. 
 
 
6.9 Public Sector/Law Enforcement and Tracking 
Technologies 
There is nothing in principle that precludes law enforcement and other public 
authorities from deploying any of these technologies. Indeed, many government 
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agencies use cookies on their websites.
64
 However, for most of the foregoing 
technologies to yield any significant surveillance results, the volume of traffic has 
to be equally significant. It is not likely that websites under the direct control of 
law enforcement agencies would generate enough traffic as to form a standard 
source of surveillance data. It is also not expected that persons that would 
generally be of interest to such agencies would normally submit private 
information on such websites. Notwithstanding, some of the technologies, 
particularly spyware and search robots, are very likely to be of interest to these 
agencies. It is indeed foreseeable that they already use search robots for general 
state security and crime prevention/investigation sweeps on the internet. Spyware 
have however attracted more attention due to their intended utilisation by law 
enforcement agencies. Additionally, law enforcement agencies are also able to 
gain access to information retained by private sector undertakings. Some of these 
likely scenarios are briefly discussed below. 
 
6.9.1 Spyware/Trojan Horse 
A Report by a Swiss newspaper, SonntagsZeitung stated that the Swiss 
government has been testing surveillance software that could enable it to 
eavesdrop on VoIP communications. According to the report, ―the police and 
intelligence services could infect users' computers with this Trojan horse program 
and listen to their VoIP conversations. Any such move, though, would be subject 
                                                          
64
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to judicial approval.‖65 In the context of computing and software, a Trojan horse 
is a program that appears to do one thing but actually does another. Many 
different forms of codes including viruses and other malware can be installed as a 
Trojan. In line with the spyware definitions explored above, the Swiss 
Government‘s Trojan payload would be a spyware in the narrow sense. This is 
because the software would be deployed without appropriate user consent and it 
would impair the user‘s control over material changes to their privacy and system 
security; it will monitor the users. 
 
The use of Trojans for surveillance is not limited to Switzerland. According to a 
New York Times report, the German Constitutional Court held that domestic 
security services are permitted to monitor the computers of persons suspected of 
crime or terrorism when there is evidence that the suspects are dangerous. ―The 
surveillance technique at issue involves sending e-mail messages that plant so-
called Trojan software on a suspect‘s computer, which would enable the 
authorities to scan the hard drive.‖66 This again is another example of the use of 
spyware by law enforcement agencies. It is to be recalled that the international 
privacy standards outlined in Chapter 4 require ‗proportionality‘ and ‗necessity‘ 
for interferences to be permissible. Making a case for the use of Trojan spyware 
for law enforcement purposes in the light of these standards seems to be a difficult 
task. In the first place, law enforcement agents will always have the option of 
                                                          
65
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executing a proper search warrant and seizing and searching the relevant 
computer in the normal way. Secondly, the suspicion with which people would 
begin to view emails from government agencies once they realise that the emails 
may be a Trojan would seem to outweigh any law enforcement gains that this 
method of surveillance could engender. Thirdly, the use of a Trojan of the 
German type would always be very invasive; it would usually scan and transmit 
all the data in the hard disk whether or not the data is relevant to the surveillance 
aim.  Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in some exceptional circumstances, with 
some evidence of serious crime or terrorism, law enforcement agencies may need 
to deploy such Trojans. Such circumstances may include when the agents need to 
gather information on accomplices or to establish the magnitude of an already 
established plot. Incidentally, the type of use of spyware described in the 
foregoing examples is so tantamount to interception that whatever standard is 
identified in the evaluation of interception laws in Part III below would be equally 
applicable to such uses.     
   
6.9.2 The Law Enforcement Backdoor 
Of all the possible ways in which the public sector, especially law enforcement 
agencies, can use private sector tracking technologies, the most likely is that of 
indirect access to user information retained by private sector undertakings. Nearly 
all websites that have privacy policies indicate that they will disclose information 
to public authorities in appropriate circumstances. Google for example indicates 
that it will disclose users‘ personal information – some of which may have been 
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gathered through some of the technologies discussed above – to inter alia ―satisfy 
any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental 
request.‖67 This possibility may not raise radically new privacy issues seeing that 
state agencies will always have a legitimate interest in lawfully obtaining 
information that will propagate a legitimate purpose such as law enforcement. 
Notwithstanding, new privacy issues are raised in jurisdictions where this 
possibility inadvertently creates a shortcut or backdoor to user information for law 
enforcement agencies. One such scenario is where the conditions precedent to the 
issuance of a warrant or subpoena for the obtainment of such user data is 
considerably less strict than if the law enforcement agents were to seek a warrant 
to intercept the data or seize and search user computers to obtain the same 
information. Without doubt, such a development is deserving of some attention 
and must be considered in determining the retention period of personal data and 




6.10 Conclusion to Chapter 6 
Cookies are the principal identification technologies among those discussed above 
and web bugs, web search engines, other technologies that capture and transmit 
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user data and perhaps some spybots are able to track users largely because the 
users are identified. Cookies facilitate this identification. Flash cookies raise the 
same issues as cookies but their use does not seem to be nearly as pervasive as 
that of HTTP cookies. The use of most of the technologies interferes with privacy 
but may be pursuant to the legitimate interest of the companies that deploy them. 
A balancing of the interest of the companies and the privacy interests of the users 
is therefore called for and ought to be reflected in the laws in Singapore, UK, and 
US. This balance would seem to be tilted enough to violate privacy where 
tracking is increased or done disproportionately. With cookies, this would seem to 
happen more often with third party advertising; the use of GUID; and with the 
disclosure of user/usage data to third parties. The use of web bugs would also 
usually be disproportionate enough to attract a higher threshold of privacy 
protection when no notice is given to the internet user. Spyware/Spybots should 
almost always require unequivocal consent of the user as should the deployment 
of other software that capture and transmit users‘ information. Certain uses of 
search robots should be criminalised while other uses would be permissible with 
the observance of data quality principles. Sound data protection laws should 
suffice to tackle most of these issues while criminal law such as computer misuse 
laws will be helpful in proscribing others. The use of tracking technologies in the 
public sector particularly by law enforcement agencies should be safeguarded by 
the same treaty standards of lawfulness and necessity discussed earlier in 
Chapters 4 and 5 above. The use of Trojan horse spyware should be for 
exceptional situations if ever and indirect access to private sector tracking data 
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should be according to the same standard of safeguard as law enforcement 
interceptions when the data are of the same grade. This discussion ends Part II of 
the thesis. Part III will evaluate applicable laws in the relevant jurisdictions to see 
if the use of interception and tracking technologies are properly regulated by laws 
that not only limit the uses to what is necessary but also provide safeguards 
against abuse.
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PART III: EVALUATING THE LAWS OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, AND SINGAPORE 
 
CHAPTER 7: FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis inquires into extant laws and policies in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Singapore to determine when and to what extent the 
surveillance technologies discussed above violate the right to privacy. Chapters 5 
and 6 have established that interception and tracking technologies do indeed 
interfere with privacy. The inquiry here will determine if the use of the 
technologies is regulated by law and assess the quality of such laws in terms of 
safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness. According to the international 
standards for the protection of the right to privacy identified in Chapter 4 above, 
to be justifiable, interference with privacy must not only be proportionate and 
based on necessity, it must also be in accordance with law. Clearly, these 
standards favour legal regulation of all interferences with the right to privacy. In 
other words, the use of international human rights treaties as a normative basis for 
evaluating surveillance practices is prima facie suggestive of an endorsement of 
the traditional command and control role of law. This however needs not be an 
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exclusive approach. There are emerging cyber-regulatory theories that highlight 
other forms of regulatory modalities. These theories would also be discussed 
below with a view to highlighting the role of other regulatory modalities as well 
as demonstrating why the thesis embraces a leading role for law for the regulation 
of interception and tracking technologies.  
   
7.2 Law versus other Cyber Regulatory Modalities  
7.2.1 Emergence of Cyber-Regulatory Theories 
Early discourse on the regulation of activities and behaviour in cyberspace was 
dominated by theories that cyberspace could not be regulated. This view was held 
by many including legal commentators such as David Johnson and David Post.
1
 
However, the most famous proposition of this view is perhaps that enunciated by 
John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in ‗A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace‘ where he insisted that cyberspace is an act of nature 
which grows itself through the collective actions of netizens and lies outside the 
borders of state governments. In so many words, Barlow declared all participants 
in cyberspace as immune to the sovereignty and control of the states in which 
their bodies reside.
2
 These views constitute what is now referred to as the cyber 
libertarian view. In his book, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace (2
nd
 edition is 
CodeV2), Lawrence Lessig, building on the then emerging contrary view, 
resoundingly refuted the libertarian view of the regulation of cyberspace and 
                                                          
1
 See ‗Law and Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace‘ 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1367 (1996) 
2
 http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html last accessed on 5 September 2007 
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posited that ―Indeed, under the architecture that I believe will emerge, cyberspace 
will be the most regulable space humans have ever known. The ―nature‖ of the 
net might once have been its unregulability; that ―nature‖ is about to flip.‖3  
 
7.2.2 Code and other Cyber-Regulatory Modalities 
The architecture of the internet that Lessig refers to is its code, ―the code that code 
writers ―enact‖the instructions imbedded in the software and hardware that 
makes cyberspace work.‖4 This code, according to him, is law, through which 
governments can effect a regulable internet. He provided many illustration of the 
plastic nature of networks that make them more regulable through code. One of 
the more forceful examples concerns the basic differences in the way in which the 
universities of Chicago and Harvard granted access to the internet through their 
networks. In the 1990s, one obtained access to the internet at the University of 
Chicago by simply connecting his computer to an Ethernet jack. This system of 
access made for anonymous access where one did not have to reveal her identity 
before being granted access; it embraced freedom of expression by design. At 
Harvard, the reverse was the case, all computers had to be registered and verified 
before access to the internet could be granted. One also had to sign a user 
agreement that made it clear that interactions were monitored; anonymous speech 
was not possible on this network. The difference between the University of 
Chicago network and that of Harvard were results of conscious administrative 
                                                          
3
 L. Lessig  Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books, New York, 2006) p. 32 
4
 Ibid, p.72 
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decisions that embraced different values and in Lessig‘s words, ―The networks 
thus differ in the extent to which they make behavior within each network 
regulable. This difference is simply a matter of code—a difference in the software 
and hardware that grants users access. Different code makes differently regulable 
networks. Regulability is thus a function of design.‖5 
  
In identifying code as a ‗regulator‘, professor Lessig did not argue that code 
should be considered to the exclusion of all other forms of regulation but that it 
should instead be added to the list of traditional regulatory modalities: law, norms, 
and market. Law here refers to ordinary laws such as copyright and defamation 
laws that threaten ex post sanctions for the violation of legal rights. These, to 
varying degrees, regulate behaviour in cyberspace. By norms, Lessig refers to a 
set of understandings that constrain behavior through the threat of ex post 
sanctions imposed by a community such as the ‗toading‘ of people who talk too 
much in a discussion list. Market refers to pricing structures that constrain access 
such as reward by advertisers of popular sites whereby online services drop low-
population forums. These four modalities in Lessig‘s view regulate cyberspace6 
 
Lessig‘s four modalities has enjoyed wide acceptance. Drawing upon these four 
modalities, Andrew Murray in his highly acclaimed book, The Regulation of 
Cyberspace,
7
 has also suggested four similar modalities of regulation: hierarchical 
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 See generally, Lessig Ibid p. 124-125 
7
 A. Murray The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment (2007, Oxford, 
Routledge) 
  241 
 
control; competition-based control; community-based control; and design-based 
control.
8
These would be the equivalent of law, market, norm, and architecture 
respectively. The four modalities could, according to Murray, be categorized into 
two families: (1) socially-mediated modalities (law, market, and norm) and (2) 
environmental modalities (architecture). In the physical world, environmental 
modalities in Murray‘s view suffer from a high degree of inertia. This inertia is 
best illustrated by the second law of thermodynamics, which states that a closed 
system will remain the same or become more disordered over time. In other 
words, our physical environment becomes less regulated over time requiring the 
expending of considerable initial resources to overcome the universal inertia. 
Accordingly, the extensive use of environmental modalities in the regulation of 
physical space is less common while pre-eminence is given to socially mediated 
modalities or socio-legal regulatory settlements. In cyberspace however, once one 
ventures into the content layer, the environmental inertia obligated by the second 
law of thermodynamics no longer applies because cyberspace is an entirely virtual 
environment with no physical presence beyond its wires and routers. With the 
non-applicability of the inertia of physical laws, a new regulatory model can be 
mapped in cyberspace in which socially mediated modalities (law, market and 
norm) are equally functional with environmental modalities (architecture or code). 
This new mapping is what Murray refers to as Socio-technological-legal theory 
(STL). Here regulatory settlements that design the environment can be exploited.  
 
                                                          
8
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In sum, Murray agrees with Lessig that code or architecture now plays an 
important role in the regulation of cyberspace and should enjoy greater inclusion 
in regulatory discourse seeing that code is law.
9
 However, Murray was of the 
opinion that Lessig‘s model described four simple modalities and assumed a static 
regulatory universe into which an intervention would be made with a view to 
another static settlement, which regulators would examine to see if they 
succeeded or failed. In his view, the process of regulation is much more complex 
than this.
10
 He proposed a model, which he felt reflects the complexity of the 
cyber-regulatory environment. The model demonstrates that regulatory 
intervention should not be viewed as a single act which would be adjudged as 
success or failure on the basis of a series of subjective standards set by the 
decision maker. One intervention begets disruptions, yields feedback, and 
necessitates a second order intervention and so on.
11
 In arriving at his model, 
Murray leaned on some abstract regulatory theories including system dynamics.  
 
Although this model does indeed reflect the complexities involved in regulation in 
reality, it is doubtful that this complexity needs always be incorporated into the 
discussion of every single type of intervention. It might suffice only to note that in 
the implementation of any model, regulators may have to go through several 
cycles of action-disruption-feedback-and a second order of action until a 
settlement is reached. In this regard, Murray‘s depiction of Lessig‘s Model as 
assuming a static regulatory universe may not have been deserved since cycles of 
                                                          
9
 See generally, A. Murray, Ibid, pp. 38-42 
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 Ibid, p. 250. 
11
 Ibid, pp. 248—249. 
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intervention may still be applied to Lessig‘s model without detracting from its 
value. Another area in which Lessig‘s cyber regulatory discourse differs from 
Murray‘s is that Murray discussed applicable theories without theorising much on 
possible solutions to specific regulatory conflicts on the internet today. Lessig on 
the other hand proffered solution scenarios for specific problems, including 
internet surveillance and privacy. As would be seen below, some of Lessig‘s 
solution scenarios are relevant to the present discourse and provide valuable 
insight.       
 
7.2.3 Indirect Regulation through Code and the other Modalities 
and a New Role for Law 
Joel Reidenberg is one of the cyber theorists to propose indirect regulation 
through code. He stated that ―Effective channeling of Lex Informatica requires a 
shift in the focus of government action away from direct regulation and toward 
indirect influence.‖12 By Lex Informatica, Reidenberg refers to technological 
capabilities and system design choices which impose rules on participants. In his 
view, ―the set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and 
communication networks form a ―Lex Informatica‖ that policymakers must 
understand, consciously recognize, and encourage.‖13 Lex Informatica is therefore 
what Lessig has now termed code or the architecture of cyberspace.  
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 J. Reidenberg ‗Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through 
Technology‘ 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, at 586 (1998) 
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 Ibid, pp 554-555  
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One obvious way through which governments can use code to achieve regulatory 
settlements is indeed through law. Law may actually be also used to indirectly 
achieve regulatory settlements that are only possible through the other modalities.  
This was recognised by Lessig when he stated that ―Law can change the 
regulation of architecture.‖14 Using many examples, Lessig demonstrated how 
law could be used to change not only architecture but also market and norms. He 
concluded that ―In each case, the law chooses between direct and indirect 
regulation. The question is: which means best advances the regulator‘s goals...‖15 
Lessig‘s argument here is that any analysis of the strategies of regulation must 
take into account these different modalities which were typically ignored in legal 
discourse.  
 
7.2.4 Code, Laws, Norms, Market and the Right to Privacy 
In Code Version 2.0 Lessig fleshed out the general form which the use of these 
modalities could take in regulating privacy on the internet. He identified two 
distinct threats to privacy that the internet will create namely, ‗digital 
surveillance‘ or the growing capacity of governments (among others) to spy on 
online activities, and the aggregation of data by private (among other) entities. He 
then envisaged possible responses by applying the cyber-regulatory modalities.
16
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 L. Lessig Supra note 3, pp 127 - 128 
15
 Ibid, p. 129 
16
 ―• Law: Legal regulation could be crafted to respond to these threats...The law could 
direct the President not to surveil American citizens without reasonable suspicion, for 
example...Or the law could ban the sale of data gathered from customers without 
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In Lessig‘s view, there is no single solution to policy problems on the internet 
accordingly; a regulatory intervention that mixes at least two of these modalities 
is preferable. One possible effective mix proposed by Lessig is code and law. 
Code in this case would be Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) such as the 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Protocol (P3P), which would be discussed 
further below. For PET to solve the problem of privacy on the internet, legal 
regulation is imperative. 
   
In this proposition, Lessig endorsed a leading role for governments. Governments 
are to use law to encourage p3p technologies and enact further laws to provide an 
enabling environment for the proper functioning of the technologies. Different 
regulatory modalities could therefore achieve the protection of the right to privacy 
and achieve treaty objectives. Notwithstanding, not everybody endorses this kind 
of hierarchical cyber-regulatory intervention as proposed by Lessig regarding 
privacy. Andrew Murray and Colin Scott, for example, prefer organic 
development of regulatory structures. They stated: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
express permission of the customers. In either case, the law threatens sanctions to 
change behavior directly. The aim of the law could either be to enhance the power of 
individuals to control data about them, or to disable such power (for example, by 
making certain privacy-related transactions illegal). 
• Norms: Norms could be used to respond to these threats. Norms among commercial 
entities, for example, could help build trust around certain privacy protective practices.  
• Markets: In ways that will become clearer below, the market could be used to protect 
the privacy of individuals. 
• Architecture/Code: Technology could be used to protect privacy. Such technologies are often 
referred to as ―Privacy Enhancing Technologies.‖ These are technologies designed to give the user 
more technical control over data associated with him or her.‖Lessig Supra note 3, p. 223 
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―Whereas Lessig places greater emphasis on top-down 
institutional approaches, of which regulatory agency forms 
represent the leading example, we contend that an emphasis on 
hybrid forms of control will tend to lead to the deployment of 
hierarchical controls as instruments to steer organic or bottom 
up developments, whether in the form of competition, 
community or design-based control.‖17 
 
In The Regulation of Cyberspace, Murray also presented many arguments that 
seem diametrically opposed to the foregoing view that governments should use 
law to harness other regulatory modalities. For example, on the use of legal action 
to regulate the use of p2p file sharing technologies in infringing copyright, he 
notes that ―Continued legal intervention in the market will only serve to further 
undermine the market, its values and its dynamics.‖18 In so saying, Murray was 
referring to the quest of the film and music industries to use the US courts and 
Congress to counteract p2p file sharing. He noted the relative success of the music 
industry in this regard
19
 but asserts that the fall in the number of files being 
downloaded illegally is more attributable to the market than to the legal successes 
of the IFPI
20
 and the RIAA.
2122
  Specifically on the use of laws to regulate online 
activity, Murray noted, ―the experience gathered from these failed attempts to 
                                                          
17
 A. Murray & C. Scott ‗Controlling the New Media: Hybrid Responses to New Forms of Power‘ 
65 Modern Law Review 491 (2002) at 505-506 
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 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry. 
21
 Recording Industry Association of America. 
22
 A. Murray, Supra, note 7, p. 200. 
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regulate indecent and obscene content in cyberspace serves as a warning to 
lawmakers hoping to directly regulate the actions of netizens through the 
application of legal regulation.‖23  
 
Although these arguments seem diametrically opposed to Lessig‘s proposal for a 
leading role for governments through law, there would seem to be a significant 
difference in the subjects of regulation in most of the scenarios considered by 
Murray and those anticipated in Lessig‘s proposal. While the more forceful of 
Murray‘s arguments concern the regulation of the online activities of internet 
users, the foregoing proposal by Lessig anticipates the regulation of the activities 
of government agencies and online businesses. Government agencies and 
Commercial undertakings are doubtlessly more regulable through laws than 
ordinary internet users. Lessig made this point succinctly. On the use of law to 
regulate code, he used the enactment of CALEA
24
 to illustrate how governments 
can use law to influence architectural designs. As changes in the architecture of 
telephone networks — the shift from circuit-switched to packet-switched 
networks — made law enforcement wiretaps more difficult, the US Congress 
enacted the CALEA to require networks to preserve the government‘s ability to 
conduct electronic surveillance.
25
 Lessig then notes that this sort of regulation 
works well with telephone companies because they are regulable intermediaries, 
i.e. ―Rules directed against them are likely to be enforced.‖26 He then asked if 
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 Ibid, p. 227. 
24
 Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 1994. 
25
 L. Lessig, Supra, note 3, p. 63. 
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undertakings that have mainly online presence such as Vonage and Skype are 
similarly regulable and answered in the affirmative. He noted that such companies 





Lessig‘s proposal will thus work well regarding the regulation of most of the 
surveillance technologies seeing that the interception technologies are deployed 
mostly by government agencies and the tracking technologies by businesses. 
These entities are for the most part quite regulable. Some legal developments in 
the area of Peer to Peer copyright infringements give credence to the notion that 
businesses that operate online are in fact regulable, more regulable than ordinary 
internet users. In a bid to reduce the infringements, right holders in the USA and 
Australia successfully relied on different doctrines of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement. They relied on secondary liability doctrines simply 
because the businesses that distribute or facilitate the use of the internet file 
sharing technologies are more susceptible to being held accountable than the 
average file sharer.
28
 In addition to the foregoing, the thesis also endorses a 
leading role for governments through laws because a top-down regulatory 
intervention is also in consonance with the nature of obligation which the treaties 
                                                          
27 Ibid, According to Lessig, ―Failing to comply with the rules of the United States government is 
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28
 See generally,  O. Vincents, ‗Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringements in the Bit Torrent 
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Studios, Inc v Grokster 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct 2764 (2005); A&M Records, Inc v Napster239 F. 
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under consideration impose. Nevertheless, all cyber-regulatory modalities have to 
be considered for privacy to be effectively protected.  
 
7.3. Legal Regulation vs. Regulation by Technological 
Measures, Market, and Norms 
The foregoing paragraphs have endorsed a leading role for governments and their 
use of laws to facilitate the use of the other regulatory modalities as proposed by 
Lessig. It remains however for the thesis to demonstrate that regulatory 
interventions that emphasise any of the other modalities without law will not 
effectively protect privacy in the context of internet surveillance. The following 
paragraphs will therefore discuss the capabilities of norms, market, and code in 
regulating the privacy issues in focus in this thesis. The limitations of these 
modalities without law will also be demonstrated. 
 
7.3.1 Regulation by Norm and Market 
 The private sector online privacy protection in the United States today leans 
towards market-driven self-regulation. One of the ways through which companies 
among others regulate themselves is through the adoption of online privacy 
policies. Privacy policies are a good example of socially-mediated regulatory 
settlements involving both norms and market. The explosion of online privacy 
policies in the United States may be attributed in part to the norm-setting 
activities of the FTC including its various reports to Congress on online Privacy. 




 described the Fair Information Practice Principles of notice, 
choice, access, and security. It disclosed that although 92% of websites were 
collecting great amounts of information from consumers, only 14% disclosed 
anything at all about their information practice. Since the publication of this 
report, surveys of US websites, including the 2000 FTC report to Congress,
30
 
showed a significant increase in websites that disclose their information practice 
through privacy policies.
31
 The so-called Fair Information Practice Principles is 
not a product of legislation. According to the FTC, the principles originate from 
various studies resulting in series of reports, guidelines and model codes from 
governmental agencies in the USA, Canada, and Europe over the past quarter 
century. The version promoted by the FTC were first articulated in a 
comprehensive manner in the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare's 
1973 report entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973).
32
 It is 
now the norm that websites include privacy policies on their websites. Most of the 
policies are based on the said fair information practice principles. This norm now 
also entails a market dimension since some customers would be wary of 
transacting online with businesses that have no privacy policy. The surveys 
referred to in paragraph 7.2.3 above however illustrate that while it is possible for 
these socially-mediated privacy policies to protect privacy and boost consumer 
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 Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, 2000. 
31
 See, Federal Trade Commission, ‗Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic 
Marketplace, a Report to Congress‘, May 2000, available online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf , accessed on 23 July 2008, p. i—ii. 
32
 Federal Trade Commission, ‗Fair Information Practice Principles‘, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm , accessed on 23 July 2008. For the 1973 
Department of Health and Education Report, see 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/c3.htm , accessed on 23 July 2008.  
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confidence, they are hardly enough. The proliferation of online privacy policies 
has not diminished the calls for comprehensive legislation in the US and other 
jurisdictions. 
 
The development of privacy policies in the US is however an example of the 
generation of norms through hierarchical intervention. There are also increasing 
examples of the role of norms in regulating online relationships without any 
hierarchical intervention. For example, on the 18
th
 of February 2009, Facebook, 
one of the world‘s most popular social networking website, reversed changes to 
its terms of service that had appeared to give it perpetual ownership of users‘ 
contributions to the service. These contributions consist mostly of personal data.
33
 
Earlier in the month, Facebook deleted a provision from its terms of service that 
said users could remove their content at any time, following which the license 
would expire. It inserted a new provision that said Facebook would retain users' 
content and licenses after an account was terminated. The reversal came after 
three days of pressure from angry users. In the words of the New York Times, 
―Facebook‘s retreat ends a hullabaloo in which tens of thousands of Facebook 
members joined groups devoted to protesting the changes and bloggers heaped 
scorn and criticism on the company.‖34 This is a good example of the potency of 
regulation by norm. Private ownership of posted content had become the norm 
whereas scorn and criticisms were the social sanction that the customers used to 
                                                          
33
 BBC News, ‗Facebook ‗withdraws‘ Data Changes‘, 18 February 2009, 
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February 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/technology/internet/19facebook.html , 
accessed on 23 May 2009. 
  252 
 
quell the disruption sought by Facebook. Although there is a certain market 
dimension to the furore, one can argue that it was the social sanctions that tipped 
the balance.  
 
Regarding the regulation of privacy by market forces, there are indeed examples 
of conduct on the part of website owners that one could say were dictated by 
market imperatives. In 2007, Amazon.com successfully opposed an attempt by 
US federal prosecutors to gain access to information about thousands of 
customers who purchased books online. Amazon filed a motion to quash a 
subpoena issued by a grand jury in August 2006 to compel it to turn over the 
records of customers who had purchased thousands of books from a particular 
seller. Amazon argued that that identifying any book buyers would violate the 
First Amendment rights of the buyers to have their reading habits kept private 
from the government.
35
 The courts agreed. According to the Magistrate Judge, ―if 
word were to spread over the Net–and it would–that the FBI and the IRS had 
demanded and received Amazon‘s list of customers and their personal purchases, 
the chilling effect on expressive e-commerce would frost keyboards across 
America.‖36 In 2006, Google fought a similar battle to keep records of the search 
                                                          
35





 In Re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7 2006, Case No. 07-GJ-04, Order 
entered on 26 June 2007, available online at http://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/bcgi-
bin/opinions/district_opinions/GJ/07/07-GJ-04-11-23-07.PDF . 
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queries of its users from the government.
37
 The consideration here is not whether 
or not there were laws upon which these companies could base their fight for the 
privacy of user data. After all US companies routinely respond positively to 
subpoenas. The impetus to fight for privacy came from market considerations and 
the words of the judge in the Amazon case quoted above says it all: e-commerce 
will be affected. 
 
These two examples may however not be taken as sufficient demonstration of the 
fact that online privacy can be effectively regulated in such an informal fashion. 
There are factors in the examples that made it possible for the privacy interests of 
the consumers to be considered. In the Facebook example, the stakeholders are all 
members of a micro community such that the stigma of the sanctions could be felt 
and there was also the market imperative that if Facebook continued its activities 
in defiance of the feelings of the community, there may have been a mass exodus 
of members to either competitors or a new undertaking that would arise to take its 
place. For a company with a much larger market share in the services it provides, 
the threat of ill will of consumers is less effective. This also applies to companies 
that operate under the radar, where few are aware of the adverse effects of 
operative online policies.  
 
Only legally binding regulation, backed by serious legal sanctions would induce 
such non-community; dominant; or inconspicuous undertakings to protect user 
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privacy. A good example of how social sanctions are ineffective against 
undertakings in a dominant position is the recent announcement by Google Inc. 
that it was going to start using customers‘ online behaviour/web browsing history 
to deliver ads. Google termed this ‗interest-based advertising.38 Google adopted 
this posture despite the fact that such overtures have raised privacy concerns in 
the past including when Doubleclick Inc. acquired Abacus Direct and announced 
it was going to combine user‘s clickstream with the users‘ personal information in 
the Abacus database to serve better targeted ads. The furore that followed the 
announcement caused DoubleClick to abandon the advertisement plan. The 
privacy concerns notwithstanding, Google is determined to go ahead with the 
impugned plan undeterred by any social sanction that would ensue. 
 
Regarding the fight by Amazon.com and Google to keep user data from the US 
government, it is noteworthy that market considerations go both ways. It is to be 
recalled that Google‘s retention of user data gathered through its search engines 
has been a source of much privacy controversy and Amazon.com did indeed 
deploy Alexa, a privacy invasive software discussed in Chapter 6 above. Amazon 
still has a privacy policy that gives it wide discretion in handling customers‘ 
personal data. Furthermore, Google‘s recent decision to use users‘ browsing 
history to target ads is no doubt engendered by market considerations that are not 
privacy friendly. Advertising based on consumer interests have the potential to 
increase response, which would translate into higher ad revenue for Google and 
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its partners. It however has the potential to lead to greater abuse of customer 
privacy. Indeed, Google‘s shares rose $9.74, or 3.16 percent, to $317.91 on 
NASDAQ following this announcement.
39
 In sum, reliance on norms and market 
to regulate the privacy issues engendered by internet surveillance technologies is 
actually unrealistic. At best only a patchwork of privacy protection can be 
expected under such a regime.       
     
7.3.2 Regulation by Code 
One of the arguments one may hear against legal regulation is that technological 
measures or code should be deployed for privacy protection. In a panel discussion 
on surveillance in the 3/8: Legal Futures Conference held by the Stanford Law 
School Center for Internet and Society on 8 March 2008, one participant urged 
people to protect their privacy themselves using technology. He noted inter alia 
that public key encryption can be used to protect communication and was quoted 
as saying: ―You have to stop thinking that the law is the stronger form of social 
control than the technology.‖ 40 There are indeed various technological measures 
that may be deployed to protect privacy online ranging from simple measures to 
measures that aim at systemic regulation of privacy but they all have significant 
limitations. Two of these, P3P, which seeks to resolve privacy issues raised by 
cookies, and encryption, which would inter alia protect communications from 
                                                          
39
 A. Oreskovic (Reuters), ‗Google to Target Ads Based on Online Activity‘ 13 March 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSN1130076920090313?pageNumber=1&virt
ualBrandChannel=0&sp=true , accessed on 24 May 2009. 
40
 E. Mills, ‗To be Anonymous or not to be that is the Privacy Question‘ CNet News, 8 March 
2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9889255-7.html , accessed on 23 July 2008. 
  256 
 
interception technologies will be discussed here to underscore their efficacy and 
limitations. Above all, the extent to which laws are required for these to be 
effective will be highlighted. 
 
7.3.2.1 Platform for Privacy Preferences Protocol (P3P) 
P3P was proposed and has since been adopted as the official World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) recommendation to solve the many problems associated with 
human-readable privacy policies. These policies attempt to inform website users 
about the privacy practices of the website. However, most internet users may not 
have the required education to properly understand the legal terminology used or 
the technologies discussed, such as cookies and web beacons. P3P enables 
websites to express their privacy practices in a standard format that can be 
retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents. P3P user agents will 
allow users to be informed of site practices machine-readable and human-readable 
formats. It will also automate decision-making based on these practices when 





P3P version 1.0, now updated by version 1.1, is a protocol designed to provide a 
way for a Web site to encode its data-collection and data-use practices in a 
machine-readable XML format known as a P3P policy. This format is readable by 
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P3P user agents incorporated into some web browsers such as Microsoft‘s 
Internet Explorer (IE). The P3P specification defines the following: 
 A standard schema for data a website may wish to collect, known as the 
"P3P base data schema" 
 A standard set of uses, recipients, data categories, and other privacy 
disclosures 
 An XML format for expressing a privacy policy 
 A means of associating privacy policies with Web pages or sites, and 
cookies 
 A mechanism for transporting P3P policies over HTTP42 
 
In practice, when an internet user visits a website using a browser with an in-built 
P3P User agent, if the website has P3P policies in its pages, the browser is able to 
automatically fetch the P3P policy for that page and check it against the user‘s 
preset preferences. If the policy is acceptable, browsing will continue 
uninterrupted, if not, access may be blocked or the user notified. The user 
interface and the different levels of preferences of the P3P features of IE are as 
depicted in Figure 7.1 below.  
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Figure 7-1 P3P Features of Internet Explorer 
 
P3P was proposed as a means to reduce the cognitive demands on Internet users; 
to obviate their plowing through the plethora of privacy policies on the internet. 
For IE, only the high, medium high, medium, and low preferences are relevant to 
P3P Policies. This is because the ‗block all cookies‘ preference will block all 
cookies regardless of whether they are associated with P3P policies or not, while 
the ‗accept all cookies‘ preference will similarly allow all cookies. 
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The next question then is whether this technology-enabled privacy setting in a 
browser solves the privacy problems associated with cookies. For websites that 
have adopted P3P, perhaps this question may be answered in the affirmative. 
However, P3P has some serious shortcomings. In the first place, its adoption is 
voluntary and even for websites that express their policies in P3P format, the 
protocol does not provide a technical mechanism for making sure sites act 
according to their policies.
43
 In other words there is no enforcement mechanism 
and there currently exists no mechanisms to compel its adoption in the private 
sector of any jurisdiction. Most existing privacy policies are based on low privacy 
standards adopted by the very people that want user data as opposed to legally 
mandated standards. These shortcomings highlight the role of law that is preferred 
in this project. Regarding enforcement mechanisms, even the W3C acknowledged 
that ―P3P is complementary to laws and self-regulatory programs that can provide 
enforcement mechanisms.‖44 A survey published in 2007 by IEEE underscores 
this point in its conclusion as follows:  
 
―…our results appear to indicate that P3P is the Internet‘s 
privacy standard in name only, since the vast majority of 
Internet Web sites lack valid P3P policies. At this point in time, 
we would have to conclude that P3P offers little assistance to 
the user. However, if legislation similar to the E-governance 
Act requiring a machine-readable form of the privacy policy 




 W3C, Ibid. 
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were to be enacted over a broad section of the Internet, 
adoption of valid P3P policies might increase.‖45  
 
P3P is supposed to be a compromise; it seeks to balance the interests of websites 
that need user data and the privacy interests of the internet user. In a 2000 report, 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) felt that P3P fails to give 
privacy protection choices to internet users. ―[T]he real choice offered is not how 
to protect privacy, but how much privacy to give up.‖46 P3P implementation, 
according to EPIC, ―seeks to extract privacy rather than protect it‖47 EPIC noted 
that setting higher privacy preferences renders most commercial websites 
impossible to surf and consumers may be forced to begrudgingly revert to lower 
privacy preferences thus maintaining industry's present privacy invasive status 
quo.
48
 When one compares P3P features with the options available in cookie 
management applications, it becomes clear that P3P does not indeed provide users 
with a full range of options. There are many cookie management technologies 
available and good ones are increasingly built into browsers. For example, P3P 
was removed from the default build of Mozilla Firefox in 2007
49
 but the cookie 
management features of the browser clearly gives users more options than does 
the P3P features of IE. Where IE does not have an option for completely blocking 
third party cookies, Firefox 3 does.  
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 See, https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=225287 , accessed on 20 May 2009. 
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One problem with cookie deleting or blocking technologies is that without 
cookies, some websites will not function. Some will even not function without the 
allowing of third party cookies. Firefox 3 however also, as seen from Figure 7.2, 
has the option of having all cookies deleted upon the closing of the browser. This 
is perhaps the most versatile cookie management feature available. It removes the 
tracking abilities of websites since the cookie-enabled identification of the 
browser is erased at browser shut down. At the same time it allows the user to 
browse all websites including those that would not work without the setting of all 
kinds of cookies. However, even this feature will also remove some of the 
seamlessness of internet browsing facilitated by cookies. Browsing history and 
preferences would always be removed and one would have to sign in every time 
to some of his frequently used sites and reset all preferences at each visit. Finally 
the user data interests of businesses that underwrite some of the free products 
available online would be seriously undermined if everybody were to implement 
these cookie deletion features. All these would be somewhat retrogressive. 
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Figure 7-2 Cookie Management Features of Firefox 3 
 
If applicable laws were to be enacted thereby making projects like P3P actually 
workable, that indeed may be a much better solution that balances the interest of 
the user against the interests of website operators. Lessig, as noted above, insists 
that the best regulatory approach is always a mix of regulatory modalities. 
Regarding PET, including P3P, Lessig observed that ―These technologies 
standing alone, however, do nothing to solve the problem of privacy on the Net. It 
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is absolutely clear that to complement these technologies, we need legal 
regulation‖.50 
 
This view is very true of P3P.  The technology is now available; privacy policies 
are now machine-readable. However, the protocol does not presently fulfill its 
stated purpose because there are no laws to back the system. The 2007 survey 
mentioned above had results that indicate a disparity in full policy adoption 
between US government websites and the most popular websites on the Internet. 
Government websites, unlike the commercial ones, have seen a statistically 
significant increase in full policy adoption.
51
 This is attributable to the enactment 
of the E-governance Act,
52
 which requires government websites to provide their 
privacy policies in a machine interoperable manner. This somehow demonstrates 
that with the backing of law, the P3P project could actually work. Unless privacy 
laws actually back such projects, internet users would have to rely on cookie 
management technologies. In addition to rendering some websites more difficult 
to use, reliance on cookie management technologies has a technological knowhow 
shortcoming; users have to be sufficiently computer savvy to put the cookies 
management features of their browsers to good use. As this problem equally 
                                                          
50
 L. Lessig, Code version 2.0, (2006, Basic books, New York) p. 227; Lessig envisioned three 
different sorts of legal regulation as follows: ―The first kind is substantive—laws that set the 
boundaries of privacy protection. The second kind is procedural—laws that mandate fair 
procedures for dealing with privacy practices. And the third is enabling— laws that make 
enforceable agreements between individuals and corporations about how privacy is to be 
respected.‖  
51
 I. Reay, P. Beatty & S. Dick, Supra, note 45, p. 155—156. 
52
 US E-government Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-347-DEC. 17 2002, 2002. 
  264 
 
applies to all technological measures for protecting privacy including encryption, 
it would be discussed a little more at the conclusion of the next paragraph.  
 
7.3.2.2 Encryption 
The aim of encryption is to make data illegible for everyone except intended 
recipients. This is done through cryptography, the study of sending 'messages' in a 
secret form so that only those authorized to receive the 'message' are able to read 
it.
53
 Today, there are many applications of encryption technology including the 
encryption of discs drives, folders, and files to keep their contents from prying 
eyes. Encryption is also used for establishing trust in the e-commerce arena 
through processes like electronic signatures. Our main concern here however is 
the use of encryption to protect the privacy of communications against 
interception technologies. 
   
In traditional cryptography, the sender and receiver of a message know and use 
the same secret or private key. The sender uses the secret key to encrypt the 
message, and the receiver uses the same key to decrypt the message. This method 
is known as secret/private key or symmetric cryptography.
54
 The main challenge 
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in this method is key management i.e. the generation, transmission and storage of 
keys. Both the sender and the user have to agree on the key and once it is revealed 
to another person, the entire scheme is compromised. Although all cryptosystems 
must deal with key management issues, a secret-key cryptosystem is more 
susceptible to compromise. This is because the same key that must remain secret 
at all times, has to be transmitted to all parties to the communication, this is 
especially difficult in open systems with a large number of users. 
 
To solve this key management problem, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman 
introduced the concept of public-key cryptography in 1976. Public-key 
cryptosystems have two primary uses, encryption and digital signatures. In this 
system, each person gets a pair of keys, one is the public key and the other is the 
private key. The public key is published, while the private key is kept secret. This 
system eliminates the need for the sender and receiver to share secret key 
information. The preparation or encryption of all messages for sending is done 
exclusively with public keys; no private key is ever transmitted or shared. While 
decryption can only be done with the private key (see Figure 7.3). Anyone can 
send a confidential message by using a published public key, but the message can 
only be decrypted with the private key counterpart. Public Key encryption 
obviates the need to trust the security of some means of communications in 
transmitting keys. It is only necessary that public keys be associated with their 
owners in a trusted/authenticated manner. A trusted directory, such as a key server 
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may be used or the keys may be communicated between persons in a pre agreed 
manner.
55
 A brief illustration of how this works seems fitting. 
 
Figure 7-3 Public Key Encryption Scheme 
 
In No. 1 of Figure 7.3, Alice uses an encryption application to generate a pair of 
keys. She deposits the public one in a public key directory or sends it by email to 
Bob. Now Bob, in No. 2, wants to send a message, ‗Hello Alice‘ in a confidential 
manner. He uses an encryption application just like Alice but for the message to 
be legible to only Alice, he uses Alice‘s public key to encrypt the message and 
Alice uses her private key to decrypt it. 
 
There are different protocols and algorithm techniques as well as software for 
encryption. Two of these applications running different protocols or techniques 
were studied for this research, GnuPG4 for Windows, a free email encryption 
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software that implements the OpenPGP/RFC 4880 standard, and Advanced 
Encryption Package 2009 Professional (AEP), which supports RSA
56
 Algorithm. 
The working of these are depicted and explained below. 
 
 
Figure 7-4 GnuPG4 GUI 
 
Figure 7-4 represents one of the GUIs of the GnuPG4 and the dialogues of its 
Windows Privacy Tray v1.2.0. The key generation, import, export and deletion as 
well as the key server access functions are clearly visible in part A of Figure 7.4. 
The lower part of Part A displays the private and public keys available to the 
software including ‗Research Trial‘, a public and private key pair generated for 
this research project and the public key of Philip R. Zimmermann, the creator of 
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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a widely used email encryption software package, 
which follows the OpenPGP standard. Keys generation in the GnuPG4 is intuitive 
enough but the encryption and decryption of emails or texts requires a bit of 
studying of the manual although it is simple enough. To encrypt a message, one 
only needs to type the message either in an email compose area or in a word 
processor and copy same to the clipboard. He should then right-click the Privacy 
Tray icon that appears on the taskbar once the application is launched. Thereafter, 
following the dialogues seen in parts B and C of the Figure 7.4 would encrypt the 
message, using already imported public keys.  The encrypted text may then be 
pasted into any email client and sent as text. The same process is followed for 
decrypting a message encrypted with one‘s public key using a private key.  
 
The AEP, in addition to plain text email encryption, also has the function of 
encrypting files (as seen in Figure 7-5 below)
57
 that may be transmitted as email 
attachments or through any other means of electronic dissemination. It also 
supports symmetric/passphrase encryption for files that one wants to keep 
confidential.  
 
Without doubt, the use of these technologies would, absent a brute force key 
search attack, protect the messages from the invasiveness of interception 
                                                          
57
 User would only need to select the file to be encrypted, select the ‗encrypt‘ option on the right 
side of the GUI, browse under ‗public key file path‘ for the appropriate public key (already 
imported), select the desirable ‗file filter‘, ‗algorithm‘ ‗Set Output Folder‘ and Source file (s) 
option and click ‗start‘. If the file option is ‗leave alone‘ and the ‗Set Output Folder‘ is ‗current 
folder‘, the original and encrypted files would be found in the folder as is the case with the 
‗Research Encryption Test.doc‘ example in Figure 7.5.  




 However, the foregoing illustrations on the GnuPG4 and AEP (see 
footnote 70) serve to demonstrate that although the process of encryption with 
some freely available software packages is easy enough,
59
 it is not so easy as to 
support the expectation that the use of the technology would soon become 
sufficiently pervasive as to be considered an effective way to regulate privacy 
through code. The en/decryption with each application takes 5-6 or more steps. 
Granted, there are email clients, such as Mozilla Thunderbird into which some 
PGP encryption applications may be incorporated but their use is not that 
widespread. 
 
                                                          
58
 It is to be noted that the laws of the UK and Singapore for example, give law enforcement 
officers power to require the disclosure of an encryption key. See S 125B (1)—(4) of Singapore‘s 
Criminal Procedure Code Chapter 68 1955 as amended and Part III of UK‘s Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
59
 GnuPG4 may be downloaded from http://www.gpg4win.org/ , accessed on 22 May 2009. 
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Figure 7-5 AEP Encryption Functions 
 
7.3.2.3 The Limitations of Code for Regulating Privacy: 
Technological Knowhow 
There are other difficulties associated with encryption such as computational cost, 
security of keys, and association of keys with their rightful owners. However, for 
our purposes the most significant problem with the choice of encryption for 
regulating privacy is technological knowhow. In the Legal Futures Conference 
referred to above, another participant rightly pointed out that encryption use isn't 
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widespread and won't be anytime soon, ―It has to be easy enough, distributed 
enough that people will use it, whether or not they care about the issue.‖60 The 
foregoing paragraphs thus in illustrating the potency of code/technological 
measures for privacy protection also illustrate the limitations. While there may be 
technologies that are effective in protecting privacy online, undue reliance on 
these would in many cases result in the protection of only the technologically 
savvy. A 2003 study by Symantec Corporation shows that even some IT experts 
fail to avail themselves of available technological measures for privacy 
protection. The study surveyed attendees at IT/Security conferences in the US, 
UK, and EU and found that poor acceptance for technologies addressing privacy 
is a serious problem. Of the 63 US respondents, only 27 were familiar with their 
browser P3P features, 30 of the 58 UK respondents were familiar with the 
technology, while 17 of the 23 EU respondents were familiar with it. 
Furthermore, only 26 of the 63 US respondents, 21 of the 58 UK respondents, and 
8 of the 23 EU respondents encrypted sensitive emails.
61
 If IT professionals do 
not always avail themselves of available privacy protection technologies, it is 
clear that the average consumer is even less placed to bear the burden of privacy 
protection. This is why this thesis leans towards comprehensive legal regulation to 
be augmented by the other regulatory modalities. Additionally, it is doubtful that a 
situation in which everybody encrypts all emails is desirable; it may even be seen 
                                                          
60
 E. Mills, Supra note 40. 
61
 Sarah Gordon, ‗Privacy: A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in US, UK, and EU Information 
Security Professionals‘, Symantec White Paper, October 2003, 
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behaviors.pdf , accessed on 23 July 
2003, pp. 10—12. 
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as retrogressive not only because this will seriously hamper national security/law 
enforcement surveillance, but also the cost particularly in terms of time spent on 
encryption routines on the part of internet users. In short, the preferable regulatory 
format would always be one in which users are assured that their communication 
would only be interfered with when it is really necessary for legitimate pursuits 
and one which ensures redress when the standards are not respected. This can 
hardly ever be achieved without comprehensive legislation           
 
7.4 Some Concluding Remarks on Chapter 7 
In sum, while the other regulatory modalities must also be countenanced, 
comprehensive legislation is necessary. Accordingly, the remainder of this part of 
the thesis evaluates legal responses to the internet surveillance technologies on the 
basis of the privacy standards identified in the previous parts. Chapters 8 & 9 
examine the laws regulating internet interception in the US, UK and Singapore, 
while Chapter 10 does the same for tracking technologies.
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CHAPTER 8: LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION 
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
8.1 Introduction 
From the foregoing chapters, clearly the thesis accepts the position that the 
standards of privacy protection discernible from the treaties are appropriate for 
evaluating the laws in the three jurisdictions. It declines to engage the debate that 
challenges the validity of international human rights norms as worthy of 
emulation as it takes the view that asking whether the laws of any country is 
compliant with human rights standards is a legitimate enquiry in legal scholarship. 
The debate on the value of human rights is indeed adumbrated in Chapter 2 above 
in the discussion of rights-based moral theory versus rights skepticism. Other 
commentators have also addressed
1
 and will continue to address the question of 
the value of international human rights. This thesis however accepts human rights 
principles and the international human rights law regime as valuable. In essence 
therefore, Part III of this thesis is an international human rights law enquiry.  
Furthermore, as the evaluation in this part draws from the principles and standards 
set out in Chapter 4 above, the relevant norms being referred to in parts of the 
evaluation below need not always be reiterated in detail as they have been set out 
in Chapter 4. However, where amplification of a particular standard of protection 
will help identify whether laws and practices in a jurisdiction are compliant, more 
                                                          
1
 See E.g., A. Heard, ‗Human Rights: Chimeras in Sheep Clothing? Introduction‘ 1997, 
http://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/intro.html accessed on 15 March 2010. 
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details will be provided on such standards. In the same vein, as it will be 
impossible to identify compliance with the standards in a particular jurisdiction 
without providing details on applicable laws in that jurisdiction, the remainder of 
this part III will necessarily be descriptive in part.  The influence of the treaties 
even on non-ratifying states is also briefly discussed in Chapter 4 above to the 
effect that the comparative exercise of examining US law on the basis of the 
ECHR, to which US is not a party and Singapore law on the basis of the ICCPR 
and ECHR, to which Singapore is not a party is deemed useful. By referring to 
international law, the thesis does not in any way wish to minimise other analytical 
approaches that emphasis domestic law processes such as constitutional 
mechanisms. It wishes only to provide an international law perspective on the 
issues.  Accordingly, relevant US laws, for example, may be found to have met 
the standards seen in the treaties but still be constitutionally deficient. In the same 
vein, relevant Singapore laws may be constitutionally sound but still fall short of 
the treaty standards. 
   
Since the evaluation of surveillance laws in this part of the thesis would be against 
the international standards for the protection of privacy as distilled from the 
ICCPR and ECHR jurisprudence, this introduction will firstly determine how the 





 while the ECHR requires that 
                                                          
2
 Lawfulness under the ICCPR entails the following: 1. Interference authorized by States can only 
take place permissibly on the basis of law. 
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surveillance should be ‗in accordance with law4 and be necessary in a democratic 
society.
5
 The ICCPR standards  do not conflict with those of the ECHR on both 
the lawfulness and non-arbitrariness/necessity counts. A major difference between 
the two however, is that the ECHR protection standards are more detailed. This is 
not surprising because the ECHR has a much larger body of case law but there is 
no apparent conflict between the two. Accordingly, for analysis purposes in this 
thesis, reference may sometimes be made to only the more detailed prescription of 
the ECHR although the thesis will endeavour to analyse the laws of the three 
                                                                                                                                                              
2. The relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such 
interference may be permitted. 
3. The decision to allow such interference can only be taken by the authority designated by law, on 
a case-by-case basis 
3
 Non-arbitrariness under the ICCPR entails the following: 1. The prohibition of arbitrariness is 
included in Article 17 to ensure that even lawful interferences are also reasonable in the particular 
circumstances. 2. Reasonableness in turn implies that any interference with privacy must be 
proportionate to the end sought, and must be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.  
4
 ‗In accordance with law‘ entails the following: 1. The interference in question must have some 
basis in domestic law; 2. The law must be adequately accessible and; 3. It must be formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct i.e. foreseeability; 4. Minimum 
Safeguards in Statutory Provisions. The statutes must determine the following: A. the offences 
which may give rise to an interception order; B. categories of people liable to have their 
communication intercepted; C. a limit on the duration of interception; D. the procedure to be 
followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; E. the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties and; F. the circumstances in which recordings may or 
must be erased or the storage medium destroyed.  
5
 ‗Necessity in a democratic society entails the following: 1. Interference with privacy must pursue 
at least one of the following legitimate aims: A. Interests of National Security, B. Interests of 
Public Safety or Economic Well-being of the country: I. for the prevention of disorder or crime, II. 
for the protection of health or morality or, III. for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
others. 
2. For the interference with privacy to be proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued, the 
following adequate and effective safeguards/guarantees against abuse must be assessed: A. the 
nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, B. the grounds required for ordering such 
measures, C. the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, D. and 
the kind of remedy provided by the national law 
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jurisdictions by the prescriptions of the two treaties separately. It is also to be 
noted at this juncture that the application of the ICCPR and ECHR to Singapore 
and the application of the ECHR to the USA can only be a normative or 
comparative exercise given that Singapore is not a party to both treaties and the 
USA is not a party to the ECHR. However, as noted in Chapter 4 above, the 
treaties also exert political and moral influence on even non state parties, which 
refer to them in reforming their laws.  
 
The standards of the treaties are applicable to all forms of surveillance, including 
internet interception. One of the major tasks of the thesis was to determine how 
internet interceptions differ from other forms of surveillance. In this regard, the 
thesis noted above that the major difference lies in the fact that users do much 
more with the internet than was possible with the more traditional means of 
communication. Interceptions are therefore likely to be much more invasive with 
the internet than with other means of communication. The analysis in this chapter 
would therefore be geared towards measuring whether the laws in the relevant 
jurisdictions allow only interceptions that are strictly necessary in a democratic 
society in order to limit the invasion of privacy in the internet context. The 
application of the safeguard features of the treaties to internet interceptions would 
therefore generally entail the evaluation of the following: 
 
Prerequisites of Interceptions  
1. Grounds Required for Ordering Measures: 
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A. Strict Conditions precedent to the issuing of interception warrants: where 
possible, a higher threshold of prima facie evidence before authorisation.  
B. Competent authorities: judicial authorisation and oversight is preferable 
 
Execution of Interception Orders 
2. Nature and Scope of Measures: 
A. Filters: The authorisation of interceptions must reflect the availability of 
interception filters and with proportionality in mind, narrowly delimit the data the 
interception of which is deemed necessary. 
B. Separation of IRI and CC: Since the internet, as a packet-switched network 
conveys addressing information and call content in the same medium, available 
laws must insist on ex ante separation of the two when only addressing 
information is required.  
C. Procedure for examining, using and storing the data obtained 
 
Control and Sanctions  
3. Nature of Remedy available at Law: 
A. Disincentives to fishing expeditions, unlawful or excessive interception, 
including redress for unauthorised interceptions. 
B. Strong security measures for preserving interception data from unauthorized 
access. 
C. Effective auditing of interceptions for the apportionment of liability in the 
event of excessive interception, including reports. 
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The laws of the US, UK and Singapore will be evaluated against these headings 
and this chapter will start with the laws of the US. 
  
8.1.1 Applicable laws 
Although most discussions of public sector surveillance in the United States focus 
on the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, 
internet surveillance is governed mainly by statutory law. In his oft-cited paper, 
Orin Kerr underscored this point quite succinctly. He noted that the courts have 
upheld a fairly narrow Fourth Amendment protection of communication networks 
by taking the view that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information revealed to third parties.
6
  This removes most of the available 
constitutional privacy protection from internet communications because 
addressing information such as IP addresses must be revealed for communication 




 Circuit found that there is 
no expectation of privacy in non-content information disclosed to an ISP. While 
this view stands, even internet call content that is visible to say an ISP would also 
not enjoy 4th Amendment protection. The US Congress has however responded to 
this constitutional vacuum by enacting a series of laws that offer statutory privacy 
protection for electronic communications like the internet. These laws are what 
                                                          
6
O. Kerr, ‗Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that isn‘t‘, (2003) 
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607 at 627. Cited: The cases include Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 740, 743-44 
(1979), United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 
335 (1973), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  
7
 Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) 
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have led Kerr to conclude that ―internet law has become predominantly statutory 
law‖8   
 
In the US, internet surveillance is directly regulated by three major legislations. 
The first is The Wiretap Act of 1968
9
 (sometimes referred to as Title III) as 
amended by Title I of the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA).
10
  While drafting the ECPA's amendments to the Wiretap Act, Congress 
recognized that threats to individual privacy extended well beyond the bounds of 
the Wiretap Act's prohibition against the ‗interception‘ of communications to 
stored electronic communication. Accordingly, Congress created the second 
statutory provision that regulates internet surveillance when it added Title II to the 
ECPA. This title is commonly referred to as the Stored Communications Act.
11
 
The third of these provisions is the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices 
Statute (hereafter pen\trap statute) enacted as part of the ECPA.
12
 Several other 
laws, such as Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the USA 
PATRIOT Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, have bearings on 
electronic surveillance. However the three aforementioned enactments are the 
primary statutory laws that regulate public sector internet surveillance in the USA 
and would provide most of the answers for the evaluation here.  
 
                                                          
8
 O. Kerr, Supra note 6, at 629. 
9
 Formerly known as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, tit. III, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). 
10
 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
11
 Codified at 18 U.S.C.  §§2701-2712 
12
 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §3121 et seq. 
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The Wiretap Act as amended by the ECPA specifies inter alia, the conditions 
under which law enforcement officers could intercept wire and electronic 
communications, and the penalties for unauthorized private interception of such 
communications. The Pen Trap Provisions similarly regulate the interception of 
addressing or intercept related information (IRI) except content while the Stored 
Communication Act regulates access to stored communication. The interception 
of internet communication in the USA would therefore be regulated by the 
Wiretap Act and the Pen\Trap Statute. The former applies to the interception of 
content (including IRI), while the latter applies to only the interception of IRI.  
 
8.2 Interception of Content   
The Wiretap Act provides that, ―Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
chapter any person who— (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or 
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication…shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or 
shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).‖13 The same consequences as 





The form of interception that is relevant to the present discourse is that of 
‗electronic communication‘. ―electronic communication‖ means any transfer of 
                                                          
13
 18 USC§2511 (1). 
14
 18 USC§2511(1) (c) & (d) 
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signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic 
or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce…‖15 Suffice it 
to say that internet communications would generally always qualify as electronic 
communications. In In re Pharmatrak, Inc. the First Circuit held that 
transmissions of completed online forms constitute electronic communications.
16
 





The Act also defines ‗intercept‘ as ―the aural or other acquisition of the contents 
of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device.‖18 By this definition, there is little doubt that the 
acquisition of the content of internet communication by the deployment of any of 
the interception technologies discussed above would qualify as intercept under the 
Act. In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that interception 
under the Wiretap Act applies only to ‗acquisition contemporaneous with 
transmission.‘19 It stated, ―for a website such as Konop's to be "intercepted" in 
violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it 
is in electronic storage.‖20 The First Circuit however clarified in Councilman that 
‗electronic communication‘ includes transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to 
                                                          
15
 18 USC§2510 (12), 
16
 Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.) 329 F.3d 9 at 18. 
17
 United States of America v. Councilman 418 F.3d 67 at 77, citing the legislative history of the 
ECPA, the court noted that communication consisting solely of data would be electronic 
communication. 
18
 18 USC§2510 (4). 
19
 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) at 878 
20
 Ibid, at 877. 
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the communication process for such communication.
21
 Whether or not the US 
Supreme Court upholds Councilman on this issue, the deployment of any of the 
interception technologies in focus here without authorization is likely to always 
violate the Act. There is therefore a general prohibition of interception of 
electronic communications under the Wiretap Act. The next step is to evaluate the 
safeguards under the Act against the treaty-prescribed ones identified above. 
 
8.2.1In Accordance with Law 
The general prohibition of interception of electronic communications and the 
requirement of interceptions to be in accordance with specific exceptions under 
the Act is indeed the first step towards answering the ‗in accordance with law‘ 
question. Broadly speaking, it is doubtful that the interception of content in the 
US will be deemed to violate privacy solely on the grounds of absence of basis for 
such interceptions in domestic law given the relative comprehensiveness of the 
Wiretap Act. In addition to the general prohibition of interceptions, the Act 
specifies the officials that may authorise an application for an interception order. 
It also enumerates the offences and category of offences the investigation of 
which may give rise to such an application.
22
 The Act places some limits on the 
use or disclosure of information obtained through interceptions;
23
 outlines the 
procedure that must be followed for the obtainment of an interception order;
24
 and 
provides for reports that must be made to the authorising judge, recovery of civil 
                                                          
21
 United States of America v. Councilman, Supra note 17 at 79. 
22
 See, 18 USC§ 2516. 
23
 See, 18 USC§ 2517. 
24
 18 USC§ 2518. 
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damages for wrongful interception, and injunction against illegal interception 
respectively.
25
 In sum, the Act may generally be said to provide basis in domestic 
law for interception. It may also be said to be precise, accessible and enables 
foreseeability. Notwithstanding, the ‗in accordance with law‘ test can only be 
fully passed if the necessity/safeguard provisions are part of domestic law. 
Accordingly, the next important determination is the quality of the safeguards in 
the Wiretap Act.  
 
8.2.2 Safeguards: Necessity in a Democratic Society 
It is indisputable that interceptions executed in accordance with the Wiretap Act 
would usually pursue the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting serious 
crimes. Accordingly, this issue needs not be delved into here. The following 
paragraphs will instead evaluate the safeguard features of the Act on the safeguard 
headings identified above: prerequisites of interceptions; execution of interception 
orders; and control and sanctions.   
 
8.2.2.1 Prerequisites of Interceptions: Grounds Required for 
Ordering Measures & Competent Authorities to Permit, Execute, 
and Supervise Measures 
The Wiretap Act contains some strict conditions precedent to the issuance of an 
interception order or warrant. In the first place, law enforcement agents may not 
                                                          
25
 18 USC§ 2519-2521. 
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directly apply for interception warrants. An application to a judge must first be 
authorized by some specified government attorneys.
26
 The application must also 
be pursuant to the investigation of one of the specific offences enumerated in the 
Act.
27
 Upon such application, the judge may authorize the interception by 
entering an ex parte order as requested or as modified.
28
 Before issuing the order 




Other than outright banning of the procurement of information, these 
requirements are the strictest in US law. In his article cited above, Orin Kerr 
outlined the different thresholds of showing the government must make before it 
can acquire a certain type of information as found in current surveillance law. 
Table 8-1 reproduces Kerr‘s thresholds. 
 
Table 8-1 Thresholds of Government Surveillance
30
 
No Legal The government can acquire the information without process or ord
                                                          
26
 The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General or any Assistant 
Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division or National 
Security Division specially designated by the Attorney General (for Federal applications); and The 
principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political 
subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a 
State court judge of competent jurisdiction. Section 2516 (1) 
27
 18 USC§ 2516 (1)(a). 
28
 18 USC§ 2518. 
29
 the Judge must inter alia determine the following: (a) there is probable cause for belief that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offence; (b) there is 
probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offence will be obtained 
through such interception; (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous and; (d) there is 
probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the interception is to 
occur are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of a relevant 
offence, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used a suspect. Section 2518 (3). 
30
 O. Kerr, Supra note 6, at 620. 
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Process er.   
Subpoena The government must obtain a subpoena such as a grand jury 
subpoena ducestecum or an administrative subpoena, before 
acquiring the information. The Subpoena compels the provider to 




The government must obtain a court order before acquiring the 
information but can obtain the order by merely certifying to the 





The government must obtain a court order before acquiring the 
information, and to obtain the order, must offer specific and 
articulable facts establishing reasonable grounds to believe the 
information to be obtained is both relevant and material to an 





The government must obtain a search warrant before acquiring the 
information. The search warrant requires ―probable cause‖ which in 
the criminal context means that the government must offer facts 
establishing a likelihood that a crime has occurred and that evidence 
of the crime exists in the location to be searched 
―Super‖ 
Search 
The government must obtain a search warrant before acquiring the 
information that adds threshold requirements beyond those of 
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Warrant ordinary search warrants (e.g., requiring the government to exhaust 




t May Not 
Acquire the 
Informatio
n by Any 
Legal 
Process 
The Law may forbid the government from acquiring the 
information regardless of the Legal process. 
 
From this table, the threshold requirement under the Act is the super-warrant 
since it requires the judge to determine that normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or unlikely to succeed in addition to other probable 
cause requirements, including that the individual is committing, committed, or 
about to commit a relevant offence.
31
 The US Court of Appeal has since endorsed 
the ‗super-warrant‘ characterisation.32 The thesis considers these conditions to be 
strict enough to meet the safeguard standards of the ECHR and the ICCPR. 
   
                                                          
31
 18 USC Section2518. 
32
 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority 
S.D.Tex.,2005. 396 F.Supp.2d 747, at 751;  
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8.2.2.2 The Execution of Interception Orders 
8.2.2.2.1 Filters and Narrow Description of the Data to be Intercepted 
In the execution of an interception order, the most important factor for our 
purposes is that the scope of the measure ordered be limited strictly to the 
information being sought. In this regard, the Wiretap Act exhibits some laudable 
features. It requires each application for an interception order to contain inter alia 
a particular description of the type of information sought to be intercepted.
33
 The 
application should also contain a statement of the period of time for which the 
interception is required to be maintained.
34
 Furthermore, each interception order 
shall also specifically identify the following: the person whose communication is 
to be intercepted, the nature and location of the communication facilities, a 
particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, the 
identity of the agency authorized to do the interception, and the period of time 
during which the interception is authorized.
35
 There is little doubt that these 
provisions narrowly delimit the data to be intercepted; they are sufficiently 
restricting as to trigger the implementation of filters in the interception 
technologies. Of notable importance to filters is the requirement of a particular 
description of the communication to be intercepted. By these provisions, the US 
Congress incorporated the 4
th
 Amendment requirement of specificity in warrants 
                                                          
33
 18 USC§ 2518 (1) (iii). 
34
 18USC §2518 (1) (d) 
35
 18 USC§ 2518 (4). 
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into the Act. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Torres, the 
relevant requirements of the Act are intended to safeguard against electronic 
surveillance that picks up more information than is strictly necessary and so 




The Wiretap Act thus limits not only the scope of the information to be 
intercepted but also the duration of the interception. Indeed, no Judge may 
approve interception for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the 
objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. The initial 
period may however be extended for another thirty day period or shorter as 
required. Moreover, the Act requires interception to be conducted in a fashion that 
minimizes the interception of communications not subject to interception.
37
 In 
sum, one can safely maintain that U.S. law has enough safeguards regarding the 
execution of interception warrants to meet the standards prescribed in the two 
treaties.   
 
                                                          
36
 U.S. v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884. See also, U.S. v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 312(2d Cir.1983), per 
the 2
nd
 Circuit: ―Our holding does not convert the electronic surveillance order into a general 
warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that search warrants particularly 
describe the things to be seized. Here the order specifically authorized the interception of audible 
narcotics-related conversations by named individuals and some unknown within a designated area. 
This satisfied Fourth Amendment requirements... incorporated in Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2518(1)(b)(i)-(iv) and 2518(4)(a)-(e).‖ 
37
 18USC2518 (5): ―Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the 
authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a 
way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under 
this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in 
thirty days.‖  
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8.2.2.2.2 Procedure for examining, using and storing the data obtained  
The Act allows for interception to be conducted wholly or in part by Government 
personnel or by an individual operating under a contract with the Government 
while being supervised by a law enforcement officer authorized to conduct the 
interception.
38
 Whenever possible, intercepted content is to be recorded on tape, 
wire or comparable device. This should include modern storage devices like CDs, 
DVDs and flash drives. The recording is also to be done in such a way as to 
prevent editing or alterations. Once the period of interception expires, the 
recorded content is to be made available to the authorizing judge and sealed under 
his direction. The data is also to be kept wherever the judge orders and shall not 
be destroyed except by the order of the judge and in any event, the content is to be 





In addition to the above measures, the general prohibition of interception, use or 
disclosure of content in Section 2511 of the Act makes it a crime for any person to 
disclose content in any other capacity outside the authorization of the Act. 
Additionally, any wilful disclosure or use by an investigative or law enforcement 
officer or governmental entity of information beyond the extent permitted by the 
Act
40
 is a violation of the Act and entitles the victim to recover appropriate relief 
from the perpetrator.
41
 As suggested by the foregoing, the Act allows for 
                                                          
38
 18 USC§ 2518 (5). 
39
 See 18 USC§ 2518 (8) (a). 
40
 Under 18 USC§ 2517. 
41
 18 USC§2520 (g). 
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disclosure and use of intercepted content in certain specified circumstances. For 
example, an investigative or law enforcement officer who has obtained 
knowledge of the content of intercepted communication or evidence derived 
therefrom as authorized under the Act may disclose same to another law 
enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
performance of his official duties.
42
 An officer may similarly use such content.
43
 
Such an officer or attorney for the Government may also disclose such content to 
some specified officials.
44





While these grounds for use and disclosure appear reasonable and would 
undoubtedly facilitate law enforcement, it would seem however that the absence 
of any form of oversight save for the determination of an officer that the 
disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of his duties confers too wide 
a discretion. In effect, once the communication is intercepted pursuant to an order, 
                                                          
42
 18USC2517 (1) 
43
 18USC2517 (2). 
44
 Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defence, or national 
security official to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. 
18USC2517 (6). 
45
 Similar disclosure may also be made by a law enforcement officer or other Federal official; to a 
foreign investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to 
the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure. 
Additionally, the officer or Federal official may disclose to any appropriate Federal, State, local, 
or foreign government official to the extent that such contents or derivative evidence reveals a 
threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts. Moreover, any person who has 
obtained knowledge of the content of intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as 
authorized under the Act may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative 
evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the 
authority of the United States. See 18USC2517 (3) & (7)—(8) 
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it is readily available to other law enforcement and other officials specified in the 
Act regardless of whether or not the content substantiated the offence for which 
the interception was ordered or whether or not any charges were brought. The 
intercepted content, whether or not they are related to the offence or even the 
offender, would seem to be subject to disclosure according to the language of the 
Act.  
 
It is unlikely that the ICCPR‘s HRC would find fault with US law in this regard. 
A study of the HRC‘s decisions  indicate that once the interference is in 
accordance with unambiguous legislation, the HRC rarely finds fault with the 
impugned measure. In Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. Netherlands, for example, 
the Committee merely noted that the procedural and substantive requirement for 
interception of telephone calls are clearly defined in Section 125g of the Dutch 
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Guideline of 2 July 1984 and that both 
required written authorization by an investigating Judge.
46
 There was no inquiry 
into the adequacy of those clear provisions regarding safeguards. As should be 
evident in the extant discourse, the requirement of initial judicial authorization for 
interceptions is not always adequate.  
 
                                                          
46
 Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. Netherlands Communication No 903/1999 : Netherlands. 
15/11/2004, CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999, at 7.7. 
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For the ECtHR however there might be a veneer of objection with the scope of 
discretion granted by the Wiretap Act. In Webber & Saravia v. Germany
47
, the 
court, after enumerating the procedure to be followed for examining, using and 
storing data and the precautions to be taken when communicating data to other 
parties as two of the  minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law in 
order to avoid abuses of power,
48
 upheld the German law. It noted that the 
relevant provision laid down limits and precautions concerning the transmission 
of data to other authorities.
49
 The law provided for intercepted data to be 
transmitted to specified agencies so far as this was necessary for the recipient 
authorities to carry out their duties. The decision to transmit data was however to 
be taken by a staff member who was qualified to hold judicial office.
50
 The latter 
precaution upheld by the court is undoubtedly stronger than those found in the 
disclosure requirements of the Wiretap Act. It may be that the ECtHR is only 
likely to find fault with such a provision when it is one of several other loopholes 
and not as an isolated shortcoming. It is nevertheless a shortcoming.  
 
8.2.2.3 Control and Sanctions: Security of Data, Audit Trails, and 
Disincentives and other Judicial Remedies 
8.2.2.3.1 Security of Data 
                                                          
47
 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE 5 
48
 Ibid, para 95. 
49
 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, Supra, note 47, para 99. 
50
 Ibid, para 36 & 37. 
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The Wiretap Act does not lay emphasis on the security of interception data from 
inadvertent or negligent exposure. Although it provides for an inventory to be 
served on the interception subject upon the termination of interception, this 
inventory is only required to notify interception subjects of certain facts relating 
to the interception
51
  Although an interception order may require reports to be 
made to the authorizing judge. The report is not however designed to ensure 
security of interception data but to show progress of the interception towards the 
authorized objective and the need for continued interception.
52
   
 
In this regard, the Wiretap Act has not gone far enough to reflect the realities of 
contemporary interception of electronic communications. The scenario of wiretap 
at the initial passing of the Act would be that of planting of bugs in target 
telephones. Today, with the internet, intercept access points are usually buried 
deep in an ISP‘s network. Even where traditional interception could be carried out 
at the facilities of a telephone company, such companies are usually fewer and 
more established than most of today‘s ISPs. Established telephone companies are 
likely to have established rules and more trained personnel to ensure security of 
data. With the numerous less-established ISPs, law enforcement agents have to 
place reliance on more non-law enforcement personnel than is necessary with 
telephone interceptions. This availability of a wide range of communications 
                                                          
51
 18 USC2518 (8) (d). the inventory notifies the interception subject of the following: (1) the 
entry of the order or the application thereof, (2) the date of the entry and the period of approved 
interception or denial of the entry, (3) the fact that interception was carried out during the period. 
The serving of this inventory may however be postponed upon an ex parte showing of good cause. 
52
 See, Section 2518 (6). 
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access methods as well as interception techniques does indeed heighten the risk of 
compromise of interception data.  
 
The precautions to be taken when communicating data to other parties is one of 
the safeguards that the ECtHR held that statute law should set out in Webber & 
Saravia v. Germany
53
. There is little doubt that law enforcement agencies usually 
have a strong interest in preserving interception data from compromise. However, 
intercepted data may include gossip-rich information that violates privacy and 
doesn‘t advance law enforcement. Accordingly, a statutory requirement is the 
stronger safeguard; it ensures that law enforcement agencies and ISPs adopt 
technologies or procedures that preserve data. The absence of emphasis on the 
security of interception data is therefore one of the shortcomings of the Wiretap 
Act as regards safeguards. 
 
8.2.2.3.2 Audit Trails 
The Wiretap Act does not also contain a requirement of an audit trail in the 
interception procedure as one of the safeguards. Audit and accountability is 
indispensable to not only the security/integrity of interception data but more 
importantly, it also safeguards against exploratory interception. A requirement of 
auditing in the Wiretap Act would have contributed in no small way in ensuring 
that all measures authorized under the Act remain necessary and proportionate to 
the legitimate aims pursued as required by the ICCPR and ECHR. ―Auditing is 
                                                          
53
 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE 5, para 95. 
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crucial in security. It is the means by which users are held accountable for their 
actions.‖54 With auditing, each set up, start, stop, or retrieval of data should be 
traceable to a specific agent. This would have augmented the other disincentive 
features of the Act. The scenario that throws this shortcoming into relief is that of 
access to interception data by more than one law enforcement agent such as was 
the case with the Carnivore system. Without a requirement of audit trails, an 
aggrieved party would not know who to particularly hold responsible in the event 
of compromise of interception data or interception that exceeds authorisation. 
Holding an entire department responsible is not nearly as inhibiting regarding 
exploratory interceptions as naming particular officers in a suit. There may be 
department-imposed audits and inventories, but such safeguards are not as strong 
as legally required safeguards.  
 
8.2.2.3.3 Judicial Remedies and Other Disincentives  
The foregoing shortcomings notwithstanding, the Act does contain substantial 
disincentives to unlawful or excessive interception including remedies and 
sanctions. It allows any person whose communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used in violation of the Act to, in a civil action, recover  appropriate 
relief from the person or entity which engaged in that violation.
55
 Reliefs include: 
preliminary and other equitable or declaratory reliefs; damages, including punitive 
                                                          
54
 IIT Research Institute, ‗Independent Review of the Carnivore System Final Report‘ 8 December 
2000, para 4.2.4. Available online at http://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf , accessed 
on 29 March 2008. 
55
 18 USC§ 2520 (a). 
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damages; and attorney fees.
56
 There are however statutory defences to the above 
claim including good faith reliance on a court warrant.
57
 The notification 
inventory referred to above
58
 also ensures that victims are properly apprised of 
interception and consequently enabled to avail themselves of the foregoing 
remedies. 
 
A department or agency may also initiate a proceeding to determine whether 
disciplinary action against an officer or employee is warranted if a court, 
appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its 
departments or agencies has violated the Act.
59
 The foregoing applies if the 
circumstances of the violation raise serious questions about wilfulness and 
intention in the violation. Any wilful disclosure or use of intercepted information 
by a law enforcement officer or governmental entity beyond the extent permitted 
by the Act is a violation for the purposes of the foregoing provisions.
60
 
Incidentally, the suppression remedy prescribed by the Act
61
 is only available for 




Furthermore, the Act requires reports. Judges are required to file reports. They are 
to file a report with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts within 
                                                          
56
 18 USC§2520 (b)—(c). 
57
 Ibid, at (d). 
58
 18 USC§ 2518 (8) (d). 
59
 18 USC§ 2520 (f). 
60
 Ibid, at (g) 
61
 See 18 USC§ 2518 (10) (a). 
62
 See also  Steve Jackson Games, Inc. V. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 n. 6 
(1994 5
th
 Cir); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (1990, 6
th
 Cir.); United States v. 
Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) ("[S]uppression is not a remedy contemplated 
under the ECPA.") 
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thirty days of approving or denying an interception order.
63
 The report is to 
include information that an application for an order was made, the kind of order 
or extension applied for, whether the order was approved as is, modified or 
denied, the period of interception authorized, the offence specified, and the nature 
of facilities or place from which the communication were to be intercepted. The 
various Government Attorneys that may authorize the application for an 
interception order are also required to file a similar report in January of each year 
regarding each application for interception order made the previous year. In 
addition to providing the information the judges‘ reports should provide, this 
report is to also provide a general description of the interceptions made including 
the approximate nature and frequency of incriminating communications 
intercepted and other communications intercepted. Other information to be 
supplied include approximate number of persons whose communications were 
intercepted; number of resulting arrests, trials, convictions etc. In April of each 
year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is to 
transmit a full and complete report to Congress. This sort of oversight is likely to 
give the judicial officers, at least, modest incentive to observe available 
safeguards and keep interceptions proportionate to the pursued legitimate aims. 
From the foregoing paragraphs, the Wiretap Act does seem to contain 
commendable safeguards. However to draw any sort of conclusion on this part of 
the chapter, some important exception in the Act must first be considered.    
 
                                                          
63
 18 USC§ 2519. 
  298 
 
8.2.2.4 Exceptions 
The broad prohibitions of the Act relating to the intentional interception, 
disclosure, or use of wire and electronic communications mean that the legality of 
most warrant-less surveillance techniques depends on whether a statutory 
exception to the rule applies.
64
 The Act does indeed contain a long list of 
exceptions some of which allow warrantless interception, while others remove 
some measures from the purview of the Act. The next question then is whether 
some of the exceptions constitute loopholes to the protective provisions of the 
Act.    
 
8.2.2.4.1 Private Sector Interceptions 
A careful reading of the relevant provisions reveals that most of the exceptions in 
the Wiretap Act are of matters that are regulated elsewhere in US law.
 65
 
                                                          
64
 M. Milone, Information Security Law: Control of Digital Assets, (2006, Law Journal Press, New 
York), para. 10-50 
65
 18 USC Section 2511 (2) (a)—(i): Paragraph (a) excepts interception, use, and disclosure by 
service providers in the normal course of their employment for activities that are necessarily 
incidental to the rendering of their service or protection of their rights or property. Public service 
providers may however only monitor their network for mechanical or service quality control 
checks. Service providers may also provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to 
persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct 
electronic surveillance under FISA if they are provided with a court order or a certification that an 
order is not required by law. By paragraph (b), interception by agents of the Federal 
Communications Commission in the normal discharge of some of their specified responsibilities 
does not violate the Act. Paragraph (c) allows persons acting under colour of law (government 
actors) to lawfully intercept communications if they are party to it or if one party to the 
communication had given consent. Under paragraph (d) persons not acting under colour of law 
(non-government actors) can similarly intercept communication if they are party to it or if one of 
the parties gave consent unless the interception is for the purpose of committing any criminal or 
tortious act.  Paragraph (e) clarifies that electronic surveillance conducted under FISA does not 
violate the Wiretap Act. Paragraph (f) provides that neither this Chapter (Wiretap Act) nor 
Chapters 121 or 206 or Section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall be deemed to affect 
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information by the US Government in accordance with 
applicable Federal law. Paragraph (f) further provides that the procedures of the Wiretap Act or 
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However, two of the exceptions – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and 
interception with the consent of one of the parties to the communication – deserve 
some comments to examine their impact on safeguards. This paragraph would 
however firstly provide a very brief commentary on the exceptions that permit 
private persons to intercept communications.  
 
Two categories of private persons— service providers and persons who are party 
to a communication —may intercept communications in certain circumstances. 
For service providers, the Act allows interception, use, and disclosure of 
communication in the normal course of their employment for activities that are 
necessarily incidental to the rendering of their service or protection of their rights 
or property.
66
 For public service providers however, this exception does not 
permit monitoring for purposes that go beyond mechanical or service quality 
control checks.
67
 Service providers may also provide information, facilities, or 
technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept communications or 
to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA if they are provided with a court 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Stored Communication Act or FISA shall be the exclusive means by which electronic 
surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be 
conducted. Paragraph (g) removes other interceptions from the purview of the Act: electronic 
communication readily accessible to the public; certain radio communications; wire or electronic 
communications causing harmful interferences to lawfully operating stations in order to identify 
the source; unscrambled radio communication made through frequencies monitored by 
individuals, by other users of the same frequency. Paragraph (h) also removes the use of use a pen 
register or a trap and trace devices from the purview of the Act. It also allows service providers to 
record start and completion of services in order to protect themselves, other providers, or a user 
from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service. Paragraph (i) allows persons acting 
under color of law to intercept wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser if 
certain conditions are met. 
66
 18 USC§ 2511 (2) (a)(i). 
67
 Ibid. 
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order or a certification that an order is not required by law.
68
 Similarly, the Act 
allows non-government actors to intercept communication if they are party to it or 
if one of the parties gave consent unless the interception is for the purpose of 
committing any criminal or tortious act.
69
 Generally, these exceptions seem 
commonsensical and  necessary. They therefore do not seem to raise safeguard 
issues under the treaties in focus. However, to the extent that the proceeds of 
interceptions by one party or with the consent of one party to a communication 
may be used by law enforcement agents, issues of safeguarding people‘s privacy 
from abuse are raised and these are discussed further below. 
 
8.2.2.4.2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Prominent among excepted matters is foreign intelligence. By the exceptions, it is 
clear that the Wiretap Act does not govern foreign intelligence surveillance. The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
70
 has governed such 
surveillance since its enactment in 1978. FISA establishes a special court to 
receive warrant applications and issue orders authorizing surveillance. Another 
special court created by the statute has jurisdiction to review the denial of any 
warrant application.
71
 FISA defines foreign intelligence information (FII) as 
information that ‗relates to‘ United States‘ ability to protect against: 1. possible 
hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, 2. sabotage or 
terrorism by a foreign power or agent, and 3.clandestine intelligence activities by 
                                                          
68
 18 USC§ 2511 (2) (a)(ii). 
69
 18 USC§ 2511 (2)(d). 
70
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 USC 1801—1871.  
71
 Ibid, Section 1803 
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a foreign power or agent. It also includes information with respect to a foreign 
power or foreign territory that ‗relates to‘ the national defence, national security, 
or conduct of foreign affairs of the United States. The information must instead be 
‗necessary to‘ these pursuits if the intended surveillance target is a U.S. person.72 
FISA covers the pursuit of FII by electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen 
register and trap and trace devices, and access to business records. By FISA 




The question for our purposes is whether, in the pursuit of FII, the provisions of 
FISA lower the safeguards that ought to accompany interference with privacy. 
Space constraints would not permit an exhaustive exploration of this question 
here but a few highlights may serve. Firstly, FISA allows warrantless interception 
in some circumstances. The President may, through the Attorney General, 
authorize electronic surveillance under FISA for up to one year without an order. 
The Attorney General must however certify inter alia that the content to be 
acquired is transmitted by a means of communication used exclusively between or 
among foreign powers; or that the surveillance is that of the acquisition of 
technical intelligence excluding spoken communications of persons from the 
property or premises under open and exclusive control of a foreign power. There 
must also be no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the 
                                                          
72
 FISA, 50 USC §1801 (e). 
73
 See 50 USC §1801 (f). 
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contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party. The 




Except this provision is used by the Attorney General as a pretence for other 
forms of warrantless surveillance, a reading of the provision does not unveil 
sufficient interference with privacy for one to argue for a higher threshold of 
safeguards. This is because foreign powers would expect their premises and 
means of communication used exclusively between them to be under surveillance. 
This form of warrantless surveillance is therefore somewhat only in the periphery 
of this study. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act of 2008 
added further provision for warrantless surveillance of non-US persons outside 
the United States.
75
 This development in US law is significant for internet 
communications given that it is easier with the internet to have communications 
intercepted from the US even if the communications are from persons outside the 
USA.  Nevertheless, the question of protection of privacy in US law would not 
normally extend to non US persons outside the US territory not least because the 
treaties in focus in this study impose obligations on states to protect the rights of 
persons within their own territory or jurisdiction.
76
   
 
For interceptions that would require a warrant, FISA provisions are not as 
stringent as those of the Wiretap Act. An application for a FISA order has to be 
made by a federal officer to a judge with the approval of the Attorney General. In 
                                                          
74
 FISA, 50 USC§ 1802. 
75
 FISA Amendment Act 2008, Section 702. 
76
 See ICCPR, Article 2 (1); ECHR, Article 1. 
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approving the application, the Attorney General must find that the application 
satisfies specific requirements
77
 including the specifying of the following:  the 
identity or description of the target if known; a statement of facts or 
circumstances justifying the applicant‘s belief that the target is a foreign power or 
an agent and that the facilities to be surveilled is being used by a foreign power or 
agent; a statement of the proposed minimisation procedure; a description of the 
nature of information sought and the type of communication or activity to be 
surveilled. The Attorney General must also find that a certification by the 
Assistant President of the National Security Affairs is obtained. The latter inter 
alia certifies that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain FII. FISA 
also requires the judge to make some necessary findings before entering an 
order.
78
 However, the probable cause findings are limited to the belief that the 
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the facilities to 
be targeted are used or about to be used by a foreign power or its agent.  
 
For our purposes, the key findings for the issuing of a FISA order are that 1) the 
target is either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 2) The facilities to 
be surveilled is being or will be used by the foreign power or agent; 3) the 
surveillance is for the acquisition of FII. There is nothing in FISA that requires 
that surveillance be directed against specific acts or conduct. Surveillance is 
instead directed against entities and persons when the foregoing and other 
conditions are met. Exploratory surveillance is therefore very much a feature of 
                                                          
77
 FISA, 50 USC §1804. 
78
 FISA, 50 USC §1805. 




 particularly that of the material to be intercepted, 
FISA does not require a ‗particular description‘ of the communication to be 
surveilled. It requires only a specification of the type of information sought and 
the type of communication or activities to be subjected to surveillance. This 
requirement is broad and would not necessitate the full use of the filters in the 
interception technologies. Accordingly, one can argue that FISA lowers the 
safeguards that are available under the Wiretap Act and will easily authorize very 
invasive surveillance. The next question however, is whether the national security 
interests that FISA pursues justify the broad surveillance it could authorize 
thereby making the surveillance proportionate to the interference with privacy.   
 
In the face of the national security challenges facing the USA today, this question 
is not that easily answered in the negative. Nonetheless, there are news reports 
that indicate that people are all too easily misidentified as agents of foreign 
powers, which by FISA definition includes terrorists.
80
 For example, a Time 
magazine report shows that ―Maryland State Police had entered the names and 
personal information of 53 peaceful left-wing activists and protesters into state 
and federal databases as terrorists.‖81 It would therefore seem that one way to 
strengthen the safeguards of FISA is by improving the procedure for identifying 
people as agents of foreign powers. Presently, FISA only provides that a judge 
                                                          
79
 50 USC §1805 (c), requires specificity in the identity and description of the target, nature and 
location of the facilities, type of information sought the means by which the electronic 
surveillance would be effected and if physical entry would be needed, the period of the 
surveillance, and whether more than one surveillance device would be used and what 
minimization procedure to be applied to information acquired by each device.   
80
 50 USC §1801 (b) (C). 
81
 Time, ‗When the State Police Finger Terrorists‘ R. Baer, 17 October 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1850692,00.html , accessed on 18 October 2008. 
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‗may‘ consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances 
relating to current or future activities of the target in determining that the target is 
a foreign power, an agent thereof, or that the target facility is being used by 
such.
82
 A strengthening of the identification procedures in FISA will go a long 
way in adding some safeguards to the broad surveillance it can presently 
authorise. 
 
8.2.2.4.3 Interception with the Consent of One of the Parties to the 
Communication  
The Wiretap Act allows interception without an order for government and non 
government actors respectively if the interceptor is a party to the communication 
or if one of the parties to the communication had given prior consent to the 
interception.
83
 For a non-government actor, the interception must also not have 
been for a criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution.
84
 U.S. Courts 
have held that the recording of telephone conversations by one of two parties to a 
communication is permissible under the above provisions.
85
 This may well be an 
acceptable interference with privacy in a typical two-way communication on the 
basis that the interceptor, in most cases has access to the communication to the 
                                                          
82
 50 USC §1805 (b). 
83
 18 USC §2511 (c) and (d). 
84
 Such as conspiracy and blackmail. 
85
 See, e.g., Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1993) (relying on § 2511(2)(c)). 
In United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1993) (interpreting § 2511(2)(d)), the 
court held that a private person who records his own telephone conversations with others 
authorizes the interception by his consent unless the commission of a criminal or tortious act (such 
as blackmail or conspiracy) was at least a determinative factor in the person's motivation for 
intercepting the communication. 
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knowledge of the other party. However, for a third party to intercept based on 
prior consent of one of the parties would seem to undermine the whole concept of 
privacy. It is tantamount to a waiving of the right to privacy of the other parties to 
a communication by the person giving the consent. Recalling the social functions 
of privacy discussed above, it is hardly acceptable that one person‘s consent 
should erode the privacy of all other parties to a communication and obviate 
judicial authorization.  
 
Several scenarios underscore this objection. An agent provocateur or a plea 
bargain beneficiary would be able to easily incite another to even self incriminate 
under this standard of one-sided consent. For internet communications, the 
example that buttresses this point further is that of communication between 
several persons, say an exclusive internet group. Sometimes in such groups, the 
conversation may have more to do with only some the members of the group but 
the others are privy because they have access. Once the issue goes beyond a 
person recording a two-way communication to which he is a party, the ability of 
just a member of a group to authorise warrantless interception by giving consent 
raises the question of arbitrariness contrary to the standards in the treaties.
86
 Some 
States in the US do not view this one-sided consent as sufficiently protective of 




                                                          
86
 See e.g. PG v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 51, (held: domestic law should provide 
protection against arbitrariness and abuse in the use of covert surveillance techniques, para 62). 
87
 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire for example, held in The State of New Hampshire v. 
Francis Kepple  (No. 2003-432 , SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 151 N.H. 661, 
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The question of arbitrariness is compounded in this regard by the fact that US 
courts have taken the view that consent to surveillance
88
 may be express or 
implied.
89
 In Berry v. Funk, the DC Circuit confirmed that implied consent is to 
be inferred from surrounding circumstances indicating that the [party] knowingly 
agreed to the surveillance. However, the key question in such an inquiry is 
whether parties were given sufficient notice. In that case, the appellants claimed 
that they never consented to the monitoring of their calls and the court agreed, 
finding that there was no evidence that the appellants were told that the specific 
conversations would be monitored.  There was also nothing in the circumstances 
surrounding the conversations to remotely suggest that the appellants knew about 
the interceptions.
90
 In practice, for our purposes, the US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has taken the implied consent doctrine as permitting the monitoring of a 
computer network that has been properly ‗bannered‘.91  
                                                                                                                                                              
665.) as follows: ―Under RSA 570-A:2, a law enforcement officer may intercept oral 
communications when one of the parties has given prior consent to the interception, provided that 
the attorney general‘s office determines that there is reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal 
conduct will be derived from the interception... Thus, the State statute does not conflict with 
federal law, but rather provides greater protection of individual rights because it requires 
authorization from the attorney general prior to conducting the one-party intercept.‖ 
88
 for the purposes of Section 2511 (c) and (d) of 18 USC. 
89
 See United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987). Implied consent exists when 
circumstances indicate that a party to a communication was "in fact aware" of monitoring, and 
nevertheless proceeded to use the monitored system. United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 
(2d Cir. 1996); see also Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]mplied 
consent is consent in fact which is inferred from surrounding circumstances indicating that the 
party knowingly agreed to the surveillance."). 
90
 Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
91United States Department of Justice, ‗Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Evidence 
in Criminal Investigations‘, 2009, http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf, 
accessed on 29 October 2009. According to the DOJ, ―A banner is a posted notice informing users 
as they log on to a network that their use may be monitored, and that subsequent use of the system 
will constitute consent to the monitoring. Every user who sees the banner before logging on to the 
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The idea that this form of notice constitutes consent for law enforcement 
interception even where the target does not have much of a choice regarding the 
use of the network is one that it is hoped the courts will disagree with as being 
wider than the scope of the exception.
92
 Without doubt, private business 
establishments as well as government agencies should be able to legitimately use 
banners to notify users of their networks of the level of privacy they should expect 
within the network.
93
 However, this sort of notice ought to be used exclusively for 
resolving legal issues arising between say employers and employees and not as a 
means of authorising prospective surveillance activities. To hold so expands the 
scope of warrantless interception allowed under the Wiretap Act. While it is not 
expected that many establishments would employ banners that inform their users 
that they may be subjected to law enforcement interceptions, thereby legalising 
interceptions, a DOJ bulletin seems to exhort businesses to employ such a banner 
and contemplates the addition of a banner to legalise prospective interception in 
the case of a computer hacker.
94
 To the extent that this form of one-sided consent 
obviates the procurement of an interception order, the exceptions do indeed water 
                                                                                                                                                              
network has received notice of the monitoring: by using the network in light of the notice, the user 
impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).‖ P. 170. 
 
92
 In Section 2511 (2) (c)-(d) of 18 USC. 
93
 United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F.2000) (sergeant had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his government e-mail account because e-mail use was reserved for official business 
and network banner informed each user upon logging on to the network that use was subject to 
monitoring). 
94
 USDOJ (R. Strand) ‗Recognising and Meeting Title III Concerns in Computer Investigations‘ 
United States Attorney‘s USA Bulletin, March 2001 Vol. 49, No. 2; 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamarch2001_2.htm accessed on 23 October 2008. 
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down the safeguard features of the Wiretap Act and raises the question of 
necessity in a democratic society or arbitrariness. In PG v. United Kingdom
95
 the 
ECtHR held that domestic law should provide protection against arbitrariness and 
abuse in the use of covert surveillance techniques. The ICCPR, as outlined in 
Chapter 4 above, abhors arbitrary interference with privacy. 
 
8.2.3 Some Concluding Remarks on Interception of Content in the 
USA 
For the interception of content, does US law measure well against the treaty 
standards in focus here; does the law allow only interceptions that are strictly 
necessary in a democratic society in order to limit the invasion of privacy? For the 
most part, this question may be answered in the affirmative. The Wiretap Act 
generally prescribes strict conditions precedent to the issuance of an interception 
order. Also, the Act may safely be said to require an appropriate use of filters; it 
requires a narrow specification of the data to be intercepted and limits the period 
of interception. Although the Act also specifies procedures for the use or 
disclosure of data, it may be said to confer too wide a discretion on law 
enforcement officers regarding to whom and when to disclose. Other 
shortcomings of the Act are seen in the fact that it does not lay emphasis on the 
security of data and although it makes substantial provisions for sanctions for 
unauthorized or excessive interceptions, the disincentives that sanctions are 
                                                          
95
 PG v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 51. 
  310 
 
supposed to provide is reduced by the absence of a requirement of proper auditing 
of the interception process.  
 
The stipulation that the Wiretap Act prescribes strict conditions precedent to an 
interception order is somewhat qualified by its numerous exceptions. Some of the 
exceptions concern processes that are regulated elsewhere while some lead to 
warrantless interception. Exceptions do not necessarily mean lowered safeguards; 
they could bring about a measure of flexibility in the application of statutory 
provisions. Two categories of exceptions have been emphasised here namely, 
foreign intelligence interceptions and interceptions with the consent of one of the 
parties to the communication.  The former does lead to lowered safeguards in the 
pursuit of FII. The lowered safeguard may however be justified by the need to 
preserve national security. The latter, it is submitted, could permit measures that 
are arbitrary and which are susceptible to abuse. In sum however, the thesis 
considers this area of US law to measure well against the standards of the treaties 
even with the shortcomings.  
 
One prominent feature of US surveillance law is that different safeguards and 
procedures are prescribed for the interception of content and addressing 
information such as phone numbers, email addresses, and IP addresses. In some 
respects this feature in itself could amount to a safeguard in that police/security 
officers may not intercept content when only addressing information is required to 
meet law enforcement needs. The safeguards for the interception of content has 
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been examined above and it remains to be seen whether US law also provides 
adequate safeguards for the interception of IRI 
 
8.3 Interception of Addressing Information/Intercept Related 
Information (IRI) 
 
The Pen/Trap Statute makes it unlawful for any person to install or use a pen 
register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order unless an 
exception applies.
96
 The statute defines ‗Pen Register‘ (pen device) as ―…a device 
or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such 
information shall not include the contents of any communication…‖97 Basically, a 
Pen Register device records the addressing information of outgoing 
communications. A ‗Trap and Trace Device‘ (trace device) is also defined by the 
statute as ―a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other 
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, 
addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a 
wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall 
not include the contents of any communication…‖98 These basically record the 
addressing information of incoming communications. These definitions are broad; 
                                                          
96
 18 USC§3121 (a). 
97
 18 USC§3127 (3) 
98
 18 USC§3127 (4) 
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they encompass many forms of communications, including the internet. They also 
cover hardware and software devices.
99
 From these definitions, a packet sniffer or 
indeed any of the interception technologies discussed above, when properly 
configured to capture non-content addressing information, would qualify as a pen 
register and a trap and trace device at the same time. Such devices are usually 
referred to as pen/trap devices. The use of any of the technologies without a court 
order would therefore violate the statute. 
 
8.3.1 In Accordance with Law 
While the Pen/Trap statute is not nearly as comprehensive as the Wiretap Act, it is 
doubtful that the interception of addressing information in the US will be deemed 
to violate privacy solely on the grounds of absence of basis for such interceptions 
in domestic law. This is because the provisions of the statute are neither 
ambiguous nor imprecise. Rather, there is a perceived design to make the 
provisions less restrictive than those of the Wiretap Act. Accordingly, while the 
interception of addressing information may be deemed to be in accordance with 
law, the more important determination is whether there are sufficient safeguards 
against abuse. 
 
                                                          
99
 According to the DOJ, ―The breadth of these definitions results from the scope of their 
components. First, "an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is 
transmitted" encompasses a wide variety of communications technologies, including a telephone, a 
cellular telephone, an Internet user account, an e-mail account, or an IP address. Second, the 
definitions' inclusion of all "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information" encompasses 
almost all non-content information in a communication. Third, because the definitions of a pen 
register and a trap and trace device include both a "device" and a "process," the statute covers 
software routines as well as physical devices.‖ DOJ, Supra, note 91. 
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8.3.2 Safeguards: Necessity in a Democratic Society 
 
8.3.2.1 Grounds Required for Ordering Measures 
An attorney for the Government or a state law enforcement officer may apply for 
an order for the installation of a pen or trace device. The application, which is to 
be made under oath or affirmation, must identify the applicant; identify the law 
enforcement agency conducting the investigation; and then certify that the 
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation 
being conducted by the agency.
100
 Upon the aforementioned application, the court 
shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation if the court finds that the 
certification has been made.
101
 By the Threshold table depicted in paragraph 
8.2.2.1 above, this kind of order is a ‗relevance court order‘, which constitutes a 
very low threshold of showing to justify an order. Indeed, once the certification is 
duly made, the court must enter the order since there is no room for discretion. In 
In re Application of the United States, the Court of Appeals noted that the court 
entering the order will not conduct an ―independent judicial inquiry into the 
veracity of the attested facts.‖102 Furthermore, in United States v. Fregoso, the 8th 
Circuit noted that ―The judicial role in approving use of trap and trace devices is 
ministerial in nature.‖103 The conditions precedent to the issuance of a pen/trap 
order are therefore not strict. 
                                                          
100
 18 USC§3122. 
101
 18 USC§3123 (a). 
102
 In re Application of the United States, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1558-59 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
103
 United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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8.3.2.2 Narrow Description of Data to be Intercepted 
Regarding narrow description of the data to be intercepted in the execution of 
pen/trap order, the statute provides for the matters to be specified in the order as 
follows: the identity, if known of the subscriber of the line or facility; the identity, 
if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation; the 
attributes of the communications to which the order applies, including the number 
or other identifier and, if known; location of the line or facility; the geographic 
limits of the order for state interceptions; and a statement of the offence to which 
the information likely to be obtained by the interception relates.
104
 A pen/trap 
interception may be authorised for a period not exceeding sixty days and the 
authorisation may be extended for another sixty days period. For our purposes, the 
most important factor is that the scope of the measure ordered be limited strictly 
to the information being sought. In this regard, the specification of the data to be 
intercepted is paramount and the requirement to specify the attribute of the 
communication to which the order applies is a far cry from the ‗particular 
description‘ requirement of the Wiretap Act. The language of the statute105 
specifically includes numbers and identifiers. Accordingly, an order that specifies 
the attribute of the communication by indicating the IP address to be intercepted 
would seem to satisfy this provision. The fact that interception under these 
provisions is limited to non-content information notwithstanding, the provisions 
                                                          
104
 18 USC§3123 (b) (1). 
105
 18 USC§3123 (b) (1) (C). 
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allow for measures that are very wide in scope. A consideration of the amount of 
information that the interception of the addressing information of all 
communication to and from a particular IP address could reveal justifies this 
assertion as would be elucidated below. 
 
8.3.2.3 Other Safeguard Criteria 
There are no provisions to speak of in the pen/trap statute regarding procedures 
for examining, using and storing data obtained through interception. However, 
disclosure of ‗record‘ obtained by a law enforcement officer by a device installed 
pursuant to the statute may only be disclosed in the proper performance of the 
officer‘s functions.106 Given our discussion on disclosures under the Wiretap Act 
above, this can only be viewed as very minimal safeguard against abuse. 
Incidentally, the statute does require an auditing of the interception process in 
some circumstances; the kind of auditing that would have strengthened the 
safeguards of the Wiretap Act if it were provided for. Where the law enforcement 
agency decides to implement an order by installing its own pen or trace device on 
a packet-switched data network of a provider of electronic service to the public, 
the agency is required to maintain a record which will identify the following: the 
officer installing the device; officer(s) accessing the device; date and time of 
installation and uninstalling; date, time, and duration of access. The record shall 
also include the configuration of the device at installation and any subsequent 
                                                          
106
 18 USC§2707 (g). 
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modification; and any information collected by the device.
107
 Unfortunately, this 
requirement of an audit trail is not augmented by any provision for a civil or 
administrative remedy. The only sanction prescribed under the statute is the 
general criminal sanction that attaches to the unauthorised use of a device.
108
 It is 
to be noted that the crime is for installing a pen or trace device without a court 
order. This means that as long as the law enforcement officer obtains the easily 
obtainable order, she may not be held accountable under any of the sections of the 
statute. Before concluding this section, it seems fitting to underscore the 
difference between internet addressing information and that of traditional 
telecommunication. 
 
8.3.3 Internet Addressing Information More Revealing than 
Traditional Telecom Addressing Information 
The safeguard features of the pen/trap provisions suggest that the US Congress 
believes that the interception of non-content addressing information engenders 
less invasion of privacy than the interception of content. This position is probably 
correct in many instances. However, the question is whether the scope of 
discretion allowed in the provisions is commensurate to the invasiveness of 
today‘s pen/trap interceptions. For telephone interceptions, where addressing 
information involves only phone numbers dialled for an outgoing call, and 
originating numbers (the caller ID information) for incoming calls, this question is 
                                                          
107
 18 USC§3123 (a) (3). 
108
 18 USC§3121 (a). 
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probably more easily answered in the affirmative. For the internet however, the 
answer cannot be so straightforward.  Firstly, for a packet-switched network like 
the internet, where addressing information and content invariably travel in the 
same conduit, the risk of intercepting content while seeking IRI is high. Indeed 
from the study of the interception technologies, the difference between 
interception of content and IRI is usually a question of configuration since the 
same device is usually capable of intercepting both. It is therefore to be expected 
that over-interception will occur sometimes. Secondly, Internet addressing 
information conveys much more than telephone addressing information. 
 
There are two main ways in which internet addressing information reveals much 
more than telephone addressing information. Firstly, unlike telephone 
communication, a monitoring of say a computer‘s IP address involves the 
monitoring of a myriad of communications. The DOJ has suggested that ―in the 
Internet context, a federal prosecutor may obtain an order to trace 
communications to a particular victim computer or IP address.‖109 This will cover 
addressing information of web surfing, VoIP calls, chats, media streaming, emails 
etc. Secondly, internet addressing information that may be intercepted under 
pen/trap orders could, in many cases, reveal content without effort. For example, 
the addressing information of visited websites allows the officer to subsequently 
visit the sites in question without breaking any laws. Far more privacy interests 
                                                          
109
 DOJ, Supra, note 91, at p. 155, http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf,  
accessed on 29 October 2009. 
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are therefore implicated in the interception of internet addressing information than 
in that of traditional telecom. 
 
8.3.4 Some Concluding Remarks on the Interception of IRI in the 
United States 
It is to be remembered that although the Pen/trap statute enacted as Title III of the 
ECPA in 1986 was intended to apply to electronic communications, the language 
was so telephone-specific that it was doubted in some quarters whether it applied 
to internet communications.
110
 Congress had to clarify that it applies to internet 
communication by the amendments made to the ECPA in the USA PATRIOT 
Act.
111
 Accordingly, the Pen/trap statute may be said to have applied standards for 
telephone networks to the internet. The result is a low threshold of conditions 
precedent to an order as well as wide specification of the communications to be 
monitored. In sum, it is submitted that the scope of discretion allowed by these 
safeguards is not proportionate to the invasiveness of internet pen/trap 
interceptions. One needs only juxtapose the level of internet usage and the 
safeguard features of the statute to understand that measures authorized by this 
law would in many cases disproportionately interfere with privacy. On the one 
hand are the advancements in internet technology; the myriad of applications that 
run on it; the amount of time many people spend on the internet; and the 
                                                          
110
 See e.g., In Re United States, Cr-00-6091 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2000) (Trumbull, Mag. J.) 
(unpublished opinion) (pen register law did not apply to the internet). 
 
111
 See PATRIOT Act § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-90 (2001). 
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increasing reliance people place on it in their daily lives. On the other hand, there 
is a very low threshold for grounds for a pen/trap order; low level of specificity in 
the orders; and the absence of disincentives in the form of controls and sanctions 
including notifications. Accordingly, the thesis concludes that the interception of 
IRI in the USA may well be in accordance with law but the law does not exhibit 
sufficient safeguards to ensure that authorised measures would always be 
necessary in a democratic society or non-arbitrary.
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CHAPTER 9: LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION 
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
SINGAPORE 
 
9.1 United Kingdom 
This chapter evaluates the laws of the United Kingdom and Singapore separately 
starting with UK laws. The interception of internet communication in the UK is 
regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA).
1
 The 
Act is divided into 5 parts and makes provision for the interception of 
communications, the acquisition and disclosure of communications data, 
surveillance, the use of covert human intelligence sources, and the decryption of 
data. It also provides for commissioners and a tribunal with functions and 
jurisdiction in relation to these matters. We are however firstly concerned with the 
rules directly regulating the interception of the contents of communications, 
which are found in Chapter 1 of Part I.
2
 As will be seen below, RIPA does not 
regard the obtainment of IRI/traffic data as interception. Accordingly, most of the 
following paragraphs will focus on the interception of content and the 
interception/obtainment of IRI will be briefly discussed at the end of the segment. 
 
                                                          
1
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA), Public Acts 2000, Chapter 23 
2
 RIPA, Sections 1—20. 
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Under RIPA, it is an offence for any person in the UK to intentionally intercept 
any communication being transmitted by a public postal service, or public or 
private telecommunication systems without authorisation.
3
 ‗Telecommunication 
system‘ under the Act is any system for facilitating the transmission of 
communications by any means involving the use of electrical or electro-magnetic 
energy.
4
 The Act also assigns a technology-neutral meaning to 
‗communication‘5and the corollary of the definitions is that all internet 
communications are covered by the Act.  
 
A person intercepts a communication within a telecommunication system under 
RIPA if he/she ―...(a) so modifies or interferes with the system, or its operation, 
(b) so monitors transmissions made by means of the system, or (c) so monitors 
transmissions made by wireless telegraphy to or from apparatus comprised in the 
system, as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available, 
while being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of 
the communication.‖6 It will be recalled that this definition is the one adopted in 
Chapter 5 above to shape the discussion of the interception technologies. Chapter 
5 demonstrated that the technologies do indeed so monitor internet transmissions 
                                                          
3
 RIPA, Section 1 (1) & (2) 
4
 RIPA, Section 2 (1) 
5
 A detailed definition of communication is found in Section 80 of RIPA. It includes the 
following: anything transmitted by means of a postal service; anything comprising speech, music, 
sounds, visual images or data of any description; and signals serving either for the impartation of 
anything between persons, between a person and a thing or between things or for the actuation or 
control of any apparatus. 
6
 RIPA, Section 2 (2). It is to be noted that by Section 2 (7), the times while a communication is 
being transmitted by means of a telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time 
when the system by means of which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted is used 
for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have 
access to it. 
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as to make some of the contents available to persons other than the intended 
recipients or senders. The deployment of any of the interception technologies in 
the UK is therefore conduct that falls within the ambit of RIPA. Having 
established this fact, the following paragraphs will evaluate RIPA on the basis of 
the lawfulness and safeguard standards of the treaties.  
 
9.1.1 In Accordance with Law 
It is to be recalled that the lawfulness of all interference with privacy is a 
requirement under the ICCPR
7
 and the ECHR.
8
 RIPA does have detailed 
provisions prohibiting unauthorised interceptions, prescribing procedure for 
authorised interception and the use of intercepted data.
9
 In short, much as it is 
difficult to conclusively answer the question of ‗in accordance with law‘ for RIPA 
with confidence, one may venture to predict that most parts of RIPA would satisfy 
that standard when the ECtHR gets to analyse it. After all, RIPA was enacted after 
                                                          
7
 To reiterate, the jurisprudence of the ICCPR indicates that to be lawful, interference with privacy 
can only permissibly take place on the basis of law. Such a law must also specify in detail the 
precise circumstance in which interference is allowed and the decision to interfere must be taken 
only by the designated authority. See Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, the 
committee, Communication No 903/1999 : Netherlands. 15/11/2004, CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999, at 
7.7. 
8
 The ECHR standards are similar to those of the ICCPR and are well settled in the ECtHR‘s 
jurisprudence. It requires legal protection in domestic law, which must be compatible with the rule 
of law. The law must be accessible and enable foreseeability. Foreseeability requires that the law 
must be sufficiently clear and precise in its terms to give individuals adequate indication as to 
when authorities are empowered to use the measures. See Malone v. United Kingdom  (1985) 7 
E.H.R.R. 14, para 66; Copland v. United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 253, at  para. 45—46. 
9
 Section 1 of RIPA makes it unlawful for anyone to intercept communication without lawful 
authorisation. Section 3 specifies the circumstances under which interception may be conducted 
without a warrant, while Section 4 provides for interception with warrant. Sections 6 to 11 specify 
the procedure for the application for a warrant, the issue, duration, modification, and 
implementation of warrants while Sections 15—19 specify restrictions on the use of intercepted 
materials. Other safeguards such as scrutiny of the use of investigatory powers, including 
interceptions, are found in Part IV of the Act. 
  323 
 
numerous negative rulings by the ECtHR emphasising that interceptions in the 
UK were not in accordance with law.
10
  Moreover, in enacting RIPA, the UK 
Parliament stated that, ―The main purpose of the Act is to ensure that the relevant 
investigatory powers are used in accordance with human rights.‖11 Generally 
therefore, it is doubtful that the interception of communications in the UK will be 
deemed to violate privacy solely on the grounds of absence of basis for such 
interceptions in domestic law. However, since lawfulness includes the availability 
of safeguards in domestic legislation, it remains to be seen whether the provisions 
of RIPA have sufficient safeguards to meet the proportionality/necessity 
requirements of the treaties. 
 
9.1.2 Safeguards: Necessity in a Democratic Society 
As noted above, RIPA prohibits the interception of communication without lawful 
authority. Conduct has lawful authority under RIPA only if it is pursuant to 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act,
12
 which provide for warrantless interception where 
there is consent or by a telecommunication service provider in connection with its 
services; warrantless interception of the communication of persons outside the 
UK; and interception pursuant to a warrant respectively. Since it is expected that 
                                                          
10
 See E.g., Malone v. United Kingdom, (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14, para 66; Halford v United 
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
11
 Explanatory Notes to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, para 3. Available online at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/en/ukpgaen_20000023_en_1. Accessed on 5 February 
2009. The Parliament‘s objective was that for each of the investigatory powers, including 
interception of communication, RIPA will ensure that the law clearly covers the following: the 
purposes for which they may be used; which authorities can use the powers; who should authorise 
each use of the power; the use that can be made of the material gained; independent judicial 
oversight; a means of redress for the individual. 
12
 RIPA, Section 1 (5). 
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the preponderance of interception in the UK would be pursuant to a warrant, the 
discussion in this segment will focus on interceptions pursuant to a warrant. 
Warrantless interception will however be discussed below as exceptions. Like the 
evaluation of US law above, the following paragraphs will evaluate the safeguard 
features of RIPA on the following headings: prerequisites of interceptions; 
execution of interception orders; and control and sanctions. 
 
9.1.2.1 Prerequisites of Interceptions: Grounds Required for 
Ordering Measures & Competent Authorities to Permit, Execute 
and Supervise Measures 
The Secretary of State may issue a warrant authorising or requiring inter alia the 
interception of postal or telecommunication materials or the disclosure of 
intercepted material intercepted with authorisation or pursuant to a warrant.
13
 The 
Secretary of State is not to issue an interception warrant unless he believes that 
the warrant is necessary in the interest of national security; for the purpose of 
preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purpose of safeguarding the 
economic well-being of the UK.
14
 The economic well-being of the UK will not 
make a warrant necessary unless the information being sought is information 
relating to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands. 
Furthermore, the Secretary of State shall also not issue an interception warrant 
unless he believes that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to 
                                                          
13
 RIPA, Section 5 (1). 
14
 RIPA, Section 5 (2) 
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what is sought to be achieved by that conduct. To consider whether the foregoing 
warrant requirements have been satisfied, the Secretary of State is required to take 
into account, in addition to any other factors, whether the information being 
sought could reasonably be obtained by other means. This part of RIPA also 
stipulates who may apply for a warrant
15




Clearly, RIPA exhibits some safeguards. A law enforcement officer that 
determines that interception of communication is desirable does not just deploy 
the requisite technology. In the first place, only a restricted group of officials may 
apply for a warrant
17
 and the warrant may only be issued by the Secretary of State 
except a very narrow exception applies. These competent authority safeguards 
would in all likelihood reduce the incidence of exploratory interception. 
Additionally, in line with the rule of law standards in both treaties, RIPA may not 
be said to have been drafted in terms that confer unfettered discretion on the 
Secretary of State in approving warrants. This is because the Act permits the 
issuing of warrants only for specified purposes: interests of national security, 
                                                          
15
 RIPA, Section 6. - (1) An interception warrant shall not be issued except on an application made 
by or on behalf of a person specified in subsection (2). 
        (2) Those persons are- (a) the Director-General of the Security Service; (b) the Chief of the 
Secret Intelligence Service; (c) the Director of GCHQ; (d) the Director General of the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service; (e) the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; (f) the Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary; (g) the chief constable of any police force maintained 
under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967; (h) the Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise; (i) the Chief of Defence Intelligence; (j) a person who, for the purposes of 
any international mutual assistance agreement, is the competent authority of a country or territory 
outside the United Kingdom. 
 
16
 RIPA, Section 7. An interception warrant shall not be issued except under the hand of the 
Secretary of State or under the hand of a senior official in an urgent case in which the Secretary of 
State has himself expressly authorised the issue of the warrant. 
17
 RIPA, Section 6. 
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preventing/detecting serious crime, or the economic well being of the UK. 
Nevertheless, this part of RIPA has been severally criticised. Firstly, although 
serious crime is defined under the Act in specific terms,
18
  neither ‗national 
security‘ nor ‗economic well-being‘ is defined under the Act and some have 




Furthermore, regarding competent authority to issue and supervise the execution 
of an interception warrant, as indicated above, the rightful authority is the 
Secretary of State, which in the UK administrative setup is the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, commonly known as the Home Secretary. The Home 
Secretary is a cabinet minister and not a judicial officer and during the 
consultation that preceded the enactment of RIPA, many were of the view that 
warrants should be authorized by members of the judiciary rather than the 
Secretary of State, particularly in serious crime cases.
20
 It was argued that with 
the continual increase in the number of applications for interception warrants, it is 
increasingly impractical for the Home Secretary to exercise effective scrutiny 
over their content.
21
 There may be some validity to these objections; the absence 
of judicial control is likely to impair the safeguarding of the citizenry from abuse 
                                                          
18
 Serious crime is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and has 
no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term 
of three years or more; or one which involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial 
gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose. 
19
 See E.g., K. Starmer et al, Criminal Justice, Police Powers & Human Rights, (2001, Blackstone 
Press, London) p. 50. 
20
 See ‗The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill‘, House of Commons Library Research Paper 
00/25, 3 March 2000, p. 30—31. Available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-025.pdf accessed on 9 February 
2009.  
21
 K. Starmer et al, Supra note 19, p. 50. 
  327 
 
of investigatory powers. Notwithstanding, the standard in the ICCPR, as noted 
above, is that the decision to interfere with privacy must be taken only by the 
designated authority.
22
 The requirement of RIPA does indeed satisfy this standard. 
For the ECHR, the standard is that ―it is in principle desirable to entrust 
supervisory control to a judge.‖23 The ECtHR may however have regard to the 
nature of the supervision and other safeguards and conclude that the exclusion of 
judicial control does not exceed the limits of what may be deemed necessary in a 
democratic society.
24
 In other words, this absence of judicial authorization in 
RIPA is not fatal.  It may however reinforce a finding of incompatibility with 
Article 8 ECHR when read together with some other safeguard shortcomings. 
 
Another shortcoming in this aspect of RIPA, which the author had criticized 
elsewhere is the requirement of just the ‗belief‘ of the Secretary of State that a 
warrant is necessary on the specified grounds and is proportionate to what is 
sought for it to be issued.
25
 This would seem to be overly subjective particularly 
when compared with the provision that was reviewed and upheld by the ECtHR‘s 
in Klass v Germany. The said provision required that some ‗factual indication‘ 
must be present before surveillance could be undertaken.
26
 ‗Factual indication‘ 
                                                          
22
 Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, Supra note 7. 
23




 See O. Vincents, ‗Interception of Internet Communications and the Right to Privacy: An 
Evaluation of Some Provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Against the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights‘, [2007] 6 European Human Rights Law 
Review, p. 644—645.  
26
 Klass v. Germany, Supra note 23, paras 17 & 51. By Article 1(2) of the Act of 13 August 1968 
on Restrictions on the Secrecy of the Mail, Post and Telecommunications (Gesetz zur 
Beschränkung des Brief-Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses), the measures by which the competent 
authorities may open and inspect mail and post, read telegraphic messages, listen to and record 
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was the first of three ‗limitative conditions‘ that the court considered in reaching 
the conclusion that the ―so-called exploratory or general surveillance is not 
permitted by the contested legislation.‖27 This requirement means that the 
officials applying for a warrant should at the very least establish a prima facie 
case for the necessity of the warrant. RIPA, as it reads today, does not have such a 
requirement.  
 
This shortcoming seems to also dilute the efficacy of the oversight of the Tribunal 
provided for in the Act.
28
 The absence of a requirement of factual indication or 
some other preliminary proof prior to the issuance of a warrant deprives the 
Tribunal of an important objective yardstick for evaluating the appropriateness of 
the basis for a warrant. This same objection applies to the duty of the Interception 
of Communications Commissioner.
29
 UK law is no stranger to more stringent 
conditions precedent to the issuance of a warrant. For offline searches and 
seizures, Section 8 of PACE
30
, for example, requires a Justice of the Peace to be 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that certain conditions are 
met, including that a serious arrestable offence has been committed, before he can 
issue a search warrant. While this is arguably less stringent than say the ‗probable 
cause‘ showings under the US Wiretap Act, it would still have been a better 
safeguard provision than the mere ‗belief‘ test of RIPA.  
                                                                                                                                                              
telephone conversations may be taken only where there are factual indications (tatsächliche 
Anhaltspunkte) for suspecting a person of planning, committing or having committed certain 
criminal acts punishable under the Criminal Code. 
27
 Klass v. Germany, Ibid, para 51. 
28
 See, RIPA, Section 65. 
29
 See, RIPA, Section 57. The Commissioner is empowered to keep the exercise of investigatory 
powers by the Secretary of State under review. 
30
 Police and Criminal evidence Act 1984 
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In Sum, although the discretion of the Secretary of State in approving warrants is 
not unfettered, it may be said to be quite wide. Since the Secretary of State is a 
cabinet minister, there is nothing in RIPA to prevent the government of the day 
from legally approving interception whenever it sees fit. There is no immediate 
judicial oversight of the interception process. Without a requirement of a prima 
facie case to be made before the issuing of a warrant, the yardstick for measuring 
the performance of the Secretary of State is less objective. All these run counter to 
the notion of safeguards, particularly under the ECHR and it is hoped that the 
ECtHR will point this out clearly when it adjudicates a RIPA case. 
 
9.1.2.2 The Execution of Interception Warrants 
9.1.2.2.1 Filters and Narrow Description of the Data to be Intercepted 
In the execution of an interception warrant, the most important factor for our 
purposes is that the scope of the measure ordered be limited strictly to the 
information being sought. Under RIPA, an interception warrant must describe 
either a person as the interception subject or a single set of premises to which the 
warrant relates.
31
 Furthermore, According to S. 8 (2) of the Act,   
 
―The provisions of an interception warrant describing 
communications the interception of which is authorised or 
                                                          
31
 RIPA, Section 8. 
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required by the warrant must comprise one or more schedules 
setting out the addresses, numbers, apparatus or other factors, 
or combination of factors, that are to be used for identifying the 
communications that may be or are to be intercepted.‖ 
 
This provision does not require a sufficiently narrow specification of the material 
to be intercepted. It would appear that the schedules required would be 
satisfactory even if they only specify the addresses, numbers, and the apparatus to 
be intercepted; the other factors mentioned seem optional. By this provision, a 
schedule that merely specifies the person that is the subject of interception along 
with his various IP addresses and perhaps his types of apparatus would be 
satisfactory. A reading of the Interception of Communications Code of Practice 
adopted by the Secretary of State pursuant to RIPA
32
 reinforces the view that the 
Act does not require specificity in this area. The Code of practice stipulates that 
each warrant shall comprise two sections, the warrant instrument and a schedule 
or a set of schedules. The schedule need only inter alia contain a means of 
identifying the communication to be intercepted. There is no requirement of 
specific description of the material since identification through only an IP address, 
for example, will suffice.
33
 The discussion of the interception technologies in 
chapter 5 above demonstrates that available technologies are capable of 
                                                          
32
 See RIPA, Section 71. It is to be noted that By Section 72 of the Act, persons exercising power 
or performing a duty to which a code of practice relates must have regard to the provisions of the 
code. Although failure to comply with any provision of a code of practice shall not of itself render 
the person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings, the code of practice shall be admissible in 
evidence in any criminal or civil proceedings. 
 
33
 Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2002, para. 4.7—4.9. 
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implementing filters that would narrowly intercept only the data that is relevant to 
a specific investigation but RIPA does not reflect this reality. 
 
Given that intercepted materials could include materials that would hitherto have 
required a search warrant and indeed a lot more than the investigation in question 
needs go into, one begins to wonder if RIPA has not diluted privacy protection 
concerning the lawful but forcible access to private information. The laws 
regulating searches and seizures in the offline setting have even better safeguards 
in this regard. For example, Section 15 (1) of PACE provides inter alia that an 
entry on or search of premises under a warrant is unlawful unless it complies with 
Section 15 and 16. Section 15 (6) (b) provides inter alia that a warrant shall 
identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought. When 
Section 15 of PACE is juxtaposed with Section 8 of RIPA, it becomes clear that 
more may be desired regarding the narrowing down of the materials to be 
intercepted pursuant to RIPA. 
 
Narrow specification of the materials to be intercepted is perhaps the most 
important safeguard in this area of surveillance since it ensures the proportionality 
prescribed by both the ICCPR and ECHR. For the ICCPR, the concept of 
arbitrariness is included in Article 17 to ensure reasonableness. Reasonableness in 
turn implies that any interference with privacy must be proportionate to the end 
sought, and must be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.
34
 The 
                                                          
34
 Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, the committee, Supra, note 7, para 7.6; 
General Comment No. 16, 08/04/88, para 4. 
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jurisprudence of the ECtHR is also replete with the testing of the quality of 
apparent safeguards against the prescription of the ECHR. In Funke v. France
35
, 
for example, the ECtHR found that safeguards were lacking in the search and 
seizure of property because,  
 
―[T]he customs authorities had very wide powers; in particular, 
they had exclusive competence to assess the expediency, 
number, length and scale of inspections. Above all, in the 
absence of any requirement of a judicial warrant the 
restrictions and conditions provided for in law, which were 
emphasised by the government, appear too lax and full of 
loopholes for the interferences in the applicant's right to have 
been strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.‖36 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The point of this case for our purposes is that where apparent safeguard 
provisions, such as the interception warrant under consideration, appear too lax 
and full of loopholes, the ECtHR may well hold that the interception carried out 
pursuant to them is not necessary in a democratic society. It has already been 
demonstrated that as compared to PACE, RIPA is loose in terms of narrowing 
down the materials to be intercepted.
37
 At the consultation stage of RIPA, Justice, 
a UK civil liberties organisation, suggested that ―Interferences with privacy may 
                                                          
35
 (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 297 
36
 Ibid, para 57 
37
 See generally, O. Vincents, Supra note 25, p. 645—647. 
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also be minimised by attaching specific conditions to a warrant.‖38 However, for 
such attachment of conditions to cure this flaw in RIPA, it must require the 
Secretary of State to impose the conditions with a view to specificity. 
Incidentally, this low level of specificity in RIPA is even further reduced when it 
is external/foreign communication that is being sought and it seems fitting to 
briefly highlight this feature of the Act 
 
9.1.2.2.1.1 Certificated Warrants and External Communications 
Where materials required to be intercepted or examined consist of external 
communication,
39
 the Secretary of State, at the time of issuing a warrant for such 
may also issue a certificate that describes the intercepted material he seeks to 
examine.
40
 In such a case, the requirement  of specification of the subject and 
premises to which a warrant relates, and a schedule containing factors such as 
numbers, for identifying the communication to be intercepted
41
 may be excluded. 
The significance of this provision is that it allows broad bulk interception of 
communication sent or received from outside the British Isles. For the internet, in 
which packets originating and destined for addresses within one country could be 
                                                          
38
 Justice, ‗Justice‘s Response to the Government Consultation Paper ‗Interception of 
Communications in the United Kingdom‘‘, August 1999, 
http://www.justice.org.uk/parliamentpress/parliamentarybriefings/index.html accessed on 11 
February 2009, para. 3.9 
39
 External Communication means a communication sent or received outside the British Islands: 
S. 20 RIPA. This also covers communication related or incidental to external communication. 
40
 RIPA, Section 8 (4)—(6). The certificate certifies the description of the intercepted material the 
examination of which the Secretary of State considers necessary on the grounds of national 
security, for the prevention/detection of serious crime, or for safeguarding the economic wellbeing 
of the UK. 
41
RIPA, Section 8 (1) and (2).  
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routed through a different country, the likelihood of intercepting internal 
communications in this process is real. Notwithstanding, strategic surveillance 
would seem to be an acceptable feature of present day state security and is not 
necessarily prohibited by the terms of the treaties in focus here. The danger 
however is that data obtained through such broad interception may be 
subsequently examined to obtain information about a specific person and the 
minimisation procedures for the examination of data obtained through a 
certificated warrant
42
 under RIPA may not be said to be sufficiently restrictive.   
 
Recently, in Liberty v United Kingdom, the ECtHR struck down certificated 
warrants interceptions that were made pursuant to the now repealed Interception 
of Communications Act of 1985. The court felt that the interceptions were not in 
accordance with law because, although that Act prescribed some safeguard 
minimisation procedures, the details of the "arrangements" made under the 
provision were not contained in the legislation or otherwise made available to the 
public to satisfy the foreseeability requirement of the Court‘s case law.43 This 
defect in the 1985 Act is supposed to have been cured by the more detailed, albeit 
complicated, minimisation provisions of RIPA. This cure may not be entirely 
sufficient. RIPA prohibits the examination of materials intercepted by certificated 
warrants by reference to an individual who is within the UK regarding the 
identifying of the contents of that individual‘s communication.44 There are 
however exceptions to this safeguard. Notably, the Secretary of State may certify 
                                                          
42
 RIPA, Section 16. 
43
 Liberty v. United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 1, para 63—66. 
44
 RIPA, Section 16 (2). 
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for a limited period of three months that the examination of such communication 
by reference to an individual in the UK is necessary in the interests of national 
security, crime prevention/detection, or economic wellbeing of the UK.
45
 This 
exception is quite wide and, as is to be expected, caused considerable disquiet 
during the debate on the RIP Bill. One of the law Lords noted that the clause 
created an ―override certificate‖ the effect of which ―is in practice to sanction a 
trawl through bulk captured material obtained through a...certificated warrant 
allowing search for an entity...or a person inside the United Kingdom...‖46 This 
exception is intended to cover a situation where, for example, a criminal is 
operating outside the UK but also has someone working on his behalf, sending 
solely internal communications.
47
 Nevertheless, the requirement of only an 
administrative certification for the application of bulk interception to a named 
individual seems to confer too wide a discretion on the Secretary of State and 
raises the issue of proportionality. The ruling of the ECtHR in Liberty suggests 
that the court may find this feature of RIPA to be a violation of Article 8 ECHR.  
 
9.1.2.2.2 Procedure for Examining, Using and Storing Intercepted Data 
The Secretary of State is charged with the duty of making arrangements to ensure 
that each of the following is limited to the minimum: the number of persons to 
whom, and extent to which any intercepted material or data is disclosed; the 
                                                          
45
 RIPA, Section 16 (3) 
46
 Lord Philips of Sudbury, Hansard, House of Lords, 12 July 2000, Col. 319. Available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo000712/text/00712-
21.htm#00712-21_spnew2 accessed on 16 February 2009. 
47
 K. Starmer et al, Supra note 19, p. 53. 
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extent to which any of the material or data is copied; and the number of copies 
that are made.
48
 These  requirements are satisfied if each copy made of any of the 
intercepted material or data (if not destroyed earlier) is destroyed as soon as there 
are no longer any grounds for retaining it as necessary for any of the authorised 
purposes.
49
 The above-mentioned arrangements must include arrangements to 
ensure that retained material is stored in a secure manner.  
 
The 2002 Interception of Communication Code of Practice clarifies that in 
practice the foregoing minimization obligation applies equally to disclosure to 
additional persons within an agency and to persons outside the agency. It is 
enforced by prohibiting disclosure to persons who do not hold the required 
security clearance, and also by a need-to-know principle. This means that 
intercepted material must not be disclosed to any person unless that person‘s 
duties, which must relate to one of the authorised purposes, are such that he needs 
to know about the material to carry out those duties. Similarly, only so much of 
the material as the recipient needs may be disclosed. For example, if a summary 
of the material will suffice, no more than that should be disclosed.
50
 The 
                                                          
48
 RIPA, Section 15. For the purposes of Section 15, ‗copy‘ means any copy, extract or summary 
of the material or data which identifies itself as the product of an interception. It also includes any 
record referring to an interception which is a record of the identities of persons to or by whom the 
intercepted material was sent, or to whom the communications data relates. Copies are therefore 
not only direct copies of the whole material. 
49
 Something is necessary for authorized purpose in this regard only if it is necessary on the 
grounds of interests of national security, prevention/detection of serious crime, or economic 
wellbeing of the UK. Something is also necessary for authorized purpose if it is necessary for the 
functions of several officials (The Secretary of State, The Interception of Communications 
Commissioner or the Tribunal, a prosecutor— for ensuring the fairness of proceedings, and 
persons with certain public records duties), RIPA, Section 15. 
50
 Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2002, para. 6.4. 
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requirement to store intercept product securely applies to all those who are 





Furthermore, no evidence shall be adduced, question asked, assertion or 
disclosure made in connection with any legal proceedings which (in any 
manner)— discloses any of the contents of an intercepted communication or any 
related communications data as originating from any of the following:   
 unlawful or unauthorized interception by public, law enforcement and 
intelligence officers, and post and telecommunication service providers;  
 a breach by the Secretary of State of his duty under section 1(4) of the 
Act;  
 the issue of an interception warrant;  
 the application for an interception warrant by any person;  
 the imposition of any requirement on any person to provide assistance 
with giving effect to an interception warrant.
52
  
There are however some narrow exceptions to this rule. For example, disclosures 
may be made to a prosecutor to ensure fairness in prosecution and to a judge 
when he orders disclosure to himself alone.
53
 The Code of practice clarifies that 
the import of this rule is that the intercepted material cannot be used either by the 
prosecution or the defence.
54
  
                                                          
51
 Ibid, para 6.7. 
52
 RIPA, Section 17. 
53
 RIPA, Section 18. 
54
 Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2002, para 7.3. 
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Although the details of the arrangements made by the Secretary of State to give 
effect to these provisions are not published but are made available to the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner,
55
 the couching of the relevant 
provisions
56
 seem to be sufficiently restrictive to satisfy the disclosure safeguard 
prescriptions of the ECHR. Although the procedures seem not to be as restrictive 
as those upheld in Weber and Saravia v. Germany,
57
 nevertheless, the difference 
may be put down to the so called margin of appreciation that States are allowed in 
framing their laws. Clearly, intercepted material is not automatically available to 
all law enforcement officials that may want to view it. This safeguard feature of 
RIPA is further strengthened by the duty of confidentiality in the Act,
58
 which 
requires the existence and particulars of a warrant and intercepted materials to be 
kept secret by the public officials. It makes it an offence for any of the officials to 
disclose the matters they are required to keep secret. This should discourage the 
invasion of privacy through the leaking of people‘s private information to others. 
The statutory exhortation to ensure the security of intercepted data is also laudable 
since it is hoped that the provision will exert caution from the relevant public 
officers and lead to compensation when any person is aggrieved. 
 
Notwithstanding, it is indeed likely that RIPA, in precluding disclosures even in 
legal proceedings, may have gone too far. This is especially so in the light of the 
                                                          
55
 Ibid, para 6.1. 
56
 RIPA, Sections 15 to 17 
57
 (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE5, para 99—101. 
58
 RIPA, Section 19. 
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fact that there is no procedure under RIPA for subsequently notifying interception 
subjects that they had been the subjects of interception. While the non-disclosure 
in legal proceedings means that even the prosecution cannot avail itself of useful 
information contained in the intercepted materials, this does not in any way 
prevent law enforcement agencies from availing themselves of the fruits of such 
information, which may lead to evidence that could be adduced in court. With 
interception subjects not being notified of interceptions, the effectiveness of the 
accountability/scrutiny provisions of RIPA are questionable regarding redress for 
unauthorised interceptions as well as disincentives as would be seen below. 
 
 9.1.2.3 Control and Sanctions: Audit Trails and Disincentives 
9.1.2.3.1 Audit Trails 
RIPA does not prescribe the maintenance of interception audit trails or similar 
records. However, the 2002 Interception of Communication Code of Practice 
requires the keeping of certain records including that of applications, resulting 
warrants, grounds for the refusal of warrants, and start and stop dates of 
interceptions.
59
 The essence of auditing as that term is used in this project is that 
                                                          
59
 Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2002, para. 4.18 &5.17: ―Each intercepting 
agency should keep, so to be made available for scrutiny by the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner, the following: all applications made for warrants complying with section 8(4), and 
applications made for the renewal of such warrants; all warrants and certificates, and copies of 
renewal and modification instruments (if any); where any application is refused, the grounds for 
refusal as given by the Secretary of State; the dates on which interception is started and stopped. 
Records shall also be kept of the arrangements in force for securing that only material which has 
been certified for examination for a purpose under section 5(3) and which meets the conditions set 
out in section 16(2) – 16(6) of the Act in accordance with section 15 of the Act. Records shall be 
kept of the arrangements by which the requirements of section 15(2) (minimisation of copying and 
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each start, stop, or retrieval of data should be traceable to a specific agent. It is 
worth reiterating that ―Auditing is crucial in security. It is the means by which 
users are held accountable for their actions.‖60 Auditing is thus meant to augment 
the other accountability features in surveillance legislation. The audit 
prescriptions of the Code of Practice can only be described as modest. On the face 
of it, only start and stop dates may be determined by the records. The times of 
access to data and the identification of the officers conducting the interception are 
not included. It is expected that the latter particulars would also be kept in the 
records of any well-run agency but one can only speculate on this with the 
absence of express legal stipulation. The duty of the Tribunal to investigate the 
conducts of a person against whom any allegations are made in a complaint is 
perhaps rendered nugatory if the complainant or the Tribunal is unable to identify 
the perpetrator of the conduct because of the absence of an audit trail. This is 
contrary to the prescription of the treaties regarding safeguards against abuse in 
the form of supervision and judicial remedy.    
 
9.1.2.3.2 The Interception of Communications Commissioner  
RIPA provides for the office of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner (The Commissioner).
61
 The Commissioner is charged with the 
duty of keeping under review inter alia the exercise and performance by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
distribution of intercepted material) and section 15(3) (destruction of intercepted material) are to 
be met.‖ 
60
 IIT Research Institute, ‗Independent Review of the Carnivore System Final Report‘ 8 December 
2000, para 4.2.4. Available online at http://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf , accessed 
on 29 March 2008. 
61
 RIPA, Section 57. 
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Secretary of State of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on him by the 
Act.
62
 A myriad of persons are required to disclose or provide documents and 
information to the Commissioner to enable him carry out his functions.
63
 
Furthermore, the Commissioner is required to report contraventions of the Act to 




The Commissioner is also to make an annual report to the Prime Minister, who is 
required to lay same before parliament. The Prime Minister may exclude any 
matter from publication in the annual report if it appears to him after consultation 
with the commissioner that such publication will be contrary to public interest or 
prejudicial to interests of national security, detection/prevention of serious crime, 
economic wellbeing of the UK.
65
  Although RIPA requires that the office of the 
commissioner be occupied by a person who holds or has held a high judicial 
office,
66
 the Commissioner‘s sanction is limited to the above reporting 
mechanism, he or she has no power to quash warrants or provide any other form 
of redress to any complainant.  
 
In practice, the Commissioner‘s oversight regime includes biannual inspection 
visits to agencies that conduct warranted interception and the departments of the 
                                                          
62
 as required by Section 15 of the Act. 
63
 RIPA, Section 58. 
64
 RIPA 2000, Section 58 (2): ―If it at any time appears to the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner— (a) that there has been a contravention of the provisions of this Act in relation to 
any matter with which that Commissioner is concerned, and (b) that the contravention has not 
been the subject of a report made to the Prime Minister by the Tribunal, he shall make a report to 
the Prime Minister with respect to that contravention.‖ 
65
 RIPA 2000, Section 58 (4), (6), & (7). 
66
 RIPA, Section 57 (5). 
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relevant Secretaries of State. It also includes annual visits to communications 
service providers charged with maintaining an interception capability and 
providing assistance to security agencies.
67
 As far as administrative disincentives 
go, this control feature of RIPA is likely to discourage public officers from 
conducting interceptions that contravene the Act. Presumably, when officials 
know that they may be required to supply information and documentation on their 
activities to the Commissioner, they are likely to observe relevant safeguards. It is 
however hard to gauge how much of a disincentive this procedure has been in 
practice. For example, The Commissioner‘s Annual Report for 2004 stipulated 
that a significant number (45 in all) of errors and breaches have been reported to 
him during the course of the year. Although the report stated that this number is 
unacceptably high, we are not told whether or not administrative sanctions were 
applied as disincentives. The report also insisted that all the errors were 
unintentional. It is conceivable that the more objectionable errors were excluded 
by the Prime Minister. Alternatively, one is perhaps to believe that all 
interceptions in the UK for the relevant year were carried out in an above-
reproach manner. In sum, administrative disincentives, particularly those in which 
sanctions are limited to non-punitive reports, are no substitutes for judicial redress 
and sanctions hence the need to discuss the tribunal created by RIPA.    
   
9.1.2.3.3 The Tribunal 
                                                          
67
 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, ‗Interception of Communications Commissioner‘, 
http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp?sectionID=8&chapter=2 23 February 2009, visited on 25 
February 2009. 
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RIPA creates a tribunal, now known as the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (The 
Tribunal).
68
 The Tribunal has the following jurisdiction:  
(a) to be the only appropriate tribunal for  proceedings on actions incompatible 
with ECHR rights
69
 involving the intelligence services, or the use of investigatory 
powers under RIPA, or any other entry on or interference with property or 
interference with wireless telegraphy;  
(b) to determine any complaints received from a person who believes he has been 
the subject of the exercise of investigatory powers under the Act or other entry on 
property by intelligence services in ‗challengeable circumstances‘;70   
(c) to determine any reference to them by a person that he has suffered detriment 




(d) to determine such other proceedings that may be allocated by an order issued 
by the secretary of state. 
 
When a complaint is made to the Tribunal regarding any of the surveillance 
activities governed by the Act, it is charged with the duty to investigate whether 
the person against whom the complaint is made has engaged in any such conduct; 
                                                          
68
 RIPA, Section 65. 
69
 proceedings brought under Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
70
 RIPA Section 65 (7): For the purposes of this section conduct takes place in challengeable 
circumstances if— (a) it takes place with the authority, or purported authority, of anything falling 
within subsection (8)[authorisation, e.g. interception warrants etc]; or (b) the circumstances are 
such that (whether or not there is such authority) it would not have been appropriate for the 
conduct to take place without it, or at least without proper consideration having been given to 
whether such authority should be sought; but conduct does not take place in challengeable 




 See, RIPA, Section 17. 
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investigate the authority (if any) for the action; and determine the complaint by 
reference to principles of judicial review.
72
 On determining any proceedings, 
complaint or reference, the Tribunal is empowered to make any such award of 
compensation or other order as it thinks fit including quashing the warrant or 
ordering the destruction of any information acquired on the basis of the warrant. 
Furthermore, upon its determination of a compliant, the Tribunal shall give notice 
to the complainant.
73
 This notice however shall be confined to either— (a) a 
statement that they have made a determination in his favour; or (b) a statement 
that no determination has been made in his favour. Where a determination is made 
in favour of a complainant and the determination relates to an act or omission by 
the Secretary of State or conduct authorised by a warrant or other permission 
given by him or her, the Tribunal is to make a report of its findings to the Prime 
Minister. 
  
The measure of control that the Tribunal is meant to provide is central to the issue 
of safeguards. In the view of the ECtHR in Klass v Germany, it must be satisfied 
that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate and 
effective guarantees against abuse. It noted that this assessment has only a relative 
character to wit, ―it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the 
nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for 
ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and 
                                                          
72
 RIPA, Section 67. 
73
 RIPA, Section 68. 
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supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law.‖74 
(emphasis added). As regards supervision, the court opined that it has to be 
determined whether the procedures for supervising the ordering and 
implementation of the restrictive measures are such as to keep the interference 
with privacy to what is ' necessary in a democratic society'.
75
 The question for our 
purposes therefore is whether the provisions of RIPA on the Tribunal and the 
Commissioner perform this function. As noted above, the oversight of the 
Commissioner would ordinarily encourage the relevant public officers to observe 
available safeguards albeit the Commissioner is not empowered to provide any 
protective sanctions other than a report to the Prime Minister. 
 
Concerning the Tribunal, RIPA‘s provision for compensations and other orders 
including the quashing of an impugned warrant and the ordering of the destruction 
of materials wrongfully intercepted would seem to amount to effective remedy to 
satisfy the safeguard threshold of ECHR. However, the complete absence of a 
requirement to notify interception subjects at the end of interception would seem 
to render these safeguards largely nugatory. There can‘t be any complaints when 
persons are completely unaware that there has been an interference with their 
privacy.
76
 It is to be recalled that RIPA goes as far as prohibiting the use of 
intercepted materials in most court proceedings. Regarding subsequent 
notification, The ECtHR opined in Klass v. Germany that ―in so far as the 
                                                          
74
 Klass v. Germany (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 214, para 50. 
75
 Ibid, para 54. 
76
 In Klass v. Germany the ECtHR noted, ―…there is in principle little scope for recourse to the 
courts by the individual concerned unless he is advised of the measures taken without his 
knowledge and thus able retrospectively to challenge their legality‖, Ibid, para. 57.  
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'interference' resulting from the contested legislation is in principle justified under 
Article 8 (2)..., the fact of not informing the individual once surveillance has 
ceased cannot itself be incompatible with this provision, since it is this very fact 
which ensures the efficacy of the 'interference'.‖77 This dictum must however not 
be read to mean that the court endorses regimes such as RIPA‘s where 
interception subjects are never subsequently notified of interceptions. This is 
because, in the first place, in that case, ―[t]he applicants' main complaint under 
Article 8 is in fact that the person concerned is not always subsequently informed 
after the suspension of surveillance...‖78 (emphasis by the Court). Secondly, the 
statement was made in the light of a German law that allowed substantial 
subsequent notification. Indeed the above dictum actually continued as follows, 
―[m]oreover, it is to be recalled that, in pursuance of the [German] Federal 
Constitutional Court's judgment of 15 December 1970, the person concerned must 
be informed after the termination of the surveillance measures as soon as 
notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction...‖79 
The Court‘s position must therefore be read to mean that the absence of 
notification would be incompatible with Article 8 (2) when notification can be 
made without jeopardising the purpose of the interception. The current regime 
under RIPA where no notification is ever given would therefore seem to be 
unsupportable.  
 
                                                          
77
 Ibid, para.58. 
78
 Ibid, para. 57. 
79
 Ibid, para. 58. 
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With regards to the supervision of measures, RIPA is quite silent on 
administrative sanctions or other process against public officers that overstep their 
authorisation. It should be recalled that criminal sanctions may not lie against a 
person who intercepts communication in accordance with a properly issued 
warrant.
80
 The fact that interception is in accordance with a warrant does not 
always guarantee that all conduct arising therefrom will be proportionate. For 
those grey areas where an offence is not committed but where conduct is not 
above board, administrative sanctions would seem to be the appropriate 
disincentive but RIPA does not provide for this. Sanctions under RIPA are limited 
to reports to the Prime Minister against the Secretary of State by the Tribunal and 
the Commissioner respectively.
81
 One of course cannot go as far as stating that 
there would be no sanctions against public officers that overstep interception 
authorisation in the UK but the absence of a statutory stipulation in this wise 
means that whatever measures are used are not in the public view and is thus left 
to speculation. This reduces the safeguard features of RIPA. In comparison, US 




The regulation of public sector interception in the UK through RIPA, could be 
said, from the foregoing paragraphs, to evince some commendable safeguards on 
one hand but also raises substantial questions on the other hand. However before 
                                                          
80
 under Section 1 (5) (b) of RIPA. 
81
 under Section 68 (5) (b) and 58 (2) of RIPA. 
82
 Under the Wiretap Act, a department or agency may initiate a proceeding to determine whether 
disciplinary action against an officer or employee is warranted if a court, appropriate department 
or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated the 
Act. See, 18USC 2520 (f) 
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these could be highlighted in conclusion, it is important to take a look at 
warrantless interception under the Act.  
 
9.1.2.4 Exceptions: Warrantless/Private Sector Interceptions  
In the RIPA scheme, it is an offence for any person to intentionally intercept any 
communication in the course of its transmission without lawful authority. This 
broad prohibition has one express exception, namely, the interception of a 
communication in a private telecommunication system by a person who has a 
right or the consent of a person with the right to control the operation or use of the 
system
83
 The exclusion of criminal liability here does not however preclude civil 
action. Such interceptions are actionable at the instance of either the recipient or 
sender of the communication.
84
 Every other interception would have to be with 
lawful authority in order to be permissible. There are two kinds of lawful 
authority under RIPA, authorized warrantless interceptions,
85
 and interception 
with a warrant.
86
 Since most of Part I of Chapter 1 of the Act is on the regulation 
of warranted interception and it is expected that most interceptions in practice 
would fall under this category, authorized warrantless interception is therefore 
treated here as exceptions. Incidentally, these exceptions are the only instances 
under which persons in the private sector may use interception technologies 
                                                          
83
 RIPA, Section 1 (6) 
84
 RIPA, Section 1 (3). 
85
 under Sections 3 and 4 of RIPA. 
86
 RIPA, Section 5. 
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without committing an offence. A brief discussion of the instances therefore 
seems fitting. 
 
9.1.2.4.1 Warrantless Interception with the Consent of Both or One of the 
Parties to the Communication 
Interception is authorized under RIPA if the person intercepting the 
communication has reasonable grounds to believe that both parties to the 
communication have consented to the interception.
87
 This form of consensual 
interception should not present any safeguard problems as long as the standards 
for ascertaining ‗reasonable grounds‘ are sufficiently stringent. 
  
The more problematic provision is the one that makes interception authorized if 
either the sender or intended recipient has consented to the interception.
88
 
However surveillance by means of such interception must also have been 





 surveillance as well as the use of covert human intelligence sources.  
A little more detail on Part II surveillance is provided below. According to K. 
Starmer et al, this one-sided consensual interception without a warrant does not sit 
happily with some ECHR case law.
91
 This statement was based on the opinion of 
the ECtHR in Lambert v. France that a French ―Court of Cassation's reasoning 
                                                          
87
 RIPA, Section 3 (1). 
88
 RIPA, Section 3 (2). 
89
 i.e. without intrusion on residential premises or private vehicle.  
90
 i.e. with intrusion on residential premises or private vehicle. 
91
 K. Starmer et al, Supra note 19, p. 47 
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could lead to decisions whereby a very large number of people are deprived of the 
protection of the law, namely all those who have conversations on a telephone 
line other than their own.‖92 The Court of Cassation held that the applicant had  
 no locus standi to challenge the manner in which the duration of the monitoring 




The foregoing dictum in Lambert v. France is however no authority for 
stipulating that the ECtHR views the interception of communication with one-
sided consent as going beyond what is necessary in a democratic society. This is 
because the issue in that case was whether the party who has not consented and 
whose communication device is not the one that has been tapped has standing to 
challenge the legality of the manner in which the interception was done. The 
Court‘s dictum shows that such a party does have standing because his right to 
privacy is implicated. The Court however also found that the interception in that 
case was in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society because a 
warrant was required. The one-sided consent interception under RIPA does not 
require a warrant although an authorization under Part II of the Act is required.  
 
The real question then is whether the authorization under Part II of the Act 
permits only what is necessary in a democratic society. Under Part II of RIPA,
94
 
persons holding such offices, ranks or positions with relevant public authorities as 
prescribed by an order issued by the Secretary of State, may authorise directed 
                                                          
92
 Lambert v. France 30 E.H.R.R. 346, Para. 38 
93
 Ibid, Para. 35 
94
 See, RIPA, Section 30. 




 and the use of covert human intelligence sources. Only the 
Secretary of State may authorise intrusive surveillance.
96
  Furthermore, it is to be 
noted that in addition to the interests of national security, detecting/preventing 
serious crime, and economic wellbeing of the UK, other interests may form the 
grounds for a Part II authorization. These include public safety, public health, the 
assessment of government collections such as taxes, levies, and duties, and any 
other purpose prescribed by the Secretary of State. Clearly, the conditions 
precedent to the issuing of a Part II authorization are not as stringent as those of 
Part I interception warrants. So, does the fact that there is consent, albeit one-
sided, so augment these less stringent conditions precedent as to amount to 
sufficient safeguard? In principle, there is no reason why one person should be 
able to waive another‘s privacy rights by consenting to a wiretap. Perhaps it is the 
greater flexibility that one sided-consent affords law enforcement endeavours that 
justifies the lowered safeguard standard. With the Part II authorisation, it is 
possible that the ECtHR will consider measures authorised by this exception as 
necessary in a democratic society. In any case, RIPA exhibits a stronger safeguard 
against abuse than what obtains in the USA on this count.
97
     
 
9.1.2.4.2 Interception by Service Providers  
                                                          
95
 Surveillance without intrusion on residential premises or private vehicle. 
96
 Surveillance with intrusion on residential premises or private vehicle. 
97
 The Wiretap Act allows interception without an order for government and non government 
actors respectively if the interceptors are parties to the communication or if one of the parties to 
the communication had given prior consent to the interception. See, 18USC2511 (c) and (d). 
  352 
 
Interception is also authorised by RIPA if— (a) it is by or on behalf of a person 
who provides a postal service or a telecommunications service; and (b) it takes 
place for purposes connected with the provision or operation of that service or 
with the enforcement, in relation to that service, of any enactment relating to the 
use of postal services or telecommunications services.
98
 In the author‘s view, this 
exception is not only commonsensical but also necessary. It makes room for the 
flexibility necessary for the maintenance of network security, efficiency, and 
integrity as well as the maintenance of the interception capability required by the 
Act.
99
 In sum, the interference allowed by this exception would seem to be 
proportionate to the service needs and necessary in a democratic society. 
 
9.1.2.4.3 Interception by or with Consent of Controller of a Private 
Network/Lawful Business Practice Interception  
The Secretary of State in exercise of powers conferred on her by RIPA
100
 has 
issued the Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of 
Communications) Regulations of 2000 (The Regulations). The Regulations now 
govern interceptions effected by or with the express or implied consent of a 
system controller for the purpose of monitoring or keeping a record of 
communications.
101
 Monitoring under the Regulations must pursue specified aims 
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 RIPA, Section 3 (3). 
99
 See, RIPA, Section 12. 
100
 See, RIPA, Section 4 (2). 
101
 Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) 
Regulations, Regulation 3 (1) (a) (i). 





103and the controller‘s business interests.104 
Such interception is also authorised only to the extent permissible under Article 5 
of Directive 2002/58/EC.
105
 Furthermore, interception under the Regulations is 
subject to a general proviso, namely it must be in pursuit of the controller‘s 
business, the system in question must be used wholly or partly for the controller‘s 
business and he/she must have notified all users of the likelihood of 
interception
106
     
 
                                                          
102
 Ibid, permissible aims are to -  establish the existence of facts; or ascertain compliance with 
regulatory or self-regulatory practices or procedures which are applicable to the system controller 
in the carrying on of his business or applicable to another person in the carrying on of his business 
where that person is supervised by the system controller in respect of those practices or 
procedures; or ascertain or demonstrate the standards which are achieved or ought to be achieved 
by persons using the system in the course of their duties... 
103
 Ibid, Regulation 3 (1) (a) (ii)—(v): interception is also authorized if it is—  in the interests of 
national security, or (iii) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, or (iv) for the purpose of 
investigating or detecting the unauthorised use of that or any other telecommunication system, or 
(v) where that is undertaken - in order to secure, or as an inherent part of, the effective operation 
of the system (including any monitoring or keeping of a record which would satisfy the conditions 
of warrantless interception by communications service providers as authorised by section 3(3) of 
RIPA). 
104
 Ibid, Regulation 3 (1) (b)—(c):  interception is also authorized for— monitoring 
communications for the purpose of determining whether they are communications relevant to the 
system controller's business (this monitoring is only authorized if the communication is one which 
is intended to be received (whether or not it has been actually received) by a person using the 
telecommunication system in question : regulation 2 (d) (ii)) ; or  monitoring communications 
made to a confidential voice-telephony counselling or support service which is free of charge 
(other than the cost, if any, of making a telephone call) and operated in such a way that users may 
remain anonymous if they so choose. 
105
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), O.J. No. L201/37, 
31.7.2002, Article 5 
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 Without prejudice to any of the provisos attached to some of the paragraphs above, by 
Regulation 3 (2) (a)—(c), Ibid,  the following provisos are applicable to all the interceptions 
discussed above, i.e. all interceptions permitted under paragraph (1) of regulation 3, as follows: 
―…Conduct is authorised by paragraph (1) of this regulation only if - (a) the interception in 
question is effected solely for the purpose of monitoring or (where appropriate) keeping a record 
of communications relevant to the system controller's business; (b) the telecommunication system 
in question is provided for use wholly or partly in connection with that business; (c) the system 
controller has made all reasonable efforts to inform every person who may use the 
telecommunication system in question that communications transmitted by means thereof may be 
intercepted…‖ 
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Of all the interceptions that may be authorised by the Regulations, national 
interest interceptions— interests of national security crime detection/prevention 
—are the ones that seem to raise safeguard issues. Recalling that lawful business 
practice interceptions are warrantless, it does seem that utilising such 
interceptions for national security and crime prevention/ detection purposes 
constitutes a backdoor for evading the rigors of obtaining an interception warrant. 
Nevertheless, the general proviso of the Regulations107 would seem to ameliorate 
this risk; the proviso requires that even national security related interceptions 
would have to be incidental to the normal business of the system controller to be 
permissible. All users of the system must also have been notified of the possibility 
of interception for the authorisation of the Regulations to take effect. In the light 
of the proviso, to argue that a system controller that happens upon communication 
in his network that endangers national security or which constitutes evidence of a 
crime should turn a blind eye is unsupportable. Accordingly the thesis considers 
that the interference allowed by this exception would usually be proportionate to 
the business interests and necessary in a democratic society. 
  
 
9.1.3 Concluding Remarks on Interception of Content in the UK 
Again, the question is whether UK laws measure well against the treaty standards 
in focus here; does the law allow only interceptions that are strictly necessary in a 
democratic society in order to limit the invasion of privacy? Clearly, RIPA 
                                                          
107
 Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) 
Regulations, Regulation 3 (2) (a)—(c). 
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exhibits some safeguards regarding conditions precedent to the issuing of an 
interception warrant. Only a limited category of officials may apply for a warrant, 
which may be approved only on specified grounds. However RIPA does not 
require judicial approval and control of the implementation of warrants. It also 
requires merely the belief of the Secretary of State that the warrant is necessary 
and proportionate for the warrant to be issued rather than some kind of 
preliminary proof of necessity. The Act does not also require a sufficiently narrow 
specification of the material to be intercepted. Hence the proportionality that 
could have been ensured by reflecting the availability of filters in the interception 
technologies is not properly ensured. RIPA could also be said to confer wide 
discretions on the Secretary of State regarding the examination of data intercepted 
through broad- strategic interceptions aimed at external communications with 
reference to specific individuals in the UK. Regarding the procedures for use and 
disclosure of intercepted data however, RIPA safeguard provisions seem to be 
sufficient; intercepted material is not lightly available to all law enforcement 
officials that may want to view it.  
 
The Act does not prescribe the maintenance of interception audit trails or similar 
records in any meaningful detail. Regarding the supervision of the exercise of 
investigatory powers, the Act makes provisions for the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The 
oversight of the Commissioner would ordinarily encourage the relevant public 
officers to observe available safeguards. However, the Commissioner is not 
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empowered to provide any protective sanctions other than a report to the Prime 
Minister. The Tribunal is empowered to award compensations and other reliefs to 
complainants in whose favour a determination has been made. This would seem 
to amount to effective remedy to satisfy the safeguard threshold of ECHR. 
However, the complete absence of a requirement to notify interception subjects at 
the end of interception would seem to render this safeguard largely nugatory. 
Furthermore, the Act is silent on administrative sanctions. Finally, although RIPA 
has a number of exceptions that allow warrantless interception, most of these 
exceptions are necessary. The warrantless interception with the consent of only 
one of the parties to the communication and the permission of interception within 
lawful business practices in the interest of national security and other law 
enforcement grounds however raise some questions. In sum, its commendable 
features notwithstanding, on the face of it, RIPA does not measure all that well 
against the treaty standards, especially those of the ECHR. 
 
 
9.1.4 ‘Interception’/Acquisition of IRI or Traffic Data 
One notable feature of RIPA is that interception of communication does not 
include the acquisition of IRI or addressing information, which RIPA terms 
‗Traffic Data‘.108 Conduct that relates to or enables a non-sender or recipient to 
identify only traffic data is, by definition, not interception under RIPA.
109
 The 
                                                          
108
 See RIPA, Section 2 (5). 
109
 Ibid. References in this Act to the interception of a communication in the course of its 
transmission by means of a postal service or telecommunication system do not include references 
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import of this distinction is that the acquisition of IRI is not regulated under the 
more protective regime of Chapter 1 of Part I of RIPA. Following the definition in 
RIPA, for internet communications, all addressing information and message 
attributes such as email, web, and IP addresses, identity of sender and recipient, 
protocol and application information, and source and destination of 
communications are all traffic data
110
 and their acquisition is regulated under 
Chapter II of Part I of RIPA. This chapter regulates the acquisition and disclosure 
of the following:  Communication data, which includes traffic data; non-content 
information about the usage of a post/telecommunication service; and subscriber 
information held by a service provider.
111
 However, of these three, only traffic 
data are relevant to our discourse here since those are the only communication 
data that are likely to be obtained by interception. Accordingly, references to 
communications data in the following paragraphs should be read to refer 
primarily to traffic data. It is to be noted at the outset that the thesis considers the 
                                                                                                                                                              
to— (a) any conduct that takes place in relation only to so much of the communication as consists 
in any traffic data comprised in or attached to a communication (whether by the sender or 
otherwise) for the purposes of any postal service or telecommunication system by means of which 
it is being or may be transmitted; or (b) any such conduct, in connection with conduct falling 
within paragraph (a), as gives a person who is neither the sender nor the intended recipient only so 
much access to a communication as is necessary for the purpose of identifying traffic data so 
comprised or attached.  
110
 See, RIPA S. 2 (9): In this section "traffic data", in relation to any communication, means-  (a) 
any data identifying, or purporting to identify, any person, apparatus or location to or from which 
the communication is or may be transmitted, (b) any data identifying or selecting, or purporting to 
identify or select, apparatus through which, or by means of which, the communication is or may 
be transmitted, (c) any data comprising signals for the actuation of apparatus used for the purposes 
of a telecommunication system for effecting (in whole or in part) the transmission of any 
communication, and (d) any data identifying the data or other data as data comprised in or 
attached to a particular communication, but that expression includes data identifying a computer 
file or computer program access to which is obtained, or which is run, by means of the 
communication to the extent only that the file or program is identified by reference to the 
apparatus in which it is stored. 
111
 See RIPA Section 21 (4). 
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definition in RIPA that excludes the obtainment of traffic data from the meaning 
of ‗interception‘112 somewhat fictitious. This is because the Act requires a service 
provider to go ahead and obtain traffic data if he/she does not already possess 
it.
113
 This would in most instances entail the interception of a user‘s 
communication to get the addressing information notwithstanding the use of the 
term ‗obtain‘. Indeed in some cases, the full content would be intercepted and 
subsequently minimised to isolate the traffic data. 
 
9.1.4.1 Prerequisites: Grounds Required for Ordering Measures & 
Competent Authorities to Permit, Execute and Supervise Measures 
A person designated for the purposes of Chapter II of RIPA may give notice or 
authorise another
114
 to give notice and thereby obtain any communication data 
from the operator of a postal or telecommunication system.
115
 Such a notice 
imposes a duty to obtain and or disclose the required data on service providers 
and may be enforced by the Secretary of State by civil proceedings.
116
 The 
Secretary of State has,
117
 by the RIPA (Communications Data) Order of 2003,
118
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 RIPA, Section 2 (5). 
113
 RIPA, Section 22, ―...where it appears to the designated person that a postal or 
telecommunications operator is or may be in possession of, or be capable of obtaining, any 
communications data, the designated person may, by notice to the postal or telecommunications 
operator, require the operator— (a) if the operator is not already in possession of the data, to 
obtain the data; and (b) in any case, to disclose all of the data in his possession or subsequently 
obtained by him.‖ (Emphasis added) 
114
 Such other person must be a person holding office, rank or position with the same relevant 
public authority. 
115
 RIPA, Section 22. 
116
 RIPA Section 22 (8). 
117
 Pursuant to Section 25 (2) of RIPA. 
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prescribed various public office ranks and positions as designated persons for the 
purposes of acquisition of communication data.
119
 These include Superintendents 
in the various UK police forces, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, and 
the National Crime Squad, as well as certain officer ranks of the relevant branches 
of the military
120
 and intelligence services.
121
 Regarding grounds for the 
obtainment of traffic data,
122
 the designated person can only give notice for the 
disclosure of the data if he believes that they are necessary on a myriad of 
grounds.
123
 Furthermore, the designated person may not proceed with the process 
unless he believes that obtaining the data by the authorised conduct is 
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. Clearly, the foregoing 
prerequisites are much less restrictive than what obtains in Chapter I of Part I of 
RIPA, however further commentary on this is reserved for the conclusion of the 
segment below.  
 
9.1.4.2 Narrow Description of the Data to be intercepted 
A notice to obtain and or disclose communications data must fulfill the following 
conditions: 
                                                                                                                                                              
118
 Regulation of Investigatory powers Order of 2003, SI 2003/3172, Article 2 etc. 
119
 Under Section 22 of RIPA. 
120
 Provost Marshal of the Royal Navy Regulating Branch, Wing Commander of the Royal Air 
Force Police, and lieutenant Colonel of the Royal Military Police. 
121
 GC8 of the Government Communications Headquarters, General Duties 3 of the Security 
Services, and Grade 6 of the Secret Intelligence Service. 
122
 Under Section 22 (1), (2), and (5) of RIPA. 
123
 interests of national security, purpose of preventing/detecting crime or preventing disorder, 
interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK, interests of public safety, purpose of protecting 
public health, assessing or collecting tax, levy, duty, or other impositions, purpose of, in 
emergency, preventing death or injury (mental or physical) or mitigating same, for other purposes 
specified by the Secretary of State by order, RIPA, Section 22 (2). 
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 be given in writing or (if not in writing) must be given in a manner that 
produces a record of its having been given;  
 describe the communications data to be obtained or disclosed under the 
notice;  
 specify the matters falling within section 22(2) (grounds: national security, 
crime prevention etc.) by reference to which the notice is given;  
 specify the office, rank or position held by the person giving it; and  




For our purposes, the most important factor is that the scope of the measure 
ordered be limited strictly to the information being sought. In this regard, the 
above requirement that the communication data to be obtained or disclosed be 
described would seem to serve. However, the value of this safeguard provision is 
questionable in the light of the fact that this chapter of RIPA does not provide for 
minimisation procedures, e.g. the destruction of data that is outside the scope of 
the authorisation. 
 
9.1.4.3 Other Safeguard Provisions 
Other safeguard features in this regard include the fact that a notice shall not 
require the disclosure of communication data to a person other than the one giving 
the notice or such other person as is specified in the notice.
125
 Additionally, the 
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 RIPA, Section 23 (2). 
125
 RIPA, Section 23 (3). 
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acquisition of communication data by the notices may only be authorised for one 
month.
126
 The notice may be renewed for a further one month period and notices 
may be cancelled if the person giving the notice is satisfied that it is no longer 
necessary on the specified ground or that the conduct by which the data is being 
obtained is no longer proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. The 
oversight of the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the 
Jurisdiction of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal also extend to this part of the 
Act. 
 
9.1.4.4 Concluding Remarks on the “interception” of IRI in the UK 
As should be already evident, this part of RIPA is far less restrictive than Chapter 
I of Part I of the Act. Indeed it is doubtful that the acquisition and disclosure of 
communications data under RIPA will satisfy the requirements of lawfulness 
particularly under the ECHR. The jurisprudence of the ICCPR indicates that to be 
lawful, interference with privacy can only permissibly take place on the basis of 
law. Such a law must also specify in detail the precise circumstance in which 
interference is allowed and the decision to interfere must be taken only by the 
designated authority.
127
 Although the Act clearly provides for designated persons 
to issue notices, one may however argue that this is probably not the kind of 
designated authority the Human Rights Committee had in mind in that case. This 
is because the Committee indicated in General Comment No. 16 that States 
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 RIPA, Section 23 (4)—(8). 
127
 See Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, the committee, Supra, note 7, para 7.7 
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parties reports to the Committee ―...should include information on the authorities 
and organs set up within the legal system of the State which are competent to 
authorize interference [with privacy] allowed by the law.‖128 The Committee 
could therefore be said to have envisaged authorities or organs set up to review 
applications and issue them when the grounds are in line with the aims and 
objectives of the Covenant. RIPA however provides for only self-authorisation. 
Whether or not the procedures are viewed to satisfy the requirements of the 
ICCPR, it is even more doubtful that they will satisfy the ‗in accordance with law‘ 
requirement of the ECHR.  
 
The ECHR standards are well settled in the ECtHR‘s jurisprudence. It requires 
legal protection in domestic law, which must be compatible with the rule of law. 
The law must be accessible and enable foreseeability. Foreseeability requires that 
the law must be sufficiently clear and precise in its terms to give individuals 
adequate indication as to when authorities are empowered to use the measures.
129
 
The rule of law precludes the couching of such a law in terms of unfettered 
discretion.
130
 Furthermore, in Weber and Saravia v. Germany, the ECtHR 
prescribed the following minimum safeguard specifications to be included in 
statutory provisions as follows: 
 A. the offences which may give rise to an interception order;  
B. categories of people liable to have their communication intercepted;  
                                                          
128
 CCPR General Comment No. 16, 08/04/88, para. 6. 
129
 See Malone v. United Kingdom  (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14, para 66; Copland v. United Kingdom 
[2007] ECHR 253, at  para. 45—46.  
130
 Malone v. United Kingdom, Ibid, para 68. 
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C. a limit on the duration of interception;  
D. the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data 
obtained;  
E. the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other 
parties and;  




Firstly, specifications D—F above are clearly lacking in Chapter II of Part I of 
RIPA. Secondly, the self-authorisation regime of this part of RIPA flirts too 
closely with unfettered discretion. Where the government department that requires 
authorisation to interfere with privacy is allowed to issue such authorisation, it is 
difficult to see how discretion may be said to be fettered in any meaningful way. 
When this is read together with the provision of the Act for many different public 
authorities to issue notices on a myriad of grounds, one begins to see that 
obtainment of traffic data under RIPA may not satisfy ECHR‘s ‗in accordance 
with law‘ requirement.  
 
A lot of the grounds for issuing notices, such as prevention of crime and disorder 
(with no requirement of seriousness), collecting tax, levy, duty, or other 
impositions, public safety, protecting public health, would in most cases not even 
amount to permissible grounds for the interference with privacy under Article 8 
(2) of ECHR. This is further compounded by the fact that the Act allows the 
Secretary of State to prescribe further grounds by order. This also means that even 
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 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE 5, para. 95 
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if the requirement of lawfulness is deemed to have been satisfied, procedures 
under this part of the Act would in many instances not be accepted by the ECtHR 
as necessary in a democratic society.     
 
As is the case with the USA‘s Pen/Trap provisions, one perceives an underlying 
assumption in RIPA that interference with traffic data inherently involves a lesser 
interference with privacy. As indicated in paragraph 8.3.3 of the thesis above, this 
position is probably correct in many instances but as also demonstrated above, 
there are at least two ways in which addressing information in internet 
communication would reveal more than say a list of telephone numbers called. In 
any event, in Malone v UK, the ECtHR opined that the disclosure of addressing 
information could amount to interference with the right to privacy as guaranteed 
by Article 8 ECHR. It rejected the UK Government‘s argument that the use of 
data obtained from metering
132
 can never give rise to an issue under Article 8. It 
held, ―The records of metering contain information, in particular the numbers 
dialled, which is an integral element in the communications made by telephone. 
Consequently, release of that information to the police without the consent of the 
subscriber also amounts, in the opinion of the Court, to an interference with a 
right guaranteed by Article 8.‖133 
  
 
                                                          
132
 The use of a meter check printer to register the time and duration of calls and the numbers 
dialled on a particular telephone. 
133
 Malone v United Kingdom, Supra note 129, paras. 83—84.  
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9.2 Singapore 
9.2.1 Regulation of Public Sector Interception 
There is no single legislation or set of legislations dedicated to the regulation of 
surveillance or the interception of communications in Singapore. There are 
however a few provisions in some statutes that could form the basis of an 
evaluation. Since these are not numerous, the analytical scheme of this segment 
would be to outline the relevant laws and subsequently apply the treaty standards 
to all the provisions. 
 
There is no shortage of statutory provisions granting powers of search and seizure 
to law enforcement and state security officers.
134
 In most instances, search and 
seizure may be effected without warrant when certain conditions are fulfilled. For 
example, under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), while investigating a 
seizable offence, a law enforcement officer may access, inspect, and check the 
operation of any computer without a warrant.
135
 One may argue that nothing in 
principle prevents this provision from being used for interception purposes with 
                                                          
134 See E.g., Sections 35 and 36 of the Internal Security Act 1963 (CAP 143); Sections 6—69, 125, 
and 125A of the Criminal Procedure Code 1955 (CAP 68). 
135
 CPC, Section 125A provides  inter alia: “(1)   A police officer or an authorised person, 
investigating a seizable offence, may at any time — (a)  access, inspect and check the operation of 
a computer that he has reasonable cause to suspect is or has been used in connection with the 
seizable offence; or (b)  use or cause to be used any such computer to search any data contained in 
or available to such computer. (2)   The police officer or authorised person may also require any 
assistance he needs to gain such access from — (a)  any person whom he reasonably suspects of 
using the computer in connection with a seizable offence or having used it in this way; or (b)  any 
person having charge of, or otherwise concerned with the operation of, such computer.‖ 
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access being read to include remote access. However, this interpretation has at 
least two problems with it. In the first place, access under this provision is limited 
to when the computer in question has been used in connection with the offence 
being investigated. If this provision is interpreted to include remote access 
interception, it would indeed authorise interception in only very limited 
circumstances. Secondly, the provision cannot be interpreted to include any sort 
of assistance from telecommunications service providers because of the 




 The Telecommunications Act
137
 makes it an offence inter alia for any officer, 
employee or agent of a public telecommunication licensee to wilfully intercept or 
acquaint himself with or detain any message or part thereof except in obedience to 
an order under the hand of the Minister or the direction of a court.
138
 Without 
doubt, the Act regulates internet communications and the licensees referred to in 
the above provision include internet service providers because it defines 
telecommunication in terms that include internet communication.
139
 Accordingly, 
any surveillance activity that would involve the assistance of licensees such as 
                                                          
136
 Section 125 CPC has the same limitations as does Section 125A regarding interception of 
communications, i.e. under Section 42 of the Telecommunications Act, a court order or a 
ministerial order is required before any assistance from any telecommunication service provider 
may be obtained. 
137
 The Telecommunications Act 1999 (CAP 323) 
138
 Telecommunications Act, Section 42 (1) (b).  
139
 Telecommunication Act, Section 2: “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires  
"telecommunications" means a transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electro-
magnetic systems whether or not such signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence have 
been subjected to rearrangement, computation or other processes by any means in the course of 
their transmission, emission or reception...‖ 
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internet service providers for the interception of communications would also 
require either an order signed by the Minister or a court order.  
 
Regarding directions from a court, a review of Singapore laws in this area does 
not unveil any provisions that specify the grounds upon which a court may direct 
or order the interception of communications. Perhaps reference to ‗direction of a 
court‘ in the Telecommunications Act is reference to a provision in the CPC. The 
CPC empowers any court to issue a search warrant where it considers that the 
purposes of justice or of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code will 
be served by a general search or inspection.
140
 While reading ‗general search or 
inspection‘ to include remote interception may not be considered a stretch of the 
imagination, the holding of the High Court in SM Summit Holdings Ltd and 
another v. Public Prosecutor and another
141
 suggests that this view may not be 
tenable. The Court held that this provision
142
 is not meant to cover investigation. 
According to the court, ―Plainly s 61 CPC cannot be used to justify a search 
warrant for investigation, much less for the purpose of a fishing expedition.‖143 
The Court further opined that the police have been given an independent power of 
search under the CPC
144
 and Section 61can only be invoked when there is a 
summons
145
 or a requisition.
146
 In sum, while the Telecommunications Act 
                                                          
140
 CPC, Section 61 (1) (c). 
141
 SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another v. Public Prosecutor and another [1997] 3 SLR 922 
142
 Section 61 (1). 
143
 SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another v. Public Prosecutor and another, Supra note 141, at 
950. 
144
 I.e. CPC, Section 125 
145
 made under Section 58, CPC. 
146
 under Section 59, SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another v. Public Prosecutor and another, 
Supra,note141, at 950—951.  
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provides that a court may direct that interception be carried out with the assistance 
of a service provider, one is unable to evaluate the grounds upon which a court 
could give such a direction given the absence of a clear legislative provision. 
Perhaps in practice the police and the security services rely on the order of the 
Minister for authorizations to intercept communications. 
 
The Telecommunications Act also provides that on the occurrence of any public 
emergency, in the public interest or in the interests of public security, 
national defence, or relations with the government of another country, 
the Minister may, after consultation with the Authority (IDA)
147
 or any 
telecommunication licensee, give such directions
148
 as are necessary in the 
circumstances of the case.
149
 The direction to be given may include provisions for 
the taking control or official usage of any telecommunication system and 
equipment. It may also include provisions for the stopping, delaying and 
censoring of messages and any other purposes which the Minister thinks 
necessary.
150
 Doubtlessly, this provision could authorise prospective interception 
of communications. The IDA or any telecommunication licensee is obligated to 
give effect to the Ministers direction notwithstanding any other duty imposed on 




                                                          
147
 ‗Authority‘ stands for ‗Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore‘ (IDA). 
148
 To the Authority or that licensee. 
149
 Telecommunications Act, Section 58 (2) (a). 
150
 Telecommunications Act, Section 58 (3) (b) and (c). 
151
 Telecommunications Act, Section 58 (5)—(6). Presently, the relevant minister for this 
provision would be the Minister for Communications Information and the Arts. 
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9.2.2 Private Sector Deployment of Interception Technologies 
Regarding the deployment of interception technologies by persons in the private 
sector, the state of the law in Singapore is that such activities are unequivocally 
proscribed with a possible exception for telecommunication service providers in 
connection with the provision of their services. The Computer Misuse Act 
(CMA)
152
 makes it an offence for any person to knowingly, and without lawful 
authority intercept any function of a computer.
153
 Similarly, the 
Telecommunications Act makes it an offence for anybody to damage, remove, 
tamper with or touch any installation or plant or any part thereof used for public 
telecommunications with the intention of intercepting or acquainting himself with 
the contents of any message. It is similarly an offence to interfere with the radio-




In proscribing interception of computer communications, the CMA seems to be 
comprehensive. Once the definition of ‗intercept‘ in the Act155 is read together 
with the proscription,
156
 there seems to be no loophole on the basis of which 
persons may intercept communications without lawful authority not least because 
                                                          
152
 Computer Misuse Act 1993 (CAP 50A) 
153
 CMA, Section 6 (1) (b): any person who knowingly intercepts or causes to be intercepted 
without authority, directly or indirectly, any function of a computer by means of an electro-
magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device shall be guilty of an offence. Upon conviction, the 
offender may be fined up to $10,000 or sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3years or both. A 
second or subsequent conviction would attract up to $20,000 fine or 5 years imprisonment or both. 
154
 Telecommunications Act, Section 41, ―Any person who intending — (a)  to prevent or obstruct 
the transmission or delivery of any message; (b)  to intercept or to acquaint himself with the 
contents of any message; or (c) to commit mischief, damages, removes, tampers with or touches 
any installation or plant or any part thereof used for telecommunications belonging to a 
public telecommunication licensee or interferes with the radio- communication service or system 
of a public telecommunication licensee shall be guilty of an offence.‖ (Emphasis added). 
155
 CMA, Section 2 (1). 
156
 CMA, Section 6. 
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to intercept includes acquiring not just the substance but also the meaning or 




Although the Telecommunications Act is broader than the Computer Misuse Act 
in this area because it is not limited to computers, it is of limited application 
regarding the interception of internet communications. This is because, to commit 
the offence under the Telecommunications Act,
158
 one has to actually 
damage, remove, tamper with or touch any installation or plant or any part of any 
installation or plant used by a public service provider. For example, it is 
immediately apparent that removing the mouthpiece of a telephone set installed 
by a public telephone company in order to install a bug could violate this 
provision whereas limited interception of internet communication could be carried 
out without the need to touch any installation. An example of the latter is the 
deployment of a packet sniffer from the interceptor‘s own computer that is 
lawfully connected to the network. However, comprehensive interception of 
internet communications would usually require some tampering with an ISP‘s 




Notwithstanding, the Telecommunications Act contains a necessary exception for 
telecommunication service providers. It provides that the prohibition of 
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 Computer Misuse Act 1993, Section 2 (1): "intercept" , in relation to a function of a computer, 
includes listening to or recording a function of a computer, or acquiring the substance, meaning or 
purport thereof 
158
 Telecommunications Act, Section 41. 
159
 Telecommunications Act 1999, Section 2: "installation or plant used for 
telecommunications" includes all buildings, lands, structures, machinery, equipment, cables, poles 
and lines used or intended for use in connection with telecommunications. 




 shall not apply to any act or thing done by an 
officer/employee/agent of a public telecommunication licensee in connection with 
the provision of some services of a telecommunication system.
161
 The requisite 
services are installation of a telecommunication line or equipment, or the 
operation or maintenance of the system.
162
 This provision may also be read to 
constitute lawful authority for the purposes of the CMA
163
 such that a service 
provider may not be said to have committed a crime under the CMA by, for 
example, intercepting communications for maintenance purposes. Having 
outlined available laws, the following paragraphs will evaluate the laws on the 
lawfulness and safeguard standards of the treaties.    
 
9.2.3 In Accordance with Law 
To reiterate, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on Article 17, 
ICCPR indicates that to be lawful, interference with privacy can only permissibly 
take place on the basis of law. Such a law must also specify in detail the precise 
circumstance in which interference is allowed and the decision to interfere must 
be taken only by the designated authority.
164
 Regarding public sector interception 
of internet communications, the laws of Singapore outlined above can neither be 
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 Telecommunications Act, Section 42 (1) (b). 
161




 CMA, Section 2 (5) ―For the purposes of this Act, access of any kind by any person to any 
program or data held in a computer is unauthorised or done without authority if — (a) he is not 
himself entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data...‖ A public service 
provider should be viewed to be entitled to control so much access as is necessary to maintain a 
public computer network. 
164
 See Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, the committee, Supra, note 7, para 7.7 
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described as detailed nor be said to precisely specify the circumstances under 
which law enforcement and other officials are allowed to recourse to interception.  
 
Clearly, the law prevents anybody, which should include law and security 
officials, from enlisting the assistance of telecommunication service providers in 
the interception of communications except with an order signed by the Minister or 
directions from a court. Yet, there seems to be no clear legislative provision under 
which a court can order the interception of communications notwithstanding that, 
from all indications, interceptions do take place in Singapore for law enforcement 
and internal security purposes. It is unfathomable today that any state will choose 
to enforce laws and ensure national security without communications interception 
capabilities. The Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore, for example 
does collect and analyse intelligence.
165
It is also unlikely that the ISD can have 
interception capabilities without assistance from telecommunication service 
providers. In its own words, ―the ISD‘s powers of investigation and arrest are 
identical to Police powers and are likewise regulated and governed by the laws of 
the land, in particular, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Official Secrets Act, the 
Internal Security Act and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act.‖166 None 
of these laws enumerated by the ISD unveils a clear provision under which a court 
can order the interception of communications.  
                                                          
165
 For example, the Internal Security Department (ISD) under the Home Affairs Ministry 
confirms that it collects and analyses intelligence amongst other functions. ―It also investigates 
and where necessary takes direct action in relation to the defined security threats of terrorism or 
politically motivated violence, foreign subversion, espionage and communal extremism.‖Internal 
Security Department, ‗About ISD‘, http://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/abt-isd.htm . 
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Additionally, although the Telecommunications Act provides for grounds under 
which the Minister for Communications Information and the Arts may possibly 
authorise the interception of communications, this provision does not cure the 
lack of detail and precision in Singapore law in this sphere. The 
Telecommunications Act does not clearly indicate who or even whether or not 
law and security officers may apply for the order of the minister, it says nothing 
about the duration of such ministerial directions and is silent on the form and 
content of such directions. There are no clear and substantial safeguards attached 
to the exercise of this power by the minister and hence no grounds upon which an 
aggrieved party may challenge the exercise of this statutory power. This perhaps 
explains the dearth of case law in this area. When the laws of Singapore in this 
area are evaluated on the basis of the ECHR, its inadequacy is even further 
accentuated.     
 
The ECHR standards for public sector interception of communications require 
legal protection in domestic law. Such domestic law must be compatible with the 
rule of law. The law must also be accessible and enable foreseeability. 
Foreseeability requires that the law must be sufficiently clear and precise in its 
terms to give individuals adequate indication as to when authorities are 
empowered to use measures such as the interceptions being discussed here.
167
 The 
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 See Malone v. United Kingdom  (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14, para 66; Copland v. United Kingdom 
[2007] ECHR 253, at  para. 45—46.  
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rule of law precludes the drafting of such laws in terms of unfettered discretion.
168
 
As noted above in evaluating Singapore against the ICCPR jurisprudence, the 
laws of Singapore in this area cannot be described as clear or precise. Hence, the 
foreseeability arm of the ‗in accordance with law‘ test under the ECHR is not 
satisfied. One also fails to see how the discretion of the Minister is fettered under 
the Telecommunications Act, the only provision that clearly allows a government 
official to authorise the interception of communication. Accordingly, Singapore 
laws would also be said to fail the ‗rule of law‘ arm of the ‗in accordance with 
law‘ test under Article 8 ECHR 
 
Furthermore, although in practice, the ECHR does not bother analysing 
safeguards or ‗necessity in a democratic society‘ where it finds that impugned 
measures are not in accordance with law, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this 
area shows that there is a clear nexus between the quality of domestic laws and 
safeguard requirements in that safeguards are to be provided for in legislations. In 
Weber and Saravia v. Germany, the Court prescribed certain  minimum safeguard 
specifications to be included in statutory provisions for the ‗in accordance with 




None of these minimum safeguards is specified in any legislation in Singapore 
regarding public sector interception of communications. In short, interception 
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measures in Singapore may be said not to be in accordance with law when the 
measures are evaluated on the basis of the ICCPR and the ECHR  
 
Regarding private sector interception, it is to be recalled that human rights treaties 
impose both negative and positive obligations on countries. The foregoing 
discussion on public sector interception deals with the negative obligations, 
requiring states not to interfere with privacy. Positive obligations require states to 
take steps to ensure that rights are not violated. Usually, negative obligations 
attach to actions of the state while positive obligations apply to activities of non-
state actors, preventing them from violating the rights. Regarding interference 
with privacy through the interception of communications, Singapore law could be 
said to fulfill the kind of positive obligation that Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 
ECHR envisage.  The law is clear that individuals are prohibited from 
intercepting internet communications as established above. It however contains a 
necessary exception for telecommunications service providers. Nevertheless, 
Singapore does need a comprehensive surveillance legislation that allows only 
interceptions that are necessary in a democratic society.  
 
9.2.4 Application of the Treaties to a Non-Ratifying State 
As the laws of Singapore do not seem to measure well against the standards of the 
ICCPR and the ECHR, perhaps it is worthwhile to consider the propriety of 
applying these standards to a country that is not a party to either treaty. As a 
preliminary matter, it is noteworthy that this sort of application is not at all 
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uncommon in the human rights law field. A common approach in the international 
human right law field in the examination of individual rights is to outline the 
minimum standards as set by the UN treaties as well as the regional treaties 
regardless of the jurisdiction to be examined. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that academics often analyse laws and practices in jurisdictions on the basis of 
international standards even when the jurisdiction in question is yet to ratify some 
of the treaties enunciating such standards.
170
  This is also why country reports by 
human rights organisations evaluate practices on the basis of treaty standards 
without regard to whether such a country is a party to the treaties that formulated 
the standards. For example, Amnesty International annual reports on Singapore 
frequently evaluate the state of civil and political rights in the country without 
reference to whether or not Singapore has ratified the treaties that promote these 
rights.
171
 Non-ratification of relevant treaties does not therefore exempt any 
country from evaluation on the bases of international standards in the human 
rights law field. 
 Furthermore, as the thesis noted at paragraph 4.4 above, the setting of standards 
is one of the primary roles of human rights treaties and even states that are not 
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 See, E.g., Thio Li-ann, ‗The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-Making a 
Westminster-Modelled Constitution to Fit the Imperatives of 'Asian' Democracy‘, 6 Sing. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 181 at 186—188 (applying the standards of Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights to Singapore with clear indication that Singapore is not a party to the 
treaty); K. Scully, ‗Blocking Exit, Stopping Voice: How Exclusion from Labor Law Protection 
Puts Domestic Workers at Risk in Saudi Arabia and Around The World‘, 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 825 at 868—675 (author discussed Saudi Arabia‘s obligations under international law 
including the ICCPR, to which Saudi Arabia is not a party).  
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 See E.g., Amnesty International, ‗Annual Report: Singapore 2010‘, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-singapore-2010?page=show  accessed 
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http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/136008.htm accessed on 17 May, 2011.   
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parties do refer to the said standards in framing as well as interpreting their laws. 
One clear example of this influence of human rights treaties in non-ratifying states 
is the use to which Canada has put the ECHR, to which it is not a party.  The 
ECHR has had great influence in the development of Charter rights in Canada 
even though Canada is not and cannot be a party to the convention. According to 
the most prominent constitutional law scholar in Canada, Peter Hogg, ―The 
European Convention on Human Rights is another source of international 
jurisprudence that has persuasive value for Canadian courts interpreting the 
Charter.‖172 He also noted that ―The existence of the general limitation clause of 
s. 1 [of the Charter], and the two-stage review process, which s. 1 mandates 
reflect the influence of international human rights instruments, and especially the 




As is the case in this thesis, the application of treaty standards in evaluating non-
member states is most often made as a normative exercise, indicating what sort of 
standard a particular jurisdiction should emulate. The impetus for such normative 
analysis is the hope that the application of the treaties to even states that are yet to 
ratify them would lead to the changing of state behaviour, which is one of the 
functions of human rights treaties as discussed at paragraph 4.4 above..  
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 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (2010, Carswell, Toronto) p. 36-42. 
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9.2.4.1 The Approach to Privacy in Singapore 
The foregoing notwithstanding, Singapore is not a party to the treaties in focus in 
this thesis and has no direct legal obligation to implement the standards. The 
question that this situation invites is why has Singapore chosen to be one of the 
small number of countries that have not ratified the ICCPR? This question raises 
the old question of whether there is a local approach or perspective regarding civil 
and political rights in general and the right to privacy in particular that is different 
from the approach or understanding of the concept reflected in the treaties. 
A common answer seen in academic commentaries on this topic is that ―cultural 
relativism and a communitarian-based understanding of rights and obligations are 
features of the approach towards law relating to the rights of the individual [in 
Singapore].‖174 With regards to the right to privacy, the oft-cited quote from a 
speech by the then Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew on privacy aligns with this 
analogy to wit:  
―I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of 
citizens. Yet, if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn't be 
here today. And I say without the slightest remorse, that we 
wouldn't be here, we would not have made economic progress, 
if we had not intervened on very personal matters - who your 
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 Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, ‗Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way‘ 30 Hong 
Kong L.J. 91—92 (2000); See also, Tsun Hang Tey, ‗Judicial Internalising of Singapore's 
Supreme Political Ideology‘ 40 Hong Kong L.J. 293 (2010). (―It [The People‘s Action Party] has 
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Paper on Shared Values‖) 
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neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or 
what language you use. We decide what is right, never mind 
what the people think. That's another problem‖175 
If the foregoing is anything to go by, one may then say that in Singapore, there is 
a policy of the government of the day to subordinate individual rights, including 
privacy, to collective interests, especially economic progress. However, may one 
also from the foregoing conclude that privacy is not viewed as a fundamental 
human right in Singapore? There are two ways to approach this question. Firstly, 
is the expectation of privacy among Singaporeans in their personal affairs so 
different from the ideals reflected in the treaties as to support the notion that there 
is a different cultural take as to privacy in Singapore? Secondly do the laws and 
policies of the government of Singapore reflect an understanding of privacy that is 
radically different from those that animate the treaties?  
Regarding the first question, the statement above by Prime Minister Lee Kwan 
Yew, as he then was, if anything, goes to show that the interference of the state 
notwithstanding, ordinary citizens had expectation of privacy in the activities 
enumerated in that segment of the speech albeit the government chose to do what 
it thought was right for the greater good of economic progress. Other 
developments in Singapore point in this same direction. For example the disquiet 
among Singaporeans after the May 1999 computer port scanning incident by 
SingNet, point to an expectation on the part of some Singaporeans that their 
                                                          
175
 Lee Kwan Yew's Speech at National Day Rally," The Straits Times, April 20, 1987, See, 
Privacy International, ‗Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Singapore‘, 
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accessed on 17 May 2011. 
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computers should not be accessed by anyone without their consent. Postings still 
available on internet chat rooms bear this notion out.
176
 Furthermore, recent 
comments in parliament by a representative lend more support to this position. 
The MP stated as follows: 
―Sir, the modern lifestyle in Singapore has made Singaporeans more and 
more exposed. We are exposed not because we have less cloth on our 
clothes, but because of the rapid changes in technology.      
If you drive, whenever you drive past an ERP gantry, your vehicle's IU 
number will be registered. When you stop at certain traffic junctions, 
there may be cameras capturing video footage. When you enter a carpark, 
the parking system will again knows what time your car enters and leaves 
the building. The LTA is also reportedly looking at implementing a future 
ERP system using GPS technology.  
     If you travel by public transport, the contactless card system keeps tabs 
of the stations and bus stops you start and end your journey. When you 
make purchases using the same card, the system keeps track of where and 
how much you spend.  
     When you go to certain sensitive areas or neighbourhoods for lunch, 
your image may be captured by CCTV [Laughter]. At lunch, when your 
friend pull out a smartphone to take photo of you and post on Facebook and 
Twitter, you can possibly find your own image shared to millions of 
                                                          
176 See E.g., http://www.spug.sg/forums/showthread.php?46396-Port-Scanning-by-SINGAPORE-
NETWORK-INFORMATION-CENTRE-and-STARHUB-CABLE accessed on 17 May 2011; 
http://www.hardware-
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Singaporean online. When you sleep at work, the next thing you see could 
be a video of you snoring on YouTube.  
     This is how technology has infiltrated our lives. However, Singapore's 
online privacy laws are almost non-exist... I am of a view that it is time that 
the Government introduces a privacy law in Singapore to protect the 
identity and privacy of individual Singaporeans.  The law should also cover 
the use of personal data collected by various agencies and commercial 
institutions.‖177 
From the foregoing, one may safely conclude that at least a section of the 
Singapore society has aspirations regarding privacy that are similar to those of 
citizens in countries that have ratified and implemented the treaties. This makes it 
difficult to rely solely on cultural differences and perception to justify any 
differences between Singapore and other jurisdictions regarding privacy 
protection.   
As regards the question of whether the laws and policies of the government of 
Singapore reflect an understanding of privacy that is radically different from those 
that animate the treaties, a similar conclusion as above is possible. One also finds 
that the current approach by the government of Singapore may be said to stem not 
so much from a difference in the understanding of privacy as in the level of 
interference the government considers necessary for the economic wellbeing and 
security of the state. This is because one still finds areas in which the law protects 
privacy in Singapore to extents comparable to jurisdictions that openly regard the 
                                                          
177
 Low Thia Khiang (Hougang), Official Report, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 11th 
Parliament, Session 2 Volume 87, 10 March 2011. Available online at 
http://160.96.186.99/reports/private/hansard/full/20110310/20110310_HR.html accessed on 17 
May 2011. 
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right to privacy as fundamental.  According to one commentator, ―To some 
extent, one may argue that anonymity in a variety of settings as imposed by the 
law in Singapore suggests that there is a fundamental respect for the individuals' 
right of privacy.‖178 He cited examples of prohibition of publication of certain 
details about parties in some court proceedings especially in juvenile offence 
proceedings as well as rape cases. He also referred to the privilege that attach to 
certain professional communication such as solicitor client privilege and medical 
records.
179
 Beyond these, as noted in paragraph 9.2.3 above, regarding 
interference with privacy through the interception of communications by non-
state actors, Singapore law could be said to fulfill the kind of positive obligation 
that Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR envisage.  The law is clear that 
individuals are prohibited from intercepting internet communications. This trend 
of privacy protection is also evident in other legislation such as the Computer 
Misuse Act, 1993 as will be discussed below. Furthermore the government 
through the Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts has 
definitively opted to enact data protection laws. According to the minister, ―The 
Government has concluded that it would be in Singapore‘s overall interests to put 
in place a data protection regime, in order to protect individuals‘ personal data 
against unauthorised use and disclosure for profit. The Government will be 
introducing a data protection law that will provide a baseline standard for data 
                                                          
178
 Looi Teck Kheong, ‗Should there be Privacy Laws in Singapore‘, Law Gazette, February 2001, 
available online at http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2001-2/ accessed on 18 May 2011. 
179
 Ibid. 
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protection in Singapore.‖180 According to the Minister, the proposed legislation is 
expected to be introduced for consideration by Parliament in early 2012 and it is 
envisaged that a Data Protection Council will be set up.
181
  
In the light of the foregoing, the suggestion that the government of Singapore 
does not consider the right to privacy to be a fundamental human right would 
seem to be a difficult one to maintain. A government that would seek to protect 
privacy in these areas may not also at the same time be said to deny the 
importance of privacy or the fundamental role it plays in society. A more 
plausible argument is that the Singapore government may be said to have chosen 
not to extend the protection of privacy to claims by individuals against public 
authorities in areas such as the interception of communication. In other words, the 
government has chosen to place a broad limit on the right as gleaned from the 
state of surveillance law in Singapore as outlined above. Perhaps this state of the 
law is a reflection of the communitarian philosophy adumbrated above.
182
 In this 
regard, in the clash between the imperative of individual privacy and the 
communal interests in national security and economic progress, the latter may be 
said to have been allowed to trump the former in the area of state surveillance. 
This leads to the question of how best to balance the competing imperatives. 
                                                          
180
 Lui Tuck Yew, Official Report, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 11th Parliament, Session 2 
Volume 87, 14 February, 2011. Available online at 





  See also, Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, ‗Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way‘ 30 
Hong Kong L.J. 91 at 100: ―This idea and belief of collective security, manifested in the 
community's interests gaining precedence over the individual has been popularly characterised in 
Singapore as ‗communitarianism‘.‖ 
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9.2.4.2 Balancing Imperatives 
Is the current state of the law in Singapore the appropriate balance between the 
imperatives of individual privacy and other social concerns such as national 
security and economic wellbeing?  Put differently, is the current absence of 
identifiable limits placed by law on the exercise of investigatory powers by public 
authorities and the absence of explicit judicial supervision of interception 
processes a satisfactory response to the tension between these competing 
imperatives?  By the terms of the treaties, national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of a country are all legitimate grounds for interference with 
privacy by public authorities. The compromise evident in the treaties between 
these and privacy interests is that legislation must specify in detail the 
circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted and the decision for 
such must be taken by designated authorities on a case by case basis. As the thesis 
has outlined above, The US and UK have sought to implement a number of 
safeguard features in their laws to achieve such a balance. In effect, once such 
laws are observed, public authorities may freely interfere with privacy in the 
interest of the competing imperatives. The model discernible in Singapore from 
the Telecommunications Act on the other hand would place reliance on the 
competence and integrity of the minister to put policies in place to ensure that 
privacy interests are protected in the pursuit of these public interests.  
 
It is not difficult to see that the current state of the law in Singapore in this area 
will make for more flexibility in the pursuit of the public interests as well as speed 
in responding to threats to say national security. It however places heavy reliance 
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on the quality of the individuals that occupy the decision-making offices.  It is 
perhaps in this respect that arguments in support of the ‗Singapore way‘183 have 
the most force. This is because Singapore public officials are reputed to have 
exceptionally high levels of probity, integrity, competence, and the trust of the 
masses. For example, The World Economic Forum‘s Global Competitiveness 
Report, 2010-11 ranked Singapore No. 1 out of 139 countries on the ‗public trust 
of politicians‘ and transparency of government policymaking‘ indices.184 It also 
assessed Singapore‘s public institutions as the best in the world and ranked it first 
for both the lack of corruption in the country and government efficiency.
185
 
Accordingly, it may well be that the current state of the law notwithstanding, 
privacy interests are protected in Singapore through the internal policies of 
relevant government bodies. Whether this model is sustainable in the long run is 
perhaps best left to commentators that will address this issue in the future. 
Whether also this model will gain a place in orthodox international human rights 
law evaluations is however doubtful not least because the interplay of factors that 
may have made the model to work in Singapore is probably not possible to 
replicate in other countries. In the light of the treaty standards however, Singapore 
still needs comprehensive legislation to protect privacy. 
                                                          
183
 Ibid, p. 97—98: ―The ‗Singapore Way‘ is not only premised on the fact that Singapore society 
is organised differently from the West but that the law has a different role too. In Western 
societies, law serves to protect the individual from the state. By contrast, law in Singapore tends to 
place relatively more importance on community interests. Further, while the law does protect the 
individual, law is also mobilised to enable the state to fulfil its development objectives.‖ 
184
 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, p. 297. Available online 
at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf accessed on 
19 May 2011. 
185
 Ibid, p. 14 
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The discussion of the laws of Singapore concludes the evaluation of public sector 
interception technologies in the three jurisdictions. It would however seem fitting 
to bring together the approaches adopted in the three jurisdictions in a 
comparative manner with a view to easily identifying best state practice for each 
heading of legislative safeguards among the three states.  
 
9.3 Comparison of the Laws of USA, UK, and Singapore 
The table below compares the laws of the UK, US, and Singapore on each of the 
treaty standards used in the evaluations above. It serves as a quick reference guide 
to the standards in each jurisdiction. As the table helps to indicate, Singapore laws 
are the least protective of the three on all counts. On the interception of content, 
one would have thought that with the direct reference to the ECHR in the 
enactment of RIPA, UK law would have been the most protective. However as 
the table helps point out, on most counts US law is generally more protective for 
law enforcement interceptions. It evinces narrower grounds for ordering 
interception measures, judicial as against administrative authorisation of 
interception, narrower description of data to be intercepted, and above all it 
provides for post-interception notification of interception subjects such that the 
judicial remedies allowed by law are more likely to be utilised. On foreign 
intelligence, both jurisdictions allow exploratory interception but the terms of the 
UK law seem to allow wider discretion, and on the interception of IRI, both 
countries seem not to have come to terms with the fact that internet IRI‘s can be 
more revealing than traditional telecom IRI.   
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This chapter evaluates the legal regulation of tracking technologies in the US, UK 
and Singapore on the basis of the privacy standards identified in Chapter 4 above. 
With regards to the privacy questions raised by each of the technologies as noted 
in chapter 6 above, it is noteworthy that although data protection laws are relevant 
in regulating nearly all of them, some of the more invasive ones are perhaps better 
regulated by criminal law. In this regard, the tracking technologies may be 
roughly divided into two broad categories: technologies that facilitate the 
obtainment and processing of personal information on the basis of user interaction 
with a web-based undertaking and technologies that engender unauthorised access 
to users‘ computers. The former includes browser/user-usage identification 
technologies i.e. cookies, web bugs, flash cookies, and web search engines as well 
as some technologies that perform undisclosed capturing and transmission of 
information (e.g. Alexa and RealPlayer). The latter includes some uses of search 
robots and spyware (in the narrow sense). The former may be adequately 
regulated by data protection laws while the latter, given their malicious nature, are 
better regulated by say criminal law such as computer misuse legislation. 
Notwithstanding, some non-malicious uses of spyware and search robots that do 
not amount to crimes could however also be regulated by data protection laws.  
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Since data protection laws,  are relevant to the regulation of most of the 
technologies, such laws would be the main focus in the evaluation of the laws of 
US, UK and Singapore. For the malicious use of search robots and spyware, 
suffice it to note here that UK, US and Singapore all have computer misuse 
legislation that generally outlaw access to a computer without authorisation.
1
 
Additionally, for spyware that have interception-like features, the laws discussed 
in chapters 8 and 9 above regarding interception by non-government actors would 
seem to operate to proscribe their use without authorisation.   
 
The normative lesson from the discussion of the EC Data Protection Directive in 
Chapter 4 above is that states should allow only the processing of personal data 
that meets specified legitimacy criteria and that ensures adequate safeguards. 
There are two parts to this standard. Firstly, available laws must provide for 
circumscribed grounds for legitimate processing of personal data. Regarding 
tracking technologies, the corollary of this requirement would be that the 
technologies may not be legitimately deployed by just any person who so desires. 
Secondly, adequate safeguards suggests a legal framework for the deployment of 
such technologies that ensures that even legitimate processing remains 
proportionate and is safeguarded against abuse by standards analogous to the 
following as seen in the Directive: data quality principles; 
information/notification to be given to the data subjects; data subject‘s right to 
access data concerning him; the right to object to processing; and confidentiality 
                                                          
1
 See E.g., The Computer Misuse Act, 1990, UK, Section 1; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
1984, US, 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(2)(C); the Computer Misuse Act (Chapter 50A), 1993, Singapore, 
Section 3 (1). 
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and security of processing. Other emulation-worthy safeguard features in the 
Directive are judicial remedies and the existence and functions of supervisory 
authorities. In addition to the foregoing, data protection laws should also evince 
flexibility such as the simplification of the requirement to notify the supervisory 
authority under the Directive and the permission of free flow of data once the 
safeguard requirements have been met. 
 
Regarding grounds for legitimate processing, the discussion of the technologies in 
Chapter 6 above suggests that different criteria for legitimate processing should 
apply to the various tracking technologies and their associated practices. From the 
discussion in Chapter 4, two of the six criteria for legitimate processing under 
Article 7 of the Directive are particularly relevant for internet tracking 
technologies. The two criteria are, consent, and processing necessary for the 
legitimate interests of the data controller that are not overridden by the interest of 
the fundamental rights of the data subjects (legitimate interests). The other criteria 
under Article 7 (a)—(f) are unlikely to suffice as legitimate grounds for the day to 
day processing of personal data obtained through tracking technologies. In terms 
of thresholds, ‗consent‘ is viewed here as the higher threshold while the 
‗legitimate interests‘ criterion constitutes the lower. To conclude this introduction, 
it seems fitting that the relevant threshold for each of the technologies in focus as 
identified in Chapter 6 should be briefly reiterated for ease of reference.  
 
Table 10-1 Minimum Threshold Requirements for Legitimate Processing 
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Tracking Technology Relevant Criterion for 
Legitimate Processing 
Remarks/Regulation of Associated 
Practices 
Cookies Legitimate interests of 
the data controller 
Some practices associated with the use 
of cookies should however attract the 
higher threshold of consent. E.g. 
multisession/multi site ad serving and 
tracking; GUID cookie; and the sale or 
disclosure of user data. 
Flash Cookies Legitimate interests of 
the data controller 
The use of flash cookies to make data 
available to third parties should require 
consent. 
Web Bugs Legitimate interests of 
the data controller 
The notification of the data subject 
would seem to be very important here 
given the covert nature of web bugs. It 
is however arguable that web bugs 
should require consent. 
Web Search engines Legitimate interests of 
the data controller and 
consent 
The use of log file data for security 
maintenance and fraud detection may 
be justified by the legitimate interest 
criterion but advertising and the use of 
the data of identifiable individuals for 
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quality assurance should require 
consent.  
Some Technologies that 
Capture and Transmit Data 
(Alexa, RealPlayer) 
Consent The surveillance features of these 
technologies are ostensibly supposed to 
serve the user and not the web 
undertakings. 
Other Tracking Technologies: 
malicious use of Search 
Robots, Spyware etc 
Consent Some of these would usually entail 
activities that are of more serious 
moment than ordinary data processing. 
Such activities should be prohibited as 
criminal offences. 
 
From the foregoing table, in many instances, most of the tracking technologies 
may be deployed legitimately on the grounds of the legitimate interests of the data 
controller. However certain associated practices may require the consent of the 
data subject. The tracking features of technologies like Alexa and RealPlayer as 
well as spyware and search robots should always require consent. Having outlined 
these relevant standards, the next step is to evaluate the available laws in the three 
jurisdictions. 
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10.2 Legal Regulation of Internet Tracking Technologies in 
the United Kingdom  
In the UK, the processing of personal data is governed by the Data Protection Act 
1998 (the Act). The Act implemented the EC Data Protection Directive and made 
changes to the regime of the Data Protection Act 1984, which it repealed. The Act 




The thesis has already established that the EC Data Protection Directive exhibits 
the ‗in accordance with law‘ and ‗necessary in a democratic 
society‘/proportionality guarantees of the ICCPR and ECHR and as such 
constitutes an adequate standard for evaluating the responses to the privacy 
implications of some of the tracking technologies. The next question then is, to 
what extent does the UK Data Protection Act implement the Directive?  Does the 
Act dilute any of the perceived safeguards? In particular, this part of the chapter 
will inquire into the minimum threshold requirements for legitimate processing as 
well as the legal framework for safeguarding data processing from abuse with a 
view to ascertaining if the protection afforded by the Act meets the standard of 
protection required by the Directive. Before embarking on the inquiry, it is 
noteworthy that the basic terms such as ‗personal data‘, ‗processing‘, and ‗data 
controller‘ are defined in the Act in terms comparable to those of the Directive. 
                                                          
2
 Part I contains the preliminary provisions, including basic interpretative provisions, Part II 
contains the rights of the data subjects, Part III is on notification by data controllers, part IV is on 
exemptions, Part V contains the enforcement provisions while Part VI is on the miscellaneous and 
general provisions. For our purposes, the most important of the schedules are Schedules 1—4 on 
the data protection principles. 
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Accordingly, as is the case with the Directive, the deployment of the tracking 
technologies would in many instances amount to the processing of personal data 
and bring the activity within the ambit of the Act. 
 
10.2.1 Threshold Requirements for Legitimate Processing/ In 
Accordance with Law 
A reading of the Act reveals a scheme in which the bedrock of data protection in 
the UK is the Data Protection Principles seen in Schedules 1—4. The principles 
provide for both the threshold requirements for legitimate processing and some of 
the most important safeguards. Lawfulness of processing is anchored on Section 4 
of the Act, which in turn indicates that the Principles are set out in Schedule 1. By 
Section 4 (4) all data controllers have a duty to comply with the principles. In 
determining the minimum threshold for the lawfulness of processing, paragraph 1 
of Part I of Schedule 1 is the primary provision and it requires that personal data 
be processed fairly and lawfully. It also requires that one of the conditions set out 
in either Schedule 2 or 3 be met depending on whether the processing is of 
personal data or sensitive personal data.
3
 Schedule 2 sets out six criteria for 
making data processing legitimate. The provisions are essentially the same as the 
criteria for legitimate processing set out in Article 7 (a)—(f) of the Directive.  
 
                                                          
3The Data Protection Principles: Schedule 1, Data Protection Act 1998: ―1 Personal data shall be 
processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless—(a) at least one of 
the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of 
the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.‖ 
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One notable difference between the Act and the Directive in this area is the 
absence of the adjective ‗unambiguous‘ in qualifying consent in Schedule 2 (1) of 
the Act. There is also no definition of ‗consent‘ in the Act unlike in the Directive, 
where ‗consent‘ is defined to indicate that the required standard is ‗informed 
consent‘.4 Apparently, at the time of drafting of the Act, the Home Office took the 
view that the courts know the meaning of consent thus rendering a definition 
unnecessary. It also felt that ‗ambiguous‘ consent is not consent hence qualifying 
consent with the adjective ‗unambiguous‘ is unnecessary.5 Notwithstanding, it 
may safely be said that at the minimum, for a data controller to lawfully deploy 
tracking technologies in the UK, he would have to either obtain the consent of the 
data subject
6
 or base the processing on a legitimate interest that is not 
unwarranted by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate 
interests of the data subject.
7
 Even under the 1984 Act, the Data Protection 
Tribunal did not seem to have a low threshold for acceptable consent.
8
 As is the 
                                                          
4
 Article 2 (f) Directive 95/46 EC: ―‗the data subject‘s consent‘ shall mean any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to 
personal data relating to him being processed.‖ 
5
 See P. Carey, Data Protection A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, (2004, Oxford University 
Press, New York) p. 72. 
6
 Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 2 (1) means that personal data shall not be processed unless, 
―The data subject has given his consent to the processing.‖ 
7
 Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 2 (6) (1) means that personal data shall not be processed 
unless, ―The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the 
processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms 
or legitimate interests of the data subject.‖ 
8
 In British Gas Trading Limited v Data Protection Registrar ([1998] Info. T.L.R. 393, Data 
Protection Tribunal; (DA98 3/49/2)), the Data Protection Tribunal did not consider it sufficient, 
for the purposes of consent and fair processing, for a monopoly supplier to merely send a leaflet to 
existing customers providing them with an opportunity to object to their personal data being 
processed for purposes beyond those known to be related to the main business of the supplier. See 
also, Midlands Electricity Plc v Data Protection Registrar ([1999] Info. T.L.R. 217 Data 
Protection Tribunal).  
  404 
 
case with the Directive, The other paragraphs of Schedule 2 are unlikely to justify 
the day to day deployment of any of the tracking technologies.  
 
In sum, the minimum threshold requirements for legitimate processing depicted in 
Table 10.1 above hold equally true for processing under the Act. Needless to say, 
under Schedule 3, sensitive personal data — the equivalent of special categories 
of data under Article 8 of the Directive — has a higher threshold requirement for 
legitimacy. For example, consent for the processing of such data has to be explicit 
for the processing to be legitimate. Furthermore, in line with Section 4(4), the 
processing of personal data would have to comply with the rest of the data 
protection principles in order to be permissible. This means that lawfulness in 
paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 is only the minimum threshold; the condition precedent 
to processing. In the same vein, all other safeguard provisions in the Act would 
have to be respected for processing to be considered entirely in compliance with 
the Act. The next paragraphs will discuss these safeguards.     
 
10.2.2 Adequate and Effective Safeguards 
In addition to specifying the minimum threshold for lawfulness of processing, the 
Data Protection Principles as a whole also constitute the core of the safeguard 
provisions of the Act. With the exception of two extra additions: processing to be 
done in accordance with the data subjects rights (the 6
th
 principle) and the 
limitation of transfers to countries outside the EEA (the 8
th
 principle), the data 
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protection principles of the Act are essentially identical to the data quality 
principles found in Article 6 of the Directive.
9
 Accordingly, the proportionality 
that seems to be the overriding objective of the data quality principles of the 
Directive is equally achieved in the Act. Unfair, unlawful, excessive, processing 
incompatible with the originally specified purpose, prolonged retention of data, 
etc are prohibited. The principles are so central to processing in the UK that they 
may be directly enforced by the Data Protection Commissioner.
10
 In addition to 
this core, equally important safeguard features of the Act are seen in its provisions 
on data subjects‘ rights, supervisory authorities and judicial remedies as seen 
below.     
 
                                                          
9
 The Data Protection Principles: Schedule 1, Data Protection Act 1998: 1 Personal data shall be 
processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless—(a) at least one of 
the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of 
the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.  
2 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not 
be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.  
3 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes 
for which they are processed.  
4 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.  
5 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is 
necessary for that purpose or those purposes.  
6 Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act.  
7 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, 
personal data.  
8 Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European Economic 
Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.  
 
10
 See Section 40 (1), Data Protection Act 1998: Enforcement Notice at the instance of the Data 
Protection Commissioner. 
  406 
 
10.2.2.1 Rights of the Data Subject 
Part II of the Act (Sections 7—14) guarantees a number of rights to data subjects 
including the right of access to personal data concerning him; right to prevent 
processing likely to cause damage or distress; right to prevent processing for 
purposes of direct marketing; right to ensure that decisions that significantly 
affect him are not based solely on the processing of data by automatic means; 
right to compensation for damage or distressed suffered as a result of 
contravention of any of the requirements of the Act; and the right to apply to a 
court for an order to rectify, block, erase or destroy inaccurate data. Processing 
would also not be considered fair for the purposes of the first data protection 
principle unless certain information is made available to the data subject at the 
time of processing or disclosure.
11
   
 
10.2.2.2 Supervisory Authority and Notification Requirements 
Regarding the requirement of a supervisory authority under the Directive,
12
 and 
the duties of such an authority including receipt of notifications and the 
conduction of prior checks, the Act seems to be sufficiently protective. Section 6 
of the Act converted the then existing office of Data Protection Registrar to the 
                                                          
11
 The information to be given include (a) The identity of the data controller, (b) The identity of 
any representative of the data controller, (c) the purpose(s) of  the processing, and (d) any other 
information that would enable the  particular processing to be fair: Schedule 1 Part II Para. 2(3), 
Data Protection Act 1998.   
12
 Article 28 Directive 95/46 EC. 
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office of Data Protection Commissioner (the Commissioner)
13
 and extended the 
existence of the Data Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal)
14
 that was created under 
the 1984 Act. Schedule 5 sets out the status, tenure, etc of the Commissioner and 
Tribunal, while Section 51 sets out the general duties of the Commissioner. 
However it is a reading of the rest of the Act, especially the enforcement 
provisions under Part V, that unveils that the Commissioner is indeed endowed 
with extensive supervisory powers. Specifically, under Section 40, the 
commissioner is empowered to serve enforcement notices on data controllers that 
he/she is satisfied have contravened any of the Data Protection Principles. A data 
subject may also request the commissioner to assess whether or not processing 
has been carried out in compliance with the Act.
15
 Upon this sort of request, the 
commissioner is empowered to serve a notice on a data controller to supply 
certain information.
16
 Notably, failure to comply with any of the notices served by 




Perhaps the most important of the duties of the commissioner is the maintenance 
of a register of persons who have provided notice of desire to be included in the 
register. Section 19 requires the maintenance of such a register while Section 17 
                                                          
13
 The Commissioner was renamed Information Commissioner when the office was allocated 
further responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (PECR) and the Environmental Information 
Regulations 2004 (EIR) 
14
 The Tribunal was renamed the Information Tribunal when it was allocated responsibility for 
hearing other information appeals under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (PECR) and the Environmental 
Information Regulations 2004 (EIR): See The Tribunal, ‗About Us‘, 
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/aboutus.htm, accessed on 10 September 2009.  
15
 Section 42, Data Protection Act 1998 
16
 See, Section 43, Data Protection Act 1998. 
17
 Section 47, Data Protection Act 1998. 
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prohibits processing without registration or inclusion in the register. The 
Secretary of State may however by regulation exempt certain processing that are 
unlikely to prejudice the rights of the data subjects from the registration 
requirement.
18
 A notification to be included in the register must specify certain 
registrable particulars and measures taken to ensure the security of processing.
19
 
Registrable particulars include names and addresses of the data controller, a 
description of the data to be processed, the category of subjects to whom they 
relate, the purpose(s) of the processing, the intended recipient(s). It is an offence 
not to comply with these registration/notification requirements. Furthermore, The 
commissioner is also empowered to conduct preliminary assessment to determine 
if a notified processing is assessable, i.e. processing which is likely to cause 
substantial damage, distress or prejudice the rights of the data subject.
20
 The 
commissioner may thereafter communicate to the controller whether or not the 




10.2.2.3 Judicial Remedies and Sanctions/Disincentives to Unlawful 
Processing 
As regards judicial remedies and disincentives to unlawful or excessive 
processing, it would seem that the Act quite adequately meets the standards 
prescribed by the Directive. The various rights of data subjects mentioned above, 
                                                          
18
 Section 17 (3) Data Protection Act 1998. 
19
 Section 18 (2), Data Protection Act 1998. 
20
 Section 22 Data Protection Act 1998. 
21
 Section 22 (3) Data Protection Act 1998. 
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including the right to compensation for damage resulting from unlawful 
processing, may all be enforced by a court at the suit of the data subject.
22
 The 
contravention of the principal provisions of the Act is likely to result in an 
offence.
23
 It is also significant that under Section 42, a data subject not wishing or 
not able to avail herself of any of the remedies above may trigger the supervisory 
role of the Commissioner by submitting a request for the assessment of any 
processing to verify compliance with the Act. It is indeed foreseeable that the 
exercise of the Commissioner‘s jurisdiction could give rise to criminal sanctions 
if the data controller refuses to comply with any of the notices or related rulings. 
In sum, the foregoing remedies and disincentives seem sufficient as safeguards 
against excessive or unlawful processing. There is therefore little doubt that 
unlawful processing is likely to attract real adverse consequences in the UK.   
   
 
10.2.3 Further Evaluation Remarks 
From the foregoing, the Act does indeed sufficiently implement the Directive. 
Since the thesis has already taken the view that the Directive meets the standard 
                                                          
22
 See the following provisions on the powers of a court to enforce the various rights of the data 
subject: Section 7 (9)—the right of access to personal data concerning him; Section 10 (4)—right 
to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress; Section 11 (2)—right to prevent 
processing for purposes of direct marketing; Section 12 (8)—right to ensure that decisions that 
significantly affect him are not based solely on the processing of data by automatic means; Section 
13 (1)—(3) —right to compensation for damage or distressed suffered as a result of contravention 
of any of the requirements of the Act;  and Section 14 (1)—(6) —the right to apply to a court for 
an order to rectify, block, erase or destroy inaccurate data. 
23
 Any data controller  who  contravenes any of the following is guilty of an offence: 
Registration/notification requirements, and notification regulations (Section 21 (1) & (2)); 
notification of assessable processing (Section 21 (5) & (6)); Duty to provide the particulars of 
processing exempted from notification  if requested by any person (Section 24 (4)); enforcement 
notice, information notice, or special information notice (Section 47 (1) & (2)).  
  410 
 
of privacy protection under the ICCPR and the ECHR, it follows that the Act 
equally meets these standards. It remains however to present the features of the 
Act from the perspective of what an online undertaking should expect as 
obligations when it deploys any of the tracking technologies. This task would 
serve two purposes. Firstly, it will buttress the fact that data protection would in 
practice protect the personal information of internet users. Secondly it would 
highlight the administrative and other burdens the Act places on data controllers. 
This latter purpose, as will be seen below, helps in gauging the flexibility of the 
Act regarding the interests of web-based concerns. It would also be helpful in 
weighing the arguments against data protection laws in the United States and 
elsewhere. 
 
The Information Commissioner‘s Office has published a data protection Good 
Practice Note that covers collecting information using websites.
24
 This note is a 
good breakdown of actions that a web-based entity ought to take or refrain from 
taking in order to comply with the foregoing provisions. The parts of the note that 
are most relevant to this discourse may be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Website operators that collect information directly from individuals 
must inform those individuals of the following: the identity of the person 
or organisation operating the website; the purpose of the processing; and 
                                                          
24
 Information Commissioner‘s Office, ‗Data Protection Good Practice Note‘ 5 June 2007, 
available online at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/collecting_
personal_information_from_websites_v1.0.pdf , accessed on 14 September 2009. 
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any other information necessary to make the processing fair, including 
telling the individuals if their information would be disclosed to third 
parties. 
 
(2) The foregoing may be included in a privacy notice or statement. Such a 
statement should also inform individuals of their data protection rights. A 
layered notice is considered more effective for this purpose. It consists of 
three linked notices which are increasingly concise (the full notice, the 
condensed notice and the short notice). A basic description of information 
use should always be displayed on each page on which information is 
collected. 
 
(3) The use of cookies must always be notified and the individual is to be 
given an option to refuse them. In the words of the Commissioner, ―under 
Regulation 6 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 
2003, you must tell visitors to your site whenever a cookie or other 
tracking system collects information, and you must give them the 
opportunity to refuse their continued use.‖25 This requirement applies to 
web bugs as well. 
 
(4) Processing personal information securely would usually entail using a 
secure, encryption-based transmission system. Sensitive personal 
information or information that would pose a risk to individuals should 
                                                          
25
 Ibid. 
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only be stored in a server only if the server is secured by encryption or 
similar technology. 
 
(5) Unless exempt, a website operator established or operating equipment 
in the UK, to process personal information, needs to notify the information 
commissioner‘s office. The current fee is £35 per annum. 
 
A proper privacy policy, preferably a layered one; secure transmission of personal 
information using technology such as the transport layer security protocol; secure 
servers or other storage facility, and registration with the commissioner at the 
yearly cost of 35 GBP, would seem to be the baseline practical obligation 
incumbent on a UK website operator that uses tracking technologies. It is difficult 
to imagine that this baseline represents transaction costs or administrative burdens 
that are too onerous in the light of the privacy interests they are designed to 
protect. Further administrative burdens may however arise from information 
requests from data subjects or any of the notices that may be served by the 
commissioner.  
 
There are two layers of protection against surreptitious processing in the Act. The 
first is the requirement that the individual be notified. This ought to enable the 
individual to make appropriate choices. The second is the requirement of 
registration/notification and the function of the commissioner to preliminarily 
assess some potentially harmful processing. Since the notification of the 
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individual may not always work well as some people would not read privacy 
policies, the second layer of protection plays an important role. At the 
Commissioner‘s level therefore, no lawful deployment of a tracking technology 
would be surreptitious given the required registration.  
 
Regarding continued compliance after registration, the threat of an enforcement 
notice and the possibility of committing an offence by disregarding any of the 
notices should encourage compliance. Similarly, the possibility of informed 
internet users complaining to the commissioner or enforcing any of their rights 
through the courts ought to keep data controllers in some check. These 
possibilities ought not to however be viewed as representing excessive 
administrative burden. This is because there are no statutory damages for a breach 
of the Act at the instance of the data subject. Compensation is reserved for cases 
in which there is actual damage and or distress. There are two possible ways of 
viewing this feature of the Act. One may take the view that the gravity of 
violation of privacy in this sphere is not well countenanced by this feature. In the 
alternative, the view may be taken that this correctly reflects the delicate balance 
that ought to be struck between the competing interests. The latter view seems 
preferable. Criminal sanctions at the instance of the Commissioner, although a 
prominent feature of the Act, are reserved mostly for deliberate disregard of the 
oversight procedures of the commissioner. With the exception of processing 
without registration, unlawful processing or processing that is incompatible with 
the Act would not automatically amount to an offence. Enforcement or other 
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notice has to be first served by the commissioner and sanctions only ensue if the 
notice is disregarded. In concluding this section, the thesis considers that the Act 
is an adequate legislative implementation of the Directive that ought to protect 
privacy rights and which does not impose obligations on data controllers that are 
so onerous as to be considered inflexible. The following paragraphs will evaluate 
laws in the US and Singapore and compare the approaches in the different 
jurisdictions where appropriate. 
 
10.3 Legal Regulation of Internet Tracking Technologies in 
the United States 
The United States currently lacks a comprehensive statutory regime for regulating 
the collection and use of personal information in the private sector. There are 
however a few ―sectorial‖ data protection statutes that are applicable to 
undertakings in the private sector.
26
 Notwithstanding, none of those may be said 
to directly regulate the use of the tracking technologies in focus here. The absence 
of an omnibus data protection law in the USA has however not prevented persons 
aggrieved by the use of tracking technologies from asserting causes of action on 
the basis of existing laws. Suits have been brought under contract and tort 
doctrines, federal statutes, and state statutes. Most of the suits were decided in 
favour of the defendant(s) as will be seen below. Due to space constraints, only a 
                                                          
26
 Examples include the Children Online Privacy protection Act 1998 (COPPA), which regulates 
the online collection and the use of personally identifying information of children under the age of 
1; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which requires financial institutions to provide specified 
safeguards to consumers; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which 
required the Department of Health and Human Services  to issue standards for the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information. 
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discussion of some of the attempts to use existing federal statutes and common 
law contract and tort doctrines to regulate the tracking technologies and related 
practices will be carried out here. For a discussion of other forms of attempts to 
litigate on tracking technologies, one may wish to see some of the existing 
literature.
27
     
 
10.3.1 Statutory Claims 
Generally, plaintiffs have relied on three main statutes in a bid to protect their 
privacy in cases involving tracking technologies and related practices: Title I of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the Wiretap Act);
28
 Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the Stored Communications Act);
29
and 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984.
30
 Most of the cases discussed below 
primarily challenged the use of cookies and web bugs. Notwithstanding, the 
decisions are relevant to the discussion of most of the other tracking technologies. 
This is because the cases shed some light on what plaintiffs that might want to use 
the statutes to challenge unauthorised processing of their personal information 
should expect. However, most of the issues trashed out in the decisions were 
threshold/preliminary requirements that plaintiffs must assert before they can rely 
on the statutes.   
                                                          
27
 See E.g., Seth Lesser, ‗Internet Privacy Litigation‘, 788 PLI/Pat 189 (2004); David Polin, ‗Proof 
of Liability for Violation of Privacy of Internet User, By Cookies or Other Means‘, 67 Am. Jur. 
Proof of Facts 3d 249; D. Solove and P. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law, (2009, Aspen, 
Austin) pp. 756—824. 
28
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510—2522. 
29
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701—2711. 
30
 18 U.S.C. §1030. 
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10.3.1.1 Claims under the Wiretap Act 
The Wiretap Act as amended by the ECPA specifies inter alia, the conditions 
under which law enforcement officers could intercept wire and electronic 
communications, and the penalties for unauthorized private interception of such 
communications.
31
 Section 2520 (a) provides that any person whose 
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of the 
Act may recover appropriate relief from the person/entity which engaged in that 
violation. Reliefs include: preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief; 
and damages, including punitive damages; and attorney fees.
32
 Most of the 
plaintiffs that have sought relief against web-based undertakings that tracked their 
online activities tried to rely on these provisions. However, most of the cases 
failed not least because of an express exemption in the Act that allows persons not 
acting under colour of law (non-government actors) to intercept communication if 
they are party to it. Interception is also allowed if one of the parties gave consent 




                                                          
31
 See 18 USC§2511 (1): ―Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person 
who— (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept 
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication…shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).‖ By subsection 
(1) (c) & (d), the same consequences as above apply to persons who intentionally disclose or use 
the contents of such communications as intercepted. 
32
 18 USC2520 (b)—(c). 
33
 See 18 U.S.C. 2511 (2) (d): ―It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a 
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of 
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In In Re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation,
34
 the plaintiffs brought a class action 
against DoubleClick, Inc. seeking injunctive and monetary relief for injuries they 
have suffered as a result of DoubleClick's purported illegal conduct. Specifically, 
plaintiffs brought three claims under federal laws: The Stored Communications 
Act, the Wiretap Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as well as four 
claims under state laws. Under the Wiretap Act, the plaintiffs claimed that 
Doubleclick violated the prohibition of interception of communications under 
Section 2511 by its use of cookies and the setting of web bugs in third party 
websites. DoubleClick conceded that its conduct violated this prohibition but fell 
under an express statutory prohibition.
35
 It contended that its affiliated websites 
have consented to the interceptions, therefore its conduct is exempted from the 
Wiretap Act's general prohibition. The District Court found, as a preliminary 
matter, that the DoubleClick-affiliated websites are ―parties to the 
communication[s]‖ from the plaintiffs and have given sufficient consent to 
DoubleClick to intercept them. The question then was whether the facts, as pled, 
unveil any ―criminal or tortious‖ purpose on DoubleClick's part to preclude it 
from availing itself of this exception? On this point, the court noted that although 
the plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick has committed a number of torts, they have 
not alleged that DoubleClick's ―primary motivation‖ or a ―determining factor‖ in 
its actions has been to injure plaintiffs tortuously. Accordingly, the court found 
                                                                                                                                                              
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or of any State.‖ 
34
 In Re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
35
 See the exception in 18 U.S.C. 2511 (2) (d), supra, note 33. 
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that DoubleClick's actions were exempted from liability under the Wiretap Act by 
Section 2511(2)(d). It  thus dismissed the plaintiffs‘ Wiretap Act claim. 
 
From the discussion of the tracking technologies in Part II of the thesis, it is 
obvious that cookies and web bugs would always be planted with the consent of at 
least one party to any communication. Little wonder then that most of the 
plaintiffs that sought to rely on the wiretap Act to proceed against the use of these 
tracking technologies found the consent exception quite formidable. Other 
plaintiffs tried to impute criminal or tortious purposes on the defendants but 
failed. In In Re Intuit Privacy Litigation,
36
 a class action, the defendant was a 
participant to the communication, being the owner of the website that planted the 
cookies in question. The plaintiffs did not deny that Intuit Inc. was a participant to 
the communication but sought to defeat the exception in 2511(2)(d) by asserting 
that Intuit Inc. intercepted the electronic communications with a criminal or 
tortuous purpose. The court dismissed the Wiretap claim. It found that the ―bare 
allegation‖ of a tortious purpose or a purpose that violates the constitutional rights 
of plaintiffs is insufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss. Similarly, in Chance v. 
Avenue A, Inc.,
37
 also a class action, the court upheld the consent exception in 
Section 2511(2)(d) noting that, ―It is simply implausible that the entire business 
plan of one of the country's largest Internet media companies would be 
―primar[ily] motivated‖ by a tortious or criminal purpose.‖38 However, in In Re 
                                                          
36
 In Re Intuit Privacy Litigation, (2001) 138 F.Supp.2d 1272. 
37
 Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., (2001) 165 F.Supp.2d 1153, the issues in this case were nearly 
identical to those in the Doubleclick case and involved the use of cookies and web bugs. 
38
 Ibid, at 1163. 
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Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation,
39
 the plaintiffs succeeded in their Wiretap 
Act claim because the First Circuit found on appeal that although the 
pharmaceutical corporations that hired Pharmatrak, Inc. consented to the planting 
of the cookies, neither the corporations nor the plaintiffs consented to the 




From the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that reliance on the Wiretap Act to 
protect internet users‘ privacy in the face of cookies, web bugs and similar 
technologies would usually be unsuccessful. The Wiretap Act was designed to 
protect against interceptions of the sort engendered by technologies such as 
packet sniffers. The functionality and models of deployment of cookies and web 
bugs do not properly fit the sort of activities the Act seeks to proscribe hence the 
general failure of plaintiffs to sustain claims under the Act.  
 
10.3.1.2 Claims under the Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) proscribes intentional access to an 
electronic communication service facility without or in excess of authorization to 
obtain, alter, or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication 
while it is in electronic storage.
41
 By 18 U.S.C. 2707, a provider of electronic 
                                                          
39
 In Re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, (2003) 329 F.3d 9. 
40
 ―[T]he client pharmaceutical companies did not give the requisite consent. The pharmaceutical 
clients sought and received assurances from Pharmatrak that its NETcompare service did not and 
could not collect personally identifiable information... Nor did the users consent.‖ Ibid, at 20—21. 
41
 18 U.S.C. 2701(a): ―Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever—  
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communication service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by an ‗intentional‘ 
or ‗knowing‘ violation of the Act may recover appropriate relief in a civil suit. 
Reliefs include preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief; damages, 
including actual damages, profits earned by violator, and punitive damages; as 
well as attorney‘s fee and other litigation costs. Plaintiffs that would rely on this 
Act to protect their privacy from tracking technologies face two obstacles. The 
first is the express exception under Section 2701 (c) whereby conduct authorized 
by either the provider of the electronic communication service or the user of that 
service with respect to communication from or intended for that user is excepted 
from the prohibition in Section 2701 (a). The second is that plaintiff must prove 
that the conduct complained of amounts to access to an ‗electronic 
communication service‘.42 In the Doubleclick, Avenue A, and Intuit cases, the 
courts treated ‗internet access‘ as the relevant electronic communication services 
but the claims failed for various reasons including the provider/user authorization 
exception in 2701 (c).  
 
In Re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation
43
 the court treated ‗internet access‘ as 
the relevant electronic communications service
44
 and ruled that all of plaintiffs' 
communications accessed by DoubleClick fell under Section 2701(c)(2)'s 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that 
facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section.‖ 
42
 18 U.S.C. 2510 (15) defines ‗electronic communication service‘ as ―…any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications‖. 
43
 In Re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation, Supra, note 34. 
44
 Ibid, at 508. 
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exception or outside Title II [ECPA] and, accordingly, were not actionable. The 
court found that the DoubleClick-affiliated websites consented to or authorised 
DoubleClick's access of plaintiffs' communications to them.
45
 Furthermore, in 
response to the plaintiffs‘ argument that access to cookie identification numbers 
are not exempt, the court found that because the cookies and their identification 
numbers are never in ―electronic storage‖, they are not protected by Title II and 
DoubleClick cannot be held liable for obtaining them. In the court‘s view, the 
cookies fall outside the definition of electronic storage
46
 . The court also noted 
that even if the cookie identification were to be considered ‗electronic 
communications for the purposes of the Act, the user authorization exception in 
2701 (c)(2) would still apply because, ―In every practical sense, the cookies' 
identification numbers are internal DoubleClick communications-both ―of‖ and 
―intended for‖ DoubleClick.‖47  
  
In Chance v. Avenue A
48
, the court in dismissing the plaintiffs‘ claim under the 
SCA summed up its findings as follows:  
 
―...web sites are users of the electronic communication service 
provided, as Plaintiffs allege, by personal computers accessing 
the Internet, and Avenue A's alleged access of the 
communications between personal computers and web sites is 
                                                          
45
 Ibid, at 511. 
46
 See Section 2510(17) of 18 U.S.C. for a definition of ‗electronic storage‘. 
47
 Ibid, at 513. 
48
 Chance v. Avenue A, Supra, note 37. 
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authorized by the web sites. As a result, the exception to the 
Stored Communications Act applies to Avenue A and 
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.‖49  
 
However, In In Re Intuit Privacy Litigation,
50
 the court denied the defendant‘s 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ SCA claim because it found that they have 
satisfactorily alleged that the defendant accessed data contained in cookies that it 




The trial court in In Re Pharmatrak Privacy Litigation
52
 essentially followed the 
Doubleclick and Avenue A courts in entering summary judgement for the 
defendant on the SCA claims. It however provided an essential clarification when 
it found that an individual Plaintiff's personal computer is not a ‗facility through 
which an electronic communication service is provided‘. The relevant service, 
according to the court, is internet access, and the service is provided through ISPs 
or other servers, not though Plaintiffs' PCs. This clarification is quite critical 
because, in the light of it, it is nearly impossible for an individual internet user to 
maintain a cause of action under the SCA. This is because the proscribed conduct 
under the Act is unauthorized access to a ‗facility‘ through which an electronic 
communication service is provided. The court also further noted that even if it 
                                                          
49
 Ibid, at 1162. 
50
 In Re Intuit Privacy Litigation, Supra, note 36. 
51
 Ibid, at 1277. 
52
 In Re Pharmatrak Privacy Litigation (2002) 220 F.Supp.2d 4 
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were to assume that the plaintiffs‘ computers were ‗facilities‘, the Section 2701 
(c)(2)‘s exception would have still applied.53   
 
In all the cases that preceded Pharmatrak on this issue, the courts entertained the 
plaintiffs‘ suit on the assumption that an individual‘s computer is the relevant 
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided. This 
position has changed since Pharmatrak.
54
 Accordingly, when this ‗facility‘ 
interpretation is read together with the formidable exception in Section 
2701(c)(2), it becomes clear that the SCA is unsuitable for protecting internet 
users‘ against the privacy implications of tracking technologies.  
 
10.3.1.3 Claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was originally enacted in 1984 but 
was updated in the 1990s and in 2001. It provides criminal and civil sanctions for 
unauthorized access to computers. 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(2)(C) provides for 
punishment for ―whoever intentionally accesses a computer55 without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—… information 
                                                          
53
 Ibid, at 13. 
54
 See E.g., Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D 2004) (―To sustain a 
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (a)(3), the plaintiffs must establish that Northwest Airlines provides 
either electronic communication services or remote computing services. It is clear that Northwest 
Airlines provides neither...courts have distinguished those entities that sell access to the internet 
from those that sell goods and services on the internet‖. 
55By 18 U.S.C. 1030 (e)(1), ―the term ―computer‖ means an electronic, magnetic, optical, 
electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or 
storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related 
to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated 
typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;…‖   
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from any protected computer
56
 if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign 
communication.‖ The Act also provides for punishment for the following: persons 
who knowingly cause the unauthorised transmission of a program, information, 
code, or command to a protected computer and thereby intentionally cause 
damage;
57
 persons who intentionally and without authorisation access a protected 
computer and thereby recklessly cause damage; or persons who intentionally 
access a protected computer without authorization thereby cause damage.
58
 Any 
person who has suffered damage or loss
59
 due to a violation of the Act may 
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and 
injunctive or other equitable relief.
60
 However, a civil action can only be 
maintained if the conduct involves one of the factors set out in clauses (i)—(v) of 
subsection (a)(5)(B).
61
 Of all the five factors, the one most likely to be relied upon 
                                                          
56
 By 18 U.S.C. 1030 (e)(2), ―the term ―protected computer‖ means a computer—  
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, in the 
case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United 
States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial 
institution or the Government; or (B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner 
that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States;…‖ 
57
 By 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(8) ―the term ―damage‖ means any impairment to the integrity or 
availability of data, a program, a system, or information;…‖ 
58
 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a)(5)(A)(i)—(iii). 
59
 By 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(11) ―the term ―loss‖ means any reasonable cost to any victim, including 
the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost 
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service…‖ 
60
 18 U.S.C. 1030(g). 
61
 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) (5)(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), 
caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)—  
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, 
prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related 
course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in 
value; (ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical 
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;  
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by plaintiffs suing against the use of tracking technologies is clause (i), i.e. loss to 
one or more persons during any 1-year period aggregating at least $5,000 in 





The threshold issue of $5,000 in damage has proved to be an obstacle to the 
successful use of the CFAA by plaintiffs seeking to use it to protect their privacy. 
The courts have predominantly found for defendants. They have consistently 
required plaintiffs to meet the statutory threshold of $5,000 in real economic loss 
or damage before they can maintain a suit under the CFAA. In In Re Doubleclick 
Inc. Privacy Litigation,
63
 The defendant, Doubleclick, did not contest that 
plaintiffs' computers were ―protected‖ under the CFAA or that its access was 
unauthorized. Instead, it claimed that the Act creates a $5,000 damages threshold 
for each individual class member and that plaintiffs have failed to plead these 
damages adequately. The plaintiffs argued that ―loss‖ under the Act is distinct 
from ―damage‖ and, accordingly, is not subject to the damage threshold. The 
court however found ―that plaintiffs' alleged injuries, whether described as 
―damage‖ or ―loss,‖ are subject to the $5,000 threshold.‖64 Similarly in In Re 
Intuit Privacy Litigation,
65
 the court dismissed the plaintiffs‘ CFAA claim without 
                                                                                                                                                              
(iii) physical injury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or safety; or (v) damage affecting a 
computer system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, 
national defense, or national security; 
62
 18 U.S.C. 1030(g) 
63
 In Re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation, Supra, note 34 
64
 Ibid, at 523 
65
 In Re Intuit Privacy Litigation, Supra, note 36. 
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prejudice because they did not sufficiently allege that they have suffered at least 




A related issue that the courts have had to grapple with is whether the CFAA‘s 
$5,000 damage threshold could be aggregated by a class of plaintiffs rather than 
each particular plaintiff. On this the, Doubleclick
67
 court found that damages and 
losses may only be aggregated across victims and over time for a single act.
68
 In 
determining what constitutes a single act, the court found that ―...the definition of 
a prohibited act turns on the perpetrator's access to a particular computer.‖69 In In 
Re America Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litigation,
70
 the district court 
disagreed with the Doubleclick court‘s reasoning that the relevant damage must 
be to a particular computer when it found that  
 
―[t]he legislative history of the CFAA actually contravenes 
AOL's argument that Congress intended for damage to be 
measured by only one computer.   In fact, the predecessor 
versions of the CFAA make it clear that damage is to be 
measured as it stems from one act, not a single computer, and 
thereby affects several individuals.‖71  
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In Chance v. Avenue A, the court held that ―[t]he damage amount can be 
aggregated across both time and individual computers, but it cannot be aggregated 
across separate acts.‖72 Also, in In Re Pharmatrack Privacy Litigation, the trial 
court held that ―Any damage or loss under the CFAA may be aggregated across 
victims and across time, but only for a single act.‖73 It therefore seems well settled 
that although individuals can aggregate their damages, the damage must stem 
from a single act even if multiple computers are affected. 
  
It is noteworthy that the CFAA still has some deterrent value because criminal 
sanctions can still be imposed on violators even if loss has not reached the $5,000 
threshold. This is because the 2001 amendment to the Act removed the $5,000 in 
damages threshold from being a part of the definition of ‗damage‘ to being one of 
the five grounds on which a civil suit may be brought against a violator. 
Accordingly, some of the offences in the Act that have the ingredient of damage 
may now be prosecuted without the need to show damages of $5000. 
Additionally, the offences in the Act that do not have the element of damage have 
always been and remain prosecutable.  For example, anyone who intentionally 
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and 
thereby obtains information from the protected computer would be guilty of an 




                                                          
72
 Chance v. Avenue A, Supra note 37 at 1158. 
73
 In Re Pharmatrack Privacy Litigation, Supra, note 52 at 15. 
74
 See Section 1030(a)(2)(C), CFAA. 
  428 
 
Notwithstanding, it is doubtful that most of the tracking technologies would 
access peoples computers or exceed authorised access in a way that would satisfy 
the terms of the Act. For some of the technologies, such as web bugs and search 
engines, the user‘s computer is not accessed beyond what is required to display a 
webpage requested by the user. For others, such as cookies and flash cookies, 
while the computer is accessed, no information belonging to the user is obtained 
and the access may be said to be technically a part of the user‘s request for a 
webpage. However, the type of access and information gathering engendered by 
some spyware and some uses of search robots might well satisfy the terms of the 
Act.  
 
 In sum, none of the three federal statutes that plaintiffs have relied on to 
challenge tracking technologies is really suitable for the task. Although the courts 
found for the defendants on the Wiretap Act claims on the bases of authorisation 
by one party to the communication, it is difficult to agree with the defendants in 
Doubleclick that cookies intercepted the content of user‘ communication. Be that 
as it may, the consent of one party to the communication would usually authorise 
the so called interception. The Stored Communication Act seems to address only 
access to the system of ISPs and telecommunication companies and not individual 
user computers. In any case, conduct authorised by either the provider of the 
communication service or the user thereof is excepted from the proscription of the 
Act. For the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the $5,000 in economic damages 
threshold would usually operate to preclude individual internet users from 
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maintaining a cause of Action under the Act. Even without this threshold, for the 
reasons given above on the deterrent value of the Act, for most of the tracking 
technologies, plaintiffs would still find it difficult to establish claims under the 
Act.  
 
In addition to these three federal statutes, the plaintiffs in most of the cases 
discussed above also made claims under state statutes on contract and tort but the 
courts declined to entertain those claims for various reasons. However plaintiffs in 
other cases did make claims on the basis of some Common Law doctrines. It 
remains therefore for this part of the thesis to explore the effectiveness of these 
doctrines in challenging the use of the technologies. This would be the task of the 
paragraph immediately below. 
 
10.3.2 Common Law Theories 
10.3.2.1 Tort Claims 
Most of the states in the United States have adopted one or more of the following 
four common law torts of invasion of privacy: Intrusion Upon Seclusion; 
Appropriation of Name or Likeness; Publicity Given to Private Life; and Publicity 
Placing Person in False Light. Of these, the first three seem to be more suitable 
for challenging the privacy implications of tracking technologies, not least 
because they do not require plaintiffs to prove that improperly disclosed 




 In addition to the above, the tort doctrines of trespass to 
chattel and unjust enrichment also have the potential of forming the basis for a 
claim against online entities but the discussion here will be limited to the first 
three privacy tort doctrines above.
76
 It to be noted at this outset that there are 
serious limitations to the use of these doctrines to protect against the tracking and 
profiling engendered by the technologies. For one thing, as will be seen below, in 
many instances the different facts that plaintiffs must establish to avail themselves 
of the doctrines as well as available defences limit the likelihood of success in the 
claims. A brief discussion of the applicability of the doctrines seems fitting. 
 
10.3.2.1.1 Intrusion upon Seclusion    
Section 652B of the Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, indicates that ―One 
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.‖ This tort doctrine protects against intrusion on the plaintiff‘s interest in 
solitude and there need not be any publication of the private information gained 
from the intrusion.
77
 The intrusion need not also be physical, technology-aided 
intrusion would seem to be covered.
78
 Examples of intrusion given in the 
comments on this section of the Restatement include: looking into a person‘s 
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windows with binoculars; tapping his telephone wires; opening his private and 
personal mail; searching his safe or his wallet; examining his private bank 
account; and inspection of his personal documents. From the foregoing examples, 
it would seem that success on this claim in the internet setting may depend on 
whether the information gathered is confidential. While technologies like spyware 
may intrude on such information, most of the tracking technologies do not usually 
gather information of such magnitude. Additionally, courts have precluded 
plaintiffs from recovering damages under this doctrine where the relevant 
information is in public records or the records of the defendant.  
 
In Dwyer v. American Express Co,
79
 the plaintiffs brought privacy and consumer 
protection claim against the defendant for renting lists of card holder names, 
categorized by purchasing patterns for advertising purposes. On the invasion of 
privacy claim, the court reiterated the four elements which plaintiffs must allege 
in order to state a cause of action: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the 
plaintiff's seclusion; (2) an intrusion which is offensive or objectionable to a 
reasonable man; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) 
the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. It then held that the Plaintiffs‘ 
allegations failed to satisfy the first element. In the court‘s words, ―We cannot 
hold that a defendant has committed an unauthorized intrusion by compiling the 
information voluntarily given to it and then renting its compilation.‖80 On the 
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basis of this decision, which followed similar precedents,
81
 it is not difficult to 
surmise that persons who would challenge the gathering and disclosure of their 
personal information by website owners would usually encounter difficulties in 
establishing a cause of action under this tort doctrine. This is more so when all the 
four elements of the tort are considered; the burden of proving that the intrusion is 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man and also that the intrusion caused 
anguish and suffering would seem to be an uphill task for plaintiffs for the 
preponderance of the information that the tracking technologies can process. 
Where plaintiffs‘ embarrassing clickstream is recorded, the defendant will usually 
be a party to the communication and plaintiff will usually find it difficult to 
satisfy the absence of authorisation element of the tort. 
 
10.3.2.1.2 Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
Section 652C of the Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts states that ―[o]ne who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.‖ The interest protected by this 
rule is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so 
far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of 
benefit to him or to others.
82
 To be liable under this rule, the defendant must have 
appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or 
commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiff's name or 
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 Although the commonest form of invasion of privacy under this 
doctrine is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff's name or likeness to 
advertise the defendant's business or product, or for some similar commercial 
purpose,
84
 a few court decisions have shielded companies that buy and sell 
consumer lists from liability under this rule. In Dwyer v. American Express Co,
85
 
the plaintiffs ‗appropriation of name or likeness‘ claim against the defendant for 
renting lists of card holder names, categorized by purchasing patterns for 
advertising purposes was dismissed by the court for failure to allege the first 
element of the tort— an appropriation, without consent, of one's name or likeness 
for another's use or benefit.
86





In Shibley, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that merely placing a person's 
name on a ―personality profile‖ list and providing that list to a third party, did not 
constitute tortious appropriation.
88
 To reach this conclusion, the court opined inter 
alia that the fact that the defendants' activity does not constitute an invasion of 
privacy is indicated by the existence of an Ohio law permitting the sale of names 
and addresses of registrants of motor vehicles.
89
 This line of reasoning may 
however no longer be available to defendants after the US Congress enacted the 
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Driver’s Privacy Protection Act90 in 1994. This Act, which has since been upheld 
by the US Supreme Court,
91
 restricts the abilities of states to disclose the personal 
information of drivers without their consent. Furthermore, In Weld v. CVS 
Pharmacy,
92
 a Massachusetts Superior Court denied defendants motion for 
summary judgement on plaintiff‘s count of tortious misappropriation. In that case, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketing activities violated their privacy 
and amounted to a sale of their names, addresses and personal prescription 
information, from which the defendants profited. In dismissing the defendant‘s 
motion, the court did not repudiate Shibley and Dwyer but distinguished them 
when it held that ―Individuals arguably possess a greater expectation of privacy as 
to the use of their names in connection with their prescription and medical 
information than in connection with an individual's spending and reading 
habits.‖93 In sum, while it is likely that plaintiffs would continue to find it difficult 
to sustain a claim under the doctrine for ordinary personal information, the ruling 
in CVS Pharmacy, seems to suggest that the likelihood of success are greater for 
sensitive personal information such as health-related data. 
  
10.3.2.1.3 Publicity Given to Private life 
Section 652D of the Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts stipulates that ―One 
who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a 
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kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.‖ Two of the elements of this tort theory make the 
likelihood of success slim for plaintiffs who would want to use it to challenge the 
gathering and disclosure of their personal information by website owners. Firstly, 
liability under this theory depends upon publicity given to the private life of the 
individual. ―Publicity,‖ under this theory, means that the matter is made public by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must 
be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. 
Accordingly, ―it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in 
this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a 
single person or even to a small group of persons.‖94 This means that the 
deployment of the tracking technologies would not make persons liable under this 
theory regardless of what information is gathered and the disclosure of the 
information to say advertisers, in circumstances in which it is unlikely that the 
information would become public knowledge is also unlikely to give rise to 
liability. Secondly, the said publicity must be highly offensive to the ordinary 
reasonable man. According to Comment b to this section of the Restatement,  
 
―Even minor and moderate annoyance, as for example through 
public disclosure of the fact that the plaintiff has clumsily 
fallen downstairs and broken his ankle, is not sufficient to give 
him a cause of action under the rule stated in this Section. It is 
only when the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable 
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person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, 
that the cause of action arises.‖95 
    
This means that plaintiffs would usually be unable to recover under this theory for 
information gathered through most of the tracking technologies because most of 
the information would be considered mundane by the terms of this theory. The 
narrow reach of the above provision is thrown into relief when one considers 
European law. Disclosure of the fact that the plaintiff has clumsily fallen down 
the stairs and broken his ankle, which is considered ‗minor and moderate 
annoyance‘ by the terms of  Comment b above will be considered the processing 
of special category/sensitive personal data by the terms of the EC Data Protection 
Directive because a person‘s health is involved.96 If communication of the fact of 
a broken ankle is not actionable under this tort, it is difficult to see how one will 
be able to recover for the preponderance of information processed by most of the 
tracking technologies. Furthermore, even with more invasive technologies such as 
spyware , a cause of action will not arise under this theory until the information is 
widely publicised. Wide publication of user data is not yet a prominent feature of 
online data processing by web-based companies.  
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10.3.2.2 Contract Claims 
The proliferation of privacy policies online naturally raises the issue of whether 
these policies amount to enforceable contracts. The view may be taken that 
privacy policies could give rise to contractual obligations when relied upon by 
internet users. According to Scott Killingsworth,  
 
―As between the website and the user, a privacy policy bears 
all of the earmarks of a contract, but perhaps one enforceable 
only at the option of the user. It is no stretch to regard the 
policy as an offer to treat information in specified ways, 
inviting the user's acceptance, evidenced by using the site or 
submitting the information. The website's promise and the 
user's use of the site and submission of personal data are each 
sufficient consideration to support a contractual obligation.‖97 
  
In practice however, plaintiffs that sought to rely on contract doctrines to recover 
damages for disclosure of their online information have encountered one or two 
obstacles. In In Re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation,
98
 the plaintiffs brought 
action claiming inter alia breach of contract and breach of express warranties 
against Northwest Airlines. The basis for the claims is that Northwest's website 
contained a privacy policy that stated that it would not share customers‘ 
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information except as necessary to make customers‘ travel arrangements. The 
airline however, in the wake of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York City, provided certain Passenger Name Records to NASA at NASA‘s 
request. The Plaintiffs contended that Northwest's disclosure of the records 
violated Northwest's privacy policy, giving rise to the legal claims. Northwest 
contended that the privacy policy on its website does not, as a matter of law, 
constitute a unilateral contract, the breach of which entitles the plaintiffs to 
damages. It further argued that, even if the privacy policy constituted a contract or 
express warranty, the plaintiffs‘ contract and warranty claims fail because the 
plaintiffs have failed to plead any contract damages. The court agreed with 
Northwest and granted the motion to dismiss. It found that the plaintiffs did not 
allege that they actually read the privacy statement prior to providing Northwest 
with their personal information. It also relied on the rule that in contract cases, 
―general statements of policy are not contractual.‖ It therefore held that ―[t]he 
privacy statement on Northwest's website did not constitute a unilateral contract. 
The language used vests discretion in Northwest to determine when the 
information is ―relevant‖ and which ―third parties‖ might need that 
information.‖99 The court stated further that even if the privacy policy was 
sufficiently definite and the plaintiffs had alleged that they read the policy before 
giving their information to Northwest, it is likely that the contract and warranty 
claims would fail as a matter of law. This is because, as the defendants pointed 
out, the plaintiffs failed to allege any contractual damages arising out of the 
alleged breach. On similar facts, the court in Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp. 
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From these cases, plaintiffs would have to surmount two major obstacles to 
succeed in a breach of contract claim over promises in a privacy policy. First, they 
have to successful allege that they read and relied on the policies. Secondly 
plaintiffs must also allege damages arising from the breach of contract. On the 
first issue, some courts have declined to follow the foregoing reasoning. In In Re 
Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation,
101
 the court opined that the holding in 
In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation ―rest[s] on an overly narrow reading 
of the pleadings‖ and held that failure to specifically allege that all plaintiffs and 
class members read the privacy policy does not defeat the existence of a contract 
for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
102
 Regarding the second issue, the decision 
in In Re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation clarifies that not only is the 
defendant to allege damages arising out of the breach of contract, the damages can 
only be of economic loss. The court rejected plaintiffs‘ claim that the damage they 
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suffered was ‗loss of privacy‘ as insufficient.103 In the court‘ view, ―recovery in 
contract, unlike recovery in tort, allows only for economic losses flowing directly 
from the breach.‖104  
 
In sum, only plaintiffs who are able to establish that they had relied on a privacy 
policy and that they had incurred some economic loss are likely to recover 
damages. A Kansas Federal District Court found for just such a plaintiff in the 
motion to dismiss in Meyer v. Christie.
105
 Although internet users‘ are likely to 
successfully claim reliance on privacy policies, most would usually be unable to 
sustain a breach of contract claim. This is because it is only in rare circumstances 
that internet users would have suffered economic loss due to the disclosure of 
their personal information by website owners. The preponderance of online 
privacy complaints regarding tracking technologies are not about economic loss. 
Obstacles to claims of breach of contract based on non-observance of privacy 
policies may not however mean that online undertakings can always disregard 
posted privacy policies without consequences as is evident from the following 
discussion of the jurisdiction of the US Federal Trade Commission.   
 
10.3.2.2.1 FTC Enforcement 
The limitations seen in the foregoing discussion of available remedies in private 
law notwithstanding, there seems to be a veneer of privacy protection in the 
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public law jurisdiction of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since its first 
complaint and decision in 1999 against Geocities,
106
 the FTC has maintained the 
position that the use or disclosure of personal information in a manner contrary to 
a published privacy policy is a deceptive practice under the FTC Act.
107
 The 
Commission has, from then onwards, brought a number of cases to enforce the 
promises in privacy statements.
108
 Section 45 of the Act outlaws ―unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce‖ and empowers the 
Commission to prevent persons and corporations from using such acts or 
practices. The Act also authorises the Commission to commence legal action to 




A number of the cases brought by the Commission pursuant to this empowerment 
concern internet companies that failed to abide by promises in their privacy 
policies. For example, in In the Matter of Geocities,
110
 the consent order entered 
by the FTC, inter alia, prohibited GeoCities, a corporation that operated a website, 
from misrepresenting the purpose for which it collects or uses the personal 
information of consumers including children. According to the FTC complaint in 
that case, Geocities had represented that the personal information collected 
through its New Member Application form is used only for the purpose of 
providing to members the specific e-mail advertising offers and other products or 
                                                          
106
 In the Matter of Geocities, FTC Docket No. C-3850; 127 F.T.C. 94, 1999 WL 33912980 
(F.T.C.) 
107
 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41—58. 
108
 See generally, FTC, ‗Enforcing Privacy Promises: Section 5 of the FTC Act‘, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises.html accessed on 4 October 2009. 
109
 15 U.S.C. 45(m)(1)(A). 
110
 In the Matter of Geocities, Supra, note 106. 
  442 
 
services they request. It also represented that the ―optional‖ information collected 
through the same form is not disclosed to third parties without the consumer's 
permission, and is used only to gain a better understanding of who is visiting 
GeoCities. In actuality however, Geocities sold, rented, or disclosed these two 
sets of information, including information collected from children, to third parties 
who used the information for purposes other than those for which members had 
given permission. The FTC therefore claimed that Geocities representations were 
false or misleading. Geocities settled the case and executed an agreement 
containing a consent order which has since been entered by the FTC. Most of the 
complaints by the FTC on disregard for promises, especially of non disclosure as 





Without doubt, the activities of the FTC in this area go some way in protecting the 
private information of internet users gathered through the tracking technologies. 
This is because FTC‘s jurisdiction helps fetter the discretion of the companies 
regarding how the information is handled. However, the efficacy of this 
jurisdiction must not be overstated as it is quite limited. Firstly, not all corporate 
entities fall under this jurisdiction. Many types of financial institutions, airlines, 
telecommunication companies and other undertakings are exempt from the FTC 
                                                          
111
 See E.g., In the Matter of Gateway Learning Corp., Docket No. C-4120; In the Matter of 
Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069; In the Matter of Liberty Financial Companies, Inc., 
Docket No. C-3891. For a full list of FTC privacy cases, see: 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html , accessed on 5 October 2009. 




 Secondly, the FTC can only proceed against a company for 
breaking promises it has made not those it did not make. Accordingly, an 
undertaking can avoid FTC enforcement action by making no promises at all or 
by indicating what it actually does with the data even if it is prejudicial to 
consumers‘ privacy interests. The FTC currently has no jurisdiction to stop an 
undertaking‘s information gathering activities on the grounds that users‘ privacy 
is violated. Making no promises at all is increasingly an unattractive option since 
it has become the norm to post a privacy policy and some people will not transact 
with a website that has no such policy. Undertakings that adopt the latter option 
can take some comfort in the fact that few people read privacy policies. They may 
also choose to bury this sort of disclosure in a voluminous policy with a good 
dose of legalese. Privacy policies can be easily crafted to appear protective but be 
still full of loopholes. In sum, the FTC jurisdiction, as essential as it is, provides 
only a veneer of privacy protection.    
 
10.3.3 Evaluation Remarks 
To reiterate, the normative lesson from the discussion of the EC Data Protection 
Directive in Chapter 4 above is that states should allow only the processing of 
personal data that meets specified legitimacy criteria and that ensures adequate 
safeguards. Since the United States lacks specific data protection laws in this area, 
the question then is whether available laws and legal rules in the US can be said to 
allow only such processing. Put differently, does information gathering and 
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dissemination facilitated by the tracking technologies in the US meet the ‗in 
accordance with law‘ and ‗necessity in a democratic society‘/ ‗adequate 
safeguard‘ standards of the ICCPR and ECHR as exemplified by the EC Data 
Protection Directive? Simply put, data processing through the tracking 
technologies in the US will usually not even pass the ‗in accordance with law test‘ 
and consequently will usually not also meet the adequate safeguard standards.  
 
The foregoing discussion of the potentially applicable laws in the US serves to 
illustrate this fact. Although the laws have a bearing on the use of the 
technologies, they cannot be said to directly regulate any aspect thereof. The 
statutes were designed to regulate activities that are different from the use of the 
technologies and accordingly contain threshold requirements that persons 
aggrieved by the use of the technologies would usually be unable to fulfill. 
Similarly, the common law tort and contract theories were developed to address 
issues that would usually not align well with the ones engendered by the use of 
the technologies. The FTC jurisdiction however provides a thin layer of protection 
against misleading privacy policies but this positive development does not go far 
enough to cure the general inadequacy of the legal regime in the USA in this area. 
The regime does not embody adequate foreseeability; internet users cannot 
reasonably determine what websites can or cannot do with their information. The 
laws do not also specify safeguards against abuse. The regime as it stands today 
contrasts sharply with what obtains in the UK as depicted further above. The 
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natural conclusion therefore is that the US needs to enact privacy laws that protect 
personal data.  
 
As one can imagine, not everyone agrees that there is a need for legislation in this 
area in the US. Often, the mode of regulation preferred by opponents of 
comprehensive legislation is self-regulation. There are various reasons proffered 
by the advocates of this mode of regulation but a recurrent theme in their 
arguments is that the market should determine what is permissible. According to 
Eric Goldman, ―Consumer behavior will tell companies what level of privacy to 
provide. Let the market continue unimpeded rather than chase phantom consumer 
fears through unnecessary regulation.‖113 Put differently, ―market forces are 
moving rapidly to provide the privacy desired by consumers...firms that do 
business on the internet are discovering that there are substantial ‗reputation‘ 
costs associated with adopting information practices that are inconsistent with 
consumers‘ expectation.‖114 These arguments seem to assign too much weight to 
the interests of the businesses and in the ability of these interests to determine the 
privacy to be handed out to consumers. The arguments also do not fully 
countenance the weight of the privacy interests, which may not always be 
                                                          
113
 E. Goldman, ‗On My Mind: The Privacy Hoax‘, 
http://www.ericgoldman.org/Articles/privacyhoax.htm , 14 October 2002, accessed on 7 October 
2009. Goldman‘s elucidation of this point is as follows: ―...online businesses will invest in privacy 
when it's profitable. In counseling several dozen companies about privacy practices over the past 
eight years, I found that companies scaled their investments in privacy to their assessments of how 
they thought consumers would react. When companies thought a lot of consumers would jump 
ship unless they got better privacy, those companies spent more money on privacy. When 
companies believed that few consumers would change their behavior if they were offered greater 
privacy, those companies did nothing or put into place privacy policies that disabused consumers 
of privacy expectations. Of course, if companies later discovered that they were losing business 
because customers wanted more privacy, they would increase their privacy initiatives.‖ 
114
 P. Rubin and T. Lenard, Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Information, (2002, 
Kluwer, Boston), p. 39.  
  446 
 
measurable in economic terms. The thesis has already, in chapter 7 above, 
acknowledged the role of norms and market in protecting online privacy. It has 
however also demonstrated the inadequacy of market as a regulator of interests 
that are considered human rights by many. Accordingly, it would suffice here to 
only point out some noticeable shortcomings in the basic underlying assumption 
in the arguments against comprehensive regulation in the light of the above 
findings on the UK law.  
 
The concern implicit in the position of those that advocate self-regulation is that 
broad based legislation will be inflexible and thus inimical to business interests. 
According to Paul Rubin and Thomas Lenard, ―[i]n the absence of evidence of 
market failure, regulation is not justified- at least from an economic perspective. 
Regulating a market that is working properly will produce distortions that impose 
costs on consumers.‖115 Any form of cost imposed by the regulation of the 
information market is supposedly antithetical to business interests. However, this 
needs not always be so. The absence of market failure does not necessarily mean 
that there is no harm to consumers and harm in an economic sense will not always 
fully comprehend the interests consumers seek to protect when they demand the 
protection of their privacy nor will it always fully account for the loss the society 
incurs when privacy is not protected.  
 
Economic harm or not, there is evidence of consumer grievance. The class actions 
discussed above, supply some of the evidence of this grievance. The plaintiffs in 
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most of the cases were unable to allege economic loss but they were aggrieved 
nonetheless, yet the US is yet to alleviate the grievances by making adequate 
laws. As is evident from the discussion of the legislative regime of the UK, it is 
possible to protect privacy in a climate that remains sufficiently flexible to protect 
business interests. The light burden imposed by the UK data protection regime on 
businesses coupled with the advantage of consumer confidence in a regulatory 
settlement that guarantees foreseeability surely beats what presently obtains in the 
United States. The status quo in the US is that businesses determine how much 
privacy they can dole out and there are no clear legal rules assuring redress to 
aggrieved consumers. This would seem to call for legal regulation. 
 
A discussion of what obtains in Singapore follows. The state of affairs in 
Singapore seems to afford an opportunity for commentary on a purely voluntary 
self-regulatory regime as there seems to be nothing in place, comparable to the 
FTC jurisdiction, to enforce promises in privacy policies. 
 
10.4 Legal Regulation of Internet Tracking Technologies in 
Singapore 
There are a few claims of availability of laws to protect personal data in 
Singapore. For example the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore 
(IDA) claims on its website that ―Singapore has both a strong common law 
tradition as well as appropriately structured statutory provisions to regulate use of 
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personal data.‖116 The IDA however also acknowledged that there is no 
overarching legislation for the protection of personal data in the country.
117
 This 
claim must however not be understood to refer to anything more than some 
provisions in existing laws that limit mostly disclosure of certain information. 
This is because there is nothing in Singapore resembling a data protection law in 
the format of say the UK Data Protection Act. For the public sector, there are laws 
with provisions protecting the confidentiality of data held by government and 
statutory bodies. Examples include the Statistics Act, the Official Secrets Act, the 
Central Providence Act, and the Statutory Bodies and Government Companies 
(Protection of Secrecy) Act. For the private sector, there are a number of public 
law provisions that protect the confidentiality of certain information. Examples 
include the Computer Misuse Act, the Telecommunication Act, and the Banking 
Act. There is also the Common Law duty of confidence. 
 
10.4.1 Relevant Laws 
Since there is no comprehensive data protection legislation in Singapore, the next 
question for our purposes is whether any of the available laws has a bearing on 
the privacy implications of tracking technologies. In this regard, only the common 
law duty of confidence and the Computer Misuse Act have enough data protection 
potential as to deserve a brief consideration here.  
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10.4.1.1 Duty of Confidence  
Although the duty of confidence doctrine could have a bearing on online privacy, 
it is unlikely to frequently sustain a cause of action for a plaintiff aggrieved by the 
use of any of the tracking technologies and the disclosure of information gathered 
thereby. This is because at least one of the elements of the doctrine would usually 
be difficult for the plaintiff to establish. In X Pte Ltd and Another v CDE,
118
 the 
High Court noted that a plaintiff who founds his claim on the law of confidence 
can rely either on a contractual agreement or on the equitable jurisdiction of the 
court. Citing Coco v AN Clarke (Engineers) Ltd,
119
 the court reiterated the 
elements to be satisfied by a plaintiff in order to succeed in a breach of confidence 
claim as follows: ―(a) the information to be protected must have the necessary 
quality of confidence about it; (b) that information must have been imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; (c) there must be an 
unauthorized use of the information to the detriment of the party who originally 
communicated it.‖120 Of the three elements, the third, unauthorised use to the 
detriment of the communicator, should pose the least difficulty for plaintiff to 
establish once the information is disclosed. Regarding the first element, in X Pte 
Ltd and Another v CDE, the second plaintiff sought to protect two categories of 
information. The first concerned his adulterous relationship with another and the 
second concerned allegations that he had cheated the company he worked for.  
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On the first category of information, the court relied on Stephens v Avery
121
 to 
find that ―...information relating to a person‘s sexual conduct can be the subject 
matter of a legally enforceable duty of confidentiality.‖122 It similarly found that 
the second category of information was arguably, confidential information and its 
publication would harm the plaintiff.
123
 The challenge for plaintiffs that would 
seek to rely on this doctrine to challenge the use of the tracking technologies is 
establishing that the relevant information has the quality of confidence as in this 
case. Without doubt, tracking technologies can facilitate the gathering of 
confidential information but the information does not have to be confidential for 
privacy to be violated. ‗Confidence‘ has to do with secrets124 but as established in 
Chapter 2 above, information does not have to be secret to be private and be 
protected as part of one‘s privacy. Data protection laws recognise this and protect 
personal information whether or not they are confidential. It is therefore in the 
need to satisfy this first element of the duty of confidence doctrine that plaintiffs 
are likely to find the doctrine of very limited usefulness. 
 
Ostensibly, the second element that requires the information to have been 
communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence ought to be 
a problem for plaintiffs that would use the doctrine against tracking technologies. 
This is because tracking technologies generally gather information surreptitiously 
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such that the information is usually not intentionally communicated by the party 
seeking to protect the information. However, the court in X Pte Ltd and Another v 
CDE accepted that information obtained by surreptitious or underhanded means is 
capable of being protected by the imposition of the duty of confidence.
125
 It 
quoted Lord Ashburton v Pape with approval as follows: ―The principle upon 
which the court of chancery has acted for many years has been to restrain the 
publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or 
of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged.‖126 In 
Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd and Another v Obegi Melissa and Others,
127
 on the basis 
of similar reasoning, the High Court allowed plaintiffs application even though 
the plaintiff had disposed the documents containing the confidential information 
by putting it out for rubbish collection. Accordingly, the use of tracking 
technologies to obtain confidential information surreptitiously will not preclude 
the protection of the information by the imposition of a duty of confidence. In 
sum, by imposing the duty of confidence, Singapore courts are likely to protect 
confidential personal information gathered through tracking technologies from 
disclosure. The courts will however not award damages for mere collection of the 
information on the basis of this duty. 
 
                                                          
125
 X Pte Ltd and Another v CDE, supra note 118, at paras 33—37.   
126
 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469. 
127
 [2006] 3 SLR 573; [2006] SGHC 107 
  452 
 
10.4.1.2 The Computer Misuse Act 
The Computer Misuse Act (CMA)
128
 creates at least three offences that may have 
a bearing on the regulation of the tracking technologies as follows: unauthorised 
access to computer material;
129
 unauthorised modification of computer 
material;
130
 and unauthorised use or interception of computer service.
131
 At some 
technical level, some of the tracking technologies may be said to facilitate 
‗access‘, ‗modification‘, or ‗use‘ of computer materials or services. For example, 
by placing codes on their websites that instructs a user‘s browser to set a cookie 
and subsequently retrieving the cookie data, a website owner may be said to have 
accessed a user‘s computer material or obtained computer services, e.g. storage 
for the cookie. This applies also to flash cookies. The tracking features of 
software such as RealPlayer as well as spyware such as Webwatcher may also be 
said to intercept the function of a computer for the purposes of Section 6 (1) of the 
Act.
132
 Conversely, although web bugs will instruct the user‘s browser to obtain 
an image, it is doubtful that this amounts to access for the purposes of the CMA. 
This is because this instruction is technically not different from other codes in a 
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webpage that enable the display of other objects such as picture images. In the 
same vein, web search engines may only be said to access users‘ computers to the 
extent that they set cookies. The tracking features of web search engines relate to 
what the administrators log within their own systems and not the users‘. 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, with the exception of spyware, and perhaps some 
uses of search robots, the activities for which web undertakings deploy these 
tracking technologies can hardly be said to fall within the mischief the CMA was 
enacted to prohibit. The original intent of parliament in enacting the CMA was to 
criminalise the activities of hackers who gain unauthorised access to computers to 
cause damage or steal data.
133
 Cookies and web bugs are routinely deployed in 
Singapore and nobody has been prosecuted for using them. Instead, the cases that 
have been prosecuted under the CMA range from ATM
134
 and credit card
135
 
frauds to unauthorised access to email and other computer accounts.
136
 Perhaps it 
is a shortcoming in the drafting of the Act that its language does not expressly 
exclude the commercial use of tracking technologies when there is nothing in the 
Act‘s legislative history to suggest that these were meant to be covered.  
 
If any undertaking were to be charged under the Act, it is likely that the courts 
will rely on the definition of ‗unauthorised access‘ under Section 2 (5) of the 
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 to construe the type of access engendered by some of the tracking 
technologies as authorised. Under Section 2 (5) (a) of the Act, access is 
unauthorised if the person causing the access is not entitled to control access of 
the kind in question. Access only for the purpose of identifying a user in that 
user‘s interaction with a website, as in the case of cookies and flash cookies, will 
most likely be viewed by the courts as one which a website is entitled to make 
particularly where, as is usually the case nowadays, the user can always reject or 
delete the cookies. The court may also consider subsequent reading of cookies to 
be access which a website is entitled to make.  Similarly access necessitated by a 
user‘s use of software for the purpose of rendering that user a service, as in the 
case of RealPlayer transmission of information, may also be viewed by the courts 
as authorised for the purpose of the CMA. In sum, although the tracking 
technologies interfere with users‘ privacy, it is doubtful that such interferences 
reach the level of mischief that should be regulated by criminal law. The use of 
spyware and search robots would however sometimes breach the Act.  
 
10.4.2 Other Responses: Industry Self-Regulation  
The need for data protection has not been lost on the Singapore authorities. This 
fact is most evidenced by the activities of the National Internet Advisory 
Committee (NIAC). NIAC was formed in 1996 to advise the Singapore 
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Broadcasting Authority (SBA), now Media Development Authority of Singapore 
(MDA), on the regulatory framework and policies governing electronic 
information services, the Internet, and the development of the Internet industry.
138
 
NIAC‘s first foray into data protection dates back to 1998 when it drew up the E-
Commerce Code for the Protection of Personal Information and Communications 
of Consumers of Internet Commerce. The aim of this code was to establish public 
confidence in e-commerce transactions over the internet.
139
 This code has now 
been succeeded by the Model Data Protection Code for the Private Sector, which 
NIAC drafted in 2002. After public consultations and fine-tuning, this code was 





The Model Data Protection Code
141
 contains definitions of principal terms such as 
‗personal data‘ collection, consent, control, disclosure, use, etc. It states the scope 
of the code, indicating that the code constitutes a description of the minimum 
requirements for the protection of personal information in the form of electronic 
data.
142
 The objective of the Code is ―...to assist organizations in developing and 
implementing policies and procedures to be used when managing personal 
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data.‖143 The core of the code is however to be found in the 10 data protection 
principles it provides for: accountability; purpose specification; consent; limiting 
collection; limiting use, disclosure and retention; accuracy; security safeguards; 
openness; individual access and correction; and challenging compliance.  
 
Although this code would have been a step in the right direction as legal 
regulation if it had the backing of legal enforcement, its requirements are not strict 
compared to those of the EC Directive. For example, there is no distinction 
between personal data and sensitive personal data. Additionally,  although 
collection, use and disclosure of data requires consent, one recurrent exception is 
that the organisation seeking to collect or use data may proceed without consent 
where it is impracticable to obtain the consent and the individual would be likely 
to give it if it were practicable to obtain the consent.
144
 This is obviously a 
loophole. However, the greatest shortcoming of the Code is that it does not in any 
way confer any rights on individuals. This fact is obvious from the complete lack 
of any enforcement or monitoring mechanism in the code. There is no provision 
for a supervisory authority and no redress for aggrieved individuals. Principle 1 
does indicate that the organisation shall be responsible for data in its possession. 
According to the implementation and operational guidelines to this principle, the 
organisation is exhorted to appoint a member of the senior management team as 
say ‗Chief Privacy Officer‘ to manage and coordinate information resources.145 
By the 10
th
 Principle, individuals should be able to challenge the organisation‘s 
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compliance by complaining to this designated officer. Obviously, this 
enforcement scheme, regardless of the little benefits that may be attributable to it, 
cannot be said to protect rights qua rights because an individual cannot claim to 
be entitled to any of the protection of the principles. Furthermore, an employee of 
an organisation has very little leverage in coaxing the organisation to respect 
privacy rights particularly if such respect can lead to loss of profits. 
 
The only semblance of an implementation mechanism that may be said to be 
related to this code is the trust scheme that was put in place in 2001 when the 
National Trust Council (NTC) was formed to build confidence in e-
transactions.
146
 NTC has since implemented a nationwide TrustMark Programme, 
TrustSg. Under the programme, appropriate organisations, such as trade 
associations, chambers of commerce and businesses will be accredited as 
Authorised Code Owners (ACO) and granted a license to use the TrustSg seal. 
The ACO can thereafter award the TrustSg seal as well as its own seal to 
merchants who adhere to their stringent codes of practice.
147
 The code of conduct 
for online business practice set by the NTC ―covers the area of disclosure, 
privacy, fulfillment, best business practices, and protection of minors and the 
elderly.‖148 Regarding privacy and disclosure, the NTC, in the TrustSg website 
displays the Model Data Protection Code as a guideline; one of the tools and 
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information that can help a business to better prepare for TrustSg accreditation.
149
 
The idea behind the trust scheme is that consumers will recognize a merchant as a 




The question however is whether this trust scheme has served to protect personal 
data. Since inception, the NTC has appointed two organisations, CommerceNet 
Singapore LTD, and Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE), as ACO‘s. 
CommerceNet awards the ConsumerTrust and BusinessTrust seals in addition to 
the TrustSG seal. However information on its website suggests that its status as 
ACO expired on the 31 of July 2007.
151
 That leaves CASE, which awards the 
CaseTrust seal in addition to the TrustSg seal. The CaseTrust information and 
application kit for ‗webfront‘ businesses does indeed summarise some data 
protection principles as part of the criteria for accreditation.
152
 However, from the 
application terms and condition in the information kit, the only sanction which 
CaseTrust can impose for a violation of these principles would seem to be 
revocation of membership to the scheme.
153
 Presently, this sanction seems to have 
no bite to it. This is principally because the scheme as a whole does not seem to 
have caught on. CaseTrust currently has only 7 accredited ‗webfront‘ businesses 
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and 2 accredited combined storefront and webfront businesses.
154
 Of the 7 
accredited webfront businesses, only 5 currently display the trust seal(s).    
 
10.4.3 Evaluation Remarks 
After the foregoing examination, the question to be answered is whether 
applicable rules in Singapore allow only the processing of personal data that 
meets specified legitimacy criteria and that ensures adequate safeguards. Again, 
the standard of evaluation is the ICCPR and the ECHR privacy prescriptions as 
exemplified by the EC Data Protection Directive. In the light of these standards, 
the question can be answered in the negative. The Common Law duty of 
confidence will in all likelihood protect information that has the quality of 
confidence if the other elements are present. The Computer Misuse Act outlaws 
unauthorised access to computers but the thesis contends that the deployment of 
most of the tracking technologies would fall outside the scope of the Act. The 
dearth of applicable laws in Singapore means that the deployment of most of the 
tracking technologies and related information processing are unregulated by law. 
Accordingly, the deployment of tracking technologies in Singapore will usually 
not pass the ‗in accordance with law‘ test of the treaties and will consequently 
also fail the safeguards/proportionality/necessity test. The self-regulation regime 
in Singapore can hardly be said to cure this shortcoming in the law.  
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As pointed out above, some commentators prefer industry self-regulation while 
others contend that such regulation will not protect privacy without legislative 
backing. In a report that followed the initial drafting of the Model Code in 
Singapore, the National Internet Advisory Committee acknowledged the position 
that a pure self-regulatory approach is unlikely to sufficiently protect privacy. It 
noted, 
 
―While a voluntary or self-regulatory regime (i.e. one that lacks 
mandatory statutory controls) has the attractive features of 
saving costs and avoiding red tape, Canadian, Australian and 
United Kingdom law reform inquiries that have examined the 
matter have unanimously concluded that this approach 
provides inadequate protection to information privacy. It has 
even been said that "in reality self regulation may equal no 
regulation and just provide a convenient tool to hold out and 
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It is likely that the debate on self-regulation versus legislative regulation will 
continue to rage and nothing written here will resolve the issue. However, if one 
were to evaluate regulatory regimes on the basis of the right to privacy standards 
contained in the ICCPR and ECHR, self-regulation without legal remedy for the 
consumer will be below the standards because the treaties require effective 
remedy for every violation of the rights they espouse
157
 and a pure self-regulatory 
regime guarantees no such remedy.  
 
Recent developments in Singapore however suggest that the current state of the 
law may soon be a thing of the past. This is because the government through the 
Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts has definitively opted to 
enact data protection laws. According to the minister, ―The Government has 
concluded that it would be in Singapore‘s overall interests to put in place a data 
protection regime, in order to protect individuals‘ personal data against 
unauthorised use and disclosure for profit. The Government will be introducing a 
data protection law that will provide a baseline standard for data protection in 
Singapore.”158 According to the Minister, the proposed legislation is expected to 
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be introduced for consideration by Parliament in early 2012 and it is envisaged 




10.5 Concluding Remarks to Chapter 10 
With the enactment of the Data Protection Act of 1998, the UK has had the 
strongest legislative response to the tracking technologies compared to the US and 
Singapore. In addition to the general protection of personal data that the Act 
requires, the baseline practical/obligations imposed by the Act is generally limited 
to the following: a proper privacy policy; secure transmission of personal 
information; secure servers or other storage facility, and registration with the 
commissioner at the yearly cost of 35 GBP. With the minimal transaction cost that 
this baseline is likely to impose, the thesis considers that the Act represents a 
proper balancing of the privacy interests of data subjects and the economic 
interests of online businesses. It also considers that, by the Act, the legal 
responses in the UK to the tracking technologies could be said to meet the privacy 
standards of the ICCPR and ECHR. Conversely, the responses in the US and 
Singapore may generally be said not to meet these standards. Many internet users 
in the US sought to rely on existing laws to challenge some tracking technologies 
and related information disclosure practices but the laws have generally proved to 
be unsuitable for the claims. However, the FTC‘s activities in enforcing promises 
in privacy policies seem to provide some privacy protection. In Singapore on the 
other hand, there does not seem to have been any attempt by internet users to rely 
                                                          
159
 Ibid. 
  463 
 
on existing laws to challenge the use of tracking technologies. Notwithstanding, 
the duty of confidence would seem to provide limited protection against the 
disclosure of confidential personal information and the Computer Misuse Act 
would also seem to outlaw the use of technologies to access users‘ computers 
without authorisation. The self-regulation scheme in Singapore has also been 
examined above and the thesis considers it a weak attempt at data protection. In 
sum, the UK is the only one of the three countries that has enacted laws that are 
likely to sufficiently protect internet users‘ privacy from the effects of the tracking 
technologies.
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
11.1 Summary of Findings 
11.1.1 Conceptual Findings 
The thesis broadly defines privacy as the state or quality of being private, that is, 
state, quality or condition of being for, pertaining to, belonging to or concerning a 
particular person or group; being personal as opposed to public or of general 
concern. When this definition is combined with Hohfeld‘s ‗rights‘ scheme,1 the 
right to privacy, in the strict sense would involve the affirmative claim of a person 
against all others to non-interference with his circumstances, affairs, or activities 
which are private; that is, which pertain to him alone or to a small group to which 
he belongs. The correlative of this claim is the prohibitive duty of all others not to 
interfere with the said privacy. To be significant, this right ought to be effective 
not only against individuals that would interfere with privacy but also against 
governments. Indeed, if one accepts the moral theory of rights as the international 
community seems to have done in human rights treaties, rights are fundamental 
and pre-exist laws. Rights should accordingly limit law in some circumstances 
even if utility is not promoted. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the UDHR, 
utility should play a role but as the exception rather than the rule. All attempts to 
translate the natural right to privacy into legal rights must therefore strike a 
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balance between the overriding nature of rights and the competing social interests 
of public order and general welfare among others.  
 
11.1.2 Identification of Evaluation Standards 
Beyond the foregoing broad definition of privacy, the position of the thesis is that 
privacy should be discussed in context. The context with which the thesis is 
concerned is internet surveillance technologies. In the language of the treaties, 
these are technologies that interfere with private life and correspondence of 
internet users. On the basis of their functionality and mode of interference with 
privacy, the thesis generally divides these technologies into interception and 
tracking technologies. This categorization is in line with the two broad methods 
by which surveillance technologies interfere with privacy: interference with 
information while in transit, and the recording of usage data or online habits 
respectively. Generally, interception technologies are deployed principally by 
public sector agencies in the exercise of investigatory powers while tracking 
technologies are principally deployed by private sector commercial entities 
although in principle nothing prevents any of the sectors from using any of the 
categories of technologies. 
   
As regards the questions of whether the technologies infringe internet users‘ right 
to privacy and the relevant standards of the said rights under the treaties and data 
protection instruments, the thesis finds that mere interference with privacy does 
not always amount to a violation of the right to privacy. The right is violated, at 
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least in the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies, when the interference is, inter alia, 





while the ECHR requires that surveillance should be ‗in accordance with law4 and 
be necessary in a democratic society.
5
 There should therefore be comprehensive 
domestic legislation to regulate the use of the technologies in each jurisdiction. 
Such legislation should, at the minimum, exhibit the necessity/non-
arbitrariness/proportionality or safeguard features recommended by the treaties.  
                                                          
2
 Lawfulness under the ICCPR entails the following: 1. Interference authorized by States can only 
take place permissibly on the basis of law. 
2. The relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such 
interference may be permitted. 
3. The decision to allow such interference can only be taken by the authority designated by law, on 
a case-by-case basis 
3
 Non-arbitrariness under the ICCPR entails the following: 1. The prohibition of arbitrariness is 
included in Article 17 to ensure that even lawful interferences are also reasonable in the particular 
circumstances. 2. Reasonableness in turn implies that any interference with privacy must be 
proportionate to the end sought, and must be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.  
4
 ‗In accordance with law‘ entails the following: 1. The interference in question must have some 
basis in domestic law; 2. The law must be adequately accessible and; 3. It must be formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct i.e. foreseeability; 4. Minimum 
Safeguards in Statutory Provisions. The statutes must determine the following: A. the offences 
which may give rise to an interception order; B. categories of people liable to have their 
communication intercepted; C. a limit on the duration of interception; D. the procedure to be 
followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; E. the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties and; F. the circumstances in which recordings may or 
must be erased or the storage medium destroyed.  
5
 ‗Necessity in a democratic society entails the following: 1. Interference with privacy must pursue 
at least one of the following legitimate aims: A. Interests of National Security, B. Interests of 
Public Safety or Economic Well-being of the country: I. for the prevention of disorder or crime, II. 
for the protection of health or morality or, III. for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
others. 
2. For the interference with privacy to be proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued, the 
following adequate and effective safeguards/guarantees against abuse must be assessed: A. the 
nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, B. the grounds required for ordering such 
measures, C. the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, D. and 
the kind of remedy provided by the national law 
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For interception technologies, the application of the safeguard features of the 
treaties generally entails the evaluation of the following: 
- Strict Conditions precedent to the issuing of interception warrants: where 
possible, a higher threshold of prima facie evidence should be required before 
authorisation.  
- Judicial authorisation and oversight of interceptions is preferable. 
- The authorisation of interceptions must reflect the availability of interception 
filters and with proportionality in mind, narrowly delimit the data the interception 
of which is deemed necessary. 
- Since the internet, as a packet-switched network conveys addressing information 
and call content in the same medium, available laws should  insist on ex ante 
separation of the two when only addressing information is required.  
- Detailed procedure for examining, using and storing the data obtained. 
- Disincentives to fishing expeditions, unlawful or excessive interception, 
including redress for unauthorised interceptions. 
- Strong security measures for preserving interception data from unauthorized 
access. 
- Effective auditing of interceptions for the apportionment of liability in the event 
of excessive interception, including reports. 
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For tracking technologies, the foregoing standards are equally applicable. 
Fortunately however, activities at the international level by the OECD and 
Council of Europe have culminated in the development of data protection 
principles and laws that amplify these standards for the specific context of 
automatic processing of personal data in the information society. Of the 
legislative developments spurred by the international activities, the EC Data 
Protection Directive is the most comprehensive and is adopted by the thesis as a 
normative benchmark for domestic legislation that seeks to regulate the right to 
privacy pertaining to tracking technologies. The Directive prescribes grounds for 
legitimate processing of personal data and an array of safeguards including rights 
accruable to data subjects: right to information, to object to processing, to 
compensation, and other remedies. It also imposes duties on data controllers 
including the data quality principles, and the duty to secure data and observe 
confidentiality. Moreover, it imposes implementation and monitoring duties on 
member states including the provision of judicial remedies and supervisory 
authorities. In sum a surveillance technology will infringe an internet user‘s right 
to privacy if it is deployed without or outside domestic legislation or if domestic 
legislation does not require or enforce the foregoing safeguards. It remains 
however to answer the question of whether the technologies interfere with 
privacy? To do this, the relevant technologies have to be first identified. 
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11.1.3 Identification of the Privacy-Interfering Features of the 
Technologies 
11.1.3.1 Interception Technologies 
The thesis examined three technologies that are likely to be deployed by law 
enforcement agencies for internet interceptions, Carnivore, Xcipio, and ALIS. It 
also identified packet sniffers or protocol analysers as technologies that may be 
deployed by anybody for interception of internet communications. Carnivore, 
Xcipio, and ALIS are suited for enforcement interceptions.
6
 It is beyond question 
that these technologies are capable of interfering with the privacy of internet 
communications by intercepting them and making them available to persons other 
than the intended recipients.  Equally undoubted is the fact that states could have 
legitimate interests of national security, prevention/investigation of crime, and 
protection of its economic well being in deploying these technologies. 
Notwithstanding, the thesis, on the basis of the architecture and capabilities of 
these technologies, finds that laws that were sufficient for the protection of 
privacy in the traditional wiretap scenario may not always be adequate for internet 
wiretaps. For example, very many different kinds of communications can be 
intercepted on the internet by each of the technologies unlike in traditional 
wiretap where say a telephone wiretap can intercept only auditory 
communication. For the internet, web surfing, file attachments, auditory/verbal 
                                                          
6
 They are capable of intercepting both content and addressing information of nearly all types of 
internet communications. They are designed to be deployed at ISP facilities but allow remote 
access to intercepted data. Carnivore is designed for deployment only by LEAs, Xcipio by ISPs, 
while ALIS is designed for hybrid deployment. None of the technologies exhibits a technically-
imposed audit features but importantly all have filter features that can limit interception to the 
specific type of communication sought. 
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VoIP communication, emails, etc may be intercepted by a single device. In the 
light of this and the very high volume of internet communications and traffic, the 
thesis adopts the position that the conditions precedent to interception warrants 
should be strict, perhaps more strict than in the traditional wiretap because it is 
easier with the internet to exceed proportionality. Another example highlighted in 
the thesis is that filters are available in the technologies unlike in traditional 
wiretap and very narrow filters are possible such that warrants can now narrowly 
specify the data to be intercepted. Proportionality would therefore require that this 
availability of filters be reflected in the law through the requirement of narrow 
specificity in warrants to prevent the authorisation of more invasive interceptions 
where a narrow one is possible.  
 
11.1.3.2 Tracking Technologies 
As regards tracking technologies, the thesis examined cookies, flash cookies, web 
bugs, web search engines, search robots, other technologies that capture and 
transmit user data, and spyware. It finds that cookies are the principal 
identification technologies among these and web bugs, web search engines, other 
technologies that capture and transmit user data and perhaps some spybots are 
able to track users largely because the users are identified. Cookies facilitate this 
identification. Flash cookies raise the same issues as cookies but their use does 
not seem to be nearly as pervasive as that of HTTP cookies. The use of most of 
the technologies will usually interfere with privacy but may be pursuant to the 
legitimate interest of the companies that deploy them. A balancing of the interest 
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of the companies and the privacy interests of the users is therefore called for and 
ought to be reflected in domestic laws. The thesis finds that the information 
gathered through these technologies are necessary for certain reporting and 
analysis that aids the Customer Relations Management of most of the 
undertakings that deploy them. However, the balance between these business 
interests and the privacy of users would seem to be tilted enough to violate 
privacy where tracking is increased or done disproportionately. With cookies, this 
would seem to happen more often with third party advertising; the use of GUID; 
and with the disclosure of user/usage data to third parties. The use of web bugs 
would also usually be disproportionate enough to attract a higher threshold of 
privacy protection when no notice is given to the internet user. Spyware/Spybots 
should almost always require unequivocal consent of the user as should the 
deployment of other software that capture and transmit users‘ information. 
Certain uses of search robots should be criminalised while other uses would be 
permissible with the observance of data quality principles. In sum, sound data 
protection laws should suffice to tackle most of these issues while criminal law 
such as computer misuse laws will be helpful in proscribing others. Furthermore, 
the use of tracking technologies in the public sector particularly by law 
enforcement agencies should be safeguarded by the same treaty standards of 
lawfulness and necessity that apply to interception technologies.  
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11.1.4 Justification of Strong Legal Regulation 
In recommending strong legal protection of the right to privacy in the face of the 
surveillance technologies, the thesis finds that on the basis of the moral theory of 
rights, the right to privacy does not need extra justification for its legal protection. 
Nevertheless, the impetus for such protection will be greater when the utilitarian 
reasons for privacy protection are considered. The thesis thus identified the 
following utilitarian considerations: avoidance of the chilling effect of 
surveillance on other rights especially freedom of association and expression; the 
function of privacy in preserving individuality, creativity and mental wellbeing in 
the society; consumer confidence in the private sector; and reduction of 
informational harm to internet users. Furthermore, having established the need to 
protect privacy, the next task is to ascertain that legislation is the most suitable 
regulatory modality. This is because some theorists have highlighted the 
usefulness of other cyber regulatory modalities, namely norms, market, and code. 
On this point, the thesis argues that while these other regulatory modalities must 
also be countenanced, comprehensive legislation is the most suitable primary 
form of regulation because of the shortcoming of the other modalities in the 
privacy context.  
 
11.1.5 Legal Regulation of Interception Technologies 
11.1.5 .1 Interception of Content in the USA 
Upon evaluation of US law on interception of content on the basis of the treaty 
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standards outlined above, the thesis finds that For the most part, US laws measure 
well against the treaty standards The Wiretap Act generally prescribes strict 
conditions precedent to the issuance of an interception order. Additionally, the 
Act may safely be said to require an appropriate use of filters; it requires a narrow 
specification of the data to be intercepted and limits the period of interception. 
However, although the Act also specifies procedures for the use or disclosure of 
data, it may be said to confer too wide a discretion on law enforcement officers 
regarding to whom and when to disclose intercepted data. Other shortcomings of 
the Act are seen in the fact that it does not lay emphasis on the security of data 
and although it makes substantial provisions for sanctions for unauthorized or 
excessive interceptions, the disincentives that sanctions are supposed to provide is 
reduced by the absence of a requirement of proper auditing of the interception 
process. 
 
The stipulation that the Wiretap Act prescribes strict conditions precedent to an 
interception order is somewhat qualified by its numerous exceptions. Two 
categories of exceptions are considered in the thesis namely, foreign intelligence 
interceptions and interceptions with the consent of one of the parties to the 
communication.  The former does lead to lowered safeguards in the pursuit of FII. 
The lowered safeguard may however be justified by the need to preserve national 
security. The latter, could permit measures that are arbitrary and which are 
susceptible to abuse. In sum however, the thesis considers this area of US law to 
measure well against the standards of the treaties even with the shortcomings. 
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11.1.5.2 Interception of Addressing Information in the USA  
US law prescribes different standards for the interception of content and 
addressing information. For addressing information interception, the Pen/trap 
statute may be said to have applied standards for telephone networks to the 
internet. The result is a low threshold of conditions precedent to an interception 
order as well as wide specification of the communications to be monitored. In 
sum, the thesis finds that the scope of discretion allowed by these safeguards is 
not proportionate to the invasiveness of internet pen/trap interceptions. The 
interception of addressing information in the USA may well be in accordance 
with law but the law does not exhibit sufficient safeguards to ensure that 
authorised measures would always be non-arbitrary or necessary in a democratic 
society. 
 
11.1.5.3 Interception of Content in the UK  
On the interception of content, the thesis finds that, measured against the 
standards of the treaties, RIPA exhibits some safeguards regarding conditions 
precedent to the issuing of an interception warrant. Only a limited category of 
officials may apply for a warrant, which may be approved only on specified 
grounds. However, RIPA does not require judicial approval and control of the 
implementation of warrants. It also requires merely the belief of the Secretary of 
State that the warrant is necessary and proportionate for the warrant to be issued 
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rather than some kind of preliminary proof of necessity. The Act does not also 
require a sufficiently narrow specification of the material to be intercepted. Hence 
the proportionality that could have been ensured by reflecting the availability of 
filters in the interception technologies is not properly ensured. RIPA could also be 
said to confer wide discretions on the Secretary of State regarding interceptions 
aimed at external communications. Regarding the procedures for use and 
disclosure of intercepted data however, RIPA safeguard provisions seem to be 
sufficient; intercepted material is not lightly available to all law enforcement 
officials that may want to view it. 
 
Furthermore, RIPA provides for the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Although the 
Commissioner‘s oversight is likely to encourage the observance of available 
safeguards, the Commissioner is not empowered to provide any protective 
sanctions other than a report to the Prime Minister. In the same vein, although the 
tribunal is empowered to award reliefs to successful complainants, the complete 
absence of a requirement to notify interception subjects at the end of interception 
would seem to render this safeguard largely nugatory. The Act is also silent on 
administrative sanctions. In sum, its commendable features notwithstanding, on 
the face of it, RIPA does not measure all that well against the treaty standards, 
especially those of the ECHR. 
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11.1.5.4 Interception of Addressing Information in the UK   
On the interception of addressing information, the thesis finds that this part of 
RIPA is far less restrictive than the part that covers interception of content. Indeed 
it is doubtful that the acquisition and disclosure of communications data under 
RIPA will satisfy the requirements of lawfulness particularly under the ECHR. In 
particular, the self-authorisation regime of the Act flirts too closely with 
unfettered discretion. Furthermore, a lot of the grounds for issuing data 
acquisition notices under RIPA would in most cases not even amount to 
permissible grounds for the interference with privacy under the ECHR. 
 
11.1.5.5 Interception of Communication in Singapore 
Regarding public sector interception of internet communications, the laws of 
Singapore can neither be described as detailed nor be said to precisely specify the 
circumstances under which law enforcement and other officials are allowed to 
recourse to interception. In short, interception measures in Singapore may be said 
not to be in accordance with law when the measures are evaluated on the basis of 
the ICCPR and the ECHR.  
 
11.1.5.6 Comparison of the Laws of USA, UK, and Singapore 
Comparing the laws of the three jurisdictions, Singapore laws are the least 
protective on all counts. On the interception of content, one would have thought 
that with the direct reference to the ECHR in the enactment of RIPA, UK law 
  477 
 
would have been the most protective. However the thesis finds that on most 
counts US law is generally more protective for law enforcement interceptions. It 
evinces narrower grounds for ordering interception measures, judicial as against 
administrative authorisation of interception, narrower description of data to be 
intercepted, and above all it provides for post-interception notification of 
interception subjects such that the judicial remedies allowed by law are more 
likely to be utilised. On foreign intelligence, both jurisdictions allow exploratory 
interception but the terms of the UK law seem to allow wider discretion, and on 
the interception of addressing information, both countries seem not to have come 
to terms with the fact that internet addressing information can be more revealing 
than those of traditional telecom.  
 
However, one area where the laws of the three jurisdictions are equally protective 
is the area of deployment of interception technologies by private persons. These 
are generally proscribed but necessary exceptions are available in the three 
jurisdictions for communication service providers in connection with their 
services.  
 
11.1.6 Legal Regulation of Tracking Technologies in the UK, USA, 
and Singapore 
With the enactment of the Data Protection Act of 1998, the thesis finds that the 
UK has had the strongest legislative response to the tracking technologies 
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compared to the US and Singapore.
7
 It also considers that, by the Act, the legal 
responses in the UK to the tracking technologies could be said to meet the privacy 
standards of the ICCPR and ECHR. Conversely, the responses in the US and 
Singapore may generally be said not to meet these standards. Many internet users 
in the US sought to rely on existing laws to challenge some tracking technologies 
and related information disclosure practices but the laws have generally proved to 
be unsuitable for the claims. However, the FTC‘s activities in enforcing promises 
in privacy policies seem to provide some privacy protection. In Singapore on the 
other hand, there does not seem to have been any attempt by internet users to rely 
on existing laws to challenge the use of tracking technologies. Notwithstanding, 
the duty of confidence would seem to provide limited protection against the 
disclosure of confidential personal information and the Computer Misuse Act 
would also seem to outlaw the use of the technologies to access users‘ computers 
without authorisation. Upon examination of the self-regulation scheme in 
Singapore, the thesis considers it a weak attempt at data protection. In sum, the 
UK is the only one of the three countries that has enacted laws that are likely to 
sufficiently protect internet users‘ privacy from the effects of the tracking 
technologies while preserving the interests of web-based companies. 
 
                                                          
7
 In addition to the general protection of personal data that the the UK Data Protection Act1998  
requires, the baseline practical/obligations imposed by the Act is generally limited to the 
following: a proper privacy policy; secure transmission of personal information; secure servers or 
other storage facility, and registration with the commissioner at the yearly cost of 35 GBP. With 
the minimal transaction cost that this baseline is likely to impose, the thesis considers that the Act 
represents a proper balancing of the privacy interests of data subjects and the economic interests of 
online businesses. 
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11.2 Recommendations 
In the light of the foregoing, the thesis seems to have achieved its overall 
objective. It has identified and examined the major technologies used for 
surveillance on the internet in the public and private sectors. It has established that 
these technologies do indeed interfere with internet users‘ right to privacy as that 
term is understood in the jurisprudence of the ICCPR and the ECHR. On the basis 
of this jurisprudence the thesis has also outlined what the responses to these 
technologies should be. Regarding the jurisdictions examined, the thesis finds that 
the laws of the US generally meet these standards on the interception of content 
but not on the interception of addressing information. The laws of the UK are 
slightly less satisfactory in both respects and Singapore needs to enact 
comprehensive legislation to regulate communications surveillance. On tracking 
technologies, the thesis finds that the UK‘s implementation of the EC Data 
Protection Directive, for the most part, satisfies treaty expectations on the right to 
privacy in this area but the US and Singapore need to enact comprehensive 
legislation. 
 
On the basis of these findings, the thesis is able to generally recommend that 
countries similarly situated as Singapore, which does not have adequate laws and 
needs to enact laws for public and private sector surveillance should, for relevant 
standards, look to the ECHR on regulating interceptions and the EC Data 
Protection Directive on regulating the tracking and profiling of persons in the 
  480 
 
private sector. This is because both instruments proved relevant and adequate on 
all points in the evaluation process of the thesis.  
 
Specifically, one area where all the jurisdictions examined failed to meet treaty 
standards is the area of interception of addressing information of internet 
communications. The recommendation of the thesis in this regard is law reform 
that reflects the fact that internet addressing information can be more revealing 
than those of traditional telecom. 
 
Additionally, the thesis recommends the enactment of different legislation for 
internet interceptions and traditional telecommunication interceptions. In the 
alternative, existing legislation should be overtly amended with a view to 
regulating internet surveillance. This recommendation is however proffered with 
some trepidation because the pace of development of information technologies is 
such that only technology neutral legislation will endure. Notwithstanding, from 
the example of the US Pen/Trap Statute, it would seem that adapting legislation 
designed for traditional telecommunication to internet communications does not 
always work well and will tend to lower safeguards not least because of the 
development of case law around the older technologies, which may be unwieldy 
when applied to internet communications. 
 
 For the interception of content, the thesis recommends that the US should 
consider some amendments to the Wiretap Act that will include Setting up a 
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regulatory body for the administrative supervision of the use of investigatory 
powers similar to the UK interception of communications commissioner. With 
this, issues like communication of interception data between governmental 
agencies could be better supervised and elements of flexibility could be added to 
make access to such information faster without compromising the privacy 
interests of the interception subjects. The Act should also be amended to require 
security of intercepted data and proper auditing of the interception process with a 
view to strengthening the disincentive features of the Act. 
 
The UK should also seriously consider overhauling RIPA. The new RIPA should 
either set up courts with jurisdiction over interception warrants or extend the 
jurisdictions of some existing courts to give them oversight of interception 
warrants. Even if non-judicial officers are to be used, it should be officers who 
will always be able to effectively supervise the exercise of investigatory powers, 
unlike the current situation with the Secretary of State who is charged with many 
other duties that his/her ability to effectively supervise the exercise of 
investigatory powers may not always be assured. In overhauling RIPA, the UK 
should also consider increasing the threshold of the conditions precedent to the 
issuance of an interception warrant by requiring some sort of preliminary proof 
before a warrant may be issued. Furthermore, as much as possible, the new RIPA 
should require a particular description of the data to be intercepted whenever 
possible. It should also provide for procedures for subsequently notifying 
interception subjects that they had been the subjects of interception, which as 
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noted above, will strengthen some of the existing control and sanction features of 
the Act. 
 
For tracking technologies, the USA and Singapore should consider enacting data 
protection laws. The guiding philosophy for such a law should be that entities that 
need to process personal data for legitimate business purposes should always be 
able to access such data without compromising the interests of the data subject. 
Such entities are however to be accountable regarding the way they process data. 
The appropriate balance in such a law should be legal accountability without 
undue administrative burdens and costs on the data controllers. One of the 
functions of such data protection laws would be to educate and sensitise the 
populace on their rights as well as obligations of data controllers. This will in turn 
narrow the awareness gap between entities that collect online information and 
internet users regarding what goes on with personal information that is submitted 
online. 
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